REESE   LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA.    \ 
MAR  13  1893 


Class  No. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA 


CAMPAIGNS   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR.—X.. 


THE  MAECH  TO  THE  SEA 


FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE 


JACOB    D.    COX,    LL.D., 

LATE  MAJOR-GENERAL  COMMANDING  TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY  CORPS 
AUTHOR  OF  "ATLANTA,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 
1892 


,0 

-J-' 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

CHARLES  SCRIBNEE'S  SONS 
1882 


TROW'S 

PRINTING  AND  BOOKBINDING  COMPANY 
201-213  Rast  iQ.th  Street 

NEW   YORK 


PREFACE. 


THE  class  of  readers  which  has  been  most  in  the  author's 
mind  in  preparing  the  two  volumes  assigned  him  in  the 
series,  is  that  which  includes  the  surviving  officers  and  men 
who  served  in  the  late  war.  His  aim  has  been  to  supple 
ment  their  personal  knowledge  by  the  facts  which  are  within 
the  reach  of  recent  research,  and  to  give  unity  and  sym 
metry  to  the  history  of  the  campaigns  here  told,  by  examin 
ing  each  in  the  light  of  the  plans  and  purposes  of  the 
leaders  on  both  sides. 

The  limits  assigned  to  the  volumes  have  made  it  neces 
sary  to  choose  between  the  narration  of  incidents  which 
would  enliven  the  story,  and  that  fulness  of  strictly  military 
detail  which  seemed  necessary  to  make  the  several  cam 
paigns  clearly  intelligible,  and  to  enable  the  reader  to  judge, 
with  some  degree  of  satisfaction,  the  character  of  the  opera 
tions.  The  former  course  would  perhaps  have  made  the 
work  more  popular,  but  the  latter  has  seemed  likely  to  make 
it  more  useful  and  to  meet  the  wishes  of  those  for  whom  it 
has  been  chiefly  written.  It  is  still  hoped,  however,  that 
the  general  reader  will  not  find  it  difficult  to  follow  the 
movements  described,  and  that  the  effort  to  do  so  will  give 
to  such  a  broader  understanding  of  what  the  great  game  of 
war  really  is. 

The  maps  in  both  volumes  are,  with  two  exceptions,  re- 


vi  PREFACE. 

duced  copies  of  the  official  surveys  made  by  the  engineers 
of  the  army.  For  the  originals  the  author  is  indebted  to 
the  courtesy  of  General  Poe,  U.  S.  Engineers.  In  reducing 
them  it  has  not  been  possible  to  preserve  all  the  details  of 
the  originals ;  but  the  effort  has  been  to  give  accurately 
what  is  most  essential.  The  reader  is  presumed  to  make 
reference  to  an  ordinary  hand-atlas  for  the  relations  of  the 
special  theatre  of  operations  to  that  of  the  whole  war.  To 
have  illustrated  the  text  by  larger  and  more  elaborate  maps 
would  have  thwarted  the  purpose  of  the  publishers  to  put 
the  series  within  the  reach  of  all. 

To  General  Drum,  Adjutant-General,  and  to  Colonel  Scott, 
of  the  War  Eecords  Office,  the  author  is  greatly  indebted 
for  access  to  unpublished  archives,  and  for  official  informa 
tion  without  which  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  reach 
the  degree  of  accuracy  which  he  hopes  will  be  found  to 
mark  the  more  important  parts  of  the  narrative  :  it  would  be 
vain  to  expect  to  escape  all  error  with  our  present  means  of 
investigation.  A  still  greater  debt  of  obligation,  if  possible, 
is  due  to  Major  E.  C.  Dawes,  late  of  the  Fifty-third  Ohio, 
who  has  not  only  given  the  use  of  his  valuable  collection  of 
books  and  documents  relating  to  the  war,  but  has  thought 
no  personal  trouble  too  great  in  assisting  to  verify  facts  and 
trace  events,  and  whose  zeal  in  investigation  has  been  a  con 
stant  aid  and  stimulus. 

CINCINNATI,  September,  1882. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGB 

LIST  OP  MAPS,  xi 


CHAPTER  I. 
PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN, 1 

CHAPTER   II. 
I  THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA, 21 

CHAPTER  III. 
SAVANNAH, 43 

CHAPTER  IV. 
MIDDLE  TENNESSEE — PULASKI  TO  SPRING  HILL,     .        .    63 

CHAPTER  V. 
BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN, 81 

CHAPTER  VI. 
BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE, 99 


viii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   VII. 

PAGE 

THE   PURSUIT   AFTER  THE    BATTLE—RESULTS   OF    THE 
CAMPAIGN, 124 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
FORT  FISHER, 137 

CHAPTER  IX. 
CAPTURE  OF  WILMINGTON — BATTLE  OF  KINSTON,    .        .  147 

CHAPTER  X. 
BAY  ANN  AH  TO  COLUMBIA, 163 

CHAPTER  XI. 

AVERASBORO    AND    BENTONVILLE  —  REUNION    OF    THE 
GRAND  ARMY, 177 

CHAPTER  XII. 
STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  EXPEDITIONS,         .  199 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

GOLDSBORO    TO   RALEIGH — SURRENDER   OF   JOHNSTON'S 
ARMY, 211 

APPENDIX  A. 
FORCES  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  TENNESSEE,  .        .  219 

APPENDIX  B. 
ORGANIZATION  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  TENNESSEE,        .  223 


CONTENTS.  ix 

APPENDIX  C. 

PAGE 

CONFEDERATE  STRAGGLERS, 230 

APPENDIX  D. 
BATTLE  OP  FRANKLIN, 232 

APPENDIX  E. 
STRENGTH  OF  THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  THE  CAROLINAS,  .  239 

APPENDIX  F. 
ORGANIZATION  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  THE  CAROLINAS,  .  244 

INDEX, 251 


LIST    OF   MAPS. 


PAGE 

ATLANTA  TO  SAVANNAH,     .  20 

SAVANNAH  AND  VICINITY, 45 

MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,    ........    69 

VICINITY   OF   COLUMBIA,  TENN., 68 

BATTLE-FIELD  OP  FRANKLIN, 83 

MAP  OF  BATTLE-FIELD  OF  NASHVILLE,     ....  109 
FORT  FISHER  AND  WILMINGTON,  N.  C.,     .        .        .        .  139 

MAP  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA, 146 

MAP  OF  BATTLE  OF  KINSTON, 157 

BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE, 190 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


CHAPTER  I. 
PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

WHEN  Sherman  stood  upon  the  border  of  Alabama,  at  the 
close  of  October,  1864,  looking  toward  Gadsden,  and  follow 
ing  in  his  mind's  eye  the  retreating  forces  of  Hood  who  was 
marching  westward,  he  had  an  undoubting  conviction  that 
the  true  counter-movement  was  to  turn  his  back  upon  his 
adversary  and  march  away  for  Savannah  and  the  sea.  He 
had  formed  the  opinion  at  the  beginning  of  the  month,  but 
the  campaign  of  October  made  him  sure  of  it.  The  mobil 
ity  of  Hood's  army  was  such  that  there  was  little  hope  of 
coming  up  with  it  till  accident,  or  the  exhaustion  of  the 
country,  should  force  him  to  come  to  bay.  The  delays  to  a 
pursuing  column  may  be  indefinitely  increased  by  an  active 
and  well-handled  rear  guard,  and  the  moral  effect  of  allow 
ing  the  war  to  be  transferred  again  to  Tennessee  would  be 
every  way  bad.  Still,  if  Hood  had  crossed  the  Tennessee 
anywhere  between  Stevenson  and  Guntersville,  in  the  bend 
of  the  river,  Sherman  would  have  pursued  him ;  but  when 
he  marched  to  Decatur,  and,  upon  General  K.  S.  Granger 
VOL.  X-l 


2  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

showing  a  bold  front  there,  moved  still  further  west  to  Tus- 
cumbia,  nearly  at  the  Mississippi  line,  it  was  clear  as  day  to 
the  National  Commander  that  the  only  way  to  preserve  the 
moral  superiority  and  the  initiative,  was  to  put  in  operation 
his  previous  plan.  He  thought  it  probable  that  Hood 
would  be  forced  to  follow  him,  especially  since  the  latter 
had  been  made,  by  a  recent  order  of  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment,  subordinate  to  General  Beauregard,  who  had  been 
invested  with  the  military  command  of  all  the  territory  be 
tween  Middle  Georgia  and  the  Mississippi  River.  He  was 
not  mistaken  in  his  forecast  of  Beauregard's  judgment  in 
this  respect,  as  will  soon  be  seen ;  but  Beauregard  did  not 
feel  authorized  to  take  actual  control  of  Hood's  movements 
under  the  somewhat  peculiar  orders  given  by  President 
Davis.  To  try  whether  an  indication  of  his  counter-move 
ment  would  call  Hood  back  from  the  west,  Sherman  marched 
again  into  Georgia  in  the  first  days  of  November,  and  con 
centrated  his  army  at  Kome  and  Kingston.  There,  upon 
the  second  of  the  month,  he  got  from  Grant  the  final  assent 
to  his  plan,  and  put  all  the  capacity  of  the  railroad,  now  re 
paired,  to  the  utmost  strain  to  remove  surplus  stores  and 
material  of  war  from  Atlanta  and  other  posts  in  Georgia  to 
Nashville. 

No  military  operation  of  the  war  has  been  so  commonly 
misunderstood  as  the  campaign  on  which  Sherman  wras  now 
entering.  The  brilliancy  of  its  design  and  the  immense  re 
sults  which  followed,  have  captivated  the  popular  imagina 
tion  and  deeply  impressed  students  of  military  history  every 
where  ;  but  there  has  been  a  singular  tendency  to  treat  the 
conception  of  a  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  gulf  or  to  the 
ocean  as  if  that  were  an  invention  or  a  discovery.  People 
have  disputed  the  priority  of  idea,  as  if  it  were  a  patent 
right ;  and,  besides  the  military  claimants  of  the  honor  o£ 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  3 

4f 

the  invention,  non-combatants  of  both  sexes  have  entered 
the  lists  and  claimed  to  have  given  expression  to  the 
thought  of  such  a  movement  before  Sherman  had  captured 
Atlanta.  General  Badeau,  the  historian  of  Grant's  cam 
paigns,  must  be  held  responsible  for  a  good  deal  of  this 
misapprehension,  which  he  seems  to  have  shared  himself; 
for  he  treats  Grant's  earlier  indications  of  Mobile  as  an  ob 
jective  point,  as  if  these  contained  the  essential  parts  of  the 
campaign  as  actually  conducted.  For  the  matter  of  that, 
we  have  seen,  in  a  former  volume,  that  Sherman  gave  a  suffi 
ciently  clear  outline  of  the  movement  in  his  letter  to  the 
General-in-Chief  before  the  campaign  of  Atlanta  had  opened 
in  the  spring.  In  "that,  not  only  the  march  to  the  coast 
was  foreshadowed,  but  the  subsequent  campaign  through 
the  Carolinas,  which  was  to  make,  as  he  said,  "short 
work  "  of  what  was  left  of  the  Confederate  Government  and 
cause. 

Whoever  will  reflect  a  little,  will  see,  however,  that  not 
even  in  this  fuller  anticipation  of  the  outward  form  of  the 
movement  are  found  the  essential  features  which  gave  to 
Sherman's  decision  and  plan  in  October  their  peculiar  mili 
tary  character.  Unless  the  campaign  just  closed  had  been 
an  aimless  thing,  we  must  suppose  that  both  Grant  and 
Sherman  had  reflected  upon  what  should  be  done  when 
Atlanta  fell.  Every  intelligent  person  in  the  country,  in  or 
out  of  the  army,  must  have  seen  that  the  successful  march 
of  a  great  army  from  Chattanooga  southward,  meant  not 
only  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  but  more.  The  problems  of 
war  are  not  matters  of  occult  science,  and  while  it  was 
hoped  that  in  some  decisive  engagement  Johnston's  army 
might  be  routed  before  it  reached  the  Chattahoochee,  it 
took  no  genius  to  see  that  if  its  retreat  to  Atlanta  should 
leave  it  with  a  still  formidable  organization,  further  opera- 


4  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

tions  would  be  necessary.  These  would  naturally  be  such 
as  would  turn  to  good  use  the  auxiliary  efforts  which  Canby 
and  the  Navy  were  making  to  reduce  Mobile,  and,  by  reach 
ing  a  hand  to  Sherman  from  the  South,  put  the  whole  of 
Alabama  and  Mississippi  behind  a  wall  of  national  bayonets 
moving  Eastward,  and  driving  the  Confederate  Army  before 
them.  This  was  the  course  of  events  which  would  be  the 
natural  sequence  of  what  had  gone  before,  if  no  disaster 
befell  us ;  and  had  things  worked  in  this  way,  we  should 
never  have  had  the  almost  absurd  debate  upon  the  question 
of  intellectual  authorship. 

It  was  Hood's  audacious  movement  upon  Sherman's  com 
munications  that  changed  all  that.  His  design  was  to  carry 
back  the  war  from  Central  Georgia  to  Tennessee,  as,  once 
and  again,  Lee  had  carried  it  back  from  Central  Virginia  to 
the  Potomac.  A  weak  general  would  have  made  haste  to 
put  the  National  Army  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee 
to  cover  and  protect  his  communications ;  and  Hood's  pur 
pose  would  have  been  successfully  accomplished.  It  would 
Lave  been  much  better  than  this  to  have  followed  Hood 
across  Alabama,  striving  to  get  between  him  and  his  own 
depots  of  supply,  though  this  might  have  had  no  really  deci 
sive  results.  To  provide  for  a  sufficient  force  to  keep  him 
from  reaching  the  Northern  States  before  the  rapidly  col 
lecting  recruits  should  swell  Thomas's  army  to  a  size  fully 
able  to  deal  with  him,  and  with  sixty  thousand  veterans 
strike  for  the  very  heart  of  the  Confederacy,  was  completely 
to  turn  the  tables  upon  the  enterprising  Southern  general, 
and  make  his  very  audacity  prove  at  once  his  own  ruin  and 
the  ruin  of  the  cause  for  which  he  fought.  This  was  what 
Sherman  did,  and  the  determination  to  do  it,  in  the  actual 
situation,  before  any  base  upon  the  distant  seacoast  had  been 
secured,  called  for  the  very  highest  qualities  in  a  commander. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  5 

The  moral  courage  which  decides  upon  a  daring  course,  when 
failure  must  involve  terrible  and  far-reaching  consequences, 
is  far  greater  in  kind  and  in  degree  than  that  which  the  sub 
ordinate  or  the  soldier  in  the  ranks  is  called  upon  to  show. 
The  cool-headed,  practical  skill  which  carries  out  such  a  plan, 
through  the  vicissitudes  of  a  campaign  where  the  circum 
stances  are  always  the  unexpected,  is  only  possible  to  one  who 
unites  physical  hardihood  to  mental  grasp  and  unbending  will. 

In  thus  fixing  his  purpose,  Sherman  had  no  assistance. 
He  had  heard  nothing  from  Grant  in  reply  to  his  proposal 
of  the  movement,  though  the  latter  had  sent,  on  Octo 
ber  llth,  a  conditional  approval,  which  the  interruption 
of  communications  had  prevented  Sherman  from  receiving. 
Thomas  advised  against  his  plan,1  and  on  November  1st 
Grant  suggested  to  him  to  resume  that  of  following 
Hood.2  But  Sherman  was  immovable  in  his  judgment,  un 
less  Hood  should  try  to  cross  the  Tennessee  somewhere  near 
him,  and  on  the  second  of  the  month  Grant  gave  formal  and 
final  consent.  Grant's  sympathies  were  never  lacking  for  a 
bold  and  decided  course,  but  in  this  instance  he  had  less 
faith  than  Sherman  that  all  would  go  well  in  Tennessee  in 
the  interval.  Lincoln,  as  he  himself  said  a  little  later,  "  was 
anxious,  if  not  fearful,"  but  did  not  interfere. 

So  long  as  it  seemed  probable  that  he  would  force  his 
adversary  to  follow  him,  Sherman's  purpose  had  been  to 

1  Despatch  of  October  17th. 

2  Despatch  of  that  date :  ''Do  you  not  think  it  advisable,  now  that  Hood  has 
gone  so  far  North,  to  entirely  ruin  him  before  starting  on  your  proposed  cam 
paign."  Badeau  says,  vol.  iii.,  p.  62  :  "  Sherman  declared  Hood  would  follow  him; 
Grant  was  certain  that  the  rebel  aimy  would  go  North."     Neither  statement  is 
quite  accurate.     He  wrote  this,  forgetting  that  in  the  despatch  of  November  1st 
(which  he  himself  quotes  on  page  157)  Grant  said  :  "  I  believed,  and  still  believe, 
that  if  you  had  staited  South  while  Hood  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  you,  he 
would  have  been  forced  to  go  after  you.1'    There  was  no  real  difference  of  opiuiott 
on  this  point. 


6  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

leave  only  the  Fourth  Corps  (Stanley's)  in  addition  to  the 
troops  already  stationed  in  Tennessee,  and  these,  with  the 
recruits  which  were  rapidly  enrolling,  would  have  given 
Thomas  very  soon  an  army  quite  large  enough  for  all  prob 
able  needs.  When  Hood  had  passed  Decatur,  however, 
Sherman  determined  to  send  back  Schofield  with  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  also,  reckoning  that  the  two  corps,  to 
gether  with  that  of  Major  General  A.  J.  Smith,  which  was 
ordered  to  join  Thomas  as-  speedily  as  possible,  and  the 
garrisons  and  posts  in  Tennessee,  would  make  an  army 
equal  to  Hood's  at  the  opening  of  the  new  campaign.  The 
recruits  which  would  be  added  to  this  would  soon  give  it 
a  decided  superiority,  the  real  risk  being  limited  to  the 
time  within  which  Thomas  should  be  concentrating  his 
forces. 

Three  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  were  at  this  time 
under  General  A.  J.  Smith  in  Missouri,  near  the  Kansas  bor 
der,  but  on  October  29th,  General  Eosecrans,  who  com 
manded  that  department,  was  directed  from  Washington  to 
send  Smith's  troops  to  Nashville,  and  promptly  put  them  in 
motion  for  the  Mississippi  River.  Sherman  had  hoped  that 
steamboats  might  meet  them  at  Booneville  on  the  Missouri 
and  transport  them  directly  to  Paducah  on  the  Ohio ;  but 
the  Missouri  was  so  low  that  navigation  could  not  be  de 
pended  upon,  and  Smith's  troops  were  obliged  to  move  by 
land  to  St.  Louis  from  Warrensburg,  where  they  were  on 
November  2d. 

Sherman  had  the  most  implicit  confidence  in  General 
Thomas's  ability  to  bear  the  great  responsibilities  to  be  im 
posed  upon  him,  writing  to  Halleck  that  he  was  better  suited 
to  the  emergency  than  any  man  he  had.  The  very  differ 
ences  in  temperament  between  the  two  men  seemed  to  adapt 
them  to  the  work  each  was  to  do.  The  task  before  Thomas 


PLANNING  THE   CAMPAIGN.  7 

was  to  conduct  a  cautious  and  purposely  dilatory  campaign 
till  his  reinforcements  should  be  well  in  hand,  and  then,  re 
suming  the  aggressive,  to  drive  Hood  southward  and  follow 
him  wherever  he  should  go.  His  whole  career  had  borno 
witness  to  the  unflinching  courage  with  which  he  would 
meet  the  impetuosity  of  his  opponent,  and  the  tenacity  with 
which  he  would  stick  to  the  contest  even  if  the  odds  should 
be  against  him.  Yet  he  would  have  been  glad  to  avoid  the 
task,  and  had  said  to  Sherman,  when  the  plan  was  first 
opened  to  him,  that  the  one  thing  he  did  not  wish  was  to 
assume  the  part  allotted  to  him,  unless  Sherman  and  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  deemed  it  absolutely  necessary. 
With  the  addition  to  his  forces  of  Schofield's  Twenty -third 
Corps  he  believed  he  would  be  strong  enough  to  drive  Hood 
back,  but  this  increase  he  urged  as  indispensable,  and  as 
soon  as  Grant's  definitive  consent  to  the  new  plan  of  cam 
paign  was  received,  Schofield  was  ordered  to  march  to 
Uesaca  and  Dalton,  where  his  troops  were  to  meet  the  trains 
and  be  transported  by  rail  to  Nashville.  The  burden  of 
taking  to  the  rear  the  surplus  material  at  Atlanta  and 
of  carrying  to  that  place  the  stores  Sherman  intended  to 
take  with  him,  was  overtaxing  the  railway,  and  it  was 
not  till  November  7th  that  the  last  of  Schofield's  com 
mand  procured  transportation,  though  he  had  gone  on 
to  Nashville  upon  the  4th,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
with  Thomas  the  details  of  the  operations  committed  to 
them. 

This  assignment  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  duty  under 
General  Thomas  had  been  at  Schofield's  own  suggestion,  and 
was  agreeable,  therefore,  to  both  officers.  Schofield's  depart 
mental  command  covered  East  Tennessee  and  part  of  Ken 
tucky,  and  his  presence  saved  the  necessity  of  any  change  in 

the  organization  there.      But  still  stronger  'motives  were 

- 


8  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

found  in  the  fact  that  the  strength  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  had  been  reduced  below  ten  thousand  men  present 
for  duty,  by  the  casualties  of  the  campaign,  and  the  op 
portunity  would  thus  be  given  it  to  recruit  the  two  divi 
sions  already  belonging  to  it,  while  a  third  division  of  new 
troops  was  ordered  to  join  it  when  the  new  levies  should 
reach  the  front.  Schofield  also  believed  that  the  cam 
paign  in  Tennessee  was  to  be  an  important  one,  full  of 
varied  military  problems  and  contingencies,  and  that  he 
could  be  quite  as  useful  there  as  in  any  other  field  of 
operations. 

For  a  full  understanding  of  the  situation  in  the  Confeder 
ate  army,  and  of  the  motives  which  controlled  Hood's  subse 
quent  plan  of  campaign,  we  must  go  back  to  the  beginning 
of  September.  The  fall  of  Atlanta  had  been  followed  by 
differences  between  Confederate  leaders  as  to  the  policy 
which  should  now  be  pursued.  Governor  Brown  of  Georgia 
had  assumed  the  responsibility  of  giving  a  general  furlough 
to  the  Georgia  militia,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  gather 
ing  the  autumnal  crops.  Against  this  the  President  of  the 
Confederacy  protested,  as  well  as  against  the  claim  of  Gov 
ernor  Brown  that  the  militia  of  the  State  were  in  the  field 
under  State  authority  for  the  defence  of  the  State,  and  that 
as  Governor  he  had  the  right  to  appoint  and  assign  the 
officers  to  these  State  forces,  and  to  keep  them  within  the 
State  boundaries.  This  assertion  by  the  State  executive  of 
a  very  mild  form  of  the  doctrine  of  State  rights,  was  looked 
upon  as  hardly  less  than  treason  by  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment.  A  war  begun  to  assert  the  doctrine  that  every  State 
was  itself  the  judge  of  its  rights  under  the  Constitution  and 
of  the  measure  of  redress  when  it  considered  those  rights 
violated,  had  resulted  in  a  centralization  of  which  no 
Northern  statesman  had  ever  dreamed. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  9 

On  September  8th,  Hood  telegraphed  to  General  Bragg, 
at  Richmond,  suggesting  that  all  the  reserves  of  Georgia, 
under  General  Cobb,  be  ordered  to  his  army,  and  that  Gen 
eral  Taylor  be  ordered  to  relieve  Hardee  in  the  command  of 
his  corps,  bringing  with  him  all  the  troops  which  could  be 
spared  from  the  department  Taylor  was  then  commanding, 
and  which  included  Alabama  and  Mississippi.  No  imme 
diate  notice  seems  to  have  been  taken  of  this  at  Richmond, 
and,  on  the  13th,  Hood  repeated  the  request  to  Davis  him 
self,  charging  Hardee  with  being  the  cause  of  all  the  de 
feats  his  army  had  suffered,  except  that  of  July  28th  at  Ezra 
Church.  A  week  later,  still  apparently  without  a  reply,  he 
sketched  his  proposed  movement  upon  Sherman's  communi 
cations,  and  he  now  learned  that  the  Confederate  President 
would  immediately  visit  his  camp.  Accordingly,  on  Sep 
tember  25th,  Davis  reached  Hood's  headquarters  at  Pal 
metto,  and  a  couple  of  days  were  spent  in  conference  not 
only  with  Hood,  but  with  his  principal  subordinates.  Tho 
general  plan  of  Hood's  new  campaign  was  approved,  with  the 
understanding  that  if  ho  should  succeed  in  drawing  Sherman 
away  from  Atlanta,  the  new  invasion  of  Tennessee  should  be 
made  by  crossing  the  river  near  Guntersville,  not  far  from 
the  Georgia  line.  The  decision  upon  Hood's  demand  for 
Hardee's  removal  from  his  corps  was  a  more  troublesome 
question  than  the  approval  «of  the  plan  of  operations.  The 
great  injustice  of  Hood's  charges  has  been  shown  in  the 
story  of  the  Atlanta  campaign ;  but  the  dissatisfaction  of  a 
commanding  general  with  a  subordinate  is  so  strong  a  rea 
son  for  a  change  that  it  will  rarely  do  to  ignore  it.  Lieu 
tenant-General  Richard  Taylor,  whom  Hood  suggested  a.s 
Hardee's  successor,  was  the  brother-in-law  of  Mr.  Davis,  and 
the  latter  very  well  knew  that  this  relationship  would  com 
plicate  the  difficulty  and  be  seized  upon  by  many  as  proof 
1* 


10  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

of  personal  motives  on  his  part  if  he  should  give  Hood  his 
wish.  He  seems,  besides,  to  have  had  a  real  respect  for 
Hardee,  and  to  have  been  driven  to  very  serious  doubts  of 
his  own  wisdom  in  giving  Hood  the  command  from  which  he 
had  hoped  so  much.  The  solution  he  reached  was  perhaps 
the  best  the  situation  allowed.  He  determined  to  transfer 
Hardee  to  a  departmental  command,  including  Eastern 
Georgia  and  the  adjacent  territory  in  South  Carolina  and 
Florida,  a  promotion  in  form,  while  he  combined  Hood's 
and  Taylor's  departments  in  one  military  division  and  as 
signed  General  Beauregard  to  the  command,  with  the  under 
standing  that  Hood's  army  organization  should  not  be  dis 
turbed,  though  Beauregard  was  expected  to  assume  the 
personal  control  whenever  he  might  deem  it  necessary  to  be 
with  the  troops. 

Hood  learned  of  the  intended  changes  by  a  communica 
tion  from  Davis  on  September  28th  or  29th,  and  the  formal 
orders  followed  in  a  day  or  two.  Davis  met  Beauregard  at 
Augusta,  in  the  first  week  of  October,  explained  to  him 
Hood's  plan  of  operations,  which  he  had  already  begun  to 
execute,  and  no  doubt  impressed  upon  him  the  policy  of 
making  no  unnecessary  interference  with  Hood's  purposes. 
Certain  it  is  that  it  must  have  been  in  deference  to  some 
such  instructions  that  Beauregard  carefully  avoided  estab 
lishing  his  headquarters  with  the  army  in  the  field,  though 
he  kept  near  enough  to  Hood  to  have  frequent  conferences 
with  him,  until  the  latter  crossed  the  Tennessee,  some  six 
wreeks  later.  Hood  was  already  across  the  Chattahoochee  on 
his  northward  march  when  the  formal  order  placing  Beaure 
gard  over  him  was  issued,  and  as  it  had  no  influence  upon 
the  campaign  till  the  Confederate  army  reached  Gadsdon 
at  the  close  of  October,  no  mention  was  made  of  these 
changes  in  the  narrative  of  operations  in  the  last  volume. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  11 

Beauregard  had  indeed  overtaken  Hood  on  October  Oth,  at 
Cave  Spring,  near  Rome,  before  the  crossing  of  the  Coosa, 
but  the  conference  does  not  appear  to  have  had  any  signifi 
cance.  At  Gadsden,  however,  on  the  20th  and  21st,  the  two 
generals  fully  discussed  the  situation,  and  Hood's  proposal 
to  march  on  Guntersville  and  cross  the  Tennessee  there,  was 
approved  by  Beauregard.  It  was  arranged  that  Wheeler's 
cavalry  corps,  consisting  of  twelve  brigades  (to  be  increased 
by  another  sent  from  Jackson's  division)  should  closely 
watch  Sherman's  movement,  opposing  and  harassing  his  ad 
vance,  whatever  way  he  turned  ;  and  if  he  should  march  for 
the  sea,  Governor  Brown  and  General  Cobb  held  out  expec 
tations  that,  in  the  emergency,  seventeen  thousand  Georgia 
troops  could  join  Wheeler,  and  throw  themselves  across 
Sherman's  path.  Beauregard  also  expected  in  this  event  to 
draw  some  five  thousand  men  from  the  Carolinas,  making, 
as  he  reckoned,  an  army  of  twenty-nine  thousand  to  oppose 
the  eastward  march  of  the  National  forces.1 

In  the  invasion  of  Tennessee,  Hood  would  be  accompanied 
by  part  of  Jackson's  division  of  cavalry,  and  Forrest,  who  was 
between  Tuscumbia  and  Corinth,  was  ordered  to  join  him 
with  all  his  mounted  force.  At  Florence,  on  November  6th, 
and  before  beginning  his  movement  against  Schofield,  Hood 
had  present  with  him  41,185  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
3,544  cavalry,  making  an  aggregate  of  44,729.  About  No- 


1  Beauregard's  Official  Report.  In  this,  however,  he  has  underestimated 
Wheeler's  cavalry.  That  corps  reported  at  Lovejoy  Station,  August  1st,  an  "  ef 
fective"  total  of  enlisted  men  of  6,283,  and  it  does  not  appear  to  have  suffered 
notably  between  that  time  and  the  opening  of  the  new  campaign.  It  was  joined 
by  a  brigade  from  Jackson's  division,  and  a  Kentucky  infantry  brigade,  which 
was  mounted.  These  made  about  two  thousand  seven  hundred  enlisted  men,  and 
adding  the  usual  proportion  of  officers  to  the  whole  list  of  "effectives,"  it  gives 
Wheeler  an  actual  force,  in  round  numbers,  of  10,000,  instead  of  7,000,  as  esti 
mated  by  Beauregard.  Hood  puts  the  number  at  10,000  (Advance  and  Eetreat, 
p.  310). 


12 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 


vember  15th  he  was  joined  by  Forrest  with  his  cavalry  corps, 
numbering  9,209  present,  and  increasing  the  aggregate  to 
53,938  officers  and  men  present.1 

After  his  conference  with  Beauregard,  Hood  had  gone  but 
one  day's  march  from  Gadsden  toward  Guntersville  when  he 
suddenly  turned  his  columns  to  the  west,  making  first  for 
Decatur.  He  learned  that  Forrest  had  started  upon  a  raid 
northward  into  "West  Tennessee,  and  that  it  was  uncertain 
how  long  it  might  be  before  that  cavalry  could  join  him. 
On  October  7th,  and  before  seeing  Beauregard,  he  had 
asked  General  Taylor  to  send  Forrest  a  second  time  into 
Tennessee  to  break  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railway, 
if  he  could,  or  at  least  to  occupy  Thomas's  forces  so  as  to 
create  a  diversion  in  his  favor.  Forrest  was  at  Cherokee 
Station,  where  he  had  been  refitting  and  resting  his  com 
mand,  and  both  Taylor  and  he  misapprehended  Hood's  wish 
to  have  a  strong  cavalry  force  with  his  moving  column  as 

1  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  official  returns  in  the  Adjutant-General's 
office  at  Washington,  and  are  distributed  as  follows : 


Infantry. 

Artillery. 

Cavalry. 

S.  D.  Lee's  corps  
A.  P.  Stewart's  corps.  .  . 
B.  F.  Cheatham's  corps. 
Engineers  

Totals  ... 

11,784 
11,524 
14,325 
484 

Lee's  909 

Stewart's...  958 
Cheatham's.  880 
Jackson's  .  .  .  321 

3,068 

Jackson's  division 
Buford's         " 
Chalmers's     " 
Roddey's        " 
Escorts  . 

..  3,152 

....  3.857 
....  2,841 
....  2.511 

392 

38,117 

12,753 

This  is  exclusive  of  Forrest's  artillery,  and  of  about  one  thousand  men  made  up 
of  the  Fifth  Mississippi  Cavalry  and  several  battalions  of  State  reserves  which 
joined  Forrest.  Eoddey's  division  was  left  in  Alabama  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  The  "present  sick"  were  reported  at  2,000,  and  the  present  on 
"  extra  duty  "  at  8,267,  but  these  last  were,  when  necessary,  put  into  action  by  the 
Confederates.  Beauregard's  estimate  of  the  "  effective  "  force  (deducting  officers, 
etc.)  was  27,285  infantry  and  artillery,  and  7,700  cavalry,  or  an  aggregate  of  o5,000. 
This  is  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  number  shown  to  ba  present  by  the  official  re 
turns.  See  also  Appendix  A,  2. 


PLANNING  THE  CAMPAIGN.  13 

soon  as  possible.  They  conceived  the  idea  that  a  strong 
diversion  in  his  favor  west  of  the  Tennessee  would  be  of 
most  use  to  him,  and  Forrest  accordingly  started  northward 
on  the  18th  and  was  at  Jackson,  Tenn.,  on  the  day  Hood  left 
the  Guntersville  road  to  move  westward.  But  Hood's  state 
ment  that  this  news  from  Forrest  was  the  reason  for  his 
change  of  plan  is  more  specious  than  sound.  Forrest  re 
mained  at  Jackson  till  the  28th,  when  Beauregard  and  Hood 
were  in  conference  near  Decatur,  and  the  orders  which  ap 
parently  stopped  him  there  could  have  brought  him  back 
to  Tuscumbia,  or  to  any  other  place  where  the  Tennessee 
could  be  more  easily  crossed  and  a  junction  with  Hood  more 
speedily  made.  It  is  more  probable  that  Hood's  real 
motive  was  to  get  rid  of  Sherman,  who  would  have  been 
close  upon  his  heels  at  Guntersville.  He  hoped  that  when 
he  should  cross  the  river  at  Decatur  or  at  Tuscumbia,  Sher 
man  would  hasten  to  concentrate  in  front  of  Nashville  to 
meet  him,  and  that  his  brilliant  strategy  would  thus  undo 
all  that  had  been  done  since  the  battle  of  Stone's  Eiver. 
After  his  disappointment  and  defeat,  it  was  natural  that  he 
should  seek  plausible  reasons  for  what  had  proven  so  disas 
trous  a  movement.  There  certainly  was  no  excuse  for  mak 
ing  so  radical  a  change  in  plans  without  consulting  his 
superior,  and  his  doing  so  shows  that  he  was  determined  to 
treat  his  subordination  to  Beauregard  as  only  a  nominal 
thing,  while  he  sought  to  regain  his  own  prestige  by  a 
brilliant  stroke.1 

Beauregard,  amazed  at  the  sudden  change  of  movement, 
hastened  after  Hood  and  overtook  him  at  Decatur,  where  he 
had  expected  to  cross  the  river,  but  where  the  vigorous  de 
fense  of  the  post  satisfied  both  the  Confederate  officers  that 

1  Beauregard's  Report ;  also,  Taylor's  Destruction  and  Reconstruction,  pp.  207, 
208,  and  Jordan  and  Prior's  Campaigns  of  Forrest,  pp.  58'J,  590. 


14  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

it  would  be  quite  too  costly  to  force  a  crossing  there,  if  it 
could  be  done  at  all.  The  post  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Doolittle,  of  the  Eighteenth  Michigan,  whose  bold  and 
judicious  use  of  the  garrison  promptly  repulsed  the  first 
efforts  to  carry  the  place.  General  E.  S.  Granger  arrived  with 
reinforcements  at  the  close  of  the  first  day.  A  brisk  sortie 
from  the  garrison  captured  over  a  hundred  prisoners  from 
Cheatham's  corps,  spiking  a  couple  of  guns,  and  inflicting 
considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded.  Hood  now  marched 
to  Tuscumbia,  and  by  the  last  day  of  October  secured  an 
unobstructed  crossing,  occupying  the  town  of  Florence  on 
the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  At  this  point  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  Tennessee  is  interrupted  by  Muscle  Shoals  above 
and  Colbert  Shoals  below,  so  that  it  was  only  in  the  highest 
water  that  even  light  gunboats  could  pass.  Croxton's  bri 
gade  of  cavalry  was  in  observation  near  Florence,  but  was 
unable  to  make  any  serious  opposition,  and  pontoon  bridges 
were  soon  laid.  Could  Hood  then  have  marched  at  once 
upon  Pulaski  he  would  have  found  but  little  opposition 
south  of  Duck  River.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  rear 
range  his  lines  of  communication  and  accumulate  at  Flor 
ence  supplies  for  the  campaign.  He  had  left  Gadsden  with 
twenty  days'  rations,  but  when  soldiers'  haversacks  are  over 
loaded  there  is  always  a  great  waste  of  food,  and  his  wagons 
had  been  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  troops.  The  prisoners 
taken  by  Granger  at  Decatur  reported  that  the  men  were 
half  mutinous  at  the  scanty  issue  of  supplies,  and  when 
Tuscumbia  was  reached  the  sustenance  of  the  army  had  be 
come  the  problem  demanding  first  attention.  Hood  pro 
fesses  to  believe  he  had  reason  to  expect  supplies  to  meet 
him  at  Tuscumbia ;  but  the  superintendent  of  the  railway 
reported  the  road  in  no  condition  to  furnish  the  requisite 
transportation,  and  in  spite  of  the  most  earnest  efforts  of 


PLANNING   THE   CAMPAIGN.  15 

Beauregard  and  Taylor  to  put  it  speedily  in  repair,  the 
greater  part  of  the  three  weeks'  delay  at  Florence  must  prob 
ably  be  attributed  to  its  half  ruined  and  decayed  condi 
tion.  Stores  were  collected  at  points  on  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad  in  Mississippi,  carried  to  Corinth  and  thence 
east  to  Cherokee  Station  upon  a  piece  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  which  Forrest  had  been  able  to  protect. 
But  from  Cherokee  Station  to  Tuscumbia  was  a  gap  of  fif 
teen  or  sixteen  miles  where  the  road  had  never  been  rebuilt, 
and  here  the  army  stores  must  be  hauled  in  wagon  trains 
over  a  wretched  country  road,  which  became  a  quagmire  as 
soon  as  the  rains  began. 

Beauregard  does  not  seem  to  have  ventured  upon  any 
peremptory  interference  with  Hood  at  their  meeting  at 
Decatur,  but  acquiesced  in  what  was  done,  sharing,  no 
doubt,  the  hopes  of  the  latter  that  the  news  of  their  cross 
ing  at  Florence  would  be  quickly  followed  by  that  of  the  re 
turn  of  Sherman  to  Middle  Tennessee.  But  it  had  become 
evident  that  there  would  be  delays ;  and  Forrest,  who  had 
been  waiting  at  Jackson,  resumed  his  expedition  with  a  pur 
pose  of  attracting  Thomas's  attention  to  the  west  and  rear  of 
Nashville,  so  as  to  draw  troops  in  that  direction  and  prevent 
the  concentration  in  front  of  Hood,  where  alone  was  any  se 
rious  danger.  He  struck  the  river  on  the  29th,  a  few  miles 
above  Fort  Henry,  and  his  batteries  disabled  and  brought  to 
three  transports  and  a  "tin-clad"  gunboat,  the  Undine. 
The  latter,  after  a  stout  defence,  was  injured  in  her  machin 
ery  and  was  run  ashore  and  abandoned.  Two  of  the  trans 
ports  were  burned,  but  the  gunboat  and  the  other  transport 
were  in  the  possession  of  Forrest's  "  horse-marines "  for  a 
couple  of  days,  when  the  transport  with  her  lading  of  stores 
was  recaptured  and  the  Undine  was  run  ashore  and  burned. 
Forrest's  first  appearance  on  the  river  was  at  the  most  north- 


16  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

ern  point  he  readied,  and  lie  returned,  making  demonstra* 
tions  to  assist  his  purpose  at  various  places  along  the  west 
ern  bank.  On  November  4th  he  appeared  opposite  John- 
sonville,  eighty  miles  directly  west  of  Nashville,  and  by 
a  noisy  cannonade  caused  a  panic  in  the  garrison.  Three 
gunboats,  eight  transports,  and  some  barges  were  moored  to 
the  river  bank,  and  great  quantities  of  stores  were  in  ware 
houses  at  the  landing.  All  these  were  abandoned  and 
burned  by  the  crews  and  garrison,  and  the  troops  fled 
toward  Nashville,  the  commandant  telegraphing  Thomas 
that  Forrest  was  across  the  river  and  marching  in  pursuit.1 
But  Forrest  had  not  crossed,  and  continued  his  march  up 
the  river.  At  Perryville  he  put  over  part  of  Kucker's  bri 
gade,  but  kept  the  body  of  his  troops  on  the  western  side, 
reaching  Cherokee  Station  on  the  15th  and  joining  Hood  at 
Florence  next  day.  The  dates  which  have  been  given  and 
the  character  of  Forrest's  movement,  which  came  in  contact 
with  no  National  forces  west  of  the  river,  plainly  prove  the 
purposes  of  the  Confederate  generals.  Time  was  needed  to 
repair  the  railway  and  collect  supplies  at  Tuscumbia,  and 
this  was  the  easiest  way  to  get  it. 

Sherman's  attitude,  however,  was  not  without  its  influ 
ence  upon  his  adversaries.  They  knew  that  the  Twentieth 
Corps  was  still  at  Atlanta  and  that  Sherman  with  three 
others  was  observing  them  at  Eome  or  Kingston.  It  was 
quite  among  the  possibilities  that  he  might  march  westward 
across  Alabama,  destroying  all  railway  lines  and  close  in 
upon  the  rear  of  Hood's  army,  while  Thomas  delayed  him 
in  the  "  barrens  "  of  Tennessee,  where  the  country  could  do 
but  little  to  sustain  such  an  army.  The  desire  to  see  Sher- 

1  The  garrison  consisted  of  about  1,000  men,  of  the  Twelfth  United  States  col- 
ored  troops,  Forty-third  Wisconsin  Infantry,  and  Eleventh  Tennessee  Cavalry, 
all  under  command  of  Colonel  C.  11.  Thompson,  of  the  first-named  regiment. 


PLANNING   THE   CAMPAIGN.  17 

man  begin  some  definite  movement  undoubtedly  worked 
upon  Hood,  and  after  the  expected  preparation  for  his  ad 
vance  was  made  he  still  delayed  till  Beauregard  spurred  him 
anew  to  his  work  by  urgent  despatches  of  a  kind  to  which  he 
was  not  used.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  he 
was  bitterly  disappointed  in  finding  that  Sherman  did  not 
hasten  back  to  Tennessee,  and  was  oppressed  with  the  fore 
boding  that  if  this  part  of  his  plan  failed  and  Sherman 
turned  eastward,  he  would  be  in  no  small  measure  respon 
sible  for  the  impending  ruin  of  the  Confederate  cause. 

[Returning  to  the  preparations  Sherman  was  making  to 
give  Thomas  forces  enough  to  cope  with  Hood  in  Tennes 
see,  we  find  that  on  October  30th  Wood's  division  of  Stan 
ley's  (Fourth)  corps  was  moving  by  rail  from.  Chattanooga, 
and  by  November  3d  the  whole  corps  was  concentrated  at 
Pulaski,  eighty  miles  south  of  Nashville  and  forty-four  north 
of  Decatur,  upon  the  railway  connecting  those  places.  De- 
catur  and  Athens  were  held  by  General  Granger,  who  com 
manded  the  District  of  Northern  Alabama,  which  also  includ 
ed  Huntsville  and  Stevenson ;  but  the  bridges  and  trestles 
on  the  railway  between  Pulaski  and  Athens  at  the  crossing  of 
Elk  Eiver  had  been  destroyed  by  Forrest  in  the  latter  part  of 
September  and  had  not  been  rebuilt,  and  Pulaski  was  there 
fore  the  terminus  of  the  direct  railway  line  south  from  Nash 
ville.  When  it  was  definitely  known  that  the  Confederate  army 
was  at  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  Thomas  had  ordered  Stanley 
to  get  together  his  corps  at  Pulaski,  but  he  did  not  put  Gran* 
ger  under  his  command,  and  the  latter  continued  through  the 
whole  campaign  to  receive  his  orders  direct  from  Nashville. 

On  November  3d,  Schofield  started  Cooper's  division  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  upon  the  railway  trains  for  Nash 
ville,  leaving  Cox's  division  for  several  days  at  Dalton  till 
transportation  could  be  got  for  it.  Schofield  himself  went 


18  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

forward  with  the  advance,  and  when  he  reached  Nashville 
next  day,  Thomas  had  just  received  the  first  alarming  news 
from  Johnsonville,  and  hurried  Schofield  in  person  with  Gal- 
lup's  brigade  (the  first  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  arrive) 
to  Gillem's  Station,  on  the  railway  from  Nashville  to  the 
abandoned  post.  Finding  no  enemy  near  Gillem's,  Scho 
field  marched  to  Johnsonville  on  the  6th,  and  was  able  to 
give  Thomas  the  truth  as  to  the  disgraceful  affair.  General 
Cooper,  with  Gallup's  and  Moore's  brigades  of  his  division, 
were  placed  at  Johnsonville  for  a  time,  with  orders  to  fortify 
it  in  accordance  with  a  general  plan  prepared  by  the  engi 
neers.  Schofield  returned  to  Nashville,  whence  he  was  sent 
on  the  llth  by  Thomas  to  Pulaski,  to  assume  command  of 
the  forces  assembling  there.  The  remainder  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  reached  Nashville  on  the  9th,  and  went  forward 
by  easy  stages.  On  the  15th,  Schofield  had  at  Pulaski  the 
Fourth  Corps  and  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third,  Strick 
land's  brigade  of  the  latter  corps  was  at  Columbia,  and  the 
cavalry  under  General  Hatch  was  covering  the  front  and 
right,  toward  Florence  and  Waynesboro. 

When  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  reported  to 
Thomas,  and  even  before  the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith  with  the 
divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  his  official  returns  showed 
a  force  present  for  duty  just  about  equal  to  that  of  Hood, 
though  differently  divided,  being  stronger  in  infantry  and 
weaker  in  cavalry.  The  latter  numbered  5,591,  being  less 
than  half  Hood's  strength  in  that  arm,  but  the  infantry  and 
artillery  were  48,97s.1  When  this  force  should  be  increased 

1  These  figures  gi^e  the  "  present  for  duty  "  on  October  81st,  and  were  distrib 
uted  as  follows:  Fourth  Corps,  12,331;  Twenty-third  Corps,  10,624;  cavalry, 
5,591 ;  District  of  Tennessee,  18,661 ;  unassigned  detachments,  7,359 — total, 
B  1,566.  This  does  not  include  the  District  of  Etowah  under  Steedman,  which, 
fir«t  appears  in  Thomas's  report  for  November  20th,  and  which  numbered  b,42i. 
The  official  returns  for  subsequent  dates  will  be  found  in  Appendix  A, 


PLANNING   THE   CAMPAIGN.  19 

"by  Steedman's  garrisons  in  Northern  Georgia  and  at  Chatta 
nooga,  by  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  and  by  detachments  widen. 
Thomas  was  authorized  to  draw  from  Schofield's  depart 
ment,  Sherman  estimated  the  army  in  Tennessee  easily  able 
to  cope  with  Hood.  When  he  should  leave  his  base  of  sup 
plies  in  Georgia,  the  necessity  for  guarding  a  long  line  of 
railway  would  cease,  and  Chattanooga  would  be  the  only 
place  in  Thomas's  department  east  of  Nashville  which  it 
would  be  necessary  to  garrison.  The  supplies  in  stoic  at 
Chattanooga  were  all  that  would  be  needed  for  the  posts 
maintained  in  East  Tennessee.  Thomas  could  therefore 
concentrate  nearly  everything  to  meet  Hood,  and  when  the 
latter  should  be  defeated  and  driven  southward,  the  lines  of 
operation  would  necessarily  be  rearranged.  As  soon  as  it 
seemed  probable  that  Hood  intended  to  make  Florence  and 
Tuscurnbia  his  base,  Sherman  wrote  Thomas,  "You  Hrr.st 
unite  all  your  men  into  one  army,  and  abandon  all  minor 
points  if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood."  The  long  delay  of  the 
Confederate  general  in  making  his  advance  from  the  Tennes 
see  gave  the  needed  time  for  preliminary  arrangements; 
and  when,  on  November  12th,  parting  messages  were  ex 
changed  between  them,  Thomas  was  able  to  say  to  Sherman 
that  he  believed  he  should  have  "  men  enough  to  ruin  Hood 
unless  he  gets  out  of  the  way  very  rapidly."  Thomas  was 
empowered,  in  the  absence  of  his  superior,  to  exert  all  the 
authority  of  Sherman  himself  in  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  new  campaign  was  begun. 


20 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA. 

AT  Rome,  when  parting  with  one  of  the  officers  he  was 
sending  back  to  Tennessee,  Sherman  said,  "  If  there's  to  be 
any  hard  fighting,  you  will  have  ifc  to  do."  He  perfectly 
understood  that  there  was  no  sufficient  force  in  Georgia  to 
thwart  his  plan  or  even  to  delay  his  inarch.  Before  leaving 
Atlanta  he  pointed  out  to  one  of  his  principal  subordinates 
that  a  National  army  at  Columbia,  S.  C.,  would  end  the  war  un 
less  it  should  be  routed  and  destroyed.  Deprived  of  the  mate 
rial  support  of  all  the  States  but  North  Carolina,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  the  Confederate  Government  to  feed  its 
army  at'  Richmond,  or  to  fill  its  exchequer.  /  The  experience 
it  had  with  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi  proved  that 
a  region  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  Confederacy  would 
not  furnish  men  or  money,  and  could  not  furnish  supplies ; 
while  anxiety  for  their  families,  who  were  within  the  Na 
tional  lines,  tempted  the  soldiers  from  those  States  to  desert, 
and  weakened  the  confidence  of  the  whole  army.  In  such  a 
situation  credit  would  be  destroyed,  the  Confederate  paper 
money  would  become  worthless,  its  foreign  assistance  would 
be  cut  off,  and  the  rebellion  must  end.  The  one  chance 
left  would  be  for  Lee  to  break  away  from  Grant,  overwhelm 
Sherman,  and  re-establish  the  Confederate  power  in  a  cen 
tral  position  by  the  abandonment  of  Virginia.  But  thi;; 
implied  that  Lee  could  break  away  from  Grant,  who,  on  the 


22  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

south  side  of  Petersburg,  was  as  near  Columbia  as  his  oppo 
nent,,  and  would  be  close  upon  his  heels  from  the  moment 
the  lines  about  Richmond  were  abandoned. 

If  Sherman,  therefore,  should  reach  Columbia  with  an 
army  that  could  resist  the  first  onslaught  of  Lee,  the  last 
hope  01  the  Confederacy  would  be  crushed  between  the 
national  forces  meeting  from  the  east  and  west.  Of  course, 
this  implied  that  Thomas  should,  at  least,  be  able  to  resist 
Hood  till  the  Eastern  campaign  should  be  ended,  when,  in 
the  general  collapse  of  the  Richmond  Government,  Hood 
must  a,s  certainly  abandon  the  hopeless  cause,  as  Johnston 
was  in  fact  forced  to  do  after  Lee's  surrender  in  the  fol 
lowing  «pring. 

To  establish  a  new  base  upon  the  sea  was  a  necessary  part 
oi  cuct.  a  plan,  for  the  old  base  at  Chattanooga  must  be 
abandoned  from  the  start,  and  the  practical  separation  of 
the  Qaiolinas  from  the  Gulf  States  could  only  be  accom 
plished  by  a  great  and  thorough  destruction  of  railway  lines 
in  Georgia.  The  army  could  live  upon  the  country  while 
ma.rching,  but  it  must  have  the  ordinary  means  of  supply 
within  a,  very  few  days  from  the  time  of  halting,  or  it  would 
starve.  The  country  through  which  it  moved  was  hostile,  no 
local  government  could  be  made  to  respond  to  formal  requi 
sitions  for  subsistence,  and  the  wasteful  method  of  foraging 
itself  made  a  necessity  for  moving  on  into  new  fields.  A 
rapid  march  to  the  sea,  the  occupation  of  some  harbor  capa 
ble  of  becoming  a  fortified  base,  and  the  opening  of  lines  of 
ocean  communication  with  the  great  depots  of  the  North  must 
therefore  constitute  the  first  part  of  the  vast  project.  Be 
yond  tnis  Sherman  did  not  venture  to  plan  in  detail,  and 
recognising  the  possibility  that  unlooked-for  opposition 
might  force  a  modification  even  of  this,  he  kept  in  mind 
the  i*itt,rnative  that  he  might  have  to  go  west  rather  than 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.         23 

east  of  Macon.  He  requested  that  tlie  fleets  on  the  coast 
might  watch  for  his  appearance  at  Morris  Island  near 
Charleston,  at  Ossabaw  Sound  just  south  of  Savannah,  and 
at  Pensacola  and  Mobile.  If  he  should  reach  Morris  Island, 
it  would  naturally  be  by  the  way  of  Augusta  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Savannah  River.  Ossabaw  Sound  would,  in 
like  manner,  indicate  the  route  by  way  of  Milledgeville,  Mil- 
len,  and  the  valley  of  the  Ogeechee.  The  Gulf  ports  would 
only  be  chosen  if  his  course  to  the  east  should  be  made  im 
practicable. 

On  November  12th  communication  with  the  rear  was 
broken.  The  railway  bridge  at  Alatoona  was  taken  to  pieces 
and  carried  to  the  rear  to  be  stored  ;  but  from  the  crossing 
of  the  Etowah,  southward  to  Atlanta,  the  whole  line  of  the 
road  was  thoroughly  destroyed.  The  foundries,  machine- 
shops,  and  factories  at  Eome  were  burned,  lest  they  should 
be  again  turned  to  use  by  the  enemy,  and  on  the  14th  the 
army  was  concentrated  at  Atlanta.  Sherman's  force  now\ 
consisted  of  two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  under  1 
General  Howard,  and  two  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
under  General  Slocum,  which  were  respectively  designated  as 
right  and  left  wing.  Logan  was  absent,  and  his  corps  (the 
Fifteenth)  was  in  command  of  Major-General  P.  J.  Oster- 
haus.  The  division  of  General  J.  E.  Smith,  which  had  been 
distributed  along  .the  railroad  in  Northern  Georgia,  had 
joined  that  corps,  which  now  consisted  of  four  divisions, 
commanded  by  Generals  Woods,  Hazen,  Smith,  and  Corse. 
Blair's  corps  (Seventeenth)  had  three  divisions,  viz.,  Mow 
er's,  Leggett's,  and  Giles  A.  Smith's.  The  assignment  of 
Slocum  to  the  command  of  the  wing  left  the  Twentieth 
Corps  under  Brigadier-General  A.  S.  Williams,  with  Geary, 
Ward,  and  Jackson  as  division  commanders.  Davis's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  retained  the  organization  it  had  at  the 


24  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  consisted  of  Carlin's, 
Morgan's,  and  Baird's  divisions.  The  cavalry  was  undei 
Kilpatrick,  and  was  but  a  single  division,  composed  of  the 
two  brigades  of  Murray  and  Atkins.  The  numerical  force 
of  the  whole,  according  to  the  returns  of  November 
10th,  only  two  days  before  communication  with  the  North 
was  broken,  was  a  little  over  fifty- nine  thousand,  but  fur- 
loughed  men  and  recruits  hurried  so  fast  to  the  front  in 
those  last  days  that  the  muster  at  Atlanta  showed  a  total  of 
over  sixty-two  thousand.1  No  pains  had  been  spared  to 
make  this  a  thoroughly  efficient  force,  for  an  army  in  an 
enemy's  country  and  without  a  base  cannot  afford  to  be 
encumbered  with  sick,  or  to  have  its  trains  or  its  artillery 
delayed  by  weak  or  insufficient  teams.  The  artillery  was 
reduced  to  about  one  gun  to  a  thousand  men,  and  the 
batteries  usually  to  four  guns  each,  with  eight  good  horses 
to  each  gun  or  caisson.  Twenty  days'  rations  were  in  hand, 
and  two  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition  of  all  kinds  were 
in  the  wagons.  Droves  of  beef  cattle  to  furnish  the  meat 
ration  were  ready  to  accompany  the  march,  and  these  grew 
larger  rather  than  smaller  as  the  army  moved  through  the 
country. 

The  determination  to  abandon  Atlanta  involved  also  the 
undoing  of  much  work  that  had  been  done  there  in  the 
early  autumn.  As  the  town  could  not  be  used  by  the  Na 
tional  forces,  the  defences  must  be  destroyed,  the  work 
shops,  mills,  and  depots  ruined  and  burned.  This  task  had 
been  given  to  Colonel  Poe,  Chief  Engineer,  and  was  com 
pleted  by  the  time  the  army  was  assembled  and  ready  to 
march  southward. 


1  Fifteenth  Corps,  infantry,  15,894;  Seventeenth  Corps,  11,732;  Fourteenth 
Corps,  13,962  ;  Twentieth  Corps,  13,741 ;  artillery,  1,812  ;  cavalry,  5,068- total, 
62,204. 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        25 

On  the  morning  of  November  15th  the  movement  began. 
The  two  corps  of  each  wing  were  ordered  to  march  upon 
separate  roads,  at  first  diverging  sharply,  and  threatening 
both  Macou  and  Augusta,  but  having  the  neighborhood  of 
Milledgeville,  the  capital  of  the  State,  for  their  place  of 
rendezvous  at  the  end  of  the  first  stage.  Sherman  himself 
accompanied  the  left  wing,  which  followed  the  line  of  rail 
way  leading  from  Atlanta  to  Augusta ;  for,  by  doing  so,  he 
could  get  the  earliest  and  best  information  of  any  new  efforts 
the  Confederate  Government  might  make  for  the  defence  of 
the  Carolinas.  In  this  way  he  could  best  decide  upon  the 
proper  direction  for  his  columns  after  he  should  reach  the 
Oconee  River. 

After  leaving  the  mountainous  region  of  Northern  Georgia, 
the  topography  of  the  country  is  determined  by  the  river 
courses,  which  run  in  radiating  lines  from  the  highlands  a 
hundred  miles  northeast  of  Atlanta.  The  Savannah  River, 
which  separates  the  State  from  South  Carolina,  flows  nearly 
southeast  in  a  very  direct  general  line  to  the  sea.  Augusta 
is  on  the  right  bank  like  a  half-way  house,  and  Savannah,  on 
the  same  side  of  the  stream,  is  near  its  mouth.  The  Ocinul- 
gee  and  Oconee  Rivers  rise  near  Atlanta,  and  flow  in  parallel 
valleys  about  forty  miles  apart  in  the  same  southeasterly 
direction  nearly  two  hundred  miles,  when  they  unite  to  form 
the  Altamaha,  which  enters  the  ocean  a  little  north  of  the 
Florida  line.  Macon  is  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Ocmulgee, 
about  a  hundred  miles  from  Atlanta,  and  Milledgeville, 
thirty  miles  northeast  of  Macon,  is  on  the  same  side  of  the 
Oconee,  which,  however,  has  a  direction  more  nearly  north 
and  south  above  the  city.  The  only  other  stream  of  any  im 
portance  in  this  part  of  the  State  is  the  Ogeechee,  which 
rises  midway  between  Milledgeville  and  Augusta,  but  grad 
ually  approaches  the  Savannah,  so  that  for  fifty  or  sixty 
VOL.  X.— 2 


26  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

miles  from  the  ocean  these  rivers  are  nearly  parallel  and 
from  fifteen  to  twenty  miles  apart. 

The  general  line  of  Sherman's  march  was  between  the 
Ocnrulgee  and  Oconee  Rivers,  though  he  sent  his  right  wing 
at  first  along  the  Macon  Railroad  by  more  westerly  routes, 
for  the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  enemy,  and  to  drive  oft 
Wheeler's  cavalry  and  some  three  thousand  Georgia  militia, 
under  General  G.  W.  Smith,  which  had  been  assembled  at 
Lovejoy  Station  for  some  days.  Howard's  right  (Fifteenth 
Corps)  marched  by  way  of  Jonesboro,  McDonough,  and  In 
dian  Spring  to  the  crossing  of  the  Ocrnulgee  at  Planters' 
Factory,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  keeping  a  little  farther  east, 
but  reaching  the  river  at  the  same  place.  Kilpatrick,  with 
most  of  the  cavalry,  was  upon  this  flank,  and  drove  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  before  him  to  Love  joy's.  Smith  had 
retired  rapidly  upon  Macon  with  his  infantry,  but  the  old 
lines  at  Lovejoy's  were  held  by  two  brigades  of  cavalry  with 
two  pieces  of  artillery.  Kilpatrick  dismounted  his  men  and 
charged  the  works  on  foot,  carrying  them  handsomely.  He 
followed  his  success  with  a  rapid  attack  by  another  column, 
which  captured  the  guns  and  followed  the  retreating  enemy 
some  miles  toward  Macon.  The  ca*valry  continued  its  dem 
onstrations  nearly  to  Forsyth,  creating  the  impression  of  an 
advance  in  force  in  that  direction ;  then  it  turned  eastward 
and  crossed  the  Ocmulgee  with  the  infantry. 

A  section  of  pontoon  train  was  with  each  corps,  and  How 
ard  put  down  two  bridges ; l  but  though  his  head  of  column 
reached  Planters'  Factory  on  the  18th,  and  the  bridges  were 
kept  full  day  and  night,  it  was  not  till  the  morning  of  the 


1  The  pontoons  used  by  Sherman,  both  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  and  the  pres 
ent  one,  were  those  of  canvas,  of  which  the  frames  could  be  disjointed.  Their 
lightness  and  serviceability  left  little  to  be  desired,  and  they  proved  thoroughly 
satisfactory  in  hard  and  constant  campaign  use. 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        27 

20th  that  the  rear  guard  was  able  to  cross.  The  bank  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  river  was  steep  and  slippery  from 
rain,  making  it  tedious  work  getting  the  trains  up  the  hill. 
His  heads  of  columns  were  pushing  forward  meanwhile,  and 
reached  Clinton,  a  few  miles  north  of  Macon,  by  the  time 
the  rear  was  over  the  river.  Kilpatrick  now  made  a  feint 
upon  Macon,  striking  the  railway  a  little  east  of  the  town, 
capturing  and  destroying  a  train  of  cars,  and  tearing  up  the 
track  for  a  mile.  Under  cover  of  this  demonstration  and 
while  the  cavalry  were  holding  all  roads  north  and  east  of 
Macon,  Howard's  infantry  on  the  22d  closed  up  toward  Gor 
don,  a  station  on  the  Savannah  railroad,  twenty  miles  east^ 
ward.  Woods's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  brought  up 
the  rear  and  was  approaching  Griswoldville. 

Eeturning  to  the  left  wing,  which  Sherman  accompanied, 
wre  find  that  it  had  applied  itself  in  earnest  to  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  railway  from  Atlanta  to  Augusta,  making  thor 
ough  work  of  it  to  Madison,  seventy  miles  from  Atlanta,  and 
destroying  the  bridge  over  the  Oconee  River,  ten  or  twelve 
miles  further  on.  Here,  the  divergence  between  the  wings 
was  greatest,  the  distance  from  Slocum's  left  to  Kilpatrick, 
on  the  right,  being  fifty  miles  in  a  direct  line.  Sherman, 
however,  did  not  cross  the  Oconee,  but  directed  Slocum  to 
turn  southward  along  the  right  bank  of  the  river  with  Wil- 
liams's  (Twentieth)  corps,  while  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  took 
the  interior  line  by  a  more  direct  route  to  Milledgeville, 
where  the  left  wing  assembled  on  the  23d,  the  advance  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps  having  entered  the  city  the  day  before, 
driving  out  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  which  retreated  rap 
idly  across  the  river,  leaving  the  bridge  uninjured.  Slocum 
immediately  threw  out  Jackson's  division  to  the  east,  cover 
ing  and  securing  the  bridge  for  further  operations. 

Sherman's  advance  from  Atlanta  drew  from  Beauregard  a 


28  THE   MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

rattling  volley  of  telegraphic  despatches  to  all  the  Confed 
erate  officials,  civil  and  military.  In  these  he  made  much  of 
the  fact  that  he  had  ordered  General  Taylor  in  Alabama  to 
move  with  his  available  forces  into  Georgia ;  but  Taylor  had 
no  available  forces,  and  could  only  go  in  person  to  Macon, 
where  he  arrived  on  the  22d,  just  in  time  to  meet  Governor 
Brown  with  his  Adjutant,  Toombs,  escaping  from  the  State 
Capitol  on  the  approach  of  Slocum's  columns.  The  only 
organized  troops  were  Wheeler's  cavalry,  Smith's  division  of 
Georgia  militia,  and  a  couple  of  battalions  of  local  volun 
teers.  General  Howell  Cobb  was  nominally  Confederate 
commander  of  "  reserves,"  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no 
reserves  to  command.  Hardee  had  been  there  the  day  be 
fore,  coming  up  from  Savannah,  and  judging  rightly  that 
the  spread  of  Sherman's  wings  from  Oconee  Bridge  to 
Planters1  Factory  argued  a  course  toward  Augusta  or  Savan 
nah,  he  declared  that  Macon  was  in  no  danger  and  directed 
Smith  to  move  his  division  rapidly  eastward,  to  interpose, 
if  possible,  between  Sherman  and  Augusta,  delaying  his 
march  and  obstructing  the  roads.  Wheeler,  under  orders 
already  given,  would  continue  to  harass  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  National  forces.  Orders  from  Richmond  had  ex 
tended  Hardee's  authority  over  the  theatre  of  operations  in 
Georgia,  and  having  given  the  best  directions  the  circum 
stances  allowed,  he  hastened  back  to  Savannah  to  strengthen 
its  means  of  defence  and  to  be  in  direct  communication  with 
Augusta,  Charleston,  and  Eichmond. 

Beauregard  issued  from  Corinth,  Miss.,  a  proclamation  to 
the  people  of  Georgia,  calling  upon  them  to  arise  for  the 
defence  of  the  State,  and  to  "  obstruct  and  destroy  all  roads 
in  Sherman's  front,  flank,  and  rear,"  assuring  them  that  the 
enemy  would  then  starve  in  their  midst.  He  strove  to  raise 
vague  hopes  also  by  announcing  that  he  was  hastening  to 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        29 

join  them  in  defence  of  their  homes  and  firesides.  A  more 
practical  step  was  his  order  to  Hood  to  begin  the  Tennessee 
campaign,  the  only  counter-stroke  in  his  power.  At  Mil- 
ledgeville,  the  approach  of  Sherman  was  met  by  an  Act  of 
the  Legislature  to  levy  en  masse  the  population,  with  a  hys 
terical  preamble,  picturing  the  National  general  as  an  ogre, 
and  exhorting  the  people  "  to  die  freemen  rather  than  live 
slaves."  The  act,  to  have  been  of  any  use,  should  have 
been  passed  a  month  before,  when  Hood  was  starting  west 
from  Gadsden.  It  was  now  only  a  confession  of  terror,  for 
there  was  no  time  to  organize.  Any  disposition  of  the  in 
habitants  along  his  route  to  destroy  roads  was  effectually 
checked  by  Sherman's  making  it  known  that  the  houses  and 
property  of  those  who  did  so  would  be  destroyed.  Such 
opposition  to  a  large  army  can  never  be  of  real  use ;  its  com 
mon  effect  is  only  to  increase  by  retaliation  the  miseries  of 
the  unfortunate  people  along  the  line  of  march,  and  in  this 
case  there  was,  besides,  no  lack  of  evidence  that  most  of 
them  were  heartily  tired  of  the  war,  and  had  lost  all  the  en 
thusiasm  which  leads  to  self-sacrifice.  Even  in  such  a  panic 
the  strife  of  political  factions  was  not  stilled,  and  the  oppo 
nents  of  Governor  Brown's  States-rights  policy  took  advan 
tage  of  the  flight  from  the  Capital  to  perpetrate  a  novel 
absurdity.  The  Lieutenant-Governor,  Wright,  was  also  a 
general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  on  the  21st,  the  day 
before  our  occupation  of  the  Capital,  issued  a  proclamation 
from  Augusta,  declaring  himself  ex-officio  Governor  of  the 
part  of  the  State  east  of  the  Oconee,  and  ordering  the  peo 
ple  under  the  levy  en  masse  to  report  to  him,  by  reason  of 
what  a  Confederate  historian  calls  the  "  territorial  disabil 
ity "  of  the  Governor.1  The  proclamation  had  no  result,  but 


1  Jones's  Siege  of  Savannah,  etc.,  p.  18. 


30  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

the  ridiculousness  of  it  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  Geor 
gia  militia  under  Smith  were  moved  by  Brown's  orders  to 
Savannah,  reaching  there  on  the  30th,  and  General  Taylor 
returned  from  Savannah  to  Macon  after  that  time,  as  will  bo 
seen.  In  truth,  communication  by  courier  from  Augusta  to 
Macon  was  only  interrupted  while  the  army  was  passing. 

"While  Taylor,  Brown,  Tooinbs,  and  Cobb  were  conferring 
at  Macon  on  the  22d,  the  division  of  Georgia  militia  under 
Brigadier  General  Phillips  was  marching  toward  Gordon  in 
the  effort  to  obey  Hardee's  order.  At  Giiswoldville,  about 
eight  miles  out,  they  ran  into  Walcutt's  brigade  of  Woods's 
division,  which  was  the  rear  guard  of  the  right  wing,  and 
attacked  it  with  more  courage  than  discretion.  Walcutt  had 
been  making  a  reconnoisance  toward  Macon,  driving  back 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  and  was  recalled  by  General  Woods  to  a 
position  on  the  Duncan  Farm,  a  little  east  of  the  town.  Here 
his  flanks  were  protected  by  swampy  ground,  his  line  was  on 
the  crest  of  a  hill,  writh  open  ground  in  front,  on  which  the 
enemy  must  attack.  This  Phillips  did  with  a  great  deal  of 
vigor,  putting  in  all  four  of  his  brigades,  and  striving  hard 
also  to  turn  the  flanks  of  Walcutt's  position.  He  was  supe 
rior  in  artillery,  as  Walcutt  had  only  two  guns  with  him, 
and  was  obliged  to  withdraw  these  early  in  the  engagement. 
But  the  infantry  attacks,  which  were  renewed  several  times, 
were  repulsed  with  severe  loss,  and  Phillips  retreated,  after 
several  hours'  fighting,  having  lost  over  six  hundred  in 
killed  and  wounded.  On  the  National  side,  General  Woods, 
who  was  present,  reports  a  total  of  ninety-four  casualties. 
Walcutt  was  severely  wounded  in  the  leg,  and  the  command 
of  the  brigade  devolved  upon  Colonel  Catterson  (Ninety- 
seventh  Indiana)  during  the  latter  half  of  the  combat.  Both 
officers  distinguished  themselves  by  their  conduct  and  cour 
age. 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH   GEORGIA.  31 

Nothing  could  be  more  useless  than  this  engagement,  for 
Phillips  had  before  him  two  corps  if  Walcutt  had  been 
driven  off;  but  he  had  been  ordered  to  move  along  the  rail 
road,  and  thought  he.  was  obliged  to  do  so  till  he  should  be 
recalled.  This  was  done  as  soon  as  Smith  at  Macon  heard  of 
the  right,  and  the  division,  at  the  instance  of  Taylor,  was  sent 
southward  by  rail  to  Albany,  which  was  the  end  of  the  rail 
way  in  that  direction.  Thence  they  marched  sixty  miles  to 
Thomasville  on  the  Savannah  and  Gulf  Railroad,  where 
Toombs  hectored  the  railway  officials  into  furnishing  trans 
portation  with  unwonted  promptness,  and  they  reported  to 
Hardee  in  Savannah  on  the  last  day  of  the  month.  Hardee's 
orders  to  Wheeler  now  directed  him  to  get  in  front  of  Sher 
man's  forces  and  cover  all"  the  roads  by  which  he  might 
move.  Wheeler  accordingly  marched  south  of  the  Central 
Bailroad,  swam  the  Oconee  Eiver,  and  reached  Sandersville 
on  the  26th,  just  before  the  National  columns.  The  change 
of  position  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  followed  by  Kil- 
patrick,  who  moved,  by  Sherman's  direction,  to  the  front 
and  left  of  the  infantry,  there  being  no  enemy  whatever  on 
the  right  flank  after  crossing  the  Oconee. 

Sherman  had  not  delayed  at  Milledgeville,  but  had 
marched  again  on  the  24th.  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  corps  now 
became  the  flanking  column  on  the  left.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  (Willianis's),  after  passing  Sandersville,  reached  the 
Central  Railroad  at  Tennille  and  marched  to  Davisboro,  de 
stroying  the  track  as  they  went.  From  Davisboro  both 
corps  of  the  left  wing  moved  by  the  same  road  to  Louisville, 
crossing  the  Ogeechee  River  before  reaching  that  place, 
where  they  camped  on  the  29th.  The  work  of  destroying 
the  railway  was  begun  by  the  right  wing  at  Griswoldville, 
and  of  the  hundred  miles  between  that  station  and  Millen 
very  little  of  the  road  was  left.  Howard  found  the  crossing 


32  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

of  the  Oconee  near  Ball's  Ferry  a  difficult  operation,  for  the 
river  was  up  and  the  current  so  swift  that  the  ferry  could 
not  be  used.  Wheeler's  cavalry  made  some  resistance  from 
the  other  side.  A  detachment  of  Blair's  corps,  directed  by 
the  engineers,  succeeded  in  constructing  a  flying  bridge 
Borne  two  miles  above  the  ferry,  and  getting  over  to  the  left 
bank,  moved  down  to  the  principal  road,  which  had  been 
cleared  of  the  enemy  by  the  artillery  on  the  hither  side. 
The  pontoons  were  then  laid  and  the  march  resumed. 

On  leaving  Milledgeville,  Sherman  ordered  Kilpatrick  to 
make  a  considerable  detour  to  the  north,  feinting  strongly  on 
Augusta,  but  trying  hard  to  reach  and  destroy  the  important 
railway  bridge  and  trestles  at  Briar  Creek,  near  Waynesboro, 
half  way  between  Augusta  and  Milieu.  He  was  then  to 
move  rapidly  on  Milieu  in  the  hope  of  releasing  the  National 
prisoners  of  war  who  were  in  a  prison  camp  near  that  place. 
Kilpatrick  moved  by  one  of  the  principal  roads  to  Augusta, 
giving  out  that  he  was  marching  on  that  city.  After  he  had 
passed  the  Ogeechee  Shoals,  Wheeler  heard  of  his  move 
ment,  and  rapidly  concentrated  his  force  on  the  Augusta 
road,  where  it  debouches  from  the  swamps  of  Briar  Creek. 
Kilpatrick,  however,  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  turned  the 
head  of  his  columns  to  the  right,  upon  the  road  running 
from  Warrenton  to  Waynesboro,  and  they  were  well  on 
their  way  to  the  latter  place  before  Wheeler  was  aware  of 
it.  Murray's  brigade  was  in  the  rear,  and  two  of  his  regi 
ments,  the  Eighth  Indiana  and  Second-  Kentucky,  consti 
tuted  the  rear-guard.  These  became  too  far  separated 
from  the  column  when  they  camped  at  evening  near  a 
place  called  Sylvan  Grove.  Wheeler  heard  of  their  where 
abouts,  and  attacked  them  in  the  middle  of  the  night. 
Though  surprised  and  driven  from  their  camps,  the  regi 
ments  stoutly  fought  their  way  back,  and  were  only  gradu- 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.  33 

ally  driven  in  on  the  rest  of  Murray's  brigade.  Wheeler 
followed  up  persistently  with  his  superior  forces,  harassing 
the  rear  and  flank  of  the  column,  and  causing  some  confu 
sion,  but  gaining  no  important  advantage,  except  that 
Kilpatrick  was  obliged  to  abandon  the  effort  to  burn  the 
Briar  Creek  bridge  and  trestles,  and  to  turn  his  line  of 
march  southwesterly  from.  Waynesboro,  after  destroying  a 
mile  or  two  of  the  railroad.  He  reported  that  he  here 
learned  that  the  Milieu  prisoners  had  been  removed,  and 
determined  to  rejoin  the  army  at  Louisville.  On  the  27th 
Murray's  brigade  passed  through  that  of  Atkins,  which  now 
became  the  rear-guard,  and  on  the  28th  this  order  was 
reversed,  each  brigade  taking,  alternately,  the  brunt  of  the 
continuing  fight  with  Wheeler.  Early  in  the  morning  of 
the  28th  Kilpatrick  himself  narrowly  escaped  capture,  hav 
ing  improperly  made  his  quarters  for  the  night  at  some 
distance  from  the  body  of  his  command,  the  Ninth  Michi 
gan  being  with  him  as  a  guard.  The  enemy  got  between 
him  and  the  column,  and  it  was  with  no  little  difficulty  he 
succeeded  in  cutting  his  way  out,  and  saving  himself  from 
the  consequences  of  his  own  folly.  The  long  causeway  and 
bridge  at  Buckhead  Creek  was  held  while  tha  division 
passed,  by  Colonel  Heath  and  the  Fifth  Ohio,  with  two  how 
itzers,  and  Wheeler  there  received  a  severe  check.  The 
bridge  was  destroyed,  and  Kilpatrick  took  a  strong  position 
at  Reynolds's  plantation.  Wheeler  here  attacked  in  force, 
but  was  decisively  repulsed,  and  Kilpatrick  effected  his 
junction  with  the  infantry  without  further  molestation. 
WTheeler's  whole  corps,  consisting  of  Dibrell's,  Hume's,  and 
Anderson's  divisions,  was  engaged  in  this  series  of  sharp 
skirmishes,  and  he  boasted  loudly  that  he  had  routed  Kil 
patrick,  causing  him  to  fly  in  confusion  with  a  loss  of  nearly 
two  hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and  captured.  Chafing 
2* 


34  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

at  this  rebuff,  Kilpatrick  obtained  permission  to  deliver  a 
return  blow,  and  after  resting  his  horses  a  day  or  two, 
marched  from  Louisville  on  Waynesboro,  supported  by 
Baird's  division  of  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  corps.  He  attacked 
Wheeler  near  the  town,  and  drove  him  by  very  spirited 
charges  from,  three  successive  lines  of  barricades,  chasing 
him  through  Waynesboro,  and  over  Briar  Creek.  Wheeler 
admits  that  it  was  with  difficulty  he  "  succeeded  in  with 
drawing  "  from  his  position  at  the  town,  but  seeks  to  take 
off  the  edge  of  his  chagrin  by  reporting  that  he  was  at 
tacked  by  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  as  well  as  by  Kilpatrick's 
cavalry.  Baird's  division  was  not  actually  engaged,  but  its 
presence  and  close  support  no  doubt  assisted  Kilpatrick,  by 
enabling  him  to  make  more  decisive  movements  than  he 
could  otherwise  have  ventured  on,  as  he  could  freely  use  his 
horsemen  on  the  flanks  of  a  solid  body  of  advancing  infantry. 
Millen  was  reached  on  December  3d,  by  Blair's  corps, 
which  Sherman  accompanied,  and  the  direct  railway  com 
munication  between  Savannah  and  Augusta  was  cut.  Three 
corps  now  moved  down  the  narrowing  space  between  the 
Savannah  and  Ogeechee  Eivers,  while  Osterhaus,  with 
the  Fifteenth,  marched  on  the  right  bank  of  the  latter 
stream  in  two  columns  some  miles  apart.  Howard  wras  in  , 
person  with  this  corps  and  met  with  no  resistance.  Indeed  « 
from  Millen  onward  the  march  of  the  whole  army  was  a 
methodic  progress  with  no  noticeable  opposition,  for  even 
Wheeler's  horsemen  generally  kept  a  respectful  distance, 
and  soon  crossed  ta  the  left  bank  of  the  Savannah.  The 
country  became  more  sandy,  corn  and  grain  grew  scarcer, 
and  all  began  to  realize  that  they  were  approaching  the  low 
country  bordering  the  sea,  where  but  little  breadstuffs  or 
forage  would  be  found.  On  the  9th  and  10th  the  columns 
closed  in  upon  the  defences  of  Savannah,  Davis's  corps  rest' 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH   GEORGIA.  35 

ing  its  left  iTpon  the  Savannah  River,  Williams's,  Blair's,  and 
Osterhaus's  continuing  the  line  toward  the  right,  near  the 
Ogeechee.  Cavalry  detachments,  and  skilful  infantry  scouts 
were  sent  out  to  open  communication  with  the  fleet  and  to 
cut  the  Gulf  Railway,  thus  severing  the  last  connection  of 
the  city  with  the  south.  But  before  tracing  these  operations 
farther,  some  of  the  characteristic  features  of  the  march  just 
made  are  worthy  of  a  little  more  attention. 

The  destruction  of  railway  communication  between  the 
Confederate  Army  at  Richmond,  and  the  Gulf  States,  had 
been  a  very  important  part  of  .Sherman's  purpose,  and  he 
spared  no  pains  to  do  this  thoroughly.  A  battalion  of  me 
chanics  was  selected  and  furnished  with  tools  for  ripping 
the  rails  from  the  cross-ties  and  twisting  them  when  heated, 
and  these  were  kept  constantly  at  work  ;  but  the  infantry  on 
the  march  became  expert  in  methods  of  their  own,  and  the 
cavalry  also  joined  in  the  work,  though  the  almost  constant 
skirmishing  on  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  army  usually  kept 
the  mounted  troops  otherwise  employed.  A  division  of  in 
fantry  would  be  extended  along  the  railway  line  about  the 
length  of  its  proper  front.  The  men,  stacking  arms,  would 
cluster  along  one  side  of  the  track,  and  at  the  word  of  com 
mand,  lifting  together,  would  raise  the  line  of  rail  with  the 
ties  as  high  as  their  shoulders ;  then  at  another  command 
they  would  let  the  whole  drop,  stepping  back  out  of  the 
way  as  it  fell.  The  heavy  fall  would  shake  loose  many  of 
the  spikes  and  chairs,  and  seizing  the  loosened  rails,  the 
men,  using  them  as  levers,  would  quickly  pry  off  the  rest. 
The  cross-ties  would  now  be  piled  up  like  cob-houses,  and 
with  these  and  other  fuel  a  brisk  fire  would  be  made ;  the 
rails  were  piled  upon  the  fire,  and  in  half  an  hour  would  be 
red  hot  in  the  middle.  Seizing  the  rail  now  by  the  two 
ends,  tLe  soldiers  would  twist  it  about  a  tree,  or  interlace  and 


36  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

twine  the  whole  pile  together  in  great  iron  knots,  making  them 
useless  for  anything  but  old  iron,  and  most  unmanageable  and 
troublesome,  even  to  convey  away  to  a  mill.  In  this  way  it  was 
not  difficult  for  a  corps  marching  along  the  railway  to  destroy, 
in  a  day,  ten  or  fifteen  miles  of  track  most  completely ;  and 
Sherman  himself  gave  close  watch  to  the  work,  to  see  that  it 
was  not  slighted.  Then  all  machine-shops,  stations,  bridges, 
and  culverts  were  destroyed,  and  the  masonry  blown  up. 

The  extent  of  line  destroyed  was  enormous.  From  the 
Etowah  River  through  Atlanta  southward  to  Lovejoy's,  for  a 
hundred  miles  nothing  was  left  of  the  road.  From  Fairburn 
through  Atlanta  eastward  to  Madison  and  the  Oconee  River, 
another  hundred  miles,  the  destruction  was  equally  com 
plete.  From  Gordon  southeast wardly  the  ruin  of  the  Cen 
tral  road  was  continued  to  the  very  suburbs  of  Savannah,  a 
hundred  and  sixty  miles.  Then  there  were  serious  breaks 
in  the  branch  road  from  Gordon  northward  through  Mil- 
ledge  ville,  and  in  that  connecting  Augusta  and  Millen.  So 
great  a  destruction  would  have  been  a  long  and  serious  in 
terruption  even  at  the  North  ;  but  the  blockade  of  Southern 
ports  and  the  small  facilities  for  manufacture  in  the  Confed 
erate  States  made  the  damage  practically  irreparable.  The 
lines  which  were  wrecked  were  the  only  ones  which  then 
connected  the  Gulf  States  with  the  Carolinas,  and  even  if 
Sherman  had  not  marched  northward  from  Savannah  the  re 
sources  of  the  Confederacy  would  have  been  seriously  crip 
pled.  The  forage  of  the  country  was  also  destroyed  through 
out  a  belt  fifty  or  sixty  miles  in  width.  Both  armies  co 
operated  in  this  ;  the  Confederate  cavalry  burning  it  that  it 
might  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  National  Army,  and  the 
latter  leaving  none  that  they  could  not  themselves  use,  so 
that  wagon  transportation  of  military  supplies  across  the 
belt  might  bo  made  more  difficult. 


THE  MAROH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        37 

As  the  campaign  progressed,  great  numbers  of  negroes  at 
tached  themselves  to  the  columns  and  accompanied  the 
march.  This  was  contrary  to  the  wish  of  Sherman,  who  felt 
the  embarrassment  of  having  thousands  of  mouths  added  to 
the  number  of  those  who  must  be  fed  from  the  country  as 
he  moved.  Those  who  had  less  responsibility  for  the  cam 
paign  did  not  trouble  themselves  so  much  with  this  consider 
ation,  and  the  men  in  the  ranks  generally  encouraged  the 
slaves  to  leave  the  plantations.  The  negroes  themselves 
found  it  hard  to  let  slip  the  present  opportunity  of  getting 
out  of  bondage,  and  their  uneducated  minds  could  not  esti 
mate  the  hope  of  freedom  at  the  close  of  the  war  as  having 
much  weight  against  the  instant  liberty  which  was  to  be 
had  by  simply  tramping  away  after  the  blue-coated  soldiers. 

The  natural  result  was  that  the  regular  bivouacs  of  the 
troops  were  fringed  by  numberless  gipsy  camps,  where  the 
negro  families,  old  and  young,  endured  every  privation,  liv 
ing  upon  the  charity  of  the  soldiers,  helping  themselves  to 
what  they  could  glean  in  the  track  of  the  army  foragers. 
On  the  march,  they  trudged  along,  making  no  complaint, 
full  of  a  simple  faith  that  "Lincoln's  men"  were  leading 
them  to  abodes  of  ease  and  plenty. 

When  the  lower  and  less  fruitful  lands  were  reached,  the 
embarrassment  and  military  annoyance  increased.  This  was 
more  particularly  felt  in  the  left  wing,  which  was  then  the 
only  one  exposed  to  the  attacks  of  the  enemy.  Losing  pa 
tience  at  the  failure  of  all  orders  and  exhortations  to  these 
poor  people  to  stay  at  home,  General  Davis  (commanding 
the  Fourteenth  Corps),  ordered  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Eben- 
ezer  Creek  to  be  taken  up  before  the  refugees  who  were 
following  that  corps  had  crossed,  so  as  to  leave  them  on  the 
further  bank  of  the  unfordable  stream  and  thus  disembar 
rass  the  marching  troops.  It  would  be  unjust  to  that  officer 


38  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

to  believe  that  the  order  would  have  been  given,  if  the  effect 
had  been  foreseen.  The  poor  refugees  had  their  hearts  so 
set  on  liberation,  and  the  fear  of  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  Confederate  cavalry  was  so  great,  that,  with  wild  waitings 
and  cries,  the  great  crowd  rushed,  like  a  stampeded  drove  of 
cattle,  into  the  water,  those  who  could  not  swim  as  well  as 
those  who  could,  and  many  were  drowned  in  spite  of  the 
earnest  efforts  of  the  soldiers  to  help  them.  As  soon  as  the 
character  of  the  unthinking  rush  and  panic  was  seen,  all  was 
done  that  could  be  done  to  save  them  from  the  water ;  but 
the  loss  of  life  was  still  great  enough  to  prove  that  there 
were  many  ignorant,  simple  souls  to  whom  it  was  literally 
preferable  to  die  freemen  rather  than  to  live  slaves. 

When  Savannah  was  reached,  the  great  number  of  colored 
refugees  with  all  the  columns  were  placed  on  the  Sea  Islands, 
under  the  care  of  government  officers,  and  added  largely  to 
the  colonies  already  established  there.  The  Freedmen's 
Bureau  was  afterward,  in  great  measure,  the  necessary  out 
growth  of  this  organization. 

The  subsistence  of  the  army  upon  the  country  was  a 
necessary  part  of  Sherman's  plan,  and  the  bizarre  character 
given  it  by  the  humor  of  the  soldiers  has  made  it  a  striking 
feature  of  the  march.  It  is  important,  however,  to  distin 
guish  between  what  was  planned  and  ordered,  and  what  was 
an  accidental  growth  of  the  soldier's  disposition  to  make 
sport  of  everything  that  could  be  turned  to  amusement. 
The  orders  issued  were  of  a  strictly  proper  military  charac 
ter.  The  supplies  in  the  trains  were  to  be  treated  as  a  re 
serve  to  be  drawn  upon  only  in  case  of  necessity,  and  a 
systematic  foraging  upon  the  country  for  daily  food  was  the 
regular  means  of  getting  rations.  Each  regiment  organized 
a  foraging  party  of  about  one-twentieth  of  its  numbers 
under  command  of  an  officer.  These  parties  set  out  first 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        39 

of  all,  in  the  morning,  those  of  the  same  brigades  and  divi 
sions  working  in  concert,  keeping  near  enough  together  to 
be  a  mutual  support  if  attacked  by  the  enemy,  and  aiming 
to  rejoin  the  column  at  the  halting  place  appointed  for  the 
end  of  the  day's  march.  The  foragers  became  the  bean 
ideal  of  partisan  troops.  Their  self-confidence  and  daring 
increased  to  a  wonderful  pitch,  and  no  organized  line  of 
skirmishers  could  so  quickly  clear  the  head  of  column  of 
the  opposing  cavalry  of  the  enemy.  Nothing  short  of  an 
intrenched  line  of  battle  could  stop  them,  and  when  they 
were  far  scattered  on  the  flank,  plying  their  vocation,  if  a 
body  of  hostile  cavalry  approached,  a  singular  sight  was  to 
be  seen.  Here  and  there,  from  barn,  from  granary  and 
smoke-house,  and  from  the  kitchen  gardens  of  the  planta 
tions,  isolated  foragers  would  hasten  by  converging  lines, 
driving  before  them  the  laden  mule  heaped  high  with  vege 
tables,  smoked  bacon,  fresh  meat,  and  poultry.  As  soon  as 
two  or  three  of  these  met,  one  would  drive  the  animals,  and 
the  others,  from  fence  corners  or  behind  trees,  would  begin 
a  bold  skirmish,  their  Springfield  rifles  giving  them  the  ad 
vantage  in  range  over  the  carbines  of  the  horsemen.  As 
they  were  pressed  they  would  continue  falling  back  and 
assembling,  the  regimental  platoons  falling  in  beside  each 
other  till  their  line  of  fire  would  become  too  hot  for  their 
opponents,  and  these  would  retire  reporting  that  they  had 
driven  in  the  skirmishers  upon  the  main  column  which  was 
probably  miles  away.  The  work  of  foraging  would  then  be 
resumed.  It  was  of  the  rarest  possible  occurrence  that 
Wheeler's  men  succeeded -in  breaking  through  these  enter 
prising  flankers  and  approaching  the  troops  of  the  line,  and 
as  the  columns  approached  the  place  designated  for  their 
evening  camp,  they  would  find  this  ludicrous  but  most 
bountiful  supply  train  waiting  for  them  at  every  fork  of  the 


40  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

road,  with  as  much  regularity  as  a  railway  train  running  on 
"  schedule  time." 

They  brought  in  all  animals  that  could  be  applied  to  army 
use,  and  as  the  mule  teams  or  artillery  horses  broke  down 
in  pulling  through  the  swamps  which  made  a  wide  border 
for  every  stream,  fresh  animals  were  ready,  so  that  on  reach 
ing  Savannah  the  teams  were  fat  and  sleek  and  in  far  better 
condition  than  they  had  been  at  Atlanta. 

The  orders  given  these  parties  forbade  their  entering  oc 
cupied  private  houses,  or  meddling  with  private  property  of 
the  kinds  not  included  in  supplies  and  munitions  of  war, 
and  in  the  best  disciplined  divisions  these  orders  were  en 
forced.  'Discipline  in  armies,  however,  is  apt  to  be  uneven, 
and  among  sixty  thousand  men  there  are  men  enough  who 
are  willing  to  become  robbers,  and  officers  enough  who  are 
willing  to  wink  at  irregularities  or  to  share  the  loot,  to  make 
such  a  march  a  terrible  scourge  to  any  country.  A  bad  emi 
nence  in  this  respect  was  generally  accorded  to  Kilpatrick, 
whose  notorious  immoralities  and  rapacity  set  so  demoral 
izing  an  example  to  his  troops  that  the  best  disciplinarians 
among  his  subordinates  could  only  mitigate  its  influence. 
His  enterprise  and  daring  had  made  his  two  brigades  usually 
hold  their  own  against  the  dozen  which  Wheeler  com 
manded,  and  the  value  of  his  services  made  his  commander 
willing  to  be  ignorant  of  escapades  which  he  could  hardly 
condone,  and  which  on  more  than  one  occasion  came  near 
resulting  in  Kilpatrick's  own  capture  and  the  rout  of  his 
command.  But  he  was  quite  capable,  in  a  night  attack  of 
this  kind,  of  mounting,  bare-backed,  the  first  animal,  horse  or 
mule,  that  came  to  hand,  and  charging  in  his  shirt  at  the  head 
of  his  troopers  with  a  dare-devil  recklessness  that  dismayed 
his  opponents  and  imparted  his  own  daring  to  his  men. 

Then,  the  confirmed  and  habitual  stragglers  soon  became 


THE  MARCH  THROUGH  GEORGIA.        41 

numerous  enough  to  be  a  nuisance  upon  the  line  of  march.  ^ 
Here  again  the  difference  in  portions  of  the  army  was  very  \ 
marked.      In  some  brigades  every  regiment  was   made  to 
keep  its  own  rear  guard  to  prevent  straggling,  and  the  bri 
gade  provost- guard  marched  in  rear  of  all,  arresting  any  wliov 
sought  to  leave  the    ranks,  and  reporting  the   regimental    ' 

commander  who  allowed  his  men  to  scatter.     But  little  by 

J 

little  the  stragglers  became  numerous  enough  to  cause 
serious  complaint,  and  they  followed  the  command  without 
joining  it  for  days  together,  living  on  the  country,  and  x 
shirking  the  labors  of  their  comrades.  It  wras  to  these  that  / 
the  name  "  bummer  "  was  properly  applied.  This  class  was 
numerous  in  the  Confederate  as  in  the  National  Army,  in 
proportion  to  its  strength,  and  the  Southern  people  cried 
out  for  the  most  summary  execution  of  military  justice 
against  them.  Besponsible  persons  addressed  specific  com 
plaints  to  the  Confederate  War  Secretary,  charging  robbery 
and  pillage  of  the  most  scandalous  kinds  against  their  own 
troops.  Their  leading  newspapers  demanded  the  cashiering 
and  shooting  of  colonels  and  other  officers,  and  declared 
their  conduct  worse  than  the  enemy's.  It  is  perhaps  vain  to 
hope  that  a  great  war  can  ever  be  conducted  without  abuses 
of  this  kind,  and  we  may  congratulate  ourselves  that  the 
wrongs  done  were  almost  without  exception  to  property,  and 
that  murders,  rapes,  and  other  heinous  personal  offences 
were  nearly  unknown.1 

The  great  mass  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  line 
worked  hard  and  continuously,  day  by  day,  in  marching,  in 
bridging  streams,  in  making  corduroy  roads  through  the 
swamps,  in  lifting  the  wagons  and  cannon  from  mud-holes, 
and  in  tearing  up  the  railways.  They  saw  little  or  nothing 

1  For  a  fow  extracts  from  Southern  newspapers  corroborating  whut  is  here 
stated  see  Appendix  C. 


42  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

of  the  people  of  the  country,  and  knew  comparatively  little 
of  the  foragers'  work,  except  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  it  and  the 
unspeakable  ludicrousness  of  the  cavalcade  as  it  came  in  at 
night.  The  foragers  turned  into  beasts  of  burden,  oxen  and 
cows  as  well  as  the  horses  and  mules.  Here  would  be  a 
silver-mounted  family  carriage  drawn  by  a  jackass  and  a 
cow,  loaded  inside  and  out  with  everything  the  country  pro 
duced,  vegetable  and  animal,  dead  and  alive.  There  would 
be  an  ox-cart,  similarly  loaded,  and  drawn  by  a  nondescript 
tandem  team,  equally  incongruous.  Qperched  upon  the  top 
would  be  a  ragged  forager,  rigged  out  in  a  fur  hat  of  a 
fashion  worn  by  dandies  of  a  century  ago,  or  a  dress-coat 
which  had  done  service  at  stylish  balls  of  a  former  genera 
tion.  The  jibes  and  jeers,  the  fun  and  the  practical  jokes 
ran  down  the  whole  line  as  the  cortege  came  in,  and  no  mas 
querade  in  carnival  could  compare  with  it  for  original  hu 
mor  and  rollicking  enjoyment.1 

The  weather  had  generally  been  perfect.  A  flurry  of  snow 
and  a  sharp,  cold  wind  had  lasted  for  a  day  or  two  about 
November  23d,  but  the  Indian  summer  set  in  after  that,  and 
on  December  8fch  the  heat  was  even  sultry.  The  camps  in 
the  open  pine-woods,  the  bonfires  along  the  railways,  the 
occasional  sham-battles  at  night,  with  blazing  pine-knots  for 
weapons  whirling  in  the  darkness,  all  combined  to  leave 
npon  the  minds  of  officers  and  men  the  impression  of  a  vast 
holiday  frolic  ;  and  in  the  reunions  of  the  veterans  since  the 
war,  this  campaign  has  always  been  a  romantic  dream  more 
than  a  reality,  and  no  chorus  rings  out  with  so  joyous  a 
swell  as  when  they  join  in  the  refrain, 

u  As  we  wera  marching  through  Georgia." 

1  For  details  and  incidents  of  all  the  phases  of  the  march,  see  Colonel  Nichols's 
Story  of  the  Great  March  ;  Reminiscences  of  the  War,  by  Samuel  Toombs ;  The 
Ninety-second  Illinois  Volunteers,  by  Gen.  Atkins,  etc.,  etc. 


CHAPTER  m. 

SAVANNAH. 

SAVANNAH  was  then  a  city  of  about  twenty-five  thousand 
inhabitants,  on  the  Georgia  side  of  the  Savannah  Eiver,  and 
had  been  the  home  of  a  well-to-do  people  who  had  made  it 
one  of  the  pleasantesfc  towns  of  the  South.  It  is  built  upon 
a  sandy  plateau  some  forty  feet  above  the  water,  and  though 
fifteen  miles  distant  from  the  ocean,  it  is  the  nearest  point 
to  the  harbor  entrance  where  a  city  could  be  built.  A  little 
below,  the  land  sinks  almost  to  the  level  of  the  sea  ;  tho 
whole  coast  is  low  and  cut  into  islands  by  deep  sinuous 
natural  canals  or  creeks.  These  are  widely  bordered  by  the 
salt  marsh  which  is  all  awash  at  high  tide.  The  upland  on 
which  the  place  is  builfc  is  almost  like  an  island  in  the 
swamps,  and  has  a  width  of  six  or  eight  miles.  Other  up 
land  knolls  are  found  here  and  there  through  the  region, 
and  these  were  usually  the  places  of  plantation  homesteads, 
in  the  midst  of  broad  rice-fields  -which  had  been  reclaimed 
from  the  surrounding  marsh. 

The  Savannah  and  Ogeechee  Rivers  approach  each  other 
at  the  ocean,  as  has  already  been  stated,  so  that  the  tongue 
of  land  which  separates  them  is  scarcely  more  than  ten  or 
fifteen  miles  in  width  for  a  distance  of  nearly  fifty  miles 
from  the  sea.  Both  rivers  are  bordered  by  the  rice  swamps 
which  make  a  natural  barrier  around  the  city  on  the  north 
west,  about  three  miles  away,  and  which,  in  their  original 


44  THE  MARCH  TO  THE   SEA. 

condition,  were  the  savannahs  from  which  the  early  naviga 
tors  gave  the  name  to  the  river.  Besides  these,  the  Little 
Ogeechee  flows  between  the  greater  stream  of  the  same 
name  and  the  Savannah,  skirting  the  city  or  the  adjoining 
plantations  on  the  southwest.  The  natural  line  of  defence 
for  the  town  on  the  north,  therefore,  was  also  a  series  of 
suburban  plantations  with  their  rice-fields  in  front :  these, 
beginning  on  the  Savannah,  were  known  as  Williamson's, 
Daly's,  Lawton's,  and  the  Silk  Hope  plantations,  and  beyond 
them  the  Salt  Creek  marshes  and  the  Little  Ogeechee  con 
tinued  the  line  of  defence  to  the  railway  bridge  of  the  At 
lantic  and  Gulf  Railroad.  The  roads  into  the  city  were 
narrow  causeways,  heaped  high  enough  to  be  out  of  water 
when  the  rice-fields  were  overflowed,  as  they  often  were,  to 
a  depth  of  from  three  to  six  feet.  Extensive  dams,  canals, 
and  flood-gates  were  part  of  the  system  by  which  the  artifi 
cial  inundation  necessary  for  rice  tillage  was  made,  and 
these  works  were  easily  modified  so  as  to  become  an  essen 
tial  part  of  the  military  defence. 

The  Savannah  River,  from  the  city  to  the  sea,  is  a  broad 
estuary  with  small,  scattered  islands.  Immediately  in  front 
of  the  town  is  Hutchinson  Island,  much  larger  than  those 
below,  being  about  five  miles  long  and  dividing  the  river  into 
two  narrower  channels.  Nearly  half  of  this  island  is  above 
"Williamson's  plantation,  and  therefore  was  outside  of  the  nat 
ural  line  of  defence  above  described.  The  lower  half  of  it, 
however,  was  hsld  by  the  Confederate  troops,  as  its  occupa 
tion  was  necessary  not  only  to  holding  the  city,  but  to  the 
preservation  of  a  line  of  retreat  toward  Charleston.  Im 
mediately  above  Hutchinson  Island  was  Argyle  Island,  ten 
miles  long,  with  a  smaller  one  (Onslow  Island)  on  the  west 
of  it,  so  that  for  some  distance  there  were  three  channels  for 
the  river. 


SAVANNAH. 


45 


Before    Sherman's  appearance   in   Eastern    Georgia  the 
sea  defences  of  Savannah  had  been  the  only  ones  of  impor- 


Savannah  and  Vicinity. 


tance,  and  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Pulasld,  in  the  spring  of 
1862,  these  had  been  somewhat  contracted,  and  now  con- 


46  THE   MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

sisted  of  a  line  of  redoubts  and  strong  detached  forts  along 
the  interior  channels  connecting  the  Savannah  River  with 
the  Great  Ogeechee,  from  Fort  Jackson  to  Fort  MacAllister, 
These,  with  the  fortified  islands  in  the  river  and  a  work  or 
two  on  the  South  Carolina  side,  had  been  sufficient  for  the 
protection  of  the  town  from  expeditions  by  sea  and  naval  at 
tacks.  They  were  armed  with  heavy  ordnance,  ranging 
from  ten  inch  columbiads  to  smooth  thirty-twos,  with  some 
howitzers  to  be  used  in  case  of  a  direct  assault.  The  ex 
pansion  of  the  mouths  of  the  Ogeechee  into  the  sea  is  known 
as  Ossabaw  Sound  ;  that  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  is 
Tybee  Sound,  and  Warsaw  Sound  1  is  an  indentation  half 
way  between  the  two.  These,  with  other  entrances  along 
that  part  of  the  shore,  were  anxiously  watched  by  the  fleet 
tinder  Rear-Admiral  Dahlgren,  so  that  no  time  might  bo 
lost  in  opening  communication  with  Sherman  when  ha 
should  reach  the  coast. 

The  principal  naval  rendezvous  and  military  post  of  the 
National  forces,  however,  was  at  Port  Royal,  twenty  miles 
farther  to  the  northeast,  at  the  mouth  of  Broad  River ;  and 
Major-General  J.  G.  Foster,  whose  headquarters  were  at 
Beaufort,  had  collected  large  quantities  of  supplies  ready  to 
be  shipped  to  Sherman's  army  as  soon  as  it  could  be 
reached. 

But  Hardee  was  unwilling  to  make  his  defence  of  Savan 
nah  upon  the  interior  line  of  fortifications,  if  he  could  avoid 
it.  To  do  so  would  involve  the  abandonment  of  the  Charles 
ton  Railroad  near  the  city,  for  it  crossed  the  river  fifteen  or 
eighteen  miles  above.  If  this  part  of  the  road  were  given 
up,  his  only  connection  with  Charleston  and  the  North 

1  Many  of  our  best  maps  call  this  name  Wassaw.  I  follow  the  authority  of 
Colonel  Jones,  author  of  The  Siege  of  Savannah,  and  a  long  time  resident  of  the 
city. 


SAVANNAH.  47 

would  be  by  the  Union  Causeway  to  Hardeeville,  a  station 
about  six  miles  from  the  river  in  South  Carolina,  which 
would  become  the  terminus  of  the  railway.  This  cause 
way,  which  became  a  little  later  Hardee's  way  of  escape 
from  Savannah,  starts  at  a  ferry  near  the  lower  end  of  Hutch- 
inson  Island  and  runs  northward  for  a  long  distance  through 
rice  swamps,  which  protect  it  from  lateral  approach.  It  had 
been  impossible  for  Hardee  to  accumulate  supplies  enough 
for  any  protracted  siege,  even  if  he  had  been  willing  to  al 
low  himself  to  be  invested ;  and  the  difficulties  of  his  situ 
ation  would  be  greatly  increased,  if  fifteen  or  twenty  miles 
of  waggoning  over  a  single  road  were  necessary  to  the  intro 
duction  of  provisions  for  his  troops  and  for  the  citizens. 
His  first  purpose,  therefore,  was  to  make  and  hold  a  line 
between  the  Savannah  and  the  Ogeechee,  far  enough  out  to 
cover  the  Charleston  railway  bridge.  An  excellent  position 
had  been  selected  and  entrenched,  running  from  a  point 
above  the  bridge,  southwest  behind  Monteith  Swamp  to  the 
Great  Ogeechee  Eivcr.  Detached  works  had  been  built 
along  this  line,  and  infantry  and  artillery  had  been  put  in 
them,  but  Sherman  had  made  them  of  no  avail  by  marching 
Howard  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps  down  the  right  bank  of 
the  Ogeechee,  flanking  and  turning  them,  so  that  Hardee 
had  no  choice  but  to  destroy  the  railway  bridge  and  fall 
back  to  his  interior  works  at  the  city. 

But  let  us  return  a  moment  to  the  last  days  of  November, 
when  General  Richard  Taylor,  by  the  aid  of  Toombs  as  State 
Adjutant,  was  bringing  to  Savannah  the  militia  derisively 
called  Governor  Brown's  army,  but  which  was  now  proving 
almost  the  sole  resource  of  the  Confederacy.  Never  was 
energy  more  timely  in  a  pinch  than  that  which  now  brought 
this  division  to  the  critical  point.  Taylor  had  hastened  to 
Savannah  in  advance  of  it,  and  while  consulting  with  Hardee 


48  THE   MARCH   TO    THE   SEA. 

on  November  29th,  news  caine  that  a  division  of  National 
troops  under  General  Hatch  had  Idnded  that  morning  at 
Boyd's  Neck,  on  Broad  River,  and  was  marching  on  Graham- 
ville  and  the  Charleston  Railroad,  about  twenty  miles  from 
the  Savannah  crossing.  General  Foster  had  ordered  this 
movement  as  one  likely  to  be  of  use  to  Sherman  whether  he 
arrived  at  Beaufort  or  at  Savannah,  and  had  Hatch  suc 
ceeded  in  establishing  himself  on  the  railway,  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  Hardee  could  have  extricated  himself  from  his  diffi 
culties.  The  Georgia  militia  were  enlisted  on  the  condition 
that  they  were  not  to  be  ordered  out  of  the  State,  but  Tay 
lor  and  Toombs  laid  their  heads  together  and  delighted  Har 
dee  by  arranging  with  General  G.  W.  Smith  to  switch  off  the 
trains  Upon  the  Charleston  road  before  reaching  Savannah, 
and  in  the  night,  so  that  the  State  troops  awoke  at  the  sta 
tion  near  Grahamville  in  South  Carolina,  having  been  made, 
as  Taylor  humorously  tells  the  story,  "  unconscious  patri 
ots."1  But  the  vigor  of  the  Confederates  had  been  lacking 
on  the  National  side.  Hatch  delayed  advancing  on  the  29th, 
when  there  was  nothing  between  him  and  the  railway  but  a 
handful  of  cavalry,  and  intrenched  a  position  near  his  land 
ing  place,  though  Grahamville  was  less  than  ten  miles  away. 
"When  he  advanced  next  day,  Smith  with  his  Georgia  troops 
was  ready  to  meet  him,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  swamps, 
which  gave  him,  near  Honey  Hill,  a  position  that  could  only 
be  approached  by  a  causeway,  the  advance  of  the  National 
column  was  checked  by  artillery.  Hatch  attempted  a  flank 
ing  movement,  but  the  Confederates  set  fire  to  the  broom- 
sedge,  which  was  dead  and  dry  in  the  late  autumn,  and  this 
prairie  fire  sweeping  down  before  the  wind  upon  our  troops 
forced  them  to  seek  cover  of  some  watercourse.  Hatch, 

1  Taylor's  DestiuctLm  and  Reconstruction,  p.   215.     Jones's  Siege  of  Savan 
nah,  p.  GO. 


SAVANNAH.  49 

however,  advanced  again,  and  drove  the  enemy  back  a  mile 
and  a  half  upon  an  intrenched  line  which  had  been  pre 
viously  made.  Here  several  courageous  assaults  were  made, 
but  they  were  repulsed,  and  in  the  night  Hatch  retired  upon 
his  own  fortifications  near  Boyd's  Neck.  The  Confederates 
report  their  loss  as  less  than  fifty,  while  ours  was  over  seven 
hundred.  It  was  only  a  fresh  instance  ..of  the  manner  in 
which  irresolute  leadership  in  war  wastes  the  lives  of  men  by 
alternating  between  an  ill-timed  caution  and  an  equally  ill- 
timed  rashness.  No  maxim  is  supported  by  more  abundant 
proof  than  that  which  enjoins  audacity  and  speed  in  the  ear 
lier  steps  of  such  expeditions,  of  which  the  essential  feature 
is  that  they  should  be  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise. 

The  result  of  the  consultation  between  Hardee  and  Taylor 
was  that  the  latter  sent  a  report  to  the  Eichmond  Govern 
ment  which  contained  a  very  just  estimate  of  the  situation. 
They  rightly  thought  that  Sherman  would  not  attempt  to 
enter  South  Carolina  before  establishing  a  new  base  of  sup 
plies  upon  the  coast,  and  that  the  greater  ease  in  following 
the  upland  roads  between  rivers  would  prevent  him  from 
moving  at  once  upon  Charleston,  where  his  route  would  bo 
across  numerous  deep  rivers  and  swamps.  They  assumed, 
therefore,  that  he  would  continue  to  move  on  Savannah,  and 
advised  that  Hardee  should  prepare  to  abandon  that  place 
before  he  should  be  completely  invested.  Then,  Hardee's 
troops  should  be  united  with  those  which  Bragg  was  now 
assembling  at  Augusta,  and  with  the  garrison  of  Charleston, 
and  all  the  scattered  detachments  in  the  Carolinas,  the 
whole  should  be  vigorously  used  to  oppose  the  march  north 
ward  which  Sherman  must  be  expected  to  make  as  soon  as 
he  had  established  a  base  on  the  ocean.  No  sounder  mili 
tary  judgment  could  be  made,  and  the  subsequent  errors  of 
Beauregard  and  Bragg  grew  out  of  their  departure  from  it 
VOL.  X.— 3 


50  THE  MARCH   TO  THE  SEA. 

when  Sherman's  skilful  demonstrations  threw  them  into 
doubt  as  to  his  purpose.  Writing  of  it  later,  Taylor  ex 
pressed  his  own  sense  of  the  crisis  by  saying  it  was  plain 
that  "unless  a  force  could  be  interposed  between  Sherman 
and  Lee's  rear,  the  game  would  be  over  when  the  former 
moved."1 

Hardee  assigned  troops  and  commanders  to  his  lines  of 
defence  as  follows.  From  the  Savannah,  at  Williamson's 
plantation,  to  the  Central  Railroad  crossing,  the  Georgia 
militia  under  General  G.  W.  Smith  held  the  lines  with 
twenty  guns  in  position.  The  batteries  at  the  Central  Kail- 
road  and  on  the  Louisville  road  with  the  lines  to  the  head 
of  Shaw's  Dam  were  held  by  the  troops  of  General  McLaws 
with  twenty-nine  pieces  of  artillery.  General  Wright  com 
manded  the  left,  reaching  from  Shaw's  Dam  to  the  bridge  of 
the  Gulf  Railway  over  the  Little  Ogeechee,  and  had  thirty- 
two  guns  in  position  on  his  front.  The  artillery  above  re 
ferred  to  was  the  heavier  armament,  besides  which  the  light 
artillery,  consisting  of  eleven  batteries  of  forty-eight  guns 
in  all,  under  Colonel  Jones,  was  distributed  as  the  necessity 
of  the  moment  demanded. 

The  forts  and  fixed  batteries  on  the  side  toward  the  sea 
were  under  the  command  of  Colonel  E.  C.  Anderson.  Of 
these,  Fort  McAllister  was  the  only  one  within  the  scope  of 
the  National  attack,  and  is,  therefore,  the  only  one  which 
need  be  described.  It  was  situated  at  Genesis  Point  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Great  Ogeechee  River,  commanding  the 
channel  of  approach  from  Ossabaw  Sound  and  covering  the 
important  bridge  of  the  Gulf  Railway  across  the  river.  It 
was  a  heavy  earthwork  with  its  principal  front  toward  the 
river  it  was  intended  to  command ;  but  the  gorge  had  also 

1  Destruction  and  Reconstruction,  p.  218. 


SAVANNAH.  51 

been  closed  by  a  straight  infantry  line  with  works  for  tho 
protection  of  artillery  at  intervals  in  it.  The  armament 
consisted  of  seven  heavy  guns  in  permanent  position,  and 
eight  light  field  guns,  all  mounted  in  barbette.  The  river 
was  planted  with  torpedoes,  and  before  the  arrival  of  Sher 
man,  sub-terra  shells  had  also  been  placed  along  the  land 
face,  where  the  ditch  was  further  protected  by  palisades  and 
a  fraise.  As  it  was  possible  this  fort  would  become  isolated, 
it  had  been  supplied  with  about  fifty  days'  rations.  Its  garri 
son  was  about  two  hundred  men  under  command  of  Major  G. 
W.  Anderson.  Immediately  above  the  fort  the  river  makes  a 
double  loop,  the  straight  lino  across  either  neck  being  less 
than  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  while  the  course  by  the  stream  is 
nine  miles.  In  nearly  a  direct  line  across  the  broader  part 
of  the  loop  above  the  fort  is  the  Cheves  plantation  with  its 
rice-mill,  two  miles  away,  upon  the  other  bank  of  the  river. 
The  fort  was  at  the  edge  of  the  higher  ground,  and  south  of 
it  the  land  fell  away  to  the  broad  salt  marshes  over  which  the 
Sound  and  the  sea  could  be  seen  in  the  distance. 

Hardee's  whole  force  consisted  of  about  eighteen  thou 
sand  men,  from  which  must  be  deducted  about  one  thousand 
sick  in  hospital.  The  garrisons  for  the  forts  on  the  sea 
front  were  small,  though  these,  of  course,  could  not  bo 
evacuated,  as  the  navy  was  likely  to  make  some  efforts  at 
co-operation  with  Sherman.1  The  inhabitants  would  also 
be  available,  to  some  extent,  under  the  levy  en  masse  which 


1  Jones's  Siege  of  Savannah  is  the  chief  authority  for  the  details  of  tho  situa 
tion  within  the  Confederate  lines.  He  says  (p.  91)  that  the  rations  issued  by  the 
Commissary  on  December  16th  were  as  follows  :  viz.,  to  Confederate  troops,  11,- 
2!tl;  to  Militia,  3.249;  to  hospitals,  1,282;  total,  15,822.  Assuming  that  officers 
either  commuted  their  rations,  or  bought  from  the  Commissary,  about  2,000 
must  be  added  to  these.  Colonel  Jones  says  that  only  10,000  men  were  available 
for  active  duty  on  the  western  line,  but  this  would  depend  on  the  judgment  of  the 
general  in  oommand. 


52  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  Legislature  had  ordered,  and  which  was  enforced  by 
Ilardee  under  a  proclamation  of  the  Mayor  issued  on  Nov 
ember  28th. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  Savannah  when,  on  December 
10th,  the  National  army  closed  in  on  the  works  around  the 
city.  A  day  or  two  was  spent  in  bringing  the  several  corps 
into  position,  but  on  the  12th  the  investment  was  complete 
from  the  Savannah  River  to  the  Ogeechee.  Jackson's  divi 
sion  of  Williams's  (Twentieth)  corps  rested  on  the  river  at 
the  extreme  left,  and  the  other  divisions  of  that  corps  ex 
tended  the  line  to  the  Central  Railroad.  Here  Davis's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  joined  it  and  reached  somewhat  beyond 
the  Ogeechee  Canal,  near  the  Lawton  plantation,  where  it 
united  with  the  left  of  Blair's  (Seventeenth)  corps.  Oster- 
haus's  (Fifteenth)  corps  completed  the  line  to  the  Great 
Ogeechee  River,  near  lung's  Bridge,  a  structure  a  thousand 
feet  long,  which  the  enemy  had  destroyed;  but  the  posts 
were  still  standing,  and  under  the  direction  of  Howard's 
chief  engineer,  Captain  Reese,  the  bridge  was  rebuilt  and  fit 
for  use  by  the  13th.  On  the  Central  Railroad  Slocum's 
pickets  were  close  to  the  three-mile  post,  the  Confederate 
entrenched  line  being  a  quarter  of  a  mile  nearer  to  the  city ; 
but  the  works  were  farther  from  the  town  in  front  of 
Howard. 

During  the  last  few  days  breadstuff's  had  been  very  scarce 
in  the  country,  and  foraging  was  not  bringing  in  the  boun 
tiful  supply  which  had  been  usual.  The  bread  ration 
was  drawn  from  the  train,  and  rice  was  nearly  the  only 
thing  the  country  now  furnished  the  troops.  Sherman's 
first  task,  therefore,  was  to  open  communication  with  the 
fleet  and  establish  a  base  of  supplies  by  means  of  transports 
plying  between  Ossabaw  Sound  and  Port  Royal.  Howard 
had  sent  a  skilful  scouting  oiEcer,  Captain  Duncan,  with  two 


SAVANNAH.  53 

men  to  pass  Fort  McAllister  in  the  night  in  a  canoe,  and 
Duncan  had  succeeded  in  reaching  Admiral  Dahlgren, 
though  it  was  not  known  till  a  day  or  two  later.  Kilpatrick 
also  was  pushing  light  parties  of  horse  along  the  coast  for 
the  same  purpose.  To  make  use  of  the  Ogeechee  Kiver, 
however,  would  be  impossible  till  Fort  McAllister  was 
taken,  and  no  sooner  was  King's  Bridge  passable  than  Sher 
man  ordered  Howard  to  send  a  sufficient  force  to  attack  and 
carry  the  fort  by  storm,  believing  that  the  more  promptly 
this  should  be  done  the  less  the  loss  would  be  in  doing  it. 
Howard  assigned  Hazen's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  to 
the  duty,  and  this  command  crossed  the  bridge  at  daybreak 
of  the  13th,  and  moving  down  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 
reached  the  vicinity  of  the  fort  before  noon. 

General  Howard  had  established  a  signal  station  at 
Cheves's  rice-mill  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  which  has 
already  been  referred  to,  and  there  a  section  of  DeGres's  bat 
tery  of  twenty-pound  Parrotts  had  been  intrenched,  covering 
the  rear  of  the  investing  line.  Sherman  and  Howard  were 
both  at  the  signal  station  on  the  roof  of  the  mill,  communi 
cating  with  Hazen,  and  watching  for  boats  from  the  fleet. 

Hazen's  men  had  captured  a  picket  about  a  mile  from  the 
fort,  and  had  learned  of  the  position  of  a  line  of  torpedoes 
in  the  road ;  these  had  been  removed,  and  the  advanced 
brigade  under  Colonel  W.  S.  Jones  had  approached  within 
half  a  mile  of  the  fort  early  in  the  afternoon.  Jones  was 
anxious  to  attack  at  once,  but  Hazen  thought  it  wiser  to 
make  the  assault  with  portions  of  each  of  his  three  brigades, 
and  delayed  the  attack  till  they  could  be  brought  into  posi 
tion.  The  reserve  was  placed  where  the  torpedoes  had  been 
found,  and  three  regiments  from  each  brigade  were  detailed 
to  make  the  assault.  Colonel  Wells  S.  Jones's  brigade  was 
on  the "  left,  Colonel  Oliver's  in  the  centre,  and  Colonel 


54:  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Theodore  Jones's  on  the  right.  The  latter  of  these  found 
considerable  difficulty  in  getting  into  position,  and  it  was 
nearly  five  o'clock  before  the  signal  for  the  attack  could  be 
given.  The  garrison  of  the  fort  had  recently  added  an  abattis 
to  th«ir  defences  on  the  land  side,  but  had  not  had  time  to 
remove  the  large  trunks  of  the  trees  from  "which  the  branches 
for  this  use  had  been  taken.  These  trunks  gave  good  cover 
to  the  skirmish  line,  which  was  pressed  so  close  to  the  fort 
as  to  pick  off  the  gunners  and  prevent  the  effective  use  of 
the  artillery. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  and  Howard,  full  of  impatience,  were 
watching  the  declining  sun  from  the  top  of  Cheves's  mill, 
and  signalling  their  orders  to  hasten.  A  tug-boat  from  the 
fleet  had  come  in  sight,  and  approached  as  close  as  it  was 
safe ;  and  to  its  captain's  question  whether  the  fort  had  been 
taken,  which  reached  Sherman  just  as  Hazen's  signal  to  his 
troops  to  advance  had  been  given,  he  answered,  "  Not  yet, 
but  it  will  be  in  a  minute."  The  gallant  dash  of  the  line 
fulfilled  the  promise.  A  short,  sharp  struggle  ensued,  and 
the  parapet  was  crowned  on  all  sides  by  the  detachments,  at 
nearly  the  same  moment.  The  attack  had  been  in  a  thin 
line  concentrating  as  they  reached  the  fort,  and  the  men 
passed  the  abatis,  the  palisades,  and  the  ditch  with  scarce 
a  perceptible  halt.  Their  greatest  loss  was  from  the  torpe 
does  which  exploded  under  their  feet  just  before  the  ditch 
was  reached.  Part  of  the  troops  on  the  extreme  flanks  got 
around  the  palisading,  where  the  angle  of  the  works  at  the 
river's  edge  was  not  so  well  protected,  and  were  helped  by 
the  fact  that  the  tide  was  out,  the  abatis  not  extending  be 
low  high-water  mark.  It  was  all  over  in  fifteen  minutes, 
and  the  National  flag  floated  on  the  staff  from  which  the 
Confederate  ensign  was  pulled  down,  while  the  victors  fired 
&feu-de-joie.  Hazen's  loss  was  24  killed  and  110  wounded' 


SAVANNAH.  55 

that  of  the  gai«.iscn  was  48.  There  was  no  formal  surren 
der,  but  officers  and  men  ceased  the  struggle  when  they 
found  that  they  were  overpowered.  Colonel  W.  S.  Jones 
fell  severely  wounded  as  the  assault  began,  and  the  com 
mand  of  that  brigade  devolved  on  Colonel  Martin  of  the 
One  Hundred  and  Eleventh  Illinois. 

The  capture  of  the  fort  had  an  importance  to  Sherman  far 
out  of  proportion  to  its  military  strength.  The  Great  Ogee- 
chee  was  now  open  and  vessels  could  reach  King's  Bridge  in 
rear  of  the  right  of  his  line.  So  the  question  of  a  base  on 
the  sea  was  already  solved,  and  the  opportune  presence  of 
the  tug  which  Sherman  had  signalled  from  Cheves's  mill 
enabled  him  to  send  despatches  that  same  night  to  Admiral 
Dahlgren's  flag-ship  in  Warsaw  Sound,  for  General  Foster  at 
Port  Royal  and  General  Grant  at  City  Point.  Before  morning 
he  heard  of  General  Foster's  arrival  in.  -the  river,  though 
unable  to  reach  Fort  McAllister  because  of  the  torpedoes 
planted  below  it.  Thereupon  Sherman  again  took  a  small 
boat  and  joined  Foster  upon  his  steamer,  when  he  decided 
that  the  best  economy  of  time  would  be  found  in  proceeding 
at  once  to  find  Admiral  Dahlgren  in  Warsaw  Sound.  The 
admiral  entered  earnestly  into  the  plans  for  co-operation, 
undertook  to  find  light-draught  vessels  for  the  transporta 
tion  of  supplies  to  King's  Bridge,  and  to  remove  the  ob 
structions  from  the  Ogeechee. 

Foster  reported  the  efforts  he  had  made  to  reach  the 
Charleston  railway,  and  that  although  he  had  not  succeeded 
in  getting  actual  possession  of  any  point  of  the  road,  he  had, 
about  a  week  before,  intrenched  a  position  near  Coosaw- 
hatchee  from  which  his  guns  commanded  the  railroad.  He 
was  unable  to  be  in  the  saddle  owing  to  the  breaking  out  of 
an  old  wound,  and  this  was  a  serious  misfortune,  for  the 
juncture  was  one  in  which  the  presence  of  the  responsible 


56  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

commander  is  the  only  guaranty  for  thorough  work  at  the 
front.  The  truth  was,  that  although  the  position  referred  to 
was  within  a  mile  of  the  railway,  the  enemy  continued  to 
operate  the  road  without  serious  interruption  as  far  as 
Hardeeville,  from  which  point  the  connection  with  Savannah 
was  made  by  the  Union  Causeway.  Within  the  range  of  the 
guns  at  Foster's  position  the  railway  was  used  chiefly  at 
night,  and  the  trains  were  kept  running  till  the  evacuation 
of  Savannah,  a  week  later. 

Foster,  however,  was  directed  to  establish  himself  upon 
the  railway,  if  possible,  and  Sherman  returned  on  the  morn 
ing  of  December  15th  to  Howard's  headquarters.  Strong 
reconnoissances  had  meanwhile  been  made  by  the  corps 
commanders,  the  approaches  to  Hardee's  works  had  been 
carefully  studied,  and  the  preliminary  steps  taken  to  drain 
off  the  overflow  from  portions  of  the  rice-fields  in  front  of 
the  city.  By  mending  some  of  the  breaks  in  the  causeways 
and  canals,  and  especially  in  the  Ogeechee  Canal,  and  by 
rearranging  the  flood-gates  within  our  lines  so  that  they 
should  shut  out  the  water  from  the  rivers  instead  of  shut 
ting  it  in,  the  depth  of  the  inundations  began  to  be  sensibly 
diminished.  Till  the  water  should  be  a  good  deal  reduced 
an  assault  could  hardly  be  thought  of,  for  narrow  columns 
along  the  causeways  and  dykes  would  have  little  chance, 
and  in  the  overflowed  fields  the  certainty  of  all  wounded 
men  being  drowned  would  make  an  unjustifiable  waste  of 
human  life. 

On  the  night  of  the  llth,  General  Williams  of  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps  had  put  over  part  of  the  Third  Wisconsin  upon 
Argyle  Island,  and  next  morning  the  rest  of  the  regiment. 
While  these  troops  were  crossing,  three  armed  steamers  of 
the  Confederates  attempted  to  descend  the  river,  but  were 
fired  upon  by  Winegar's  rifled  battery,  two  of  them  were 


SAVANNAH.  57 

driven  back,  and  one,  the  Eesolute,  was  driven  ashore  upon 
the  island  and  captured  with  its  crew  by  Colonel  Hawley 
and  the  Wisconsin  regiment.  Hardee  had  other  gunboats 
below,  and  the  presence  of  these  in  the  river  made  it  seem 
unadvisable  to  lay  pontoon  bridges  till  some  thorough  means 
of  protecting  them  could  be  arranged.  By  an  unfortunate 
mistake  the  Resolute  was  burned  by  her  captors,  when  she 
would  have  been  of  inestimable  value  in  ferrying  troops  and 
supplies.  The  Confederates  had  carefully  removed  all  flat- 
boats  and  barges  from  the  river,  and  the  great  exposure  of 
detached  troops  on  the  South'  Carolina  side,  with  no  as 
sured  means  of  communication  or  of  supply,  made  it  seem 
better  to  trust  to  Foster's  ability  to  complete  the  invest 
ment  on  the  east  by  seizing  the  railway  to  which  his  troops 
were  so  near. 

Large  quantities  of  rice  were  found  on  the  island,  and  for 
some  days  this  was  the  only  breadstuff  the  men  could  pro 
cure,  while  the  rice-straw  was  the  only  forage  for  animals. 
On  the  16th,  Colonel  Carman  with  the  remainder  of  his  bri 
gade  joined  Hawley  on  the  island,  while  at  the  same  time 
Wheeler  began  a  concentration  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
opposite,  to  contest  any  landing  on  the  Carolina  shore. 

At  the  right,  Howard  was  making  corduroy  roads  to  con 
nect  the  camps  with  the  new  depot  that  was  preparing  at 
King's  Bridge,  and  was  hurrying  the  operations  which  were 
expected  to  drain  the  rice-fields.  His  divisions  and  Slo- 
cum's  were  also  arranging  earthworks  to  receive  some  heavy 
rifled  guns  which  Sherman  had  directed  Foster  to  send  from 
Port  Royal,  as  the  light  artillery  brought  with  the  army 
could  not  cope  with  the  armamejit  of  the  Confederate  forti 
fications.  In  many  places  a  fringe  of  pine  woods  protected 
the  camps  of  the  National  troops,  and  it  was  noticed  that 
when  this  was  half  a  mile  deep,  the  shot  from  even  the 
3* 


58  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

heaviest  of  the  enemy's  guns  failed  to  pass  through  it. 
Around  the  plantation  houses  were  groves  of  giant  live-oaks 
festooned  with  the  tillandsia,  the  long  moss  of  the  South, 
and  the  headquarters  tents  were  picturesquely  dotted 
among  these. 

A  despatch  boat  had  been  waiting  on  the  coast  with  the 
mail  for  the  army,  and  Sherman  received  despatches  from 
Grant,  dated  the  3d  and  6th  of  December,  in  which  he  di 
rected  that  an  intrenched  position  be  established  at  any 
eligible  point,  and  that  the  bulk  of  the  army  should  then 
be  shipped  by  sea,  to  join  the  forces  before  Richmond. 
Sherman  responded  to  these  at  some  length  on  the  16th, 
accepting  the  role  assigned  him  with  hearty  subordination, 
but  saying  that  his  own  expectation  had  been  to  reduce 
Savannah  and  then  march  to  Columbia.  To  the  officers  of 
Grant's  staff,  who  were  the  bearers  of  the  despatches,  he 
explained  more  fully  Ins  plans,  and  very  vigorously  urged 
the  advantages  of  the  movements  he  had  proposed,  so  that 
these  might  be  properly  laid  before  the  General-in-Chief.' 
It  happened,  however,  that  on  the  very  day  when  Sherman 
was  thus  replying,  Grant  had  himself  reached  the  conclu 
sion  to  leave  his  subordinate  free  to  choose  his  own  course, 
and  Halleck  was  writing  to  Sherman,  by  his  direction,  the 
authority  to  act  upon  his  own  judgment.  The  true  strategic 
purpose  of  the  campaign  was  thus  maintained,  but  as  the 
despatches  of  the  16th  and  18th  did  not  reach  Sherman  till 
Savannah  was  in  his  possession,  the  effect  was  to  make 
him  less  decisive  than  he  would  otherwise  have  been  in 
putting  the  left  wing  of  the  army  into  positions  on  the 
Carolina  side  of  the  river,  and  in  committing  himself  to  siege 
operations  and  to  a  completed  investment,  from  which  it 


1  My  authority  for  this  is  Colonel  G.  W.  Nichols,  of  Sherman's  staff,  who  was 
present  at  the  conversation. 


SAVANNAH.  50 

would  not  have  been  easy  to  withdraw  when  the  expected 
transports  should  appear  to  take  away  the  army.  As  a  mid 
dle  course,  therefore,  he  determined  to  rely  mainly  upon 
Foster  for  operations  in  South  Carolina,  limiting  Slocum 
to  such  auxiliary  efforts  from  Argyle  Island  as  might  at  any 
time  be  withdrawn.  That  such  a  middle  course  was  a 
comparatively  weak  one,  no  one  was  better  aware  than 
Sherman,  but  it  was  that  which  duty  seemed  to  dictate. 
He  directed  his  Chief  Engineer,  Colonel  Poe,  to  lay  out  an 
intrenched  camp  at  Fort  McAllister,  which  might  be  held  in 
the  manner  indicated  by  General  Grant's  first  despatches, 
and  ordered  the  corps  commanders  to  press  the  siege  with 
the  means  in  hand. 

In  the  hope  also  that  the  boldness  of  the  demand  might 
have  some  moral  effect,  he  sent  on  the  17th  a  formal  sum 
mons  to  Hardee  to  surrender,  but  this  was  refused.  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  Confederate  commander  was  de 
termined  not  to  allow  himself  to  be  shut  up  in  the  city,  and 
the  only  question  with  him  was  how  long  he  could  stay 
without  too  seriously  endangering  his  escape.  i6eauregard 
had  reached  Augusta.,  and  was  in  general  command,  and  this 
officer  had  accepted  and  earnestly  reiterated  the  views 
which  Hardee  and  Taylor  had  laid  before  the  Confederate 
Government  on  this  subject.  General  S.  Jones,  now  in 
command  at  Charleston,  was  ordered  to  Pocotaligo  to  keep 
open  the  railroad  at  every  hazard,  and  a  bridge  of  boats 
was  built  across  the  two  channels  of  the  river,  from  Savan 
nah  to  Hutchinson  Island  and  thence  to  the  Carolina  shore. 

Meanwhile  the  waters  on  the  inundated  rice-fields  were 
slowly  subsiding,  Howard  and  Slocum  had  their  siege  bat 
teries  in  position,  some  of  their  divisions  had  prepared 
light  bridges  to  be  carried  by  the  men  and  thrown  acros  j 
the  ditches,  and  other  preparations  were  made  for  an  assault? 


GO  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

which  must  have  been  sanguinary,  but  which  they  believed 
could  be  successfully  made.  On  the  19th  Carman's  brigade 
was  ferried  across  from  Argyle  Island  to  the  Carolina 
shore,  and  obtained  a  strong  defensive  position  at  Izard's 
mill,  but  the  fields  were  under  water  there  also,  and  all 
bridges  were  burned,  so  that  it  was  not  an  easy  thing  to 
advance.  The  movement,  however,  satisfied  Hardee  that  he 
could  not  delay  longer,  and  he  began  the  evacuation,  first 
sending  over  a  strong  detachment  to  resist  fiercely  the  advance 
of  Carman  along  the  dykes.  Knowing  the  danger  of  Har- 
dee's  escape,  and  believing  that  a  vigorous  effort  by  Foster's 
troops  might  still  prevent  it,  Sherman  started  in  person  by 
steamer,  on  the  18 bh,  to  visit  Foster,  whose  physical  condi 
tion  was  not  such  that  he  could  come  to  the  camp.  Ho 
spent  the  20th  at  Hilton  Head,  giving  directions  for  a  move 
ment  of  Hatch's  division  against  the  Union  Causeway,  and 
started  to  return  in  the  night ;  but  his  boat  was  delayed  by 
high  winds  and  by  grounding  at  low  tide,  so  that  he  did 
not  get  back  till  toward  evening  on  the  21st,  when  he  found 
the  city  already  in  possession  of  his  troops.  Hardee  had 
completed  the  evacuation  in  the  night  of  the  20fch,  and 
Geary's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  being  the  nearest  to 
the  town,  had  marched  in  at  daybreak  next  morning.  Sher 
man's  despatch  announcing  the  possession  of  the  city  reached 
President  Lincoln  on  Christmas  eve,  and  its  publication 
was  received  by  the  country  as  a  Christmas  gift  of  priceless 
value.  The  moral  prestige  of  the  march  was  greatly  height 
ened  by  the  so  quick  capture  of  one  of  the  principal  South 
ern  cities  and  seaports.  The  escape  of  Hardee  was  a 
disappointment,  but  as  we  now  know  that  he  had  been  care 
fully  watching  the  roads  since  the  first  approach  of  the 
National  army,  with  the  determination  to  abandon  the  city 
before  the  investment  could  have  been  made  complete, 


SAVANNAH.  61 

the  only  question  was  whether  he  should  make  the  evacua 
tion  a  few  days  sooner  or  later. 

Hardee  had  only  been  able  to  remove  his  light  artillery 
with  his  troops,  and  the  heavy  guns,  mounted  and  in  store, 
which  were  captured,  were  found  to  number  over  two  hun 
dred  and  fifty.  Thirty-one  thousand  bales  of  cotton  also 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  National  army  and  were  turned 
over  to  the  officers  of  the  Treasury  Department.  The  re 
treating  Confederate  army  moved  first  to  Charleston,  whence 
the  Georgia  militia  were  sent  to  Augusta,  that  they  might 
relieve  other  Confederate  troops  there  and  serve  within 
their  own  State,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  enlist 
ment. 


62 


FRANKLIN   AND  NASHV1LM& 


CHAPTER  IV. 

MIDDLE  TEXNESSEE-PULASKI  TO  SPRING  HILL. 

WHILE  the  events  described  in  the  last  chapters  were 
occurring  in  Georgia,  the  struggle  in  Middle  Tennessee  had 
reached  a  crisis.  We  have  seen  that  before  November  15th 
Forrest's  cavalry  had  joined  Hood,  and  that  a  portion  of  the 
Confederate  infantry  occupied  Florence,  covering  the  bridge 
that  was  laid  there  in  preparation  for  the  advance  of  the 
whole  of  Hood's  arrny.  General  Thomas  had  committed  to 
General  Schofield  the  command  of  the  troops  immediately 
opposed  to  Hood,  but  it  was  the  universal  expectation  that  a 
rapid  concentration  of  the  National  forces  would  be  made 
in  time  to  prevent  the  Confederate  army  from  advancing 
far.1 

In  East  Tennessee  the  enemy,  under  Breckenridge,  made 
an  attack  upon  General  Gillem,  who  commanded  a  body  of 
our  cavalry  there  ;  but  this  was  simply  a  diversion  intended 
to  delay  the  concentration  of  our  forces,  like  that  made  just 
before  by  Forrest,  and  had  no  further  significance.  Sher 
man's  march  from  Atlanta  made  it  necessary  for  Hood  to  do 
promptly  whatever  he  meant  to  do,  and  his  cavalry  began  to 
make  demonstrations  toward  Lawrenceburg  and  Waynes- 
boro  as  early  as  the  15th.  The  weather,  however,  had 
proven  a  formidable  obstacle,  delaying  the  rebuilding  of  the 
railroad  between  Tuscumbia  and  Cherokee  Station,  and 


1  For  organization  of  the  armies  of  Thomas  and  Hood,  see  Appendix  B. 


C4  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

delaying  still  more  the  wagon  trains  which  were  toiling 
through  the  mud  in  the  effort  to  accumulate  supplies  suffi 
cient  to  warrant  the  opening  of  an  active  campaign.  The 
storms,  of  which  only  the  edge  reached  Sherman  near  Ma- 
con,  were  continuous  and  severe  in  Tennessee,  alternating 
between  rains  and  severe  frosts,  covering  the  roads  with  a 
frozen  crust  over  deep  mire,  just  strong  enough  to  make  the 
utmost  obstruction,  without  getting  the  solidity  necessary  to 
bear  up  the  wagons  and  teams. 

Beauregard  had  left  Hood  on  the  17th,  after  issuing  the 
order  which  directed  the  latter  to  advance  with  the  least 
possible  delay,  and  on  the  20th  had  reached  West  Point, 
Miss.,  whence  he  telegraphed  to  Hood  to  ''push  an  active 
offensive  immediately."  On  that  day,  Lee's  corps  marched 
ten  miles  out  from.  Florence,  on  a  road  between  those  lead 
ing  to  Waynesboro  and  to  Lawrenceburg,  and  on  the  21st 
the  whole  of  the  army  was  in  motion,  Hood  hoping  by  a 
rapid  march  to  get  in  rear  of  Schofield's  forces  before  they 
could  reach  Duck  River.  Schofield  received  word  on  the 
20th  from  Hatch,  who  commanded  his  cavalry,  that  the  ad 
vance  had  begun,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  evident  that  Hood 
was  moving  on  the  Lawrenceburg  road,  he  sent  back  his 
surplus  stores  from  Pulaski,  and  prepared  to  retreat  to  Co 
lumbia.  He  had  ordered  Colonel  Strickland,  who  was  at  the 
last-named  place,  to  prepare  a  defensive  line  by  which  he 
could  hold  the  town,  or  at  least  the  crossings  of  Duck 
River  at  the  railway  and  pontoon  bridges.  On  the  21st  the 
cavalry  reports  left  no  doubt  that  Hood  was  near  Lawrence 
burg,  and  the  next  morning  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  was  sent  to  Lynnville,  about  half  way  between  Pulaski 
and  Columbia,  where  it  was  joined  in  the  evening  by  Wag 
ner's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  At  this  point  they  cov 
ered  an  important  cross-road  coming  in  from  Lawrenceburg 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  65 

to  the  railway.  Thomas's  despatches  to  Schofield  had  all 
contained  the  strong  wish  that  the  troops  might  retreat  as 
little  and  as  slowly  as  possible,  for  on  Sunday,  the  20th,  he  had 
abandoned  the  expectation  of  seeing  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  be 
fore  the  following  Friday.  He  expressed  a  hope  that  Pulaski 
might  be  held  till  then,  but  coincided  in  Schofield's  opinion 
that,  if  Hood  attempted  to  get  in  his  rear,  it  would  be  neces 
sary  to  retire  to  Columbia,  covering  the  railway.  The  min 
gled  and  continuous  storms  of  snow,  sleet,  and  rain  were 
delaying  Hood,  and  he  was  not  yet  so  far  North  as  to  make 
it  sure  that  he  would  not  seek  to  reach  the  railway  south  of 
Columbia.  On  the  23d,  Schofield's  movement  kept  pace 
with  Hood's,  Cox's  division  being  sent  ten  miles  farther 
north  to  Hurricane,  the  crossing  of  the  railway  by  the 
Mount  Pleasant  and  Shelbyville  road,  and  Stanley,  with  the 
whole  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  was  moved  to  Lynnville.  But 
during  the  night  Schofield  received  word  that  the  cavalry 
on  the  Mount  Pleasant  and  Columbia  Boad  were  unable  to 
resist  the  determined  advance  of  Forrest,  and  before  day 
break  of  the  24th  he  put  his  little  army  in  rapid  motion  for 
Columbia.  Cox's  division,  having  the  shorter  distance  to 
travel,  approached  the  town  first,  and  hearing  the  noise  of 
the  cavalry  combat  on  the  converging  road  at  the  west, 
marched  by  a  cross-road  some  two  miles  out  of  town,  and 
reached  that  on  which  the  fight  was  going  on  in  time  to  in 
terpose  the  infantry  skirmishers,  moving  at  double-quick, 
between  Forrest's  cavalry  and  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Capron, 
which  was  rapidly  retreating  into  the  place.  The  enemy 
was  quickly  checked  and  a  line  formed  behind  Bigby  Creek. 
It  was  now  a  little  after  seven  o'clock ;  in  less  than  three 
hours  Stanley's  head  of  column  came  up,  and  a  strong  posi 
tion  was  taken  by  the  whole  command,  covering  the  town  on 
the  south.  Hood  did  not  succeed  in  getting  the  whole  of 


66  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

his  forces  up  until  the  26th,  his  utmost  exertions  having 
failed  to  move  his  army  faster*  than  ten  miles  a  day.  Scho- 
field  was  joined  on  the  march  by  General  Wilson,  who  took 
command  of  all  the  cavalry,  which  was  slowly  reinforced, 
and  he  was  met  at  Columbia  by  General  Euger,  with  one  of 
the  brigades  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  had  been  left 
at  Johnsouville.  General  Cooper,  who  had  also  been  at 
Johnsonville,  was  ordered  by  General  Thomas  to  march 
with  his  brigade  from  there  to  Centreville,  a  crossing  of  the 
Duck  River,  thirty  miles  west  of  Columbia,  where  it  was 
thought  Forrest's  cavalry  might  try  to  pass  that  stream. 
Part  of  Euger's  command  was  scattered  at  several  points  on 
the  river,  within  a  few  miles  of  Columbia,  to  protect  cross 
ings  and  fords  on  Schofield's  right  flank.  Wilson,  with  the 
cavalry,  was  directed  to  operate  on  the  left,  covering  the 
country  in  the  direction  of  Lewisburg  and  Sbelbyville  as 
well  as  possible,  besides  watching  the  fords  and  crossings  of 
the  river  above  Columbia. 

Schofield's  position  was  a  strong  one  if  the  attack  were 
made  upon  him  in  front,  but  it  had  the  great  disadvantage 
of  a  river  at  his  back.  No  line  north  of  the  river  could  be 
occupied  without  abandoning  the  railroad  bridge  to  destruc 
tion,  and  this  would  be  needed  again  as  soon  as  a  forward 
movement  should  begin.  The  river  at  the  town  makes  a 
horse-shoe  bend  to  the  south,  and  the  land  on  the  north 
bank  in  the  bend  is  low,  and  completely  commanded  by 
that  on  the  south.  Hood  was  too  wary  to  make  an  assault 
of  the  lines,  and  contented  himself  with  a  sharp  skirmishing 
engagement,  while  he  prepared- to  turn  Schofield's  position 
by  crossing  the  river  some  miles  above. 

Thomas  had  given  orders  to  General  Granger,  at  Decitur, 
prior  to  the  retrograde  movement,  under  which  that  officer, 
on  the  same  day  that  Schofield  abandoned  Pulaski,  with- 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  G7 

drew  his  garrisons  from  Athens,  Decatur,  and  Huntsville, 
and  concentrated  bis  division  at  Stevenson,  a  hundred  miles 
east.  The  relations  of  this  singular  divergent  movement 
will  be  considered  later ;  its  immediate  effect  was  to  relieve 
Hood  of  any  embarrassment  as  to  his  right  flank  in  operat 
ing  against  Schofield.  The  garrison  at  Johnsonville  was 
ordered  to  remove  the  public  property  and  retire  to  Clarks- 
ville,  fifty  miles  northwest  of  Nashville. 

On  the  24th,  a  careful  examination  of  the  country  satisfied 
Schofield  that  he  must  expect  Hood  to  try  to  turn  his  posi 
tion,  and  he  informed  Thomas  of  his  purpose  to  prepare  an 
interior  and  shorter  line,  so  that  when  it  became  necessary 
he  could  retire  to  this  and  send  part  of  his  force  north  of 
Duck  Eiver.  Thomas  still  urged  that  the  effort  be  made  to 
cover  the  railway  and  pontoon  bridges  with  a  bridge-head,  so 
keeping  command  of  a  crossing  till  he  should  be  ready  to 
advance;  and  Schofield  prepared  to  delay  and  obstruct 
Hood  to  the  last  moment,  urging  that  the  infantry  rein 
forcements  be  sent  to  him  as  fast  as  possible.  The  strong 
efforts  which  had  been  made  had  increased  Wilson's  cavalry 
to  about  seven  thousand  equipped,  five  regiments  being  sent 
forward  from  Nashville  between  the  24th  and  27th  of  the 
month.  These,  however,  did  not  reach  him  at  the  front  till 
the  30th,  and  till  that  time  his  force  remained  inferior  in 
strength  to  Forrest's,  even  if  we  deduct  from  the  latter  Rod- 
dey's  division,  which  seems  to  have  been  detached,  guarding 
Northern  Alabama. 

During  the  night  of  the  25th  Schofield  ordered  Cox  to 
move  two  brigades  of  his  division  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  and  take  a  position  covering  the  pontoon  bridge  which 
was  at  the  ford.  On  the  26th,  this  was  strengthened  by 
breastworks  on  indented  lines,  where  the  brigades  and  regi 
ments  were  separately  intrenched,  taking  advantage  of  every 


68 


FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 


irregularity  of  the  ground  and  of  groves  of  timber  to  pro 
tect  the  force  from  the  cross-fire  of  artillery  which  the  en 
emy  would  have  from  the  higher  ground  on  the  south  of  the 
stream.  Pits  were  also  made  for  a  line  of  skirmishers  close 


Vicinity  of  Columbia,  Tenn. 

to  the  river  bank.  The  Fourth  Corps  troops  were  brought 
into  the  interior  line  which  had  been  constructed  on  the 
other  side,  and  the  town  and  bridges  were  still  held. 

Hood  felt  cautiously  the  new  line  in  front  of  Columbia 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE,  69 

but  still  did  not  attack,  and  the  whole  of  his  infantiy  being 
up,  he  began  a  movement  to  cross  the  river  above.  Forrest 
assembled  most  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  between  Hood's 
right  and  the  turnpike,  and  other  roads  leading  from  Lewis- 
burg  to  Franklin  eastward  of  Columbia,  trying  the  different 
fords.  Wilson  was  actively  at  work  to  prevent  the  crossing, 
watching  the  country  as  far  as  Shelbyville.  The  indications 
of  Hood's  purpose  were  now  so  plain  that  Schofield  felt  ho 
could  no  longer  delay,  and  moved  the  whole  of  his  command 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  in  the  night  of  the  27th,  partly 
destroying  the  railway  bridge,  so  that  the  enemy  could  nob 
make  use  of  it.  He  was  also  obliged  to  destroy  the  pontoon 
bridge,  which  was  of  heavy  wooden  boats,  for  which  he  had 
no  means  of  transportation.  He  earnestly  assured  Thomas 
that  he  had  held  on  as  long  as  was  at  all  safe,  and  he  was 
plainly  right,  the  only  doubt  being  whether,  in  his  zeal  to 
give  Thomas  all  the  time  possible  for  the  intended  concen 
tration,  he  was  not  taking  too  great  a  risk. 

Wilson  heard,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  that  Forrest 
had  forced  a  crossing  at  Huey's  mill,  eight  miles  above 
Columbia.1  He  tried  to  unite  his  forces  as  rapidly  as  possi 
ble  in  front  of  the  enemy,  but  Hurt's  cross-roads,  between 
Spring  Hill  and  the  Lewisburg  road,  was  the  first  point  at 
which  he  was  able  to  make  any  continued  stand.  At  eight 
in  the  evening  his  information  seemed  to  show  that  Forrest 
was  moving  eastward  toward  the  Lewisburg  road,  and  that 
none  of  the  enemy  had  gone  toward  the  Franklin  road,  in 


1  The  official  reports  and  memoirs  on  both  sides  are  full  of  differences  as  to  the 
distance  from  Columbia  to  the  place  where  Hood's  infantry  crossed.  The  Con 
federate  accounts  say  nothing  of  Huey's  mill,  and  do  not  distinctly  fix  the  place 
of  their  pontoon  bridge.  By  the  courtesy  of  Capt.  R.  D.  Smith,  of  Columbia, 
who  was  in  Hood's  army  at  the  time,  I  am  able  to  say  definitely  that  the  bridge 
was  laid  at  Davis's  ford,  between  five  and  six  miles  from  Columbia.  Some  of  the 
cavalry  crossed  at  Huey'a  mill. 


70  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

rear  of  Schofield.  At  one  o'clock,  however,  he  received  in 
formation  that  pontoons  were  laid  at  Huey's  mill,  and  that 
Hood's  infantry  were  crossing.  This  he  immediately  de 
spatched  to  Schofield;  but  the  messenger  had  to  go  by 
Spring  Hill,  and  the  way  was  long,  so  that  the  intelligence 
was  only  received  at  daylight  in  the  morning.  A  brigade  of 
infantry  (Post's  of  Wood's  division)  was  immediately  sent 
upon  a  reconnoissaiice  up  the  river,  accompanied  by  one  of 
Schofield's  staff,  with  orders  to  observe  and  report  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy.  Stanley  was  ordered  to  march  at  eight 
o'clock  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps  to  Spring  Hill,  eleven 
miles,  leaving  Wood  in  support  of  Post's  reconnoissance,  and 
about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Cox's  division,  which  was  ordered  to 
hold  stubbornly  the  crossing  at  Columbia  and  the  tongue  of 
land  in  the  bend  of  the  river.  Euger  was  ordered  to  hasten 
the  blockade  of  the  fords  and  roads  below  the  town  by  fell 
ing  trees,  and  then  to  march  also  to  Spring  Hill.  Stewart's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  which  had  been  watching  the  lower 
fords,  had  been  ordered  the  preceding  evening  to  proceed 
rapidly  to  join  Wilson  by  way  of  Spring  Hill ;  and  Ham 
mond's  brigade,  which  was  coming  from  Nashville  freshly 
remounted,  was  ordered  to  stop  at  the  same  place  and  move 
as  Wilson  should  direct.  As  another  precaution  Scholield 
had  telegraphed  Thomas,  asking  that  a  pontoon  bridge  be 
sent  to  Franklin,  where  the  wagon  bridge  had  been  carried 
away  by  a  freshet. 

Soon  after  daylight  the  Confederate  artillery  around  the 
whole  bend  of  the  river  opened  upon  the  division  en 
trenched  in  the  lower  lands  along  the  north  shore,  but  the 
precautions  that  had  been  taken  by  building  traverses  and 
angles  in  the  lines  prevented  any  serious  loss.  The  lire 
was  returned  from  our  batteries,  and  the  renewal  of  the 
artillery  combat  at  different  times  through  the  day,  by 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  71 

showing  that  Hood's  cannon  were  in  position,  proved  also 
that  his  whole  army  could  not  have  moved. 

The  truth  was  that  Hood  had  left  two  divisions  of  Lee's 
corps,  and  the  whole  of  his  artillery,  in  Columbia,  with 
orders  to  make  strong  demonstrations  in  the  morning,  and 
to  force  the  crossing  of  the  river  later  in  the  day.  The 
roads  by  which  he  was  leading  Cheatham's  and  Stewart's 
corps  were  not  thought  practicable  for  the  cannon.  Scho- 
field  needed  time  for  Ruger  to  complete  his  work  at  the 
fords  below,  and  to  send  by  rail  some  artillery  which  had  no 
horses  and  other  material  for  which  transportation  was 
lacking.  He  judged  also  from  the  strong  force  of  the  ene 
my  in  Columbia  that  Hood  was  not  unlikely  to  move  straight 
down  the  river  upon  his  flank,  when  the  two  parts  of  the 
Confederate  army  could  co-operate.  He  therefore  modi 
fied  his  order  to  Stanley,  so  as  to  place  Kimball's  division 
near  Rutherford  Creek  crossing,  about  two  miles  from 
Wood,  and  let  Stanley  proceed  to  Spring  Hill  with  Wag 
ner's  division  alone.  Ruger  was  ready  to  march  early  in 
the  day,  and  leaving  one  regiment  as  an  outpost  on  the 
right,  he  hastened  with  the  rest  of  his  two  brigades  over 
Rutherford  Creek,  when  he  halted,  by  Schoneld's  orders,  a 
short  distance  beyond  the  position  of  Kimball.  The  wagon 
trains  of  the  army  had  been  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  and 
Stanley  reached  that  place  about  noon,  and  just  in  time  to 
prevent  their  capture  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

Forrest  had,  on  the  28th,  placed  Buford's  division  upon 
the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  turnpike,  Chalmers's  division  at 
Holland's  Ford,  about  seven  miles  east  of  Columbia,  and 
Jackson's  at  Huey's  mill,  between  Chalmers  and  Bnford, 
while  he  himself,  with  his  escort,  and  Biffle's  demi-brigade 
attempted  Davis's  Ford,  two  miles  west  of  Chalmers.1  The 

1  Jordan  and  Prior's  Campaigns  of  Forrest,  p.  019. 


72  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

two  divisions  of  the  National  cavalry  were  broken  into 
smaller  detachments,  part  of  them,  well  out  toward  Shelby  - 
ville,  the  nearest  to  the  infantry  being  part  of  Capron's 
brigade,  at  Bally  Hill,  on  the  Lewisburg  road,  where  a 
branch  turnpike  turns  off  to  Spring  Hill.  The  resistance 
made  to  Buford  was  so  vigorous  that  he  could  not  get  over 
the  river,  but  Jackson  and  Chalmers  forced  a  crossing  after 
a  sharp  skirmish,  and  Forrest  himself  does  not  seem  to  have 
found  any  resistance.  He  soon  struck  the  Columbia  and 
Murfreesboro  road,  and  turning  Chalmers  and  Jackson  to 
the  east,  drove  Wilson's  detachment  beyond  Eally  Hill. 
The  enemy  was  now  between  the  main  body  of  our  cavalry 
and  the  parties  watching  the  fords  near  the  Lewisburg 
crossing.  These  were  collected  by  Major  Young  (Fifth 
Iowa  Cavalry)  and  under  his  lead  they  daringly  cut  their 
way  through.  Wilson  now  called  in  his  detachments  to 
ward  Hurt's  Corners  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but  his  despatch 
to  Schofield  at  eight  o'clock,  giving  the  information  already 
referred  to,  shows  that  he  was  misled  as  to  Forrest's  pur 
poses.  It  is  true  that  the  latter  was  moving  eastward  with 
two-thirds  of  his  command,  but  he  was  doing  so  only  to 
clear  the  way  for  Buford,  and  at  Bally  Hill  he  was  in  pos 
session  of  the  only  macadamized  road  leading  directly  to 
Schofield's  rear  at  Spring  Hill.  Wilson  had  been  able  to 
rally  his  whole  command  at  Hurt's  Corners,  and  checked 
the  further  advance  of  the  enemy  in  the  evening,  but  Buford 
joined  Forrest  in  the  night,  and  early  in  the  morning  the 
whole  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  again  advanced.  Wilson 
made  a  brave  and  determined  resistance,  putting  Croxton's 
brigade  of  Johnson's  division  in  the  rear,  to  contest  every 
foot  of  the  way.  Capron's  brigade  of  the  same  division, 
which  had  been  badly  worsted  the  evening  before,  took 
the  advance  on  the  Franklin  road,  and  Hatch's  division  was 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  73 

the  middle  of  the  column  supporting  Croxton.  Forrest 
operated  by  flank  movements,  using  his  heavier  force  to 
turn  the  positions  selected  by  Wilson,  and  by  the  mid 
dle  of  the  forenoon  had  gained  Mount  Carmel,  where  the 
Murfreesboro  and  Spring  Hill  road  crosses  the  turnpike 
on  which  our  cavalry  was  retiring.  Here  Coon's  brigade 
of  Hatch's  division  occupied  a  barricade  which  had  been 
previously  made  by  Capron,  and  the  rest  of  the  command 
moved  through  it.  The  enemy  made  two  determined 
charges  upon  it,  but  were  repulsed.  Wilson  continued, 
however,  to  retire  slowly  on  Franklin,  and  Forrest,  who  now 
had-  possession  of  the  direct  road  to  Spring  Hill,  covering 
that  by  which  Hood's  infantry  was  moving,  no  longer 
pressed  the  pursuit ;  but  leaving  a  detachment  in  observa 
tion,  he  moved  directly  upon  Spring  Hill,  where  Stanley 
arrived  almost  at  the  same  moment  with  him,  as  we  have 
seen.  It  is  now  plain  that  Wilson  erred  in  adhering  to  the 
line  of  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  road  after  Forrest 
gained  Bally  Hill.  By  doing  so  he  allowed  Forrest  to  cut 
him  off  both  from  Schofield's  infantry,  and  from  the  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  which  were  ordered  to  Spring  Hill  to 
reinforce  him,  and  Schofield  wras  left,  during  the  whole  of 
the  critical  day  and  night  of  the  29th,  without  the  means  of 
learning  Hood's  movements  except  from,  his  infantry  recon- 
noissances.  The  true  line  of  action  was  manifestly  to  regain 
the  road  from  Bally  Hill  to  Spring  Hill  in  the  night  of  the 
28th,  or,  failing  that,  to  have  made  a  rapid  march  by  Mount 
Carmel  to  Spring  Hill,  so  as  to  anticipate  Forrest  there. 

Hood  did  not  cross  Duck  Biver  with  his  infantry  in  tho 
night,  as  had  been  expected,  but  Cleburne's  division  of 
Cheatham's  corps,  which  was  his  head  of  column,  crossed 
soon  a^ter  daylight  in  the  morning  upon  the  pontoon  bridge 
at  Davis's  Ford,  followed  by  Bate  and  Brown.  Stewart's 
VOL.  X— 4 


74  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

corps  came  next,  the  rear  being  brought  up  by  Jolmson'a 
division  of  Lee's  corps,  which  was  temporarily  reporting  to 
Stewart.  Hood  himself  accompanied  the  advance  guard, 
but  despite  all  his  efforts  it  was  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  or  later,  when  Cleburne  reached  the  Bally  Hill  turn 
pike  where  it  crosses  Rutherford  Creek,  twro  and  a  half  miles 
from  Spring  Hill.  Ordering  Cheatham  to  remain  and 
hurry  the  crossing  of  his  other  divisions,  Cleburne  was  di 
rected  to  press  forward  and  attack  whatever  force  there 
might  be  at  Spring  Hill,  where  the  noise  of  Stanley's  artil 
lery  warned  them  that  Forrest  was  meeting  with  opposition. 
But  the  distant  firing  at  Columbia  could  also  be  heard,  and 
the  tenacity  with  which  Schofield  hung  on  to  the  line  of 
Duck  River  apparently  raised  doubts  in  Hood's  mind 
whether  the  National  commander  might  not  have  received 
reinforcements  enough  to  cut  boldly  between  the  now  sepa 
rated  wings  of  his  army.  Post's  reconnoissance  had  gone  far 
enough  to  observe  the  movement,  and  it  is  probable  that  it 
had  in  turn  been  seen  by  Hood's  command,  and  he  would 
thus  know  that  infantry  was  approaching  his  line  of  march. 
But  whatever  the  reasons  which  induced  it,  Hood  ordered 
Stewart  to  form  his  corps  in  line  of  battle  south  of  Ruther 
ford  Creek,  facing  west,  and  this  instruction  necessarily  im 
plies  the  expectation  of  the  approach  of  an  enemy  from  that 
direction,  or  the  purpose  of  himself  making  an  attack  upon 
the  line  which  Schofield  had  prepared  to  receive  him  by 
putting  Wood's,  Kimball's,  and  Ruger's  divisions  within  sup 
porting  distance  of  each  other  upon  the  extension  of  Cox's 
left.  He  may  have  thought  that  the  resistance  at  Spring 
Hill  would  be  slight  when  Cheatham  reached  the  field,  and 
that  this  corps  sweeping  down  the  turnpike  toward  Colum 
bia  would  meet  the  convergent  advance  of  Stewart  in  a  gen 
eral  attack  upon  Schofield's  flank.  The  advantages  of  the 


MIDDLE   TENNESSEE.  75 

defence  in  a  broken  and  wooded  country,  and  the  prudent 
disposal  of  his  force,  by  which  Schofield  had  now  some  niileg 
of  line  facing  the  east,  would  possibly  have  made  such  an 
attack  as  disastrous  as  the  one  at  Franklin  next  day ;  but 
Hoocl  did  not  attack  there,  and  Stewart  remained  in  line  till 
Cheatham  had  been  repulsed  at  Spring  Hill,  and  was  then 
ordered  up  when  darkness  had  fallen  and  it  was  thought  too 
late  for  further  action  that  night. 

When  Stanley  had  reached  Spring  Hill  lie  found  a  part  of 
Forrest's  command  already  in  the  outskirts  of  the  place.  He 
ordered  Wagner  to  put  Opdycke's  and  Lane's  brigades  in 
position  to  cover  the  village,  and  advanced  Bradley's  brigade 
to  a  wooded  hill  about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  east  of  the 
turnpike,  which  commanded  the  approaches  from  that  direc 
tion.  One  battery  of  artillery  had  accompanied  Wagner, 
but  Captain  Bridges,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
had  followed  Stanley's  march  with  six  batteries,  leaving  one 
with  Wood's  division.  This  had  been  done  only  to  get  them 
well  forward  en  route  to  Franklin ;  but  on  reaching  Spring 
Hill,  Captain  Bridges  had  with  wise  precaution  put  his  guns 
in  battery  on  a  commanding  bench  just  west  of  the  road, 
and  where  a  little  later  they  proved  of  great  use  and  most 
fortunate  in  position.  The  enemy's  cavalry  made  active  ef 
forts  to  reach  the  trains,  which  were  parked  by  the  roadside, 
and  also  to  destroy  the  railway  station  a  short  distance  west 
of  the  turnpike,  and  the  protection  of  all  these  kept  Opdycke 
and  Lane  fully  employed.  Bradley  was  engaged  at  the  same 
time,  but  the  affair  was  not  serious  until  the  arrival  of  Cle- 
burne's  division  on  the  field.  This  officer  formed  his  com 
mand  along  the  Bally  Hill  road,  and,  advancing  at  right 
angles  to  it,  attempted  to  reach  the  Columbia  turnpike.  He 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  fully  aware  of  Bradley's  position, 
for  his  extreme  right  (Lowry's  brigade)  alone  reached  it, 


70  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

and  was  received  with  so  rude  a  shock  that  Cleburne  wag 
quickly  forced  to  change  front  nearly  at  right  angles  in 
order  to  engage  his  opponent.  Bate's  division,  which  fol 
lowed  Cleburne,  had  formed  in  the  same  manner  and  took 
the  same  line  of  direction.  It  had  nearly  reached  the  Col 
umbia  road  when  Bate  discovered  that  Cleburne  had 
changed  direction,  and  his  orders  being  to  form  on  the  left 
of  that  division,  much  time  was  consumed  in  rectifying  the 
line.  Brown's  division  had  followed  Bate  and  had  been 
sent  forward  on  Cleburne's  right.  Bradley's  position  had 
been  too  isolated  to  be  held  by  a  single  brigade  against  so 
extended  a  line  of  battle,  and  after  his  first  sharp  encounter 
with  Cleburne  he  retreated  in  some  disorder,  he  himself 
being  severely  wounded.  The  brigade  was  quickly  re 
formed  on  the  right  of  Lane,  at  the  southern  edge  of  the 
village  commanding  the  Columbia  road,  and  a  regiment  was 
detached  from  Opdycke  to  strengthen  it.  Wagner's  line  was 
now  a  semicircle,  reaching  from  the  Columbia  road  around 
the  eastern  side  of  the  place  to  the  railway  station  on  the 
northwest,  Opdycke's  brigade  being  stretched  out  till  it  waa 
only  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers.  A  regiment  which  was 
with  the  trains  as  a  guard  was  also  utilized,  and  advantage 
was  taken  of  the  ground  to  present  the  strongest  front  pos 
sible.  Cleburne  and  Brown  followed  up  Bradley's  retreat, 
but  were  met  with  so  continuous  a  fire  and  on  so  long  a  de 
fensive  line,  that  they  were  made  to  believe  they  were  in  the 
presence  of  a  superior  force.  The  concentration  of  artillery 
fire  upon  them  was  so  far  beyond  what  they  could  expect 
from  a  single  division,  that  it  checked  them  as  much,  per 
haps,  by  producing  the  conviction  that  they  had  most  of 
Schofield's  army  before  them,  as  by  the  severe  losses  caused 
by  the  terrible  fire  of  shrapnel  and  canister.  It  was  now 
growing  dark,  and  Hood  having  reached  the  conclusion  that 


MIDDLE  TENNESSEE.  77. 

he  needed  Stewart's  corps  also,  ordered  this  up  from  Ruther 
ford  Creek,  with  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  which 
accompanied  it.  Jackson's  division  of  cavalry  occupied 
Thompson's  Station,  three  miles  north  of  Spring  Hill,  and 
the  rest  of  Forrest's  horsemen  were  in  that  direction.  "When 
Stewart  arrived  it  was  already  night,  and  he  was  ordered  to 
bivouac  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Cheatham. 

Meanwhile  Schofield  had  issued  his  orders  that  Cox's  di 
vision  should  continue  to  hold  the  bank  of  the  river  opposite 
Columbia  till  nightfall,  if  possible,  and  then,  leaving  a  skir 
mish  line  in  position,  should  march  to  Spring  Hill,  followed 
in  turn  by  Wood's  and  Kiniball's  divisions.  The  skirmishers 
were  directed  to  remain  till  midnight  unless  driven  off,  and 
to  join  the  rear  guard  of  the  army  or  follow  it.  The  divi 
sions  were  all  to  move  by  the  left  flank,  so  that  whenever 
they  should  halt  and  face  they  would  be  in  line  of  battle, 
and  could  use  the  road  fences  for  barricades  if  attacked  by 
Hood.  The  whole  line  would  thus  be  shortened  from  the 
right  till  Kimball  only  should  remain  on  that  flank,  when  he 
also  would  inarch  to  Spring  Hill.  By  this  arrangement  there 
was  the  least  risk  of  confusion  and  the.  greatest  readiness 
for  any  contingency  wThich  might  arise. 

On  hearing  from  Stanley  that  he  was  attacked  by  infantry, 
Schofield  hastened  to  Ruger's  division,  which,  it  will  be  re 
membered,  was  nearest  to  Spring  Hill,  and  led  its  two  bri 
gades  in  person  by  a  rapid  march  to  Stanley's  support.  As 
he  approached  the  village  he  found  pickets  of  the  enemy 
on  the  road,  but  these  were  driven  off  and  he  joined  Stanley 
at  seven  o'clock.  Whittaker's  brigade  of  Kimball's  divi 
sion  had  also  been  ordered  up,  and  followed  Ruger  closely. 
When  it  arrived  it  was  placed  on  the  right  of  Wagner's  line, 
to  cover  the  march  of  the  rest  of  the  column  as  it  should 
approach.  Learning  from  Stanley  that  some  force  of  the 


78  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLR 

enemy  was  at  Thompson's  Station,  Schofield  immediately 
marched  with  finger's  division  to  that  point  to  open  the  way 
to  Franklin.  At  his  approach  Jackson  withdrew  his  cavalry 
and  Ruger  was  placed  in  position  there  without  a  contest. 
Schofield  now  returned  to  Spring  Hill,  reaching  the  village 
at  midnight,  and  meeting  there  the  head  of  Cox's  division 
which  had  moved  from  Duck  Eiver  in  accordance  with  his 
orders. 

It  is  necessary,  to  a  complete  understanding  of  the  situa 
tion,  that  we  should  go  back  a  little  and  notice  the  efforts 
which  Lee  made  to  carry  out  Hood's  orders,  and  force  the 
crossing  of  Duck  Eiver  in  the  afternoon.  He  had  kept  up, 
at  intervals,  an  annoying  plunging  fire  upon  Cox's  troops  in 
the  bend  of  the  river,  but  our  rifled  cannon,  by  greater  range 
and  better  practice,  had  prevented  the  enemy's  artillery  from 
maintaining  its  positions  or  doing  much  damage.  A  line  of 
skirmishers'  pits  on  the  very  end  of  the  tongue  of  land  had 
been  made  untenable,  but  a  fringe  of  wood,  a  little  further 
back,  afforded  a  cover  which  gave  complete  command  of  the 
open  ground  to  the  edge  of  the  river  bank.  About  four 
o'clock  the  efforts  of  Lee  to  effect  a  crossing  became  more 
energetic.  Some  pontoons  were  brought  to  the  south  bank 
of  the  river,  and,  under  cover  of  a  rapid  artillery  fire,  a  few 
boats  were  run  down  to  the  water.  Some  troops  were  fer 
ried  over  in  these,  and  so  long  as  they  remained  under  pro 
tection  of  the  river  bank,  they  could  not  be  reached  by  our 
fire.  As  soon,  however,  as  they  appeared  above  its  edge, 
and  attempted  to  advance  against  the  fringe  of  woods  held 
by  the  Twelfth  and  Sixteenth  Kentucky  (part  of  Keilly's* 
brigade)  they  were  met  by  the  most  determined  resistance. 
The  Sixty-third  Indiana  and  One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  Illi 
nois,  of  Henderson's  brigade  (temporarily  commanded  by 
Colonel  Stiles),  were  sent  forward  to  support  the  right  of 


MIDDLE   TENNESSEE.  7| 

lieilly's  men,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from  the  open 
ground  to  the  cover  of  the  river  bank  again,  and  made  no 
further  effort  to  cross  the  river  during  the  evening. 

Soon  after  nightfall  the  line  of  pickets  near  the  river  was 
strengthened,  the  two  Kentucky  regiments,  under  command 
of  Colonel  White,  were  left  as  their  support,  the  Division 
Inspector-General,  Major  Dow,  being  with  them,  and  having 
orders  to  bring  them  off  at  midnight.  The  division  then 
marched  to  Spring  Hill,  where  it  was  directed  by  General 
Schofield  to  take  the  advance  and  proceed  at  once  to  Frank 
lin,  twelve  miles  further.  The  other  divisions  followed  in 
the  appointed  manner  and  without  serious  interruption. 
The  pickets  at  the  river  were  withdrawn,  as  directed,  and 
overtook  the  rear  of  Wood's  division  a  little  beyond  Spring 
Hill,  and,  under  orders  from  that  officer,  protected  the  flank 
of  the  trains  from  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  on  the  remainder 
of  the  march  to  Franklin. 

Wagner's  division  was  kept  in  position  at  Spring  Hill  till 
the  trains  and  all  the  other  troops  were  in  movement,  and 
Opdycke's  brigade,  which  was  the  rear  guard  of  the  whole, 
did  not  march  until  six  o'clock  in  the  morning.  About  mid 
night  Hood  was  informed  that  troops  were  passing  on  the 
Columbia  road,  and  sent  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  to 
extend  Bate's  line  and  stop  the  movement;  but  the  night 
was  dark  and  the  country  unfamiliar,  and  nothing  came  of 
it  but  a  slight  occasional  skirmish,  while  our  columns 
marched  by  in  full  view  of  the  enemy's  camp-fires,  which 
were  burning  less  than  half  a  mile  away. 

Here,  as  at  Atlanta,  Hood  sought  to  shift  the  responsibil 
ity  for  his  failure  upon  a  subordinate,  and  Cheatham  was  now 
selected  to  bear  the  burden.  Hood  charged  him  with  tardi 
ness  and  weakness  in  the  attack  upon  Stanley,  and  asked 
to  have  him  relieved  from  his  command.  This  request  was 


80  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

withdrawn  after  the  battle  of  Franklin,  though  without  re 
tracting  the  charge.  But  a  commander  who  is  personally 
with  the  head  of  column  in  such  a  movement  and  upon  the 
field,  has  the  means  of  enforcing  his  orders  by  direct  com 
mands  to  the  divisions.  Had  his  own  confidence  not  wav 
ered,  and  had  he  not  begun  to  yield  to  the  belief  that  much 
more  than  one  division  was  before  him,  his  own  energy 
would  have  carried  his  subordinates  with  him,  and  would 
have  made  the  assault  as  desperate,  if  need  be,  as  it  was 
next  day.  But  he  seems  to  have  lacked  the  grasp  of  mind 
which  enables  a  general  to  judge  and  to  act  with  vigor  in 
the  presence  of  circumstances  which  throw  doubt  upon  his 
plan,  and  he  proved  inferior  to  his  opponent  in  a  strategic 
contest,  which  has  been  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the 
most  critical  and  instructive  conjunctures  of  the  war.  The 
circumstances,  as  narrated  by  the  leading  Confederate  of 
ficers  who  were  present,  show  that  Hood  had  an  access  of 
hesitation  at  the  very  moment  when  the  success  of  his  move 
ment  demanded  that  all  doubts  should  be  thrown  to  the 
winds  and  everything  risked  upon  a  desperate  stroke. l 

1  A  paper  read  in  December,  1881,  before  a  society  of  Southern  officers  at  Louis 
ville,  Ky.,  by  General  Cheatham,  contains  a  very  full  array  of  the  evidence  which 
sustains  the  above  view. 


CHAPTER  V. 

BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN. 

THE  march  of  the  National  army  from  Spring  Hill  to 
Franklin  was  not  seriously  interrupted.  Forrest's  troopers 
made  an  occasional  dash  at  the  long  wagon  train,  but  only 
in  one  or  two  instances  did  they  succeed  in  reaching  it,  and 
very  few  wagons  were  lost.  After  seeing  his  columns  fairly 
started,  Schofield  rode  forward  and  overtook  General  Cox 
with  the  advanced  division  just  before  the  village  of  Frank 
lin  was  reached.  He  had,  about  noon,  urgently  renewed  his 
request  to  Thomas  to  send  a  pontoon  bridge  to  the  crossing 
of  the  Harpeth  River,  but  having  received  no  answer,  he 
spurred  forward  with  his  staff  to  see  if  it  had  arrived.  It 
was  not  yet  daybreak,  and  the  division  was  ordered  to  mass 
by  the  roadside  to  allow  the  trains  to  pass  into  the  town. 
The  division  commander  and  his  staff  had  halted  at  the 
house  of  a  Mr.  Carter,  at  the  edge  of  the  village  (a  house 
soon  to  become  the  key-point  of  a  fierce  battle)  and  were 
trying  to  catch  a  few  minutes'  sleep  upon  the  floor,  when 
General  Schofield  returned,  much  disturbed  at  finding  that 
no  pontoons  had  come.1  He  ordered  General  Cox  to  as- 

1  In  the  correspondence  on  file  in  the  War  Kecords  office,  no  response  to  the 
second  request  for  pontoons  is  found,  and  General  Schofield  informs  the  author 
that  he  received  none.  The  same  files  do  not  contain  any  explanation  of  the  de 
struction  of  the  boats  at  Columbia,  and  it  would  therefore  seem  that  General 
Thomas  must  have  continued  to  assume  that  they  were  available,  notwithstanding 
the  strong  implication  of  Schofieid's  despatches.  See  Appendix  D. 

4* 


82  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

sume  command  of  both  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
and,  as  soon  as  day  should  dawn,  intrench  them  upon  the 
best  line  which  could  be  made  right  and  left  of  the  knoll  on 
which  the  Carter  house  stood,  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the 
trains  and  the  rest  of  the  army.  He  himself,  with  Major 
Twining,  his  Chief  Engineer,  began  immediately  to  plan 
such  improvements  of  the  river  crossings  as  should  enable 
him  to  get  the  trains  and  the  artillery  upon  the  north  side 
of  the  Harpeth  at  the  earliest  possible  hour. 

The  village  of  Franklin  is  upon  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
which  partly  encloses  it  in  a  deep  curve  to  the  northeast. 
The  northern  bank  is  here  considerably  higher  than  the 
other,  and,  upon  a  hill  commanding  the  railway  and  wagon- 
road  bridges,  an  earthwork  called  Fort  Granger  had  been 
built  more  than  a  year  before.  The  railway  approaches  the 
town  from  the  south,  parallel  to  the  Columbia  turnpike,  and 
about  five  hundred  yards  east  of  it.  For  a  thousand  yards 
it  runs  close  to  the  bank  of  the  river  and  on  the  eastern 
edge  of  the  village,  then  crosses  without  change  of  direction, 
for  the  river  here  makes  a  turn  to  the  west,  nearly  at  right 
angles  to  its  former  course.  Through  a  part  of  the  distance 
last  traversed  the  railway  is  in  a  considerable  cut,  and  this 
as  well  as  the  bridges  and  the  reach  of  the  river,  is  com 
pletely  under  the  fire  of  the  fort.  The  Carter's  Creek  turn 
pike  runs  southwest  from  the  centre  of  the  town. 

The  line  selected  for  defence  was  a  curve  which  would  be 
very  nearly  that  struck  with  a  radius  of  a  thousand  yards 
from  the  junction  of  the  two  turnpikes  in  the  village.  Its 
centre  was  a  few  rods  in  front  of  the  Carter  house  on  the 
Columbia  road,  and  was  upon  a  gentle  rise  of  ground.  Its 
left  was  at  the  railway  cut  close  to  the  river,  where  wras  an 
other  knoll.  Upon  this  line  the  Carter's  Creek  turnpike  is 
about  the  same  distance  from  the  Columbia  turnpike  as  the 


BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN. 


83 


railway,  and  this  constituted  the  proper  front  facing  Colum 
bia  and  Spring  Hill,  whence  Hood  was  advancing.  The 
third  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  (General  Ileilly  in 


\          •».  CHEATHAM'S  CORPS  ^^     _«-—   -*"  "^ 


Battle-Field  of  Franklin. 


84  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

temporary  command)  was  placed  on  the  left,  Eeilly's  own 
brigade  resting  its  flank  on  the  road,  with  Casement's  and 
Henderson's  brigades  (Colonel  Stiles  in  temporary  com 
mand  of  the  latter)  continuing  the  line  to  the  railway  and 
river.  The  front  of  Eeilly's  own  brigade  was  shorter  than 
the  others,  for  the  two  regiments  which  were  left  behind 
as  pickets  at  Duck  Eiver  belonged  to  it,  and  these  did  not 
arrive  till  the  line  was  occupied.  They  were  then  placed 
in  second  line,  supporting  the  first  and  less  than  a  hundred 
yards  in  rear  of  it.  Euger's  division  was  between  the  Col 
umbia  and  Carter's  Creek  turnpikes,  Strickland's  brigade  on 
the  left,  and  Moore's  on  the  right.  Along  the  whole  front 
the  ground  sloped  very  gently  from  the  line,  and  was  only 
obstructed  by  a  small  grove  of  locust  trees  a  short  distance 
in  front  of  Euger,  and  by  farm  buildings,  with  orchards  here 
and  there  in  the  distance.  A  range  of  high  hills  bounded 
this  plain  on  the  south,  through  a  gap  in  which  the  Columbia 
road  runs.  The  Twenty-third  Corps  immediately  began  the 
building  of  breastworks,  and  by  noon  a  strong  intrenchment 
had  been  completed,  the  lack  of  timber  for  revetment  being 
the  only  thing  which  prevented  it  from  being  equal  to  those 
usually  made  during  the  campaign.  An  old  cotton  gin  in 
Eeilly's  line  furnished  timber  for  head -logs,  and  upon  the 
knoll  near  the  railway,  at  the  Carter  house,  and  in  one  or 
two  other  places,  where  the  slope  was  sufficient,  strong 
epaulements  for  artillery  were  constructed  inside  of  and 
somewhat  higher  than  the  infantry  parapet.  At  the  Colum 
bia  turnpike  the  full  width  of  the  road  was  left  open,  for  it 
was  all  needed  to  enable  the  doubled  lines  of  wagons  and 
artillery  to  pass,  and  a  retrenchment  crossing  the  road  a  few 
rods  in  rear  was  built  to  command  the  opening  and  its  ap 
proach. 

At  the  river  it  had  been  found  that  by  scarping  the  banks, 


BATTLE   OF  FRANKLIN.  85 

the  ford,  though  a  very  bad  one,  could  be  used  to  some  ex 
tent.  Some  wooden  buildings  were  dismantled  to  furnish 
planking  for  the  railway  bridge,  and  a  wagon  approach  to 
this  was  made.  The  lower  part  of  the  posts  of  the  county 
bridge  were  found  to  be  good,  and  these  were  sawn  oft' 
nearly  level  with  the  water,  crossbeams  and  planking  were 
laid  upon  them,  and  by  noon  the  army  was  provided  with 
two  passable  bridges.  Tho  artillery  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  passed  over  first  of  all  at  the  ford,  to  gain  time,  and 
part  of  it  was  placed  in  the  fort  on  the  north  bank,  General 
Stanley  being  directed  to  send  several  batteries  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  report  to  the  commandant  upon  the  line 
when  they  should  arrive.  The  trench  on  the  left,  in  front  of 
Stiles,  was  placed  close  behind  a  thick-set  hedge  of  osage 
orange,  which  was  thinned  out  so  as  to  make  an  impassable 
thorny  palisade,  and  the  material  was  used  to  make  a  slight 
obstruction  in  front  of  Eeilly's  brigades.  In  front  of  Euger 
the  locust  grove  was  cut  down  for  the  same  use,  though  the 
trees  were  much  too  small  for  the  purpose.  At  General 
Cox's  request  for  troops  to  cover  the  right  flank,  since  his 
force  was  not  sufficient  to  reach  the  river  on  that  side,  Kim- 
ball's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  ordered  to  report  to 
him  as  it  came  in,  and  was  placed  there.1 

Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  arrived  and  crossed 
to  the  north  bank,  Kimball  had  taken  his  place  in  the  line, 
Wilson's  cavalry  was  upon  Wood's  left,  opposing  the  efforts 
of  Forrest  to  cross  the  river  in  that  direction,  the  town  was 
full  of  wagons  waiting  their  turn  at  the  bridges,  and  some 
of  them  struggling  through  the  ford.  The  wearied  troops, 
which  had  fought  and  marched  since  daybreak  of  the 
preceding  day,  dropped  to  sleep  as  soon  as  their  breast- 


1  See  Appendix  D. 


86  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

works  were  built,  and  caught  such  rest  as  they  could  pre. 
paratory  to  a  more  terrible  struggle  and  another  night  of 
inarching. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Lee  had  sent  forward  the  artil 
lery  from  Columbia,  as  soon  as  it  could  be  crossed  over 
Duck  Eiver  in  the  morning,  and  with  it  went  ammunition 
for  Forrest's  men,  who  were  getting  short  of  it.  The  march 
in  pursuit  does  not  seem  to  have  been  hurried,  and  the  sin 
gle  brigade,  which  was  rear-guard,  had  no  difficulty  in  hold 
ing  back  the  enemy.  A  more  annoying  task  was  to  drive 
forward  the  stragglers.  A  number  of  new  regiments  had 
joined  the  army  at  Columbia,  and  in  these  were  many  inex 
perienced  recruits,  who  were  not  hardened  to  their  work, 
and  who  had  overloaded  their  knapsacks.  It  required  the 
utmost  exertion  to  prevent  these  men  from  falling  into  the 
enemy's  hands,  footsore  and  dispirited  from  fatigue  as  they 
were.  To  keep  them  up,  Colonel  Opdycke  was  obliged  to 
order  their  knapsack  straps  to  be  cut,  and  to  detail  a  pro 
vost  guard  to  hurry  them  on. 

About  noon  the  rear-guard  reached  the  hills  at  the  border 
of  the  Harpeth  Valley,  from  which  the  heavy  columns  of 
Hood's  army  could  now  be  seen  advancing  rapidly.  Op 
dycke  checked  them  for  a  time  by  opening  upon  them  with 
artillery,  but  was  then  withdrawn  and  brought  within  the 
lines,  where  he  was  placed  in  reserve  upon  the  west  of  the 
Columbia  road,  two  or  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Carter 
house.  Wagner  placed  the  rest  of  his  division  (Lane's  and 
Conrad's  brigades)  astride  the  Columbia  turnpike,  about  half 
a  mile  in  front  of  the  principal  line.  The  commandant 
upon  the  line  was  notified  by  General  Schofield  that  Wag 
ner's  orders  directed  him  to  remain  in  observation  only  till 
Hood  should  show  a  disposition  to  advance  in  force,  and 
then  to  retire  within  the  lines  to  Opdycke's  position  and  act 


BATTLE   OF  FRANKLIN.  87 

as  a  general  reserve.  Wagner,  on  being  shown  tlie  note 
conveying  this  notice,  said  that  snch  were  his  orders. 

By  three  o'clock  the  trains  were  nearly  all  over  the  river, 
and  Schofield  had  issued  orders  that  the  troops  should  also 
pass  over  at  six  o'clock  if  the  enemy  should  not  attack  be 
fore  sunset.  But  the  period  of  depression  and  recrimina 
tion  in  Hood's  army  in  the  morning  seems  to  have  been  fol 
lowed  by  fierce  excitement.  Cleburne  talked  with  Brown, 
as  they  rode  along,  complaining  bitterly  that  Hood  had  cen 
sured  him,  and  telling  of  his  determination  to  demand  an 
investigation.1  Evidently  all  were  keyed  to  a  high  moral 
tension,  and  were  determined  that  at  the  next  opportunity, 
their  commander  should  not  have  it  to  say  that  his  plans 
had  failed  from  any  lack  of  energy  or  courage  on  their  part. 
Hood,  himself,  had  resolved  upon  a  desperate  effort  to 
destroy  Schofield's  army  before  any  further  concentration  of 
Thomas's  forces  could  be  made. 

About  three  o'clock  word  was  sent  from  Wagner's  brigades 
in  front  that  the  enemy  was  forming  at  the  foot  of  the  hills 
in  heavy  force,  and  reiterating  to  General  Wagner  the  direc 
tions  already  given  him,  the  commandant  upon  the  line 
went  to  the  knoll  in  Stiles's  brigade,  which  afforded  a 
better  view  of  the  whole  field.  General  Schofield  had 
moved  his  headquarters  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  and 
was  personally  at  the  fort  on  the  hill,  which  not  only  com 
manded  a  view  of  the  field,  but  was  nearest  the  bridges  by 
which  communication  was  kept  up,  and  where  alone  he 
could  see  the  cavalry  demonstrations  on  the  left  where  For 
rest  and  Wilson  were  already  engaged.  The  village  itself  is 
on  a  plateau  lower  than  the  line  intrenched,  and  from  it 

1  Statement  of  General  Brown  in  General  Cheatham's  paper  before  referred  to. 
Hood,  however,  in  his  Advance  and  Ilctreat,  p.  294,  speaks  of  a  cordial  under 
standing  with  Cleburne  before  he  entered  the  battle. 


83  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

nothing  whatever  could  be  seen.  General  Stanley,  who  had 
been  ill  during  the  morning,  had  also  his  quarters  on  the 
north  of  the  Harpeth,  with  Wood's  division. 

A  depression  in  front  of  Wagner's  brigades  and  some  scat 
tered  trees  shut  out  Hood's  lines  from  view  at  the  Carter  house, 
but  from  Stiles's  position  they  were  plainly  seen,  formed  ap 
parently  in  double  and  triple  lines  of  brigades,  with  artillery 
in  the  intervals  between  the  columns.  Hood  had  placed 
Cheatham's  corps  upon  the  Columbia  turnpike  with  Cle- 
burne's  division  on  the  east  of  the  road,  Brown's  on  tho 
west  of  it,  and  Bate's  in  Gchelon  on  Brown's  flank.  Stewart's 
corps  was  on  the  right  (east)  of  Cheatham,  the  order  of  his 
divisions  from  Cleburne's  flank  being  French,  Walthall,  and 
Loring.  Johnson's  division  was  the  only  one  of  S.  D.  Lee's 
corps  which  had  yet  come  up,  and  it  was  kept  in  reserve. 

Very  few  battlefields  of  the  war  were  so  free  from  obstruc 
tion  to  the  view.  Here,  along  a  mile  and  a  half  of  front,  the 
imposing  array  of  the  Confederate  army  could  be  seen  ad 
vancing  at  quick  step  with  trailed  arms,  the  artillery  in  the 
intervals  galloping  forward,  unlimbering  and  firing  as  soon 
as  they  were  within  range.1  A  section  of  artillery  with  Wag 
ner's  brigades  first  opened  on  the  advancing  enemy,  but  as 
they  approached  it  limbered  up  and  deliberately  trotted 
within  the  principal  line,  in  accordance  with  orders  sent  it 
by  the  Chief  of  Artillery.  It  was  now  four  o'clock,  and  to 
the  amazement  of  the  thousands  who  were  watching  them, 
Wagner's  infantry  opened  fire.  There  was  a  rattling  fusillade 
for  a  few  moments,  Clebtirne  and  Brown  were  checked  for 
an  instant,  but  the  Confederate  forces  passed  the  flanks  of 
Lane  and  Conrad,  to  right  and  left,  a  rush  and  a  yell  fol- 

1  Hood  pays  he  did  not  use  artillery.  That  he  is  in  error  of  recollection  is 
abundantly  shown  by  reports  and  printed  statements  on  both  sides.  The  writer 
speaks  from  his  personal  observation. 


BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN.  89 

lowed,  and  the  two  hapless  brigades  came  streaming  to  the 
rear  in  a  disorganized  crowd,  running  rapidly  to  reach  the 
parapets  behind  them.  Orders  were  quickly  sent  down  the 
line  to  withhold  the  fire  at  the  centre  till  our  own  men 
should  be  in,  but  to  make  the  utmost  use  of  the  artillery 
and  small  arms  on  the  flanks.  Opdycke  was  warned  to  be 
ready  for  a  rush  to  the  centre  if  the  line  should  give  way 
there,  and  the  second  line  along  the  whole  front  was  simi 
larly  prepared.  A  few  moments  later,  the  head  of  the  flying 
mass  was  seen  swarming  over  the  works  at  the  turnpike,  and 
orders  were  sent  for  all  reserves  to  charge.  The  men  in  the 
trenches,  confused  by  the  crowd  trampling  over  them,  and 
hearing  Wagner's  officers  calling  upon  their  men  to  rally  at 
the  rear,  were  carried  away  by  the  surging  mass,  and  for  the 
length  of  a  regiment  on  the  left,  and  more  than  that  on  the 
right,  they  fell  away  from  the  works.  Neither  Colonel 
White,  commanding  Eeilly's  second  line,  nor  Colonel  Op 
dycke  waited  for  the  word  to  charge,  but  were  in  motion 
before  the  order  could  reach  them.  White  was  nearest  the 
parapet  and  reached  it  soonest,  but  his  line  did  not  reach 
quite  to  the  turnpike.  The  Carter  house  and  out-buildings 
on  the  right  of  the  road  obstructed  the  movement  to  the 
front,  and  Opdycke  made  part  of  his  brigade  oblique  to  the 
left  till  clear  of  the  obstacles,  and  they  then  charged  head 
long  upon  the  enemy.  Part  also  went  forward  on  the  west 
of  the  houses,  and  Strickland's  brigade  rallying  with  them, 
the  Confederates  were  driven  back  here  also  ;  but  that  the 
gap  was  open  longer  here  than  on  the  left,  was  proven  by 
the  enemy's  dead  who  were  found  fifty  yards  within  the 
lines. 

Stanley,  forgetting  his  illness,  had  mounted  his  horse  at 
the  first  sound  of  the  cannonade,  and  the  commandants  of 
the  two  corps  met  on  the  turnpike  just  as  Ojxlycke  and  his 


A  Oi 


90  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

men  were  rushing  to  the  front.  Four  guns,  which  had  been 
placed  a  few  yards  to  the  left  of  the  road,  were  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  and  were  loaded  with  canister.  These  were  turned 
upon  the  flank  of  Eeilly's  line,  but  the  frightened  horses  had 
run  off  with  the  ammunition  chests  which  contained  the 
primers,  and  while  the  captors  were  unsuccessfully  trying 
to  fire  the  pieces,  the  reserve  was  upon  them.  Four  other 
guns  on  the  right  of  the  road  were  also  in  the  enemy's 
hands.  There  was  a  few  minutes'  fierce  me!6e,  but  the  guns 
were  retaken  and  all  of  the  men  in  gray  who  were  inside  the 
parapet  were  dead  or  prisoners.  Yet  the  successive  lines  of 
assailants  charging  the  works  allowed  no  respite.  Colonel 
White  received  a  severe  wmmd  in  the  face,  but  refused  to 
leave  the  line  till  after  nightfall,  and  Opdycke  had  joined 
personally  in  the  thickest  of  the  deadly  tussle  on  the  turn 
pike.  Our  men,  who  had  been  driven  back  from  the  line, 
rallied  by  officers  of  all  grades,  returned  to  their  posts,  min 
gling  with  those  who  were  there,  making  a  wall  three  or  four 
deep,  those  in  rear  loading  the  muskets  for  those  who  were 
firing.  While  rallying  these  men  Stanley  was  wounded, 
his  horse  was  shot  under  him,  and  he  was  reluctantly  per 
suaded  to  return  to  his  quarters  for  surgical  help. 

Farther  to  the  right,  and  in  part  of  what  had  been  Strick 
land's  brigade  line,  the  Confederates  of  Brown's  division 
held  the  outside  of  our  parapet,  so  that  when  their  com 
rades  were  driven  back  they  were  able  to  prevent  our  men 
from  reaching  it  again.  These,  seizing  upon  fences  and 
such  material  as  came  to  hand,  made  a  new  barricade  within 
about  twenty-five  yards  of  the  first,  and  across  the  narrow 
interval  the  battle  raged  with  most  persistent  fierceness.  It 
was  hard  to  tell  where  either  brigade  line  ended,  for  Op- 
dycke's  men  mingled  with  ReiHy's  on  the  one  side,  and  with 
Strickland's  on  the  other,  and  the  three  crowded  the  space 


BATTLE   OP   FRANKLIN.  91 

where  two  had  been.  Officers  and  men  had  been  conscious 
that  with  the  centre  broken,  nothing  but  superhuman  exer 
tions  could  keep  one  wing,  at  least,  of  the  little  army  from 
being  driven  into  the  river.  They  were  equal  to  the  occa 
sion  and  they  saved  the  day. 

But  though  the  crisis  of  the  engagement  was  at  the 
centre,  the  fight  was  by  no  means  all  there.  In  other  parts 
the  veterans  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  held  their  lines  with 
out  flinching,  though  the  assaults  of  Stewart's  divisions 
rivalled  those  of  Cheatham  in  their  gallantry,  and  they 
made  the  most  daring  efforts  to  reach  the  bridges  which 
were  on  that  flank.  Loring's  men  came  upon  the  hedge  in 
front  of  Stiles,  and  attempted  in  vain  to  tear  it  away,  or  to 
pass  it.  Henderson,  who  had  been  for  some  days  ill,  re 
joined  his  brigade,  and  both  he  and  Stiles  directed  the  fir 
ing,  which,  sweeping  along  the  ground,  mowed  down  all 
before  it.  The  Confederate  officers  urged  their  men  to  the 
right,  hoping  to  pass  through  the  railway  cut,  but  here  they 
were  met  by  the  shrapnel  and  canister  of  the  guns  in  the  fort 
north  of  the  river.  The  batteries  in  Stiles's  line  were  also 
admirably  handled,  and  the  attack  here  had  never  a  chance. 

On  Casement's  line,  Walthall's  and  part  of  Loring's  divi 
sions  made  the  assault,  and  as  there  was  here  no  obstruc 
tion  in  front  of  the  trench  worth  naming,  the  possibility  of 
carrying  such  a  line  when  properly  held  was  fully  tested. 
General  John  Adams  led  his  brigade,  riding  straight  at  the 
ditch,  leaping  it,  and  mounting  the  parapet,  where  his  horse 
was  killed  astride  of  it,  and  he  himself  pitched  headlong 
among  Casement's  men,  mortally  wounded.  Scott,  com 
manding  another  of  Loring's  brigades,  was  wounded.  In 
Walthall's  division  not  only  had  Quarles  fallen  in  leading 
his  brigade  to  the  assault,  but  the  loss  of  officers  was  so 
great  that,  at  the  close  of  the  battle,  a  captain  was  the  rank- 


92  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

ing  officer  in  that  brigade.1  It  was  only  when  the  last  oi 
Stewart's  reserves  had  tried  all  that  courage  and  dash  could 
accomplish,  that  they  relaxed  their  efforts.  Some  asked 
for  quarter  in  the  ditch,  and  came  in  as  prisoners ;  some  lay 
down  in  front  of  the  hedge,  and  waited  for  darkness  to 
enable  them  to  crawl  away  undiscovered.  The  remainder 
fell  back  to  a  position  near  the  extension  of  the  line  Wag 
ner's  brigades  had  occupied. 

Cleburne  had  led  his  division  forward,  on  the  east  of  the 
central  turnpike,  with  a  desperation  that  was  born  of  the 
wounded  feelings  he  had  shown  in  the  morning,  and  he  fell 
among  the  first  who  were  at  the  ditch  when  the  rush  of  our 
reserves  restored  the  line  between  the  cotton-gin  and  *tha 
road.  His  three  successive  lines  pressed  forward  to  avenge 
his  death,  but  only  to  leave  a  thousand  gallant  officers  and 
men  beside  him.  On  the  other  flank,  Bate  had  moved  for 
ward  his  division  at  the  same  time  with  Brown,  deploying  as 
lie  went.  His  left  reached  beyond  the  Carter's  Creek  road 
as  he  neared  the  intreiichrnents,  but  the  shape  of  our  lines, 
which  there  bent  back  to  the  river,  made  him  travel  on  a 
large  curve,  and  his  assault  was  considerably  later  than 
Brown's.  It  struck  the  right  of  Euger's  division,  and  the 
left  of  Kimball's,  but  finding  the  works  before  him  stoutly 
held,  and  that  the  cavalry  Avhich  he  expected  to  advance 
upon  his  flank  were  not  doing  so,  his  attack  was  not  pressed 
as  determinedly  as  that  of  Brown.  The  success  which  this 
division  seemed  to  have  at  the  first,  and  the  fact  that  for 
some  distance  they  continued  to  hold  the  outside  of  the 
works,  encouraged  them  to  the  most  desperate  and  persis 
tent  efforts  there.  General  Strahl  was  with  his  brigade  in 
the  ditch,  personally  directing  the  fire  of  his  men  who  got 

1  Walthall's  official  report. 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN.  93 

a  foothold  in  the  outside  of  the  slope,  and  making  those  in 
rear  supply  the  front  rank  with  loaded  guns.  As  darkness 
came  on,  and  it  came  quickly  on  that  short  winter  day,  the 
two  breastworks,  so  little  apart,  were  lines  of  continuous 
flame,  as  the  men  fired  at  the  flash  of  each  other's  guns. 
On  other  parts  of  the  field,  there  were,  after  dark,  frequent 
vollies,  as  the  Confederate  generals  strove  to  assist  the 
central  attack  by  strong  demonstrations  ;  but  here  the  roar 
was  for  a  long  time  incessant  and  deafening.  Others  sug 
gested  to  Strahl  to  withdraw,  or  to  surrender,  but  he  steadily 
repeated  the  command,  "  keep  firing,"  till  he  was  himself 
struck  down.  He  called  for  Colonel  Stafford,  to  turn  over 
the  command,  and  they  tried  to  carry  him  to  the  rear,  but 
on  the  way  a  second  and  a  third  ball  struck  him,  killing 
him  instantly.1  Colonel  Stafford  continued  the  contest  with 
the  same  determination.  Messengers  were  sent  to  General 
Brown  to  tell  him  of  Strahl's  death  and  ask  for  orders,  but 
they  found  that  he  was  already  disabled  by  a  wound,  and 
the  staff  supposed  Strahl  to  be  in  command  of  the  division. 
Cheathani  had  sent  in  all  of  Brown's  brigades,  but  Gordon 
had  been  captured  in  the  first  melee,  Gist,  as  well  as  Strahl, 
was  dead,  and  Carter  was  wounded.  Hood  was  called  upon 
for  assistance,  and  he  sent  forward  Johnson's  division  oi 
Lee's  corps,  but  this,  too,  was  driven  back  by  that  terrible 
fire,  leaving  General  Manigault  wounded  on  the  field. 

On  the  National  side  the  One  Hundred  and  Twelfth  Illi 
nois  was  brought  over  from  Stiles's  brigade,  and  put  in  to 
assist  Strickland.  An  effort  was  made  to  get  this  regiment 
forward  over  the  little  interval  between  the  two  breast- 
wrorks,  but  it  was  not  successful.  The  oblique  fire  from  our 

1  The  det.iils  of  the  situation  on  the  Confederate  side  at  this  point  are  chiefly 
drawn  from  a  pamphlet  by  S.  A.  Cunningham,  Sergeant- Major,  entitled  Remi 
niscences  of  the  Forty-first  Tennessee  llegimeiit. 


94  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

troops,  on  right  and  left,  when  they  were  not  hotly  engaged 
in  front,  was  turned  upon  Cheatham's  men,  but  it  was  nine 
o'clock  before  they  gave  up  the  contest,  and  those  that  were 
left  were  reformed  on  the  line  occupied  by  Stewart  and 
Lee,  though  for  more  than  an  hour  occasional  volleys  were 
exchanged.  At  eleven  o'clock,  the  whole  front  being  quiet, 
Schofield  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops  to  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  but  an  accidental  fire  broke  out  in  the  vil 
lage,  making  a  bright  background  on  which  our  lines 
could  be  too  plainly  seen  by  the  enemy,  and  it  was  neces 
sary  to  wait  an  hour  till  the  fire  was  extinguished.  Kim- 
ball's  division  then  marched  by  the  rear  to  the  wagon 
bridge,  Ruger's  passed  behind  the  lines  to  the  railroad 
bridge,  Opdycke's  brigade  was  sent  to  follow  Kimball,  and 
Reilly's  division  crossed  behind  Ruger,  a  line  of  skirmishers, 
under  command  of  Major  Dow,  Inspector  General,  remain 
ing  in  the  trenches  till  all  the  rest  were  over  and  the  plank 
taken  from  the  wagon  bridge,  when  these  also  crossed  at 
the  railway.  The  dead  could  not  be  removed,  but  the  well 
disciplined  ambulance  corps,  under  Surgeon  Frink,  had 
taken  off  all  the  wounded  who  could  endure  transportation, 
except  some  who  had  crawled  away  into  buildings  and  sheds 
and  were  not  found  in  the  darkness.  Eeilly's  division  car 
ried  off  as  trophies  twenty-two  battle  flags  of  the  enemy, 
and  Opdycke's  brigade  ten.1 

The  battle  had  been  peculiar,  partly  by  reason  of  the  late 
hour  in  the  day  at  which  it  began,  which  prolonged  the 
hard  fighting  far  into  the  night,  and  partly  from  the  char 
acter  of  the  weather.  A  day  or  two  of  sunshine  had  fol 
lowed  the  continuous  storms  of  the  preceding  fortnight, 

1  Hood  says  that  thirteen  was  the  number  of  flags  he  lost,  but  the  number 
stated  above  was  officially  reported  by  our  division  aud  brigade  commanders  and 
verified  at  the  time. 


BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN.  95 

and  the  air  had  been  still  and  hazy.  The  smoke  of  the 
battle  did  not  rise  or  drift  away,  but  settled  on  the  field  in 
a  thick  cloud,  obscuring  the  vision  far  more  than  commoiio 
It  was  said  that  this  had  led  to  the  mistake,  on  Hood's 
part,  of  supposing  that  his  first  advantage  at  the  centre  was 
much  greater  than  in  fact  it  was,  and  resulted  in  greater  de 
struction  to  the  Confederate  troops,  by  repeated  assaults 
after  all  real  chance  of  success  was  gone. 

The  Confederate  accounts  of  the  condition  of  the  field  next 
morning  are  full  of  tragic  interest.  Before  daybreak  it  was 
learned  that  the  National  lines  were  empty,  and  the  plain  was 
covered  with  torchbearers  seeking  their  comrades  and  friends. 
Colonel  Stafford  was  found  in  the  ditch  General  Strahl  and 
he  had  so  stubbornly  held.  The  dead  lay  literally  in  a  pile 
about  him.  They  had  fallen  about  his  legs  and  behind  him, 
till  when  he  at  last  received  a  fatal  shot,  he  did  not  wholly 
fall,  but  was  found  stiffened  in  death  and  partly  upright, 
seeming  still  to  command  the  ghastly  line  of  his  comrades 
lying  beneath  the  parapet.  The  color-bearer  of  the  Forty- 
first  Tennessee  had  fallen  between  the  two  lines  of  breast 
works,  but  neither  friend  nor  foe  had  been  able  to  reach  the 
flag  till  it  was  hidden  by  the  night,  and  in  the  morning  it 
was  found  where  it  dropped.1 

But  even  civil  war  rarely  furnishes  so  sad  a  story  as  that 
which  the  Carter  family  have  to  tell.  The  house  was  occu 
pied  by  an  elderly  man  and  his  two  daughters.  Their 
presence  during  the  day  had  been  respected  and  had  kept 
their  property  from  unnecessary  disturbance,  and  the  day 
was  so  far  gone  that  they  thought  there  was  no  need  to  leave 
their  home.  The  battle,  when  it  came,  broke  upon  them  so 
suddenly  that  they  did  not  dare  to  leave,  and  they  took 

1  Sergeant-Major  Cunningham's  pamphlet. 


96  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHTILLE. 

refuge  in  the  cellar.  The  house  was  in  the  focus  of  the 
storm  which  raged  about  it  for  hours.  They  said  that  while 
the  horrid  din  lasted,  it  seemed  that  they  must  die  of  terror 
if  it  did  not  cease ;  but  when  there  was  a  lull,  the  suspense 
of  fearful  expectation  seemed  worse  than  the  din,  and  ib 
was  almost  a  relief  when  the  combat  was  renewed.  The 
long  night  ended  at  last,  and  with  the  first  light  the  young 
women  found  relief  in  ministering  to  the  wounded  who  had 
crept  into  the  house  and  outbuildings,  and  in  carrying 
water  to  those  on  the  field.  But,  as  they  climbed  the  para 
pet  at  the  rear  of  the  house,  among  the  first  they  found  was 
a  young  staff  officer,  their  own  brother,  mortally  wounded, 
lying,  as  he  had  fallen  at  sunset,  almost  at  the  door  of  his 
home. 

The  withdrawal  of  Schofield's  forces  in  the  night  left  no  op 
portunity  to  reckon  the  Confederate  losses.  Hood  says  that 
his  casualties,  computed  ten  days  after  the  battle  by  means  of 
the  returns  of  "  effective  strength,"  were  found  to  be  7,547 
since  the  opening  of  this  campaign,  and  including  the  losses 
about  Columbia  and  Spring  Hill.  This,  however,  excludes 
all  the  slightly  wounded  who  had  returned  to  duty,  and  all 
officers,  and  makes  no  account  of  the  accessions  he  had  by  the 
return  of  absentees  and  the  joining  of  recruits.  It  still 
acknowledges  a  loss  of  6,300  in  this  battle,  of  which  700 
were  prisoners  in  our  hands.  It  is  very  certain  that  the 
whole  Confederacy  was  deeply  impressed  with  the  fright 
ful  carnage  of  their  troops,  and  their  writers,  with  common 
accord,  spoke  of  the  desperate  fighting  as  remarkable  even 
in  this  war  of  desperate  combats.  The  partial  returns  acces 
sible  seem  to  show  clearly  that  no  one  of  the  divisions  en 
gaged  (except  Bate's),  lost  less  than  eight  hundred,  and  that 
Brown's  and  Cleburne's,  at  the  centre,  and  Loring's,  on  our 
left,  lost  much  more  heavily.  The  long  list  of  general 


BATTLE   OF   FRANKLIN.  97 

officers  killed  and  wounded  gives  terrible  significance  to  the 
recriminations  which  the  affair  at  Spring  Hill  had  excited, 
We  have  seen  that  Brown  and  all  four  of  his  brigadiers  were 
disabled  or  killed.  In  Cleburne's  division,  Cranberry  be 
sides  himself  fell.  In  Loring's  division  they  lost  Generals 
John  Adams  and  Scott.  In  French's,  Cockrell ;  in  Walt- 
hall's,  Quarles  ;  and  in  Johnson's,  Manigault ;  twelve  gen 
erals  in  all,  besides  Stafford,  and  a  long  list  of  colonels  and 
field  officers  who  succeeded  to  brigade  commands. 

On  the  National  side  the  losses  were  2,326,  of  which  more 
than  one  thousand  were  in  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner, 
which  were  so  unnecessarily  compromised  at  the  front.  Near 
the  centre,  where  the  line  was  temporarily  broken,  the  losses 
were  naturally  much  heavier  than  on  the  flanks,  where  our 
men  stoutly  held  the  breastworks  and  fought  under  good 
cover.  The  result  well  illustrates  the  fearful  odds  at  which 
the  bravest  troops  assault  a  line  of  earthworks  over  open 
ground,  even  when  a  grave  faulfc  of  a  subordinate  has  given 
them  an  exceptional  and  unlooked-for  advantage.  General 
Wagner's  place  of  duty  was  with  the  two  brigades  of  his 
division  which  were  exposed  in  front,  and  the  order  to  bring 
them  in  without  fighting  had  been  sent  through  the  Fourth 
Corps'  head-quarters,  and  had  been  received  by  him.  He  was 
at  the  Carter  house  when  the  message  came  from  the  front 
that  Hood  was  forming  in  line  of  battle,  and,  in  a  moment  of 
excitement,  forgetting  himself  and  his  orders,  he  sent  back  a 
command  to  fight.1  The  overwhelming  of  the  two  brigades 
and  the  peril  to  the  whole  line  were  the  necessary  conse 
quence.  He  rallied  the  disorganized  brigades  at  the  river, 
but  they  were  not  again  carried  into  action. 

During  the  battle  and  in  preparation  for  any  contingency 


iThis  is  stated  to  the  writer  by  two  officers  who  were  present  and  heard  it, 

VOL.  X. — 5 


98  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

which  might  arise,  General  Schofield  directed  General 
Wood  to  put  the  three  brigades  of  his  division  in  position  to 
cover  the  flanks  of  the  troops  in  front  of  the  town,  and  to 
protect  the  bridges  in  case  of  need.  Wood  accordingly 
placed  Post's  brigade  opposite  Kimball's  flank,  below  the 
town,  Streight's  near  the  bridges,  and  Beatty's  above  Fort 
Granger,  all  on  the  high  ground  of  the  north  bank  of  the 
Harpeth ;  and  these  brigades  maintained  their  position  in 
the  night  till  the  rest  of  the.  infantry  had  passed  through 
their  lines  and  marched  to  Brentwood.  General  Wilson, 
with  the  cavalry,  had,  during  the  afternoon,  a  warm  skirmish 
with  Forrest,  who  tried  in  vain  to  cross  the  Harpeth  beyond 
the  left  of  Schofield's  forces.  Thomas  sent  a  warm  con 
gratulatory  despatch  when  the  result  of  the  engagement  was 
announced  to  him  ;  but,  as  he  thought  three  days  would  still 
be  needed  to  prepare  his  concentrated  army  for  aggressive 
operations,  and  as  this  was  a  longer  time  than  Schofield 
could  engage  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Harpeth  without  rein 
forcements,  he  directed  the  latter  to  retire  upon  Brentwood, 
and  thence  to  Nashville.1  Despatches  had  been  sent  to 
General  Cooper,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been 
stationed  at  Centreville,  on  Duck  River,  with  a  brigade  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  directing  him  to  fall  back  on  Franklin. 
Bat  unavoidable  delays  occurred,  and  when  he  approached 
Franklin,  the  enemy  was  in  possession.  He  was  similarly 
anticipated  at  Brentwood,  but  by  coolness  and  good  conduct 
brought  in  his  command  safely  to  Nashville. 

1  For  correspondence  between  these  officers  on  November  29th  and  30th,  see 
Appendix  D. 


CHAPTER  YL 

BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE. 

SCHOFIELD'S  little  army  reached  Nashville  in  the  morning- 
of  December  1st,  and  was  merged  in  the  forces  which  Gen- 
eral  Thomas  was  assembling  there.  General  A.  J.  Smith,  after 
many  uni'oroseon  delays,  had  arrived  with  his  detachments 
from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  consisting  of  three  divi 
sions,  aggregating  nearly  twelve  thousand  men.  Of  these, 
something  over  nine  thousand  men  reached  Nashville  early 
in  the  morning  of  November  30th,  and  the  rest  on  the  next 
day.  The  first  intention  of  General  Thomas  had  been  to 
meet  Schofield  at  Brentwood,  ten  miles  in  front  of  Nash 
ville,  with  these  troops,  while  Schofield  marched  the  ten 
miles  from  Franklin  to  the  same  point ;  but  he  concluded 
later  to  make  the  union  at  Nashville.  When  he  received 
from  Schofield  and  from  Wilson  the  reports  of  Hood's  move 
ment  of  the  28th  and  29th,  by  which  the  cavalry  had  been 
separated  from  Schofield,  and  Forrest  was  reported  pushing 
eastward,  he  ordered  Steedman  to  leave  a  garrison  in  Chatta 
nooga  and  take  his  other  available  forces  to  Cowan,  a 
station  near  Elk  Eiver,  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Eailway.  Steedman  reached  there  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th  and  put  his  troops  in  position  ;  but  in  the  evening, 
Thomas,  having  learned  of  Hood's  attack  in  force  upon 
Sckoneld  at  Franklin,  ordered  Steedman  to  hasten  to  Nash 
ville.  The  troops  were  accordingly  put  upon  the  railway 


100  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

trains  again,  and  most  of  them  reached  their  destination 
safely  on  the  evening  of  December  1st.  One  train,  being 
delayed  by  an  accident,  did  not  arrive  till  the  2d,  and  was 
attacked  by  Forrest  five  miles  south  of  Nashville,  but  the 
troops  made  their  way  through  without  serious  loss,  though 
the  train  was  captured  and  destroyed.  Of  the  8,000  men 

on     fTl 


brought  with  h]*"  Kt2flOf  fionaigting  of  two  brigades  of  colored 
trOOggj  and  *•  prnvifiimml  rlivision  mn.rlp.  np  of  anlriiera  be 
longing  to  the  army  with  Sherman,  but  wh»  hsu\  n.rri'vpd.  n.t 
the  front  too  late  to  rejoin  thm'r  own  regiments. 

Most  of  the  troops  under  General  E.  S.  Granger,  in  North 
Alabama,  and  of  those  under  General  Milroy,  at  Tullahoma, 
were  ordered  to  Murfreesboro,  where  the  whole,  amounting 
to  about  eight  thousand  men,  were  placed  under  command  of 
General  Eousseau,  and  remained  until  after  Hood's  defeat 
on  December  15th  and  16th.  The  block-house  garrison,  at 
the  important  railroad  bridge  on  the  Elk  Eiver,  was  the 
only  considerable  detachment  left  along  the  line  of  the 
Chattanooga  Eoad,  between  Murfreesboro  and  Stevenson. 

In  Nashville,  on  November  30th,  besides  Smith's  forces, 
Thomas  had  about  six  thousand  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
three  thousand  cavalry,  mostly  dismounted.1  The  Chief 
Quartermaster,  General  Donaldson,  had  also  armed  and 
organized  into  a  division  the  employes  of  his  and  the  com 
missary  department,  and  these  were  prepared  to  serve  as  an 
addition  to  the  garrison  when  needed.  The  new  regiments 
which  arrived  were  gradually  assigned  to  the  old  divisions, 

1  By  the  table  in  Appendix  A,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  cavalry  "  present  for 
duty1  were  10,884,  of  which  2,272  were  not  "equipped,"  i.e.,  were  dismounted.  I 
have  not  been  able  to  procure  the  exact  figures  showing  how  many  were  with 
Wilpon  in  the  field,  and  what  other  small  detachments  there  might  be.  The  in 
fantry  would  be  the  difference  betweeu  14,000  and  the  number  at  Murfreesboro, 
See  Appendix  A. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE.  101 

and  the  additions  to  the  list  of  Sherman's  convalescents  and 
returning  men  were  united  to  those  who  had  come  with 
Steedman,  making,  by  December  14th,  a  division  of  over  five 
thousand  men,  under  command  of  General  Cruft. 

Accepting  Hood's  statements  of  his  losses  thus  far  in  the 
campaTgh,  the  "army  wliicn  he  led  against  Nashville  con 
sisted'  of  aTJo'ut  f orty_- f our,. .thousand  men  of  all  arms.1  His 
means  of  information  were  such  that  he  had  pretty  full 
knowledge  of  the  concentration  Thomas  was  now  effecting, 
and  the  motives  which  induced  a  march  to  Nashville  are 
matters  of  interesting  inquiry.  Beauregard,  in  his  prelimin 
ary  report  to  the  Confederate  War  Department,  said  :  "  It  is 
clear  to  my  mind  that  after  the  great  loss  of  life  at  Franklin, 
the  army  was  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  make  a  successful 
attack  on  Naslrville."  Hood's  own  statement,  which  would 
be  entitled  to  the  greatest  weight  if  his  subsequent  writings 
were  not  so  full  of  evidence  that  they  are  labored  apologies 
for  his  misfortunes,  is  that  he  expected  reinforcements  from 
Texas,  and  that  he  hoped  by  intrenching  near  Nashville  he 
could  maintain  himself  in  a  defensive  attitude  till  these 
should  arrive ;  or  that  he  might  even  take  advantage  of  a 
reverse  to  Thomas,  if  the  latter  should  be  beaten  in  an  attack 
upon  his  fortified  line.  The  hope  of  aid  from  Texas  was  a 
forlorn  one,  for  no  organized  body  of  Confederates  had  for 
a  long  time  succeeded  in  passing  the  Mississippi  River. 
From  other  sources,  however,  we  learn  that  the  show  of 
confidence  and  of  success  was  relied  upon  to  induce  recruit 
ing  in  Tennessee,  and  that  the  pretended  Governor,  Harris, 
was  with  Hood,  endeavoring  to  enforce  the  conscription  in 
that  State.  This,  and  the  collection  of  supplies,  give  an  in 
telligible  reason  for  occupying  as  much  territory  as  possible, 

1  Sc*  Appendix  A. 


102  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

and  for  an  appearance  of  bravado  which  could  hardly  be 
justified  on  military  grounds.  Doubtless,  too,  Hood  be 
lieved  that  while  his  veterans  might  be  forced  to  retreat, 
they  could  not  be  routed ;  and  he  underestimated  the  dis 
couragement  that  began  to  pervade  them  when  they  were 
taught,  by  the  terrible  lesson  of  Franklin,  how  hopeless  was 
that  dream  of  conquest  with  which  their  leaders  had  tried 
to  inspire  them  when  they  crossed  the  Tennessee.  Hood 
also  says  he  learned  that  Schofield  retreated  in  alarm  ;  but 
never  wras  a  greater  mistake.  Schofield's  officers  on  the 
line  had  reported  their  perfect  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
hold  it,  and  the  withdrawal  from  the  Harpeth  had  been 
based  solely  on  the  probability  of  the  position  being  turned 
before  reinforcements  could  be  sure  to  arrive. 

In  truth,  Hood's  situation  was  a  very  difficult  one,  and  to 
go  forward  or  to  go  back  was  almost  equally  unpromising. 
He  followed  his  natural  bent,  therefore,  which  always 
favored  the  appearance,  at  .least,  of  aggression,  and  he 
marched  after  Schofield  to  Nashville.  On  approaching  the 
town,  he  put  Lee's  corps  in  the  centre,  across  the  Franklin 
turnpike,  for  it  had  suffered  least  in  the  campaign,  and  was 
now  his  strongest  corps.  Cheatham  took  the  right,  and 
Stewart  the  left  of  the  line,  while  Forrest,  with  the  cavalry, 
occupied  the  country  between  Stewart  and  the  river  below 
Nashville.  Attempts  were  made  to  repair  the  railway  from 
Corinth  to  Decatur,  and  thence  by  Pulaski  to  Hood's  rear. 
Hood  tells  us  that  he  gained  possession  of  two  locomotives 
and  several  cars  (perhaps  at  Spring  Hill),  and  that  these 
were  used  to  help  transport  supplies. 

Thomas  put  his  troops  in  position  upon  the  heights  sur 
rounding  Nashville,  General  Smith's  divisions  on  the  right, 
the  Fourth  Corps  (General  Wood  temporarily  commanding) 
in  the  centre,  and  Schofield's  Twenty-third  Corps  on  the 


BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE.  10^ 

left.  Steedman,  who  arrived  later,  was  first  put  on  the 
Nolensville  road,  about  a  mile  in  front  of  Schofield's  left, 
but  was  placed  on  the  extension  of  Schofield's  line  a  day  or 
two  later,  when  Wilson,  with  the  cavalry,  were  sent  over 
the  river  to  Edgefield,  on  the  north  bank. 

On  December  2d,  Hood  sent  Bate's  division  of  Cheatham's 
corps  to  destroy  the  railroad  between  Nashville  and  Mur- 
freesboro.  Bate  reached  Overall's  Creek,  ten  miles  from 
Murfreesboro,  and  attacked  the  block-house  protecting  the 
railway  bridge  there ;  but  the  little  garrison  held  out 
against  a  severe  cannonade  till  General  Milroy  arrived  with 
reinforcements  from  Murfreesboro,  and  drove  the  enemy  off. 
Bate  now  took  the  road  toward  Nashville,  and  at  Stewart's 
Creek  and  two  other  places  in  that  neighborhood,  found 
the  block-houses  evacuated,  and  burned  them  with  the 
bridges  they  were  built  to  protect.  He  also  reported  that 
he  had  torn  up  several  miles  of  track.  Forrest,  mean 
while,  who  had  been  directed  to  co-operate  with  Bate,  had 
sent  Buford's  division  against  the  block-houses  nearest 
Nashville,  and  succeeded  in  reducing  three  of  them  near 
Mill  Creek,  beginning  with  one  five  miles  from  the  city. 
On  the  5th  he  united  Jackson's  division  with  Buford's, 
and  moving  toward  Lavergne  took  two  more  block-houses. 
He  now  met  Bate,  who  was  moving  in  the  opposite  direc 
tion,  and  turned  the  united  forces  upon  Murfreesboro. 
Here,  on  the  evening  of  the  6th,  he  was  further  reinforced 
by  Sears's  brigade  of  French's  division,  and  Palmer's  brigade 
of  Stevenson's,  and  on  next  morning  approached  the  towTn, 
reconnoitring  the  fortifications  in  person.  Rousseau  now 
sent  Milroy  against  the  enemy,  with  seven  regiments,  and 
these  attacked  vigorously  the  left  flank  of  Forrest's  infantry, 
while  they  were  moving  by  his  orders  in  the  same  direc 
tion  for  the  purpose  of  taking  ground  farther  to  the  left. 


304  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHVILLE. 

Milroy's  attack  fell  obliquely  upon  the  extremity  of  Bate's 
line,  which  was  quickly  rolled  up  and  put  to  rout,  losing  two 
pieces  of  artillery.  Bate  admits  213  casualties  in  the  in 
fantry,  but  those  of  the  cavalry  are  not  given.  Milroy  took 
207  prisoners,  and  his  own  losses  in  the  affair  were  30 
killed,  and  175  wounded.  Meanwhile,  Buford's  division 
attempted  to  enter  the  town  by  another  road,  but  was  also 
defeated  and  driven  off. 

Bate's  division  was  now  recalled  to  Nashville,  and  re 
placed  by  a  brigade  under  Colonel  Olmstead  (formerly 
Mercer's)  so  that  Forrest  retained  three  brigades  of  infantry 
as  a  support  for  his  cavalry.  He  continued  till  the  15th  to 
operate  on  the  east  of  Nashville,  and  along  the  south  bank 
of  the  Cumberland,  part  of  his  duty  being  to  "  drain  the 
country  of  persons  liable  to  military  service,  animals  suita 
ble  for  army  purposes,  and  subsistence  supplies."  '  On  the 
15th  Jackson's  division  captured  a  railway  train  of  supplies 
going  from  Stevenson  to  Murfreesboro,  for  the  garrison 
there,  who,  ifc  would  seem,  must  have  been  in  danger  of 
running  short  of  rations,  since  the  breaking  of  their  com 
munications  with  Nashville. 

At  Thomas's  request,  Lieutenant-Commander  Fitch  pa 
trolled  the  Cumberland  with  gunboats  above  and  below 
Nashville,  to  prevent  the  crossing  of  that  stream  by  the 
enemy,  and  Wilson  sent  Hammond's  brigade  of  cavalry  to 
Gal  latin  to  watch  the  north  bank  of  the  liver  as  far  as 
Carthage. 

From  the  time  of  Hood's  arrival  in  front  of  Nashville,  the 
President  and  Secretary  of -War  became  very  urgent  in  their 
desire  that  Thomas  should  at  once  assume  the  aggressive. 

1  Campaigns  of  Forrest;  p.  634.  Thomas's  report  puts  the  affair  at  Murfrees 
boro  on  the  8th,  but  both  Bate's  report  and  Forrest's  biographers  say  it  was  th^ 
7th. 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  105 

At  their  suggestion,  General  Grant  telegraphed  on  Decem 
ber  2,  advising  Thomas  to  leave  the  defences  of  Nashville  to 
General  Donaldson's  organized  employes,  and  attack  Hood 
at  once.  Grant's  language  was  scarcely  less  imperative 
than  an  order,  but  Thomas  was  so  desirous  of  increasing 
his  force  of  mounted  men  that  he  determined  to 'wait  a  few 
days.  On  the  8th,  the  weather,  which  had  been  good  for 
more  than  a  week,  suddenly  changed.  A  freezing  storm  of 
snow  and  sleet  covered  the  ground,  and  for  two  or  three 
days  the  alternations  of  rain  and  frost  made  the  hills  about 
Nashville  slopes  of  slippery  ice,  on  which  movement  was 
impracticable.  As  Hood's  positions  could  only  be  reached 
by  deployed  lines  advancing  over  these  hills  and  hollows, 
everybody  in  Thomas's  army  felt  the  absolute  necessity  of 
now  waiting  a  little  longer,  till  the  ice  should  thaw.  This 
was  not  fully  appreciated  by  the  authorities  at  Washington, 
who  connected  it  too  closely  with  Thomas's  previous  wish 
for  more  time,  and  a  rapid  correspondence  by  telegraph  took 
place,  in  which  Thomas  was  ordered  to  attack  at  once  or  to 
turn  over  his  command  to  General  Schofield.  He  assembled 
his  corps  commanders  and  asked  their  advice,  saying  that  he 
was  ordered  to  give  Hood  battle  immediately  or  surrender 
his  command.  To  whom  the  army  would  be  transferred 
was  not  stated,  but  it  was  matter  of  inference,  and  he  de 
clined  to  submit  the  despatch  itself  to  the  council  of  war, 
though  one  of  the  junior  officers  intimated  a  wish  to  know 
its  terms.  By  the  custom  of  such  councils  the  opinion  of 
officers  is  given  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  grade ;  but 
General  Schofield,  feeling  the  delicacy  of  his  position  as 
senior  subordinate,  volunteered  his  own  opinion  first,  that 
till  the  ice  should  melt  it  was  not  now  practicable  to  move. ' 


1  In  the  account  of  this  meeting,  the  author  follows  a  written  statement  o£ 
General  Schofleld. 

5* 


106  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

All  concurred  in  this,  and  Thomas  telegraphed  Grant  that 
he  felt  compelled  to  wait  till  the  storm  should  break,  but 
would  submit  without  a  murmur  if  it  was  thought  necessary 
to  relieve  him.  On  the  13th,  General  Logan,  who,  it  will 
be  remembered,  was  temporarily  absent  from  the  Fifteenth 
Corps,  was  ordered  to  Nashville  for  the  purpose  of  super 
seding  Thomas  in  command  of  the  Department  and  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  and  Grant  himself  was  on  the  way  there 
also,  when  the  result  of  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville  (December  15th)  stopped  further  action  in  that  direc 
tion. 

As  early  as  December  6th,  the  troops  had  been  ordered  to 
be  ready  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and  the  plan  of  battle 
afterward  adopted  had  been  in  substance  determined.  From 
day  to  day  Hood  appeared  to  be  taking  ground  to  the  east, 
so  as  to  bring  himself  more  closely  into  support  of  Forrest's 
operations.  This  led  to  a  suggestion  to  Thomas  from  his 
corps  commanders  to  modify  his  plan  which  had  looked  to 
the  use  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  demonstrate  on  the 
left,  and  give  more  weight  to  an  attack  by  the  right.  From 
the  8th  to  the  14th,  it  was  definitely  understood  in  camp 
that  an  attack  would  be  made  the  moment  the  ice  melted, 
and  on  the  date  last  mentioned  a  warm  rain  made  it  certain 
the  ground  would  be  bare  next  day.  The  position  of  Hood 
had  not  materially  changed  for  a  week.  Chalmers  was 
operating  with  a  division  of  cavalry  along  the  Cumberland, 
for  some  miles  below  Nashville,  as  Buford  was  above  ;  but, 
while  ordinary  steamboat  transportation  was  thus  inter 
rupted,  the  navy  patrolled  the  river  and  prevented  the  enemy 
from  crossing.  Hood  had  sent  a  detachment  of  cavalry  also, 
supported  by  Cockrell's  brigade  of  infantry  to  the  mouth  of 
Duck  River,  on  the  Tennessee,  to  blockade  that  stream  also, 
if  possible.  In  his  anxiety  to  cover  so  large  a  territory,  the 


BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE.  107 


much  extended,,  and  in  front  of 


Thomas's  right  his  flank  was  only  covered  by  Ch^m^ra*"  divi 

sion  of  horse.  To  make  some  connection  with  the  river  on 
this  side,  ho  had  built  a  unmoor  of  detached  works,  Init 
these  were  not  completed,  though  he  had  put  artillery  in 
them,  supported  by  detachments  of  infantry  from  Walthall's 
division.  Reports  brought  in  by  deserters  indicated  that  he 
was  intending  to  withdraw  from  his  advanced  lines  since 
the  10th,  but  the  same  causes  which  prevented  Thomas  from 
moving,  affected  him  also,  and  a  change  of  quarters,  to  his 
ill-clad  and  poorly  shod  troops,  would  have  been  the  cause 
of  much  suffering,  if  it  were  made  during  the  severe  weather 
of  that  week. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  a  heavy  fog  obscured  the 
dawn  and  hid  the  early  movements  of  Thomas's  army.  The 
ice  had  given  place  to  mud,  and  the  manoeuvres,  like  those 
of  all  winter  campaigns,  were  slow.  The  modified  order  of 
the  day  directed  a  strong  demonstration  by  Steedrnan  on  the 
extreme  left,  with  two  brigades  ;  one  commanded  by  Colonel 
Grosvenor,  Eighteenth  Ohio,  and  the  other  (colored  troops) 
commanded  by  Colonel  Morgan,  Fourteenth  United  States 
Colored.  General  Wood,  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  Gen 
eral  Smith,  with  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  were  ordered  to  form 
upon  a  position  nearly  continuous  with  the  eastern  line  of 
the  city  defences,  extending  from  a  salient  on  the  Acklen 
place  across  the  Hillsborough  turnpike  toward  the  Hardin 
turnpike  in  a  southwest  direction.  Advancing  toward  the 
southeast  these  corps  would  make  the  principal  attack 
obliquely  upon  the  left  of  Hood's  line.  General  Wilson, 
with  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  clear  the 
Hardin  and  Charlotte  turnpikes  of  the  enemy  (still  farther 
to  the  west)  and  move  forward  on  the  right  of  Smith's 
corps.  General  Schofield,  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 

1 


108  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

constituted  the  reserve,  and  was  placed  in  rear  of  Wood, 
to  strengthen  and  extend  the  attack  on  the.  right.  As 
Smith  had  occupied  the  fortifications  on  the  right  of  the 
line  about  the  city,  these  orders  would  be  executed  by  wheel 
ing  the  whole  of  both  corps  forward  to  the  left,  upon  the 
salient  at  the  Acklen  place  as  a  pivot,  after  Wood  had  taken 
ground  to  the  right  by  the  distance  of  say  half  a  mile,  so  as 
to  bring  his  left  flank  at  the  point  named.  Schofield,  who 
had  been  in  the  fortifications  still  to  the  left  of  Wood, 
marched  from  his  lines  at  daybreak,  and  passing  through  the 
works  at  the  Hillsborough  road  moved  to  the  east  into  the 
position  assigned  him,  as  soon  as  the  wheel  of  the  right 
wing  made  room  for  him.  The  interior  lines  at  the  city 
were  held  by  General  Donaldson's  men,  while  General 
Craft,  with  his  division,  occupied  those  from  which  Schofield 
and  Steedrnan  moved. 

Standing  in  the  salient  in  Wood's  line,  which  has  been 
mentioned,  the  topography  of  the  country  about  Nashville 
is  clearly  seen.  On  the  left,  toward  the  east,  is  a  valley  in 
which  Brown's  Creek  flows  north  into  the  Cumberland.  It 
rises  in  the  high  Brentwood  Hills,  which  shut  out  the  view 
toward  the  south  a  little  more  than  four  miles  away,  and  its 
course  is  nearly  parallel  to  the  eastern  line  of  Thomas's  in- 
trenchments.  On  the  right,  but  a  little  farther  off,  is  Rich- 
land  Creek,  flowing  northwest  into  the  Cumberland.  It  rises 
also  in  the  Brentwood  Hills,  not  more  than  a  mile  west  of 
Brown's  Creek,  and  runs  nearly  parallel  with  it  toward  the 
city  for  some  distance,  when  the  two  curve  away  to  right 
and  left,  encircling  the  place,  and  marking  its  strong  and 
natural  line  of  defence.  On  the  high  ridge  between  the 
creeks  is  the  Granny  White  turnpike.  A  mile  eastward  is 
the  Franklin  turnpike,  diverging  about  thirty  degrees.  At 
nearly  equal  distances,  on  that  side,  the  Nolensville  and 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE. 


109 


rflurfreesboro  turnpikes  leave  the  city  successively.  Turn 
ing  toward  the  west  from  our  station,  the  Hillsboro,  the 
Hardin,  and  the  Charlotte  turnpikes  successively  go  out  at 


May  of  Buttle-Fiulu  of  Nashville. 


110  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

similar  angles,  all  radiating  from  the  centre  of  the  town. 
The  ground,  is  hilly,  rising  into  knobs  and  eminences  two  or 
three  hundred  feet  above  the  Cumberland,  but  mostly  open, 
with  groves  of  timber  here  and  there. 

Hood's  line  was  over  Brown's  Creek,  on  the  high  ground 
from  the  Nolensville  turnpike  and  the  Chattanooga  railway 
to  the  Franklin  turnpike,  then  crossing  the  creek  and 
mounting  a  high  hill  west  of  it,  it  extended  to  the  Hillsboro 
road,  where  it  turned  back  along  a  stone  wall  on  the  side  of 
the  turnpike.  The  detached  works,  of  which  mention  has 
been  made,  were  still  to  the  southwest  of  this,  and  across 
Eichland  Creek.  The  relative  places  of  his  several  corps 
were  the  same  as  when  he  first  came  before  the  town.  His 
main  line  at  his  left,  where  it  reached  the  Hillsboro  pike,  was 
about  a  mile  in  front  of  Wood,  but  he  also  occupied  an  ad 
vanced  line  with  skirmishers,  only  half  that  distance  away, 
and  terminating  in  a  strong  outpost  on  Montgomery  Hill,  at 
the  Hillsboro  road. 

Before  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  Steedman  was  moving 
forward  under  cover  of  the  fog  by  the  Murfreesboro  road,  on 
the  extreme  left,  and  about  eight  he  attacked  Hood's  right 
between  the  turnpike  and  the  railway.  The  vigor  of  the  as 
sault  made  it  something  more  than  a  demonstration,  and  the 
rapid  fire  of  both  artillery  and  small  arms  attracted  the  at 
tention  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction.  The  distance  Smith's 
right  wing  had  to  move  was  found  to  be  greater  than  had 
been  reckoned  on,  and  it  was  ten  o'clock  before  McArtlmr's 
division  had  moved  sufficiently  to  the  left  to  open  the  way 
for  Wilson's  cavalry  to  advance  upon  the  Hardin  road. 
Johnson's  division  moved  forward  on  the  Charlotte  turn 
pike,  looking  also  after  the  enemy's  battery  at  Bell's  Land 
ing,  on  the  Cumberland ;  Croxton's  brigade  took  the  interval 
to  the  Hardin  turnpike,  Hatch's  division  continued  the  line 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE.  HI 

to  the  flank  of  Smith's  infantry,  and  Kiripe's  division  was  in 
reserve.  Smith  formed  the  Sixteenth  Corps  with  Garrard's 
division  on  his  left,  connecting  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  and 
McArthur's  division  on  the  right.  The  division  of  Moore 
was  in  reserve.  On  the  other  side  Chalmers  did  what  he 
could  to  oppose  them,  supported  by  Coleman's  (formerly 
Ector's)  brigade  of  infantry,1  but  the  odds  was  too  great, 
and  they  were  driven  steadily  back.  Half  a  mile  southeast 
of  the  Hardin  road  the  first  of  Hood's  detached  works,  con 
taining  four  guns,  was  found.  The  batteries  of  McArthur 
and  Hatch  were  brought  to  bear  upon  it  from  all  sides,  and, 
after  a  severe  cannonade,  McMillan's  and  Hubbard's  bri 
gades  of  infantry  and  Coon's  of  cavalry  (dismounted)  at 
tacked  and  carried  the  redoubt.2  Stewart  now  recalled 
Coleman.  and  directed  him  to  reporb  to  Walthall,  whose 
division  occupied  the  stone  wall  bordering  the  Hillsboro 
turnpike.  Walthall  placed  him  on  the  extension  of  his  line 
southward,  upon  some  high  points  covering  the  Granny 
White  road.  This  left  the  other  redoubts  to  their  fate,  as 
Chalmers  was  far  too  much  over-matched  to  make  much  re 
sistance  with  his  cavalry.  He  had  been  driven  back  so  fast 
that  his  train,  with  his  headquarters  baggage  and  papers, 
had  been  captured.  The  next  redoubt,  about  four  hundred 
yards  to  the  right,  was  carried  by  the  same  troops,  and  two 
guns  in  it  were  taken.  Another  four-gun  battery,  intrenched 
on  a  detached  hill,  was  stormed  and  captured  by  the  cavalry, 
and  a  two-gun  battery  by  Hill's  brigade  of  McArthur's  divi 
sion,  though  with  the  loss  of  Colonel  Hill,  who  fell  in  the 


1  This  was  of  French's  division,  bub  French  seems  to  have  been  absent,  and  his 
brigades  were  separately  used  as  occasion  required.  Scare's  had  been  recalled 
from  Forrest,  and  was  temporarily  reporting  to  Walthall. 

a  Smi^-h  and  Wilson  each  claim  for  their  men  the  honors  in  the  attack  of  all 
these  works,  but  in  such  a  combined  movement  it  is  vain  to  discriminate  minutely 
as  to  the  exact  credit  due  each  brigade. 


112  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

moment  of  success.  Smith's  corps  now  bore  somewhat  to 
the  left,  striking  the  extreme  flank  of  the  stone  wall  held  by 
Walthall's  division,  driving  Reynolds's  brigade  from  it  in  con 
fusion.  At  the  same  time,  Schofield,  who  had  followed  the 
movement  closely  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  in  accord 
ance  with  Thomas's  order,  pushed  Couch's  division  (formerly 
Cooper's)  past  Smith's  flank,  and  beyond  the  last  redoubt 
which  had  been  captured.  Now  advancing  on  the  line  from 
the  Hillsboro  road,  eastward,  across  an  open  valley  half  a 
mile  wide,  Couch  assaulted  and  carried  the  left  of  a  series 
of  hills  parallel  to  the  Granny  White  turnpike.  The  as 
sault  was  made  by  Cooper's  brigade,  and  the  rest  of  the 
division  was  quickly  brought  up  in  support,  while  Cox's 
division  marched  still  farther  to  the  right  and  occupied  the 
continuation  of  the  line  of  hills  along  Eichland  Creek  with 
two  brigades,  keeping  the  third  (Stiles's)  on  the  heights  west 
of  the  creek  to  cover  the  flank. 

These  last  movements  had  occurred  just  as  darkness  was 
falling,  and  completed  the  day's  work  on  the  extreme  right. 
Ifc  is  now  necesaary  to  go  back  and  trace  the  progress  of  the 
Fourth  Corps.  General  Wood  had  formed  the  corps  with 
Elliott's  division  (formerly  Wagner's)  on  the  right,  connect 
ing  with  Smith's  corps,  while  Kimball's  and  Beatty's  extend 
ed  the  line  to  the  left.  The  time  occupied  in  the  deployed 
movement  of  the  right  of  the  army  made  it  one  o'clock  be 
fore  it  was  time  for  the  extreme  left  to  move.  Wood  then 
ordered  forward  Post's  brigade  of  Beatty's  division  to  attack 
Montgomery  Hill,  the  high  point  half  a  mile  in  front  of  the 
salient  of  OTLT  ..line,..  on_  which  was  Hood's  advanced  guard. 
The  assault  was  preceded  by  rapid  artillery  fire  and  was 
gallantly  executed.  The  general  advance  of  the  line  was 
now  progressing,  and  Schofield's  corps  was  ordered  away  by 
General  Thomas  to  support  the  movement  of  the  right  flank. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE.  113 

Wood  met  with  a  strong  skirmishing  resistance,  but  the 
lines  went  forward  steadily,  keeping  pace  with  the  troops  on 
the  right,  till  Smith's  attack  upon  the  south  end  of  the 
stone  wall  along  the  Hillsboro  road,  which  was  held  by 
Walthall.  Kimball's  division  was  opposite  the  angle  in 
Hood's  line  where  Walthall  joined  upon  Loring,  having 
Sears's  brigade  of  French's  division  between  them.  Kimball 
pushed  straight  at  the  angle,  and  the  right  of  the  stone  wall 
having  already  been  carried,  Walthall's  brigades,  under 
Johnson  (formerly  Quarles's)  and  Shelley,  successively  gave 
way.  Elliott's  division  of  Wood's  corps  lapped  upon  Gar- 
rard's  of  the  Sixteenth,  and  the  whole  went  forward  with 
enthusiasm,  capturing  several  guns  and  many  prisoners. 

Hood's  left  was  now  hopelessly  broken,  and  he  made  haste 
to  draw  back  his  shattered  divisions  upon  a  new  line.  Scho- 
field's  advance  had  separated  Coleman's  brigade  from  Walt- 
hall,  but  it  occupied  a  commanding  hill  (afterward  known 
as  Shy's  Hill),1  and  held  on  with  tenacity  till  Walthall, 
helped  by  the  gathering  darkness,  could  form  along  its  right 
across  the  Granny  White  road.  At  the  first  news  of  the  loss 
of  the  redoubts,  Hood  ordered  Cheatham's  corps  (except 
Smith's,  formerly  Cleburne's  division)  from  the  right  to  the 
left,  and  his  divisions,  hurrying  by  the  Franklin  pike  toward 
Overton's  Hill,  passed  great  numbers  of  stragglers  streaming 
to  the  rear.  Bate  was  ordered  to  relieve  part  of  Walthall's 
division,  so  as  to  make  a  stronger  line  between  Shy's  Hill 
and  the  Granny  White  road,  and  WTalthall  closed  to  the'right 
upon  Loring.  South  of  Shy's  Hill,  Lowry's  (formerly 
Brown's)  division  extended  the  Confederate  left  in  front  of 
Schofield,  and  the  whole  worked  diligently  to  intrench 
themselves.  Lee's  corps  was  drawn  back  till  his  right  en- 

1  This  name  is  given  the  hill  by  General  Bate,  whose  troops  held  it,  in  honor 
of  Colonel  Shy  who  fell  there.  It  seems  to  have  had  no  special  name  before. 


114  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

circled  Overtoil's  Hill,  on  which  Clayton's  division  was 
placed,  supported  by  Brantley's  brigade,  while  Stevenson's 
and  Johnson's  divisions  extended  the  line  to  the  west  till  it 
united  with  Loring's  division  of  Stewart's  corps. 

On  our  left  Steedman  had  kept  his  men  active.  He  had 
attacked  and  carried  an  earthwork  near  the  Eaines  house 
early  in  the  day,  and  had  followed  up  the  progressive  move 
ment  of  the  army,  harassing  the  enemy's  right  as  it  drew 
back. 

About  nightfall  there  was  a  strong  appearance  of  a  pre 
cipitate  retreat  of  the  enemy,  and  Thomas  ordered  Wood 
to  move  his  corps  farther  to  the  left,  reaching  the  Franklin 
turnpike,  if  possible,  and  to  push  southward  upon  it.  This 
direction  was  a  wise  one  if  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat, 
for  it  prevented  the  crowding  of  the  army  upon  a  single 
road  ;  but  had  Thomas  been  sure  that  Hood  would  reform 
upon  the  new  line,  he  would,  no  doubt,  have  continued  the 
general  movement  of  the  day  by  extending  his  forces  to  the 
right.  The  darkness  stopped  "Wood  before  he  had  reached 
the  Franklin  road,  and  he  bivouacked  where  night  overtook 
him,  ready  to  continue  the  march  in  the  morning.  His 
right  was  near  Smith's  left,  and  his  own  left  was  diagonally 
\  toward  the  rear,  in  the  works  which  Lee's  corps  had  aban 
doned  on  the  hither  side  of  Brown's  Creek. 
f  For  the  results  obtained,  the  losses  had  been  astonishingly 
light.  Wood  reports  only  three  hundred  and  fifty  casualties 
in  his  corps,  Smith's  were  about  the  same,  and  Schofield's 
not  over  one  hundred  and  fifty.  Those  of  Steedman  and  of 
Wilson  were  proportionately  small,  though  the  exact  figures 
cannot  be  given,  as  the  losses  of  the  first  and  second  days 
are  not  discriminated  in  any  report  but  Wood's.  Sixteen 
pieces  of  artillery  and  twelve  hundred  prisoners  had  been 
taken,  and  Hood's  whole  line  had  been  driven  back  fully 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE. 


115 


two  miles.  The  work  was  not  completed,  but  should  the 
enemy  maintain  his  position,  the  promise  for  the  morrow 
was  good. 

Hood  now  realized  the  mistake  hisj>v£ 
ledhim  into,  by  inducing  Him  not  only  to  extend 
beYond~wEat^\  uu  uiudcnL  bill.  woTIJt  ut  all,  t.n  allow  Forrest. 

to 

time' 


•  dctachrd  that  he  could  not  bo  recalled  m 
tor  tue  Dame.  »ears's  brigade  had  been  brought  back 
to  the  lines  before  the  loth,  but  two  others  were  still  with 
Forrest,  and  Cockrell's  was  at  Buck  Biver.  The  Confede 
rate  commander  set  to  work  in  earnest,  however,  to  repair 
Iris  mistake.  The  cavalry  was  too  far  away  to  join  him  in 
twenty-four  hours,  but  orders  were  despatched  recalling 
Forrest,  and  preparations  were  made  to  hold  the  new  line 
another  day.  As  his  left  still  seemed  his  weak  point,  Hood 
ordered  the  whole  of  Cheatham's  corps  to  that  flank.  Shy's 
Hill,  which  was  held  by  Coleman's  brigade,  made  the  angle 
in  the  line,  from  which  the  sharply  refused  flank  continued 
southward,  Lowry's  division  and  Smith's  (formerly  Cle- 
burne's)  extending  it  to  the  Brentwood  Hills.  Bate's  divi 
sion  was  placed,  as  we  have  already  seen,  between  Shy's 
Hill  and  the  flank  of  Stewart's  corps,  facing  north.  Chal 
mers's  division  of  cavalry  was  close  upon  the  left  of  the  in 
fantry,  bending  the  line  back,  somewhat,  toward  the  Granny 
White  road. 

The  Confederate  line  now  rested  upon  high  hills,  Over- 
ton's  and  Shy's,  between  which  the  ground  was  lower, 
though  rolling,  and  was  broken  by  the  upper  branches  of 
Brown's  Creek,  which  ran  in  nearly  straight  courses  north 
ward,  crossing  Hood's  position  at  right  angles.  Overton's 
hill  was  a  broad,  rounded  elevation,  and  the  works,  in  curv 
ing  southward  around  its  summit,  did  not  present  any  sharp 
angle  to  weaken  their  strength.  Shy's  Hill,  however,  though 


116  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

high,  was  of  less  extent,  and  the  lines  of  Bate  and  Lowry 
made  a  right  angle  there.  Bate  complained  of  the  position, 
but  Hood's  engineers  had  established  it,  and  Cheatham  did 
not  feel  at  liberty  to  change  it.  Indeed,  it  could  not  have 
been  changed  much,  unless  the  whole  Confederate  army 
were  to  retreat.  Coleman  had  been  driven  to  Shy's  Hill  by 
Schofield's  advance  at  dusk,  and  had  all  he  could  do  to  hold 
on  to  it  at  all.  The  extension  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
along  the  east  side  of  Eichland  Creek  left  only  the  hills 
directly  south  of  Shy's  unoccupied,  and  it  was  there  alone 
that  the  advance  of  Thomas's  right  wing  could  be  checked. 
The  National  skirmish  lines  were  so  close  that  the  digging  had 
to  be  done  on  the  inside  of  the  parapet  chiefly,  getting  cover 
for  the  men  as  soon  as  possible.  The  hill  on  our  side,  held 
by  Couch's  division,  was  only  three  hundred  yards  from 
Shy's,  and  the  work  on  the  latter,  built  under  fire,  was  weak. 
Farther  south,  the  confronting  hills,  held  by  the  rest  of 
Cheatham's  corps  on  the  one  side,  and  Schofield's  on  the 
other,  were  farther  apart,  and  that  in  the  Confederate  line 
was  considerably  higher  and  well  wooded  on  the  top.  A 
strong  work  was  made  upon  it,  revetted  with  timber,  with 
embrasures  for  cannon,  and  a  parapet  high  enough  to  defi 
lade  the  interior ;  but  the  fire  of  our  sharpshooters  prevented 
any  abatis  being  made. 

General  Thomas  held  a  council  with  his  corps  commanders 
in  the  evening,  but  no  new  orders  seem  to  have  been  issued, 
except  some  directions  as  to  movements  in  the  event  of  a 
retreat  of  Hood  during  the  night.  If  he  remained  in  posi 
tion,  the  movements  progressing  at  the  close  of  the  day 
would  be  continued.  During  the  night  the  lines  on  the 
National  side  also  were  adjusted.  In  Schofield's  corps, 
Couch's  division,  in  making  connection  with  Smith,  opened 
a  gap  between  it  and  Cox's  division,  which,  after  extending 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  117 

the  two  brigades,  which  were  over  Richland  Creek,  in  single 
line,  without  reserves,  was  still  unable  to  join  Couch's  left 
by  as  much  as  three  hundred  yards.  The  disadvantage  of 
drawing  in  and  contracting  the  extension  of  the  right  flank 
was  so  manifest,  that,  upon  the  report  of  the  fact,  Schofield 
applied  to  Smith  for  some  of  his  reserves  to  complete  the 
line,  and  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Colonel  Moore  re 
ported  with  five  regiments  and  a  battery,  and  was  placed 
there.1  Three  of  the  regiments  were  put  in  the  trenches 
already  there,  and  two  in  support  of  the  artillery  in  rear. 

At  the  same  hour,  Wood  resumed  the  movement  of  the 
Fourth  Corps,  which  had  been  interrupted  in  the  evening, 
and  Steedman  advanced  upon  the  Nolensville  road  to  the 
abandoned  line  of  the  Confederate  works,  where  he  half 
wheeled  to  the  right  and  came  up  on  Wood's  left.  The  lat 
ter  first  formed  his  corps  with  Beatty's  division  on  the  left 
of  the  Franklin  road,  and  Kimball's  on  the  right,  with  Elliott 
in  reserve  ;  but  finding  a  large  space  vacant  between  himself 
and  the  centre  of  the  army,  he  moved  Elliott's  division  for 
ward  into  line  continuous  with  Smith's  corps.  The  left  of 
the  Fourth  Corps,  where  it  now  connected  with  Steedman, 
remained  across  the  Franklin  road,  and  opposite  Overton's 
Hill,  where  Hood's  line  bent  back  to  the  south.  The  Na 
tional  line,  therefore,  instead  of  being  oblique  to  the  enemy, 
and  far  outreaching  it  on  the  right,  as  on  the  previous  day, 
was  parallel  and  exterior  to  it  from  flank  to  flank,  nowhere 
reaching  beyond  it,  except  where  Wilson's  cavalry  was  oper 
ating  beyond  Schofield  on  the  Hillsboro  road. 

About  noon,  Steedman's  troops  formed  a  connection  with 
Wood's,  and  the  latter,  by  order  of  General  Thomas,  took 
direction  of  both.  Along  the  whole  line  the  skirmishers 

J  In  Smith's  report  this  is  spoken  of  by  mistake  as  Moore's  division,  but  it  was, 
in  fact,  only  part  of  his  division. 


118  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

(were  advanced  close  to  the  enemy's  works,  and  various 
points  were  reconnoitred  to  determine  the  feasibility  of  an 
assault.  Thomas  did  not  order  an  attack  upon  the  intrench- 
ments,  but  left  the  corps  commanders  to  their  own  discre 
tion  in  this  respect.  Wood  concentrated  his  artillery  fire 
upon  Overton's  Hill,  Smith  and  Schofield  maintained  a  se 
vere  cross-fire  upon  the  angle  at  Shy's  Hill,  and  at  other 
points'  on  the  line  the  opposing  batteries  were  warmly  en 
gaged. 

Finding  that  the  enemy  was  strongly  intrenched  in 
Wood's  front,  General  Thomas  rode  to  Smith,  and  learned 
the  results  of  the  reconnoissance  there,  and,  after  examining 
for  himself  the  position,  continued  on  to  Schofield's  lines 
on  the  right.  Schofield  had  ordered  Sfciles's  brigade  of 
Cox's  division  to  leave  its  position  in  rear  of  the  extreme 
right  and  march  farther  south,  then,  turning  to  the  east, 
to  push  forward  upon  a  wooded  hill  on  the  extension  of 
the  line  of  the  division.  Thence  he  was  to  keep  pace  with 
the  advance  of  Wilson's  dismounted  cavalry,  and  attack  with 
the  rest  of  the  line  when  it  should  go  forward.  The  termi 
nation  of  the  Confederate  continuous  works  in  Cheatham's 
line,  was  the  embrasured  earthwork  already  referred  to, 
with  a  recurved  flank  facing  the  south.  A  four-gun  battery, 
of  smooth  twelve-pound  guns,  was  in  this  fort,  with  four 
more  in  the  curtain  connecting  it  with  Shy's  Hill.  Tho 
rifled  guns  of  Cockerell's  battery,  on  the  west  side  of  Rich- 
land  Creek,  were  able  to  reach  the  embrasures  of  the  work  in 
front,  while  the  shells  of  the  smooth  guns  fell  short  in  the 
efforts  at  reply,  and  the  superiority  of  the  National  artillery 
was  such  that  the  Confederate  gunners  were  forced  to  re 
load  their  pieces,  by  drawing  them  aside  with  the  prolonye, 
to  the  protection  of  the  parapet. 

On  learning  the  nature  of  the  works  in  front  of  Schofield, 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE.  119 

and  the  extent  of  the  enemy's  line,  Thomas  ordered  Smith 
to  send  one  of  his  divisions  to  extend  that  flank,  but  on 
representations  as  to  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Smith's  front, 
the  order  was  withdrawn. 

"Wilson,  however,  was  making  good  progress  with  his 
cavalry,  which  must  now  be  traced.  Johnson's  division  had 
not  felt  strong  enough  to  attack  the  position  of  Chalmers, 
near  Bell's  Landing,  on  the  15th,  and  Wilson's  movements 
had  bean  made  with  the  rest  of  the  corps.  The  concentra 
tion  of  Chalmers's  division  in  the  night,  enabled  Wilson  to 
bring  Johnson  up  in  the  morning,  and  he  now  had  all  three 
of  his  divisions  in  hand.  Hammond's  had  pickets  toward 
the  Granny  White  turnpike,  in  rear  of  Hood's  left,  Hatch's 
division  was  ordered  to  move  from  his  bivouac  on  the  Hills- 
boro  road,  on  the  left  of  Hammond,  and  upon  the  enemy's 
rear.  Johnson  was  moving  across  the  country  from  near 
Bell's  Landing.  By  noon,  or  shortly  after,  Wilson's  skir 
mishers  formed  a  continuous  curved  line  from  Schofield's 
right  around  the  enemy's  flank  across  the  Granny  White 
road.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Schofield  ordered  the  move 
ment  of  Stiles's  brigade,  which  has  been  mentioned,  and  had 
suggested  the  desirability  of  sending  a  full  division  of  in 
fantry  beyond  Hood's  flank,  if  one  could  be  spared  from  the 
line.  He  did  not  think  it  wise  to  assault  the  heavy  work  in 
front  of  Cox's  division,  except  in  connection  with  a  general 
advance. 

The  situation  at  the  angle  on  Shy's  Hill,  however,  was  \ 
opening  the  prospect  of  a  successful  attack  there.  The  ad 
vance  of  Wilson's  dismounted  cavalry  from  one  wooded  hill 
to  another  on  the  south,  was  making  Hood  uneasy,  and  his 
vehement  exhortation  to  Chalmers,  to  hold  his  own,  not 
being  enough  to  overcome  the  odds  against  that  officer,  he 
was  forced  to  withdraw  Govau's  brigade  from  Cheathain'a 


120  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

line,  and  send  it  to  Chalmers's  support.  Bate  was  ordered 
to  extend  liis  left,  and  occupy  Shy's  Hill,  while  Coleman, 
who  had  been  there,  was  sent  to  fill  Govan's  place.  Bate'.) 
line  was  now  a  good  deal  stretched,  and  he  found  also  that 
the  earthworks  built  in  the  night  were  too  far  back  from 
the  brow  of  the  hill,  so  that  they  did  not  command  its  slope. 
The  fire  upon  it  was  too  hot  to  change  it,  he  could  get  no 
reinforcements,  and  he  could  only  hold  on  to  the  last. 
Bate's  own  words  best  describe  his  situation  in  the  afternoon  : 
"  The  enemy,  he  says,  opened  a  most  terrific  fire  of  artillery, 
and  kept  ifc  up  during  the  day.  In  the  afternoon,  he  planted 
a  battery  in  the  woods,  in  the  rear  of  Mrs.  Bradford's  house 
(this  was  in  McArthur's  line),  fired  directly  across  both  lines 
composing  the  angle,  and  threw  shells  directly  in  the  back 
of  my  left  brigade;  also  placed  a  battery  on  a  hill  diag 
onally  to  my  left,  which  took  my  first  brigade  in  reverse. 
(This  was  in  Cox's  line.)  The  batteries  on  the  hill,  in  its 
front,  not  more  than  three  hundred  yards  distant  (in  Couch's 
line)  had  borne  the  concentrated  fire  of  my  Whitworth 
rifles  all  day,  and  must  have  suffered  heavily,  but  were  not 
silenced.  These  rifled  guns  of  the  enemy  being  so  close, 
razed  the  works  on  the  left  of  the  angle  for  fifty  or  sixty 
yards."  l 

General  McArthur,  from  his  position,  was  able  to  see 
something  of  the  mischief  done  to  Bate's  line,  and  reported 
that  an  assault  upon  the  angle  was  practicable.  He  pro 
posed  to  move  McMillan's  brigade  to  the  right,  in  front  of 
the  hill  held  by  Couch,  and  to  charge  under  the  cover  of 
Couch's  guns,  where  the  hillside  gave  most  protection  to  an 
advance.  Thomas  approved  the  plan,  and  Smith  sent  to 
Schofield  for  directions  to  Couch  to  co-operate.  Schofield 

1  General  Bate's  official  report. 


BATTLE  OP  NASHVILLE.  121 

acceded  to  this,  and  directed  Cox  also  to  attack  the  hill  in 
his  front  simultaneously,  while  Stiles  should  advance  be 
yond  the  flank  with  the  cavalry.  It  was  now  near  four 
o'clock,  and  Thomas  was  in  person  at  Schofield's  position, 
from  which  Shy's  Hill,  and  the  wThole  range  south,  to  the 
Brentwood  Hills,  were  in  full  view. 

The  wrhole  connection  of  events  will  be  best  understood 
if  we  now  return  to  the  left  flank,  where  Wood  had  beeri 
making  anxious  examination  of  the  enemy's  position  on! 
Over  ton's  Hill,  and  upon  the  report  of  a  reconnoissance  by 
Colonel  Post,  had  determined  to  try  the  chances  of  an  at 
tack  there.  The  assault  from  the  Fourth  Corps'  position  , 
was  assigned  to  Post's  brigade  of  Beatty's  division,  sup 
ported  by  Streight's.  Thompson's  colored  brigade,  of  Steed- 
man's  command,  supported  by  Grosvenor's  brigade,  were  to 
attack  at  the  same  time  from  the  east.  A  concentrated 
artillery  fire  upon  the  hill  preceded  the  assault,  and  at 
three  o'clock  the  order  to  advance  was  given.  A  cloud  of 
skirmishers  ran  forward  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire  and  to 
annoy  the  artillerists  in  the  works,  and  the  brigades  in  line 
followed  them.  Nearing  the  intrenchments,  they  rushed 
forward,  some  of  the  men  gaining  the  parapet,  but  they 
were  received  with  so  hot  a  fire,  that  they  could  not  endure 
it,  and  after  a  short,  sharp  struggle  they  recoiled.  Their  re 
treat  was  covered  by  the  rest  of  Beatty's  division  and  Steed- 
man's  reserves,  and  by  the  artillery.  These  were  so  handled 
that  the  enemy  did  not  venture  from  his  works,  and  our 
wounded  were  brought  safely  off;  but  the  casualties  were -I 
probably  half  of  all  that  occurred  in  the  battle,  adding  an 
other  to  the  many  proofs  of  the  terrible  disadvantage  at  which 
a  direct  assault  of  a  well  intrenched  line  is  usually  made.  ] 
Colonel  Post  was  wounded,  and  the  loss  in  officers  was  heavy, 
for  they  exposed  themselves  fearlessly  in  leading  their  men. 
VOL.  X.— 6 


122  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

At  the  angle  in  the  Confederate  works  held  by  Bate,  at 
Shy's  Hill,  the  circumstances  were  different.  His  lines,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  enfiladed  and  taken  in  reverse ;  his  para 
pet  was  levelled  for  some  distance ;  the  closeness  of  Couch's 
batteries,  the  near  approach  of  our  skirmishers,  the  attenua 
tion  of  Bate's  troops,  the  cover  for  the  approach  of  the  as 
sailing  force  under  the  hill-slope,  all  combined  to  neutralize 
the  advantage  of  modern  weapons,  and  to  give  the  assault 
the  preponderance  of  chances  which  justify  it.  While  the 
fire  upon  the  angle  was  kept  up  with  increasing  severity, 
McArtlmr  ordered  Colonel  McMillan  to  form  his  brigade 
in  the  hollow  before  Couch's  works,  and  when  they  should 
be  half-way  up  the  hill,  the  brigades  to  the  left  were  to  ad 
vance  in  echelon,  attacking  the  lower  line  before  them. 

Wilson's  dismounted  cavalry  had  been  advancing  from  the 
south,  gaining  position  after  position,  and  increasing  their 
ardor  as  they  advanced.  Their  numbers  enabled  them  to 
outflank  Govan's  brigade,  which  Hood  had  sent  to  assist 
Chalmers  in  holding  them  back,  and  as  they  approached 
Schofield's  position  Stiles's  brigade  of  infantry  came  in 
close  support.1  The  balls  from  this  attacking  force  were 
now  falling  in  rear  of  Bate  and  Lowry,  and  the  men  of  Cle- 
burne's  old  division  were  vainly  trying  to  form  a  line  long 
or  strong  enough  to  match  that  which  was  coming  from  the 
south.  Wilson  had  gone  in  person  to  Thomas,  at  Schofield's 
position,  to  report  what  his  men  were  doing,  and  reached 
him  just  as  McMillan's  brigade  was  seen  to  rush  forward 
upon  the  slope  of  Shy's  Hill.  At  a  sign  from  Schofield, 
Cox's  division  started  also  on  the  run,  Doolittle's  brigade  in 
. — _ — _ . 

1  In  his  report  General  Schofield  expressed  some  disappointment  that  this  bri 
gade  had  not  been  able  to  get  forward  faster ;  but  Colonel  Stiles's  account  of  the 
matter  and  of  the  nature  of  the  ground  show  that  he  accomplished  all  that  could 
be  expected  of  so  small  a  force  moving  over  rough,  detached  hills. 


BATTLE   OF  NASHVILLE.  123 

advance.  Wilson  turned  to  gallop  back  to  his  command, 
bnt  before  he  could  get  half-way  there,  the  whole  Confede 
rate  left  was  crushed  in  like  an  egg-shell. 

McMillan  swept  unchecked  over  Bate's  ruined  line  at  Shy's 
Eill.  The  gallant  Colonel  of  the  Twentieth  Tennessee  did 
all  that  man  could  do  to  hold  it,  and  dying  at  his  post,  gave 
to  the  height  the  name  it  bears.  The  arch  was  broken ; 
there  were  no  reserves  to  restore  it,  and  from  right  and  left 
the  Confederate  troops  peeled  away  from  the  works  in  wild 
confusion.  From  the  heavy  earthwork  in  front  of  Doolittle 
one  volley  of  cannon  and  small  arms  was  fired,  but  in  the 
excitement  it  was  aimed  so  high  as  to  do  no  mischief,  and 
Cox's  whole  division  was  over  the  works  before  they  could 
reload.  At  the  same  time  Hatch  and  Knipe,  with  their  divi 
sions  of  dismounted  men,  rushed  in  from  the  right,  and, 
abandoning  their  artillery,  the  Confederates  west  of  the 
Granny  White  road  crowded  eastward,  running  for  life. 
Some  were  killed,  many  were  captured,  and  Smith's  and 
Schcfield's  men  met  upon  the  turnpike  at  right  angles,  and 
were  halted  to  prevent  their  organizations  from  being  con 
fused  together. 

Hubbard's  brigade,  of  McArthur's  division,  which  followed 
McMillan's  movement,  met  with  more  resistance,  and  suf 
fered  more  severely;  but  though  some  of  the  Confederate 
regiments  held  tenaciously  to  their  works,  and  surrendered 
in  form,  most  of  the  troops  broke  their  organizations  entirely 
when  the  advance  was  taken  up  from  centre  to  wings,  and 
Wood's  divisions  now  charged,  with  hardly  a  show  of  opposi 
tion,  over  Overtoil's  Hill,  from  which  they  had  been  driven, 
back  an  hour  before. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE— RESULTS  OF  THE 
CAMPAIGN. 

NIGHT  was  falling  when  the  victory  was  complete,  and  a 
drenching  rain  had  set  in  to  add  to  the  darkness  and  confu 
sion.  Thomas  ordered  Wood  to  pursue  by  the  Franklin 
road,  and  the  cavalry  by  the  Granny  White  road,  to  the  in 
tersection  with  that  to  Franklin,  when  Wilson  was  to  take 
the  advance.  Smith  and  Schofield  were  ordered  to  follow 
Wilson  on  the  next  day.  But  few,  if  any,  of  the  Confederates 
fled  by  the  Granny  White  turnpike,  for  it  was  commanded 
by  Wilson's  cavalry,  and  the  masses  streamed  through  the 
Brentwood  Hills,  making  the  best  of  their  way  to  the  Frank 
lin  road.  There  was  hardly  the  semblance  of  organization 
among  them  till  they  passed  the  Harpeth  Eiver.  Forrest 
was  ordered  to  retreat  on  Shelbyville  and  Pulaski,  but  he 
hurried  Armstrong's  brigade  of  cavalry  across  country  to 
get  in  rear  of  Hood's  routed  forces  and  cover  their  retreat. 
Reynolds's  and  Coleman's  brigades  had  been  taken  from  the 
line,  at  the  last  moment,  to  cover  the  passes  through  the 
Brentwood  Hills  from  the  Granny  White  road,  and  had  pre 
served  their  organization.  By  delaying  the  advance  of  Wil 
son's  horsemen  toward  the  Franklin  turnpike,  these  brigades 
had  saved  the  larger  part  of  Hood's  army  from  capture. 
The  hospitals  at  Franklin  were  abandoned,  containing  over 
two  thousand  wounded.  Wilson,  with  his  cavalry,  had  come 


THE  PURSUIT   AFTER  THE  BATTLE.  125 

up  "with,  the  reai1  guard  four  miles  north  of  Franklin,  at  Hol 
low  Tree  Gap,  and  luiipeV  division,  charging  it  in  front  and 
flank,  carried  the  position,  capturing  over  four  hundred 
prisoners  and  their  colors.  At  the  Harpeth,  Johnson's  divi 
sion  crossed  some  distance  below,  and  compelled  Hood  to 
abandon  the  defence  of  the 'river  at  Franklin.  At  Ruther 
ford  Creek,  on  the  18th,  the  water  was  up,  the  stream  was  a 
torrent,  and  some  delay  in  getting  a  pontoon  train  forward 
gave  the  enemy  a  little  respite.  At  Columbia,  Forrest  re 
joined  Hood,  and  his  cavalry,  with  an  infantry  rear  guard 
under  command  of  Walthall,  covered  the  retreat  to  the  Ten 
nessee.  General  Walt-hall's  force  was  made  up  of  the  two 
brigades  which  had  been  detached  with  Forrest,  and  of  three 
others  besides  his  own  division.1  This  force  was  able  to 
present  so  strong  a  front  that,  aided  by  the  condition  of  the 
roads  and  streams,  which  retarded  pursuit,  our  advance 
guard  was  not  able  to  break  through  again,  and  Hood 
reached  the  Tennessee,  at  Bainbridge,  by  way  of  Pulaski,  on 
the  26th.  Here  he  was  favored  by  a  gleam  of  goo4  fortune 
in  the  arrival  of  pontoons,  which  had  been  floated  down 
from  Decatur,  where,  by  some  blunder,  they  had  been  left  by 
our  forces  when  General  Granger  had  evacuated  that  post  in 
November.2  Their  own  pontoon  train  was  delayed  by  the 
condition  of  the  roads,  and  part  of  the  defeated  army  passed 
the  Tennessee  before  it  arrived;  but  when  it  came  it  was 
laid,  and  Hood  had  his  shattered  forces  on  the  southern 
bank  by  the  evening  of  the  27th.  A  Confederate  account 


1  Featherston's  brigade  of  Loring's  division,  Heiskell's  and  Field's  of  Lowry's 
division,  were  the  three  others.     Coleman's  was  now  part  oi  Walthall's  own  divi 
sion.     See  Appendix  B,  II. 

2  The  author  learns  from  officers  who  were  at  Decatnr  that  the  pontoon  bridge 
had  be.cn  cut  loose,  with  the  expectation  that  it  would  be  taken  in  tow  by  gun 
boats  ;  but  he  is  unable  to  trace  the  responsibility  for  the  failure  either  to  take  it 
up  or  to  destroy  it. 


126  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

states  that  soon  after  the  first  bridge  was  down,  two  Na« 
tional  gunboats  appeared  in  the  direction  of  Florence  and 
steamed  toward  it ;  but  General  Stewart  opened  upon  them 
with  a  battery  of  smooth  field  guns,  which  was  all  he  then 
had,  and  the  boats  desisted  from  the  attempt  to  break 
through  the  pontoons.1 

From  Franklin,  on  the  17th,  Thomas  had  ordered  Steed- 
man  to  march  to  Murfreesboro,  and  thence  to  proceed 
by  rail  to  Decatur,  occupying  the  posts  in  Northern 
Alabama  which  had  been  abandoned  earlier  in  the  cam 
paign.  At  the  close  of  the  month  Steedman  was  at  Decatur, 
Wood  was  near  Lexington,  in  North  Alabama,  thirty  miles 
southwest  of  Pulaski,  Smith  was  at  Pulaski,  and  Schofield 
at  Columbia.  Thomas  issued  his  orders  announcing  the 
close  of  the  campaign,  assigning  winter  quarters  to  the 
various  corps ;  but  directions  were  received  from  Washing 
ton  to  continue  operations.  The  expected  march  of  Sher 
man  northward,  from  Savannah,  made  it  important  that  no 
rest  or  time  for  concentration  should  be  given  the  enemy  in 
the  Gulf  States,  and  Thomas  prepared  for  a  new  campaign, 
x'&mong  the  results  of  the  two  days'  battle  at  Nashvillo 
/nad  been  the  capture  of  about  four  thousand  five  hundred 
/  prisoners,  and  fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery,  besides  small 
arms  in  great  number.  Among  the  prisoners  were  Generals 
Johnson,  Smith,  Jackson,  and  Eucker,  and  a  number  of 
regimental  officers  commanding  brigades.  The  losses  in 
killed  and  wounded  on  both  sides  were  small,  compared 
with  the  material  results,  though  the  demoralization  of 
Hood's  army,  followed  so  soon  by  the  close  of  the  war, 
leaves  us  without  the  full  returns  which  are  necessary  to 

•  J  Sergeant"Major  Cnnningham's  pamphlet.  The  author  has  found  the  state 
ments  of  Mr.  Cunningham  so  accurate  when  he  has  the  means  of  verifying  them, 
that  he  does  not  feel  at  liberty  to  ignore  them  in  this  case. 


THE   PURSUIT   AFTER  THE   BATTLE.  127 

determine  the  casualties  on  the  Confederate  side.  Hood 
assembled  the  remnant  of  his  army  at  Tupelo,  Mississippi, 
and  then  gave  furloughs  to  part  of  his  men  (particularly 
the  Tennesseeans),  and  asked  to  be  relieved  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  army.  He  does  not  admit  a  loss  from  all 
causes,  from  December  15th  to  30th,  as  great  as  the  num 
ber  of  prisoners  taken  by  Thomas's  army  on  the  15th  and 
16th,  and  claims  that  he  reassembled  at  Tupelo  an  army  of 
18,500  effective  muskets.  These  figures  are  nearly  worth 
less  for  any  historical  purpose.  General  Thomas's  return 
of  prisoners  captured,  and  deserters  received  during  No 
vember  and  December,  show  the  number  to  be  over  thir 
teen  thousand ;  besides  these  he  reports  the  capture  of  11 
cannon  and  3,000  muskets.  We  shall  meet  with  some  of 
the  veterans  of  Hood's  army  again  in  the  Carolinas,  main 
taining  their  old  corps  organization ;  but,  for  the  time,  they 
were  scattered  and  demoralized,  and  seemed  almost  to  lose 
the  character  of  a  disciplined  army. 

Thomas's  losses  in  the  battle  of  Nashville  were  3,057,  of 
which  less  than  four  Imniluadr  were  killed.  The  analysis  of 
these  figures  shows  that  the  Fourth  Corps  suffered  a  little 
less  than  a  thousand  casualties,  of  which  two-thirds  were 
in  the  unsuccessful  attack  upon  Overtoil's  Hill.  Steedman's 
losses  were  over  eight  hundred,  and  nearly  all  of  them  seem 
to  have  occurred  in  the  same  assault,  those  of  his  second 
colored  brigade  (Colonel  Thompson's)  being  fifty  per  cent, 
heavier  than  in  any  other  on  the  field.  The  Sixteenth 
Corps  lost  750,  which  appear  to  have  been  pretty  evenly 
divided  between  the  two  days.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
attack  upon  the  angle  at  Shy's  Hill  was  not  a  costly  one, 
for  the  preceding  preparation  by  the  enfilading  artillery 
fire,  and  the  shape  of  the  ground,  which  enabled  McMillan 
to  approach  closely  before  exposing  his  men,  show  that 


128  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

success  in  such  cases  (when  success  is  possible),  follows  the 
use  of  proper  means.  The  total  number  of  casualties  in 
McMillan's  brigade  was  118,  of  which  not  more  than  two- 
thirds  occurred  in  the  final  assault,  and  they  were  less  than 
half  of  those  which  occurred  in  Hubbard's  brigade,  which 
went  forward  on  its  left  against  the  works  in  the  lower 
ground,  and  where  Bate's  centre  and  right,  holding  on  with 
better  cover,  were  able  to  inflict  considerable  loss  before 
the  crushing  of  the  whole  of  Hood's  left  made  their  posi 
tion  untenable.  The  Twenty-third  Corps  was  in  reserve 
nearly  all  of  the  first  day,  and  its  only  losses  worth  men 
tioning  were  in  Couch's  division,  when  carrying  the  hill 
close  to  Shy's  in  the  evening.  The  position  was  of  inestima 
ble  importance  for  one  so  cheaply  gained,  for  the  casualties 
were  only  150.  Those  of  the  other  division  in  the  final 
assault  were  less  than  twenty.  As  nearly  always  happens  in 
a  panic,  the  break  of  the  enemy's  line  was  so  sudden  and 
complete  that  the  loss  was  almost  wholly  on  one  side.  The 
loss  in  the  cavalry  corps  was  329,  and  when  distributed 
among  the  three  divisions,  it  must  also  be  regarded  as 
trifling,  and  the  larger  part,  even  of  this,  undoubtedly  oc 
curred  in  carrying  the  redoubts  on  the  15th. 

These  considerations  show  that  the  success  was  due  chiefly 
to  the  tactical  combination  of  a  superior  force,  and  that, 
moral  causes,  growing  out  of  the  preceding  part  of  fho 
campaign,  must  have  had  a  great  effect  in  producing  dis 
couragement  among  Hood's  men,  and  predisposing  them  to 
panic  when  the  break  in  the  line  occurred.  Hood  was  evi 
dently  in  fault,  as  a  tactician,  on  the  15th,  when  he  allowed 
Thomas  to  array  his  whole  force  diagonally  beyond  his  left 
flank,  and  awaited  an  attack  in  such  a  position.  His  only 
hope  was  to  have  drawn  back  to  the  Brent  wood  Hills  .at 
once,  without  allowing  his  troops  to  become  engaged.  He 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTER   THE  BATTLE.  129 

would  thus  have  saved  them  from  the  demoralizing  effect  of 
being  driven  from  position  after  position  on  the  first  day, 
and  from  the  conviction  (which  was  partly  the  cause  of  its 
own  fulfilment),  that  they  were  wholly  unable  to  cope  with 
the  National  army.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th  he  issued 
or(Ters~to"~Ms  subordinates  to  prepare  for  a  retreat  in  the 
evening ;  but  he  could  not  withdraw  under  fire,  and  the  de 
cision  was  reached  too  late  to  be  of  successful  accomplish 
ment.  The  evening  found  his  routed  army  a  disorganized 
crowd  flying  from  the  lost  battle-field. 

Hood's  retreat  from  Nashville  to  the  Tennessee  and  \ 
Thomas's  pursuit  were  almost  equally  laborious  for  their  / 
armies,  though  very  different  in  their  effect  upon  the  spirits 
of  the  troops.  The  roads  were  in  horrible  condition,  even 
'those  which  had  been  macadamized  being  almost  impass 
able.  The  ordinary  country  roads  were  much  worse,  and, 
after  passing  Pulasld,  till  the  Tennessee  was  reached,  the 
wrecks  of  wagons  and  the  carcasses  of  animals  filled  the 
way.  Hood  had  been  forced  to  destroy  ammunition  to  get 
teams  to  take  forward  his  pontoons,  and  Wilson  and  Wood 
in  pursuit  had  been  obliged  to  leave  most  of  their  cannon, 
and  double  the  teams  of  the  rest.  On  getting  orders  from 
Washington  to  resume  the  campaign,  Thomas  ordered  Wood 
to  assemble  the  Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  Schofield, 
Smith,  and  Wilson  to  concentrate  at  Eastport,  Mississippi. 
Schofield  marched  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  Clifton  on  the 
Tennessee,  preparatory  to  taking  boats  up  the  river,  but 
other  orders  met  him  there,  transferring  him  to  a  distant 
field  upon  the  sea-coast. 

The  completeness  of  the  victory  at  Nashville  caused  a  joy-V 
ful  revulsion  of  feeling  throughout  the  Northern   States./ 
The  impatience  of  the  President  and  of  General  Grant  had 
only  been  the  expression  of  a  feeling  which  all  the  country! 
6* 


130  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHVILLE. 

had  shared.  The  conviction  was  general  that  Hood  ought 
to  have  been  met  much  nearer  the  Tennessee  River,  and  the 
fear  that  he  would  be  allowed  to  march  to  the  Ohio  was  all 
but  universal.  Now,  however,  all  vied  in  giving  honor  to 
the  successful  general,  and  not  a  few  were  ready  to  blame 
the  authorities  at  Washington  for  having  doubted,  even  for 
a  day,  the  wisdom  of  Thomas's  management  of  the  early 
campaign.  The  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  Gen 
eral  Grant  were  not  slow  or  stinting  in  their  congratulations, 
and  between  the  chief  actors  in  the  scene  a  cordial  good 
understanding  was  at  once  established.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  was  ungrudgingly  conceded  that  the  final  battle  had  been 
skilfully  delivered  and  crowned  with  the  most  satisfactory 
results;  on  the  other,  it  was  felt  that  the  anxiety  of  the 
early  December  days  was  reasonable,  and  that  the  demand 
for  prompt  action  was  such  a  stimulus  to  great  exertion  as 
the  responsible  authorities  of  a  government  may  apply  to  its 
most  trusted  officers  in  such  a  crisis,  without  giving  cause  for 
lasting  chagrin.  In  such  a  time,  the  reward  for  success  and 
the  responsibility  for  ill-fortune  may  neither  of  them  be  quite 
justly  proportioned  to  real  desert,  and  both  are  apt  to  be  ex 
aggerated.  In  war,  more  than  in  anything  else,  the  proverb 
"  all's  well  that  ends  well "  is  the  popular  one,  and  the  popular 
sympathy  was  evidently  with  the  hero  of  the  great  victory. 

Few  men  have  the  qualities  which  deserve  public  confi 
dence  in  greater  measure  than  General  Thomas.  He  was  a 
patriot  whose  love  of  his  country  was  greater  than  his  at 
tachment  to  a  province ;  a  Virginian  who  refused  to  follow 
the  example  of  Lee  in  taking  arms  against  the  National 
Government  which  Washington  had  founded.  He  was  a 
man  of  large  mould  in  body  and  mind,  of  a  quiet,  modest 
dignity,  who  hated  pretence,  and  avoided  notoriety.  Ho 
was  transparently  true  to  his  superiors,  and  kindly  consid- 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE.  131 

crate  to  his  subordinates.  He  had  the  personal  courage 
which  would  be  ashamed  of  its  own  display  as  much  as  of  a 
cowardice,  but  which  seemed  simply  oblivious  of  danger 
when  duty  required  a  risk  to  be  taken.  These  qualities 
made  him  always  a  trusted  lieutenant  to  his  chief,  and  were 
the  basis  of  an  affectionate  and  respectful  attachment  in  his 
own  army  which  was  peculiar.  His  real  and  unaffected 
aversion  to  taking  the  chief  responsibility  of  command  had 
kept  him  in  secondary  positions  when  his  rank  in  both  the 
regular  and  volunteer  armies  would  have  made  him  the 
head  of  a  separate  army  in  the  field.  In  this  respect  he  was  j 
not  unlike  Harclee,  in  the  Confederate  Army,  who  also 
steadily  refused  a  supreme  command.  The  duties  of  the 
soldier,  and  ths  exhibition  of  courage  and  skill  in  making  '• 
the  details  of  a  campaign  successful,  were  easy  to  him ;  but 
to  become  the  theme  of  discussion  in  Congress  and  in  the 
newspapers,  to  be  the  butt  of  ten  thousand  public  critics, 
and  to  carry  the  burden  of  plans  whose  failure  might  be 
ruin  to  the  country — this  he  hated  so  heartily  and  shrunk 
from  so  naturally,  tliat,*afTer  *alfhis  long  experience,  we 
have  seen  him  protesting  that  the  position  assigned  him  in 
this  last  campaign  was  "the  one  thing  he  did  not  want." 
That  these  qualities  in  some  degree  unfitted  him  for  an  in 
dependent  command  cannot  be  questioned.  The  very  anx 
iety  to  be  right,  if  it  is  excessive,  produces  hesitation  in 
action  and  timidity  in  plan.  Under  such  conditions  the 
stimulus  from  without,  coming  in  the  form  of  urgency  from 
the  Government  and  command  from  the  General-in-Chief, 
may  not  have  been  wholly  unwelcome,  and  unquestionably 
added  vigor  to  the  final  movements. 

It  is,  however,  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  campaign  that  the 
steps  taken  were  most  open  to  question,  though  very  few  of 
the  officers  and  men  who  served  there  had  any  exact  knowl- 


132  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

edge  of  the  means  which  were  at  General  Thomas's  disposal, 
or  of  the  manner  in  which  they  were  used.  The  magnitude  of 
the  final  success  was  so  splendid,  that  it  seemed  to  prove  each 
Btep  toward  it  the  best  possible ;  and  it  is  only  when  we  ex 
amine  the  official  evidence  of  the  number  and  position  of  the 
troops  in  Tennessee  that  we  are  able  to  apply  to  the  events 
which  followed  the  tests  afforded  by  the  rules  of  military  art.1 
/  General  Thomas  tells  us  in  his  official  report  that,  had 
Hood  delayed  his  advance  from  Florence  ten  days  longer, 
he  would  have  met  him  at  Columbia,  or  some  other  point 
south  of  the  Duck  River.  An  early  concentration  in  front 
of  the  enemy  is  thus  indicated  as  the  controlling  purpose, 
and  Hood's  march  on  Nashville  is  recognized  as  the  result 
only  of  the  unforeseen  delays  in  the  arrival  of  General 
Smith  with  his  divisions.  The  military  student  of  the  cam 
paign  is  therefore  led  to  inquire  whether  a  concentration  of 
the  means  at  hand  would  -not  have  opposed  to  Hood  a  force 
which  would  have  kept  him  at  least  south  of  Duck  River  till 
Smith  could  have  arrived. 

Communication  with  Sherman  was  broken  on  November 
12th,  and  Hood  began  his  advance  from  Florence  on  the 
20th,  though  it  was  not  till  the  26th  that  his  infantry  was  all 
assembled  in  front  of  Columbia,  Schofield  having  aban 
doned  Pulaski  on  the  22d.  A  fortnight  was  thus  unexpect 
edly  given  for  concentration,  and  the  resources  of  the  rail 
ways  were  at  Thomas's  disposal.  His  tri-monthly  return  of 
November  20th  shows  a  force  in  Tennessee  of  59,534  offi 
cers  and  men  "present  for  duty  equipped."  To  determine 
the  deductions  necessary  for  smaller  garrisons  and  bridge 

1  The  author  has  been  led  by  this  examination  to  conclusions  quite  different 
from  his  own  predilections.  He  had  assumed,  in  common  with  most  of  his  com 
rades  in  that  campaign,  that  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  were  the  only 
forces  available  to  oppose  Hood  until  the  arrival  of  Major- General  A.  J.  Smith, 
with  the  Sixteenth  Corps. 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE.      133 

guards,  no  better  method  can  be  used  than  to  make  them 
the  same  as  was  actually  done  when  the  battle  of  Nashville 
was  imminent.  Add  to  these  a  garrison  of  2,500  for  Nash 
ville  and  Chattanooga  each,  and  we  shall  find  still  remain 
ing  a  force  of  47,000  infantry  and  artillery,  and  about  six 
thousand  cavalry,  which  there  could  have  been  no  difficulty 
in  assembling  at  Columbia  before  Hood  reached  there. 
After  Sherman  started  from  Rome,  it  was  known  that 
Wheeler's  cavalry  had  hastened  after  him.  The  raid  of 
Breckenridge  into  East  Tennessee  was  a  feeble  diversion 
which  the  troops  in  that  part  of  Schofi eld's  department  were 
quite  able  to  meet.  Eoddey's  division  of  cavalry  was  the 
only  Confederate  force  in  North  Alabama,  and  gave  no  trou 
ble  during  the  campaign.  Everything  combined,  therefore, 
to  point  to  an  immediate  concentration  in  front  of  Hood,  as 
the  true  policy  on  our  side.  General  E.  S.  Granger  was  at 
Decatur  on  November  1st  with  over  five  thousand  men. 
Steedman  could  have  joined  him  there  with  the  five  thou 
sand  which  he  subsequently  took  to  Nashville.  The  bridge 
and  trestle  between  Pulaski  and  Athens  could  have  been  re 
built,  and  if  demonstrations  on  the  south  of  the  Tennessee 
did  not  keep  Hood  from  committing  himself  to  a  campaign 
north  of  the  river,  the  divisions  of  Steedman  and  Granger 
could  have  joined  Schofield  at  Pulaski.  If  Thomas  had 
joined  them  there  or  at  Columbia  with  the  remainder  of  his 
available  force,  he  would  have  been  superior  to  Hood  in 
everything  but  cavalry  from  the  beginning,  and  would  have 
ueen  able  himself  to  dictate  whether  a  battle  should  be 
/ought  before  the  arrival  of  Smith's  corps.1  From  the 
knowledge  of  the  facts  we  now  have,  it  would  seeni  that 
Thomas  gave  undue  importance  to  the  necessity  of  having 


1  See  tables  in  Appendix  A. 


134  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

the  Sixteenth  Corps  present  before  decisive  operations 
against  Hood.  When  the  battle  of  Nashville  was  fought, 
Rousseau's  eight  thousand  or  more  at  Murfxeesboro  were  ^,s 
wholly  out  of  the  account  as  if  they  had  been  north  of  the 
Ohio,  and  nearly  five  thousand  of  Graft's  division,. besides 
the^ost  ~  garrison,  were  kept  in  the  works  at  the  city  with 
General  Donaldson's  employe's,  and  were  not  brought  into 
the  action.  The  battle  was  fought,  therefore,  with  a  force 
numerically  less  "than  it  would  have  been  if  Smith's  corps 
had  been  entirely  absent,  and  Eousseau  and  Cruft  had  been 
in  line  instead.  It  is  true  that  a  good  many  new  regiments 
had  taken  the  place  of  old  ones ;  but  these  were  not  what 
is  commonly  meant  by  raw  recruits.  They  were  always  of 
ficered  by  men  of  experience,  and  many  veterans  were  in 
the  ranks.  Four  thousand  of  them  swelled  the  old  divisions 
of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  there  was  no  complaint  that  they 
did  not  fight  well.  As  to  the  provisional  organization  of 
convalescents  and  furloughed  men  of  the  different  corps 
with  Sherman,  their  conduct  in  Grosvenor's  brigade  in  this 
action,  and  subsequently  on  the  North  Carolina  coast,  proved 
they  were  scarcely  distinguishable  from  veteran  troops 
under  their  accustomed  flags.  But  if  the  troops  had  not 
been  of  the  best  quality,  there  would  be  no  less  need  of 
handling  them  according  to  the  principles  which  military 
experience  has  established,  and  a  rapid  concentration  would 
still  be  proper. 

When  Hood  began  the  campaign  in  earnest,  the  first 
movements  of  our  forces  were  the  reverse  of  concentric. 
Granger,  instead  of  joining  Schofield,  was  sent  "a  hundred 
miles  to  the  east,  and  the  garrison  at  Johnsonville  was 
taken  to  the  rear  of  Nashville.  This  would  seem  to  have 
been  with  the  idea  that  it  was  necessary  to  protect  the  rail 
ways  against  expected  raids.  If  so,  it  was  an  error,  for  had 


THE  PURSUIT  AFTER  THE  BATTLE.  135 

Hood  been  unwise  enough  to  have  detached  Forrest  for  such 
a  purpose,  he  would  have  been  at  the  same  disadvantage  ho 
subsequently  was  at  Nashville,  where  the  absence  of  the  hos 
tile  cavalry  made  the  opportunity  which  resulted  so  glori 
ously  for  our  arms.  No  raid  of  Forrest's  could  have  clone 
more  damage  to  the  Chattanooga  Eailroad  than  the  forced 
retreat  from  Pulasld  did  to  an  equally  important  line,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  damage  actually  done  to  the  former  while 
Hood  lay  in  front  of  Nashville. 

The  delay  in  concentration  was  also  fraught  with  the 
very  gravest  perils  to  the  portion  of  the  army  under  Scho- 
field.  It  was  Hood's  policy  to  force  the  fighting  with  this, 
in  the  hope  of  destroying  or  capturing  it  before  it  could  be 
aided,  yet  nothing  was  farther  from  Thomas's  wish  than  that 
it  should  make  a  precipitate  retreat.  Had  it  reached  Nash 
ville  a  single  day  sooner,  Thomas  would  have  been  wholly 
unprepared  to  meet  his  adversary,  and  Steedman's  rein 
forcements  would  have  been,  cut  off.  To  save  time,  Scho- 
field  took  the  gravest  risks  ;  but  as  he  well  said,  the  slight 
est  mistake  on  his  part,  or  the  failure  of  a  subordinate,  might 
have  proved  disastrous.  The  misconduct  of  Wagner  at 
Franklin  would  certainly  have  proved  so,  but  for  the  hero 
ism  of  Opdycke  and  White  and  the  brave  men  of  their 
commands. 

^consideration  of  all  the_  facts,  therefore,  seems  to  show 
thatTrBonTas  should  have  concentrated  every  available  man 
in  front  of  Hood  before  the  latter  moved ;  and  that  the 
great  success  of  the  closing  part  of  the  campaign  was  in 
spite  of  this  error  in  its  beginning,  and  by  no  means  because 
of  it.  The  difficulties  had  certainly  been  very  great,  and  to 
an  ordinary  man  they  would  have  been  overwhelming. 
There,  was  a  great  scarcity  of  animals  for  the  cavalry,  for  the 
artillery,  for  the  pontoons,  and  for  the  wagon  trains,  while 


136  FRANKLIN  AND   NASHVILLE. 

tlie  season  was  such  as  to  use  up  the  animals  with  double 
rapidity.  The  army  was  new  to  its  organization,  and  though 
it  did  all  that  an  army  could  do,  Thomas  could  hardly  have 
full  faith  in  it  till  it  had  been  proven.  But  through  all 
these  difficulties  a  triumph  was  achieved  wThich  has  been 
rarely  equalled,  and  without  which  even  Sherman's  position 
in  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy  and.  on  the  communications 
of  its  only  remaining  great  army  must  have  lost  half  its 
significance. 


CHAPTER  VIH. 

FORT  FISHER. 

THE  subsidiary  operations  which  were  intended  to  co-op 
erate  with  Sherman's  march  northward  from  Savannah  were 
two.  First,  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  at  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River  in  North  Carolina,  and  second,  the  transfer 
of  Schofield  from  Middle  Tennessee  to  the  Carolina  coast, 
where,  with  the  Tenth  Corps  under  Major-General  A.  H. 
Terry  and  the  Twenty-third  under  Major-General  Cox,  he 
was  to  reduce  Wilmington  and  advance  upon  two  lines 
from  that  city  and  from  Newbern  to  Goldsboro,  at  which 
place  it  was  expected  a  junction  with  Sherman  would 
be  made.  The  attack  upon  Fort  Fisher  was  practically 
simultaneous  with  Sherman's  departure  from  Savannah 
and  with  Schofield's  from  Clifton  on  the  Tennessee  Kiver ; 
and  the  result  of  all,  accomplished  two  months  later,  was 
the  reunion  at  Goldsboro  of  the  army  which  Sherman 
had  led  at  Atlanta,  except  that  the  Tenth  Corps  was 
substituted  for  the  Fourth,  which  still  remained  at  the 
West, 

The  city  of  Wilmington,  which  had  been  one  of  the  prin 
cipal  ports  of  the  Confederacy,  is  on  the  left  bank  of  Cape 
Fear  Kiver,  about  thirty  miles  from  the  ocean.  The  river, 
near  its  mouth,  runs  parallel  to  the  sea-coast,  the  sandy 
tongue  between,  called  Federal  Point,  being  hardly  more 
than  a  mile  wide  for  the  last  five  or  six  miles  of  its  length. 


138  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

Fort  Fisher  was  upon  the  southern  point  of  this,  and  con 
sisted  of  sand  parapets  sodded  with  marsh  grass  on  the  slope, 
and  revetted  with  the  same.  The  land  face  extended  across 
the  tongue,  from  the  sea  beach  to  the  river,  something  over 
a  mile  from  the  point,  and  the  parapet  was  about  five  hun 
dred  yards  in  length.  The  sea  face  was  thirteen  hundred 
yards  long  from  the  bastion  where  it  joined  the  land  front 
to  a  work  known  as  the  mound  battery  at  its  southern  end. 
On  the  extreme  point  was  a  smaller  detached  work  known 
as  Fort  Buchanan,  mounting  four  heavy  guns.  Smith  Island 
lies  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  river,  giving  two  channels 
from  the  sea  into  the  harbor.  Fort  Fisher  with  Fort  Bu 
chanan  commanded  the  northern  entrance,  called  New  Inlet, 
and  on  the  main  land  south  of  the  entrance,  two  other  forts, 
Caswell  and  Johnson,  protected  the  principal  channel.  A 
village  of  pilots  and  fishermen,  called  Srnithville,  lay  under 
the  guns  of  Fort  Johnson,  a  quaint  little  place  embowered 
in  live-oaks,  where  the  daring  men  lived  who  chose  the 
stormiest  nights  and  the  foggiest  days  for  piloting  in  the 
blockade  runners  upon  which  the  South  was  dependent  for 
its  commerce. 

Fort  Fisher  not  only  commanded  New  Inlet  where  the 
turns  of  the  channel  brought  every  entering  vessel  under 
its  guns,  but  the  narrowness  of  Federal  Point  gave  it  con 
trol  of  the  river  also  ;  and  when  it  should  once  be  in  our 
possession  the  port  would  be  closed.  It  had  been  con 
structed  in  accordance  with  its  situation  and  use.  with  the 
two  long  faces  described,  but  open  at  the  back  upon  the 
river  and  having  only  a  light  rifle  trench  extending  from  the 
mound  battery  to  the  river,  facing  Fort  Buchanan.  As  any 
military  force  intending  to  attack  the  place  would  neces 
sarily  land  out  of  cannon  range  to  the  northward,  the  land 
face  of  the  fort  was  the  most  elaborately  built.  Starting 


FORT  FISHER. 


139 


Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington,  N.  C. 


140  FRANKLIN   AND  NASHVILLE. 

from  a  half  bastion  on  the  river,  a  curtain  ran  to  the  bastion 
at  the  angle  on  the  sea.  The  parapet  was  about  twenty 
feet  high,  with  a  shallow  ditch,  most  of  the  sand  for  tho 
work  being  taken  from  the  interior.  Midway  the  curtain 
was  a  small  outwork  covering  an  entrance  to  the  fort.  Two 
field-pieces  in  this  gave  a  flanking  fire  upon  the  ditch  and 
assisted  the  guns  in  the  bastions  in  sweeping  the  front.  A 
heavy  loopholed  palisade  was  before  the  ditch  and  about 
fifty  feet  from  the  foot  of  the  slope.  This  front  was  armed 
with  twenty-one  heavy  guns  and  three  mortars.  A  formida 
ble  system,  of  torpedoes  had  been  planted  beyond  the  pali 
sade,  to  be  discharged  by  electricity  from  within  the  fort. 
To  protect  the  guns  from  an  enfilading  naval  fire,  very  heavy 
traverses  had  been  built,  about  a  dozen  in  number,  at  right 
angles  to  the  parapet,  from  twenty-five  to  forty  feet  long, 
and  rising  ten  feet  above  the  gunners'  heads.  These  were 
strongly  built,  as  hollow  bomb-proofs,  and  served  both  as 
magazines  and  as  shelter  for  the  garrison  when  driven  from 
the  guns  by  a  cannonade  from  the  fleet.  A  large  interior 
magazine  and  some  stores  and  quarters  were  similarly  con 
structed.  The  sea-front  was  built  in  the  same  way,  but  was 
not  so  continuously  heavy  as  the  other,  the  guns  being 
grouped  in  batteries  connected  by  a  lighter  parapet  for  in 
fantry.  Twenty -four  guns  were  on  this  face,  and  among 
them  an  Armstrong  rifled  gun  of  150  Ibs.  calibre,  mounted 
upon  a  solid  mahogany  carriage,  a  gift  from  English  friends 
of  the  Confederate  cause.  The  armament  was  mostly  of 
eight-  and  ten-inch  columbiads,  interspersed  with  heavy 
rifled  cannon.  The  garrison  numbered  about  twenty-five 
hundred  men  under  Colonel  Lamb,  though  Major-General 
Whiting  was  present  in  the  fort  when  it  surrendered.1 


General  Terry  reports  his  prisoners  at  2,083,  but  does  not  state  the  casualties 
among  the  Confederates. 


FORT  FISHER.  141 

An  attempt  to  take  the  fort  in  December  had  been  fruit 
less,  but  the  strong  opinion  of  Rear-Admiral  Porter  and  of 
some  of  the  army  officers  that  it  could  be  taken,  led  to  the 
speedy  renewal  of  the  effort.  General  Terry  was  put  in  com 
mand  of  Ames's  division  and  Abbott's  brigade  of  the 
'Twenty-fourth  Corps,  and  Paine's  division  of  the  Twenty-fifth 
Corps,  with  two  light  batteries.  A  fleet  of  transports  con 
veyed  them  and  a  siege-train  to  the  rendezvous  on  the 
North  Carolina  coast,  where  they  met  Admiral  Porter's  fleet. 
Storms  delayed  the  landing,  which  was  effected  January 
13th,  upon  the  beach  about  five  miles  north  of  the  fort 
and  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  fleet.  The  shore  there  is 
a  mere  key  of  sand  a  few  hundred  yards  wide,  and  sepa 
rated  from  the  mainland  by  Myrtle  Sound,  a  long  and  shallow 
bay  of  which  the  outlet  is  at  Masonboro  Inlet,  a  few  miles 
further  north.  Nearly  two  hundred  small  boats  from  the 
navy,  besides  steam-tugs  were  employed  in  taking  the  troops 
from  the  transports  to  the  shore,  and  the  whole  was  done  be 
tween  eight  in  the  morning  and  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
though  a  heavy  surf  beat  continuously  upon  the  open  coast. 

After  several  reconnoissances,  it  was  determined  to  estab 
lish  a  line  of  contravallation  across  the  point  about  two 
miles  from  the  fort,  which  should  protect  Terry's  camp  from 
any  attack  in  rear  during  his  operations.  This  line  was  es 
tablished  and  occupied  by  Paine's  division  and  Abbott's  bri 
gade.  The  interior  of  Federal  Point  and  the  part  of  the 
peninsula  along  the  river  is  a  shallow  fresh-water  swamp, 
overgrown  with  pines,  and  with  a  thicket  of  smaller  trees 
and  shrubs.  The  first  efforts  were  aimed  at  establishing 
the  line  farther  away  from  the  fort,  with  its  flanks  resting 
upon  the  swamps ;  but  these  were  found  to  be  so  shallow  as 
to  make  no  protection,  and  the  trench  was  therefore  put 
where  it  could  reach  from  river  to  the  sea.  Under  cover  oi 


142  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

the  fire  of  the  fleet,  Curtis's  brigade  of  Ames's  division  was 
moved  down  along  the  river  toward  the  fort,  and  reached  a 
small  unfinished  outwork  in  front  of  the  west  end  of  the 
land  face,  while  Terry,  with  General  Curtis  and  Colonel 
Comstock  of  General  Grant's  staff  (who  accompanied  the 
expedition  as  chief  engineer),  made  a  reconnoissance  within 
six  hundred  yards  of  the  works.  Curtis  had  approached 
the  fort  at  this  place  on  the  former  expedition,  and  the  re 
sult  of  the  reconnoissance  confirmed  his  opinion  that  it  was 
the  proper  point  for  an  assault,  which  it  was  determined  to 
make  the  next  day.  Admiral  Porter  was  requested  to  main 
tain  a  steady  fire  of  the  fleet  upon  the  works,  and  to  destroy 
the  palisade  in  front  of  the  ditch,  so  as  to  prevent  delay 
when  the  attacking  force  should  move  forward.  After  con 
sultation,  the  hour  of  3  P.M.  of  the  15th  was  fixed  for  the  as 
sault,  which  General  Ames  was  ordered  to  make  with  his 
division,  and  the  Admiral  ordered  a  party  of  sailors  and 
marines,  under  Commander  Breese,  to  land  and  attack  the 
bastion  at  the  sea-angle  at  the  same  time  with  Ames's  as 
sault  upon  the  other  end  of  the  land  front. 

Admiral  Porter  had  maintained  an  occasional  fire  on  the 
fort  during  the  night,  and  at  an  early  hour  in  the  morning 
of  the  15th,  sixty  men-of-war  and  gunboats,  arranged  in  a 
great  curve  off  the  shore,  opened  a  steady  and  systematic 
cannonade  upon  it.  The  method  adopted  was  to  fire  slowly 
and  with  great  care  to  get  the  range  accurately,  taking  the 
traverses  in  regular  order,  and  endeavoring  to  dismount  the 
guns  between  them.  A  designated  section  of  the  fleet  di 
rected  their  fire  upon  the  palisade.  A  steady  rain  of  great 
projectiles  was  thus  kept  up  upon  the  fort,  many  of  them 
eleven  and  thirteen  inch  shells,  driving  the  infantry  of  the 
garrison  to  their  bomb-proofs.  The  Confederate  artillerists 
vainly  tried  to  match  the  persistent  cannonade  of  the  ships, 


FORT  FISHER.  143 

One  by  one  their  gnns  were  silenced,  many  were  dismounted 
and  broken,  till,  by  the  time  fixed  for  the  assault,  hardly 
any  of  the  larger  cannon  were  in  condition  to  be  used. 

Ames  had  kept  Curtis's  brigade  in  the  advanced  work  it 
had  occupied  the  evening  before,  with  Pennypacker's  and 
Bell's  in  supporting  distance.  At  two  o'clock  a  line  of 
sharpshooters,  provided  with  shovels,  ran  forward  and 
established  themselves  in  pits  a  hundred  and  seventy-five 
yards  from  the  fort.  The  infantry  of  the  garrison  now  be 
gan  to  man  the  parapet,  and  opened  with  their  muskets 
upon  Curtis's  line,  which  advanced  to  a  point  about  four 
hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  sharpshooters,  when  they  also 
quickly  covered  themselves  with  a  shallow  trench  in  the 
sand.  Again  Curtis  was  moved  forward  to  the  cover  of  a 
little  ridge  in  the  sands  much  nearer  the  enemy,  while 
Pennypacker's  brigade  occupied  the  trench  he  had  left,  and 
Bell's  brigade  came  to  the  advanced  work,  which  had  been 
Curtis's  first  position.  The  signal  was  now  given  to  the 
fleet  to  change  the  direction  of  its  fire,  and  Curtis's  brigade 
rushed  at  the  end  of  the  half-bastion  next  the  river.  The 
ground  along  the  river  bank  was  marshy,  and  the  palisades 
were  standing  in  some  places ;  but  a  party  of  axemen  with 
the  head  of  the  column  quickly  cleared  the  way  of  obstruc 
tions,  and  there  was  no  halt  till  the  men  swarmed  over  the 
parapet,  and  took  it  in  reverse  as  far  as  the  first  traverse.  At 
the  same  time  Commander  Breese's  storming  party  from  the 
ships  charged  upon  the  bastion  at  the  sea-angle,  but  the  enemy 
ran  forward  a  light  gun  or  two  in  the  bastion,  and  another 
in  the  outwork  at  the  middle  of  the  curtain  opened  on  them, 
while  they  were  met  with  a  steady  musketry  fire  from  the 
parapet.  Their  position  had  none  of  the  advantages  of  Ames's, 
and  they  were  soon  driven  back  with  considerable  loss. 

At  the  river  side  Pennypacker's  brigade  went  forward  to 


144  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

Curtis's  support,  and  carried  the  palisade  reaching  from  the 
end  of  the  earthwork  to  the  water,  taking  a  number  of  pris 
oners.  A  hand-to-hand  conflict  began,  in  which  the  garri 
son  were  slowly  driven  back  from  one  traverse  to  another. 
In  carrying  the  third  traverse,  Colonel  Pennypacker  fell 
badly  wounded ;  Bell's  brigade  was  ordered  up  and  formed 
along  the  river  within  the  fort,  but  the  interior  was  full  of 
trenches  from  wThich  sand  for  the  parapet  had  been  dug,  and. 
the  magazines  and  the  ruins  of  barracks  and  storehouses 
made  tenable  defences  for  the  garrison,  so  that  the  progress 
was  slow.  By  six  o'clock  nine  traverses  had  been  carried, 
and  Terry  now  ordered  to  Ames's  assistance  Abbott's  bri 
gade  and  the  Twenty -seventh  colored  regiment  from  Paine's 
division.  Abbott  was  able  to  complete  the  occupation  of 
the  land  front,  and  Ames  directed  a  general  advance  upon 
the  reverse  of  the  sea  front,  which  cleared  the  works  and 
took  full  possession  of  the  fort.  In  the  final  effort  Curtis 
had  been  wounded  in  the  head  by  a  canister-ball,  and  Colonel 
Bell  received  a  fatal  shot  while  leading  forward  his  brigade. 
The  garrison  retreated  precipitately  to  the  shelter  of  Port 
Buchanan,  where,  upon  the  advance  of  Abbott's  brigade 
against  them,  they  were  surrendered  late  in  the  evening  by 
General  Whiting  and  Colonel  Lamb,  their  commanders. 
While  the  attack  upon  the  fort  was  going  on,  General 
Hoke  had  made  some  demonstrations  of  attack  upon  the 
line  of  General  Paine,  and  Commander  Breese's  sailors  and 
marines  were  sent,  after  their  repulse,  to  strengthen  that 
line;  but  a  slight  skirmish  was  all  that  followed,  and 
Hoke  retired,  leaving  the  garrison  to  its  fate.  The  fight 
ing  along  the  parapet  had  been  obstinate,  and  the  losses 
were  severe  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged,  espe 
cially  in  officers,  of  whom  fifty  were  killed  and  wounded, 
The  casualties  in  the  rank  and  file  were  about  six  hundred. 


PORT  FISHER.  145 

From  the  time  the  assault  began  the  ships  could  give  no 
further  assistance,  and  the  advantages  for  defence  which  the 
traverses  and  the  obstructions  within  the  fort  gave,  were 
such  as  to  make  the  work  of  Ames  and  his  brigade  com 
manders  hardly  less  difficult  than  the  assault  of  a  well- 
manned  field  fortification.  The  assault  of  the  detachment 
from  the  ships,  though  unsuccessful,  was  of  assistance  as  a 
diversion,  and  enabled  the  infantry  to  get  forward  faster  than 
they  could  otherwise  have  done.  The  cannonade  from  the 
ships  appears  to  have  destroyed  the  connection  between 
the  torpedoes  which  had  been  placed  in  the  ground  along  the 
front  which  was  assailed  and  the  electric  battery  within  the 
fort,  for  no  explosions  took  place  and  the  attacking  parties 
did  not  suffer  from  this  cause. 

The  victory  was  in  itself  an  important  one,  and  it  was  all 
the  more  grateful  to  the  country  because  of  the  chagrin  at 
the  so  recent  failure  of  Butler's  expedition  against  the  same 
fortress.  The  other  forts  near  Smithville  were  immediately 
abandoned  by  the  enemy,  and  their  armament  also  was  cap 
tured,  making  in  all  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine  cannon,  be 
sides  small  arms  and  stores,  and  over  two  thousand  prisoners. 
The  harbor  was  now  in  our  possession  and  blockade  run 
ning  was  nearly  ended.  General  Hoke,  the  Confederate 
commander  of  the  District,  intrenched  himself  with  his  own 
and  the  remainder  of  Whiting's  divisions,  on  a  line  reaching 
from  Myrtle  Sound  to  Cape  Fear  River,  a  mile  or  two  above 
the  southern  end  of  the  Sound.  Nearly  opposite  this  line, 
Upon  a  projecting  point  of  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  was 
Fort  Anderson,  a  heavy  earthwork,  either  built  or  enlarged 
and  strengthened  at  this  time.  From  this  point  also,  the 
channel  was  planted  with  torpedoes,  and  full  use  was  made 
of  all  the  means  for  obstructing  the  passage  of  the  ileei 
which  the  ingenuity  of  the  Confederates  had  devised. 
VOL.  X.—  l" 


CHAPTER  DL 

CAPTURE  OF  WILMINGTON— BATTLE  OF  KINSTON. 

THE  orders  which  had  been  sent  General  Schofleld  to 
move  the  Twenty-third  Corps  eastward  reached  him  on 
January  14th.  River  transports  took  the  troops  down  the 
Tennessee  and  up  the  Ohio  to  points  where  railway  trans 
portation  could  be  got,  and  the  transfer  to  Washington  and 
Alexandria  was  then  completed  by  rail.  The  distance  trav 
elled  was  fourteen  hundred  miles,  and  the  corps  was  ready 
to  take  ship  before  February  1st ;  but  the  unusual  severity 
of  the  winter  weather  had  frozen  the  Potomac  River,  and  it 
was  not  till  the  4th  that  the  first  detachments  of  the  troops 
sailed.  Meanwhile  Schofield  had  joined  General  Grant  at 
Fortress  Monroe  and  had  accompanied  him  to  the  mouth  of 
Cape  Fear  River  to  hold  a  consultation  with  General  Terry 
and  Admiral  Porter  with  regard  to  future  operations  in  the 
Department  of  North  Carolina,  as  the  new  command  was 
designated.  The  result  was  the  decision  to  make  Wilming 
ton  the  first  objective  point  of  the  campaign,  so  that  a  new 
base  might  be  secured  for  Sherman  if  circumstances  should 
oblige  him  to  concentrate  his  army  south  of  Goldsboro. 
The  first  step  accomplished,  Schofield's  task  would  be  to 
open  the  route  from  Newberne  to  Goldsboro,  rebuilding  the 
railway,  and  uniting  both  his  corps  there  in  time  to  meet 
Sherman  for  the  final  operations  of  the  general  campaign  when 
the  concentration  of  the  grand  army  should  be  complete. 

Returning  to  Washington,  Schofield  embarked  with  Cox's 
division  on  February  4th,  leaving  the  rest  of  the  corps  to  fol- 


148  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

low  as  fast  as  ships  could  be  procured.  A  gale  off  Cape 
Hatteras  delayed  the  transports  for  a  day  or  two,  but  the  di 
vision  landed  safely  at  Fort  Fisher  on  the  9th.  The  fort 
still  bore  evidence  of  the  extraordinary  bombardment  ifc 
had  undergone,  and  its  broad  sandy  interior  was  thickly 
strewn  with  great  shells  rusted  red  in  the  weather,  and  re 
sembling  nothing  so  much  as  a  farmer's  field  strewn  with 
pumpkins.  On  the  llth  Terry's  line  was  advanced  close 
enough  to  that  of  the  enemy  to  compel  him  to  hold  it  in 
force.  The  next  night  the  attempt  was  made  to  convey 
pontoons  up  the  coast  by  the  navy,  while  Cox's  and  Ames's 
divisions  marched  along  the  beach  to  receive  the  boats,  haul 
them  over  the  sands  and  lay  a  bridge  across  Myrtle  Sound  in 
a  narrow  place  in  rear  of  Hoke.  The  weather  became  so 
stormy,  however,  that  the  boats  could  not  be  brought  to 
the  rendezvous  and  the  infantry  marched  back  to  their 
camps  before  morning.  The  night  was  dark  but  intensely 
cold,  and  the  gale  from  the  ocean  seemed  to  find  every 
button-hole  in  the  men's  clothing,  and  to  chill  them  to  the 
marrow.  A  severe  northeaster  swept  the  coast  for  several 
days,  but  on  the  night  of  the  14th  a  new  attempt  was  made 
to  move  the  pontoons  to  the  selected  place.  This  time 
the  boats  were  put  on  their  wagons  and  all  the  scanty  supply 
of  horses  and  mules  was  used  to  haul  them  forward  along 
the  beach.  The  high  tide  and  surf  proved  too  great  a 
hindrance ;  the  sand,  where  not  washed  by  the  water,  was 
too  deep  and  soft  for  the  teams,  and  where  the  waves  broke, 
the  sea  was  too.  much  for  them ;  so  this  also  had  to  be  given 
tip.  Before  they  reached  the  appointed  position  the  moon 
rose,  revealing  the  naval  squadron  in  the  oifing,  and  reveal 
ing  also  the  marching  troops  to  the  enemy,  who  were  put 
upon  the  alert  to  defeat  the  effort  to  cross  the  Sound. 

Schofield  now  determined  to  try  the  right  bank  of  the 


CAPTURE  OF   WILMINGTON.  149 

river,  where  there  was  at  least  room  for  manoeuvre,  although 
the  country  was  very  swampy  and  filled  with  ponds  and 
lakes.  Cox's  and  Ames's  divisions  were  ferried  to  Smith- 
ville,  where  they  were  joined  by  Moore's  brigade  of  Couch's 
division,  just  landed,  and  the  whole,  under  command  of  Gen« 
eral  Cox,  was  directed  to  advance  upon  Fort  Anderson  and 
attempt  to  turn  it.  The  vessels  of  the  fleet  had  from  time 
to  time  engaged  the  forfc  at  long  range,  and  Admiral  Porter 
ordered  a  section  of  them  to  renew  the  fire  when  the  land 
forces  should  advance.  General  Schofield  made  his  head 
quarters  temporarily  upon  a  steamer,  passing  from  one  bank 
to  the  other  as  circumstances  required. 

The  16th  was  used  in  getting  the  troops  over  the  bay  with 
a  few  field  pieces  and  a  small  train  of  wagons.  Cox's  divi 
sion  marched  on  the  morning  of  «the  17th,  meeting  the 
enemy's  cavalry  within  two  or  three  miles  of  the  village, 
and  pressing  them  back  by  a  continuous  skirmish  till  within 
two  miles  of  the  fort,  established  a  line  with  the  right  flank 
resting  on  the  river,  and  opened  communication  with  the 
fleet,  having  marched  ten  miles  during  the  day.  Next 
morning  the  advance  was  resumed  and  the  enemy  driven 
within  the  fortifications.  A  reconnoissance  showed  that  be 
sides  the  principal  fort  upon  the  river,  a  line  of  infantry 
trench  ran  at  right  angles  from  the  bank  to  the  foot  of  Ortou 
Pond,  a  lake  several  miles  long,  giving  it  a  front  which  could 
not  be  turned  except  by  a  long  detour.  The  line  was  pro 
tected  by  abatis,  and  epaulernents  for  field  artillery  were 
seen  in  places  along  it,  from  which  a  rapid  fire  with  shrap 
nel  was  opened  as  the  National  forces  came  within  range. 
In  accordance  with  his  orders,  Cox  intrenched  two  brigades 
to  invest  the  fort  on  this  side,  and  with  two  others  marched 
for  the  head  of  Orton  Pond,  sending  directions  to  Ameses 
division  to  join  him  there.  The  detour  required  a  march  of 


150  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

about  fifteen  miles,  and  it  was  almost  night  when  the  cause 
way  through  the  marsh  at  the  head  of  the  pond  was  reached, 
The  enemy  made  a  sharp  resistance  with  cavalry,  but  by 
sending  detachments  on  the  flanks  to  pass  the  swamps  by 
wading,  the  crossing  was  forced  and  high  ground  beyond 
was  occupied.  During  the  day  the  fleet  had  continued  a 
cannonade  of  the  fort,  and  demonstrations  had  been  kept  up 
by  the  two  brigades  in  position.  In  the  night  the  enemy 
abandoned  the  place,  and  the  troops  hastening  forward  by 
the  west  side  of  Orton  Pond  to  complete  their  work,  were 
met  by  the  news  that  the  fort  was  in  our  possession,  with 
ten  pieces  of  heavy  ordnance  which  made  its  armament. 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  river  the  enemy  retreated  to 
Town  Creek,  destroying  bridges  and  obstructing  the  road. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  river  he  fell  back  to  a  strong  posi 
tion  opposite  the  mouth  of  Town  Creek,  covered  by  swamps 
on  the  east.  General  Terry  followed  Hoke's  retreat  up  the 
left  bank,  and  it  appearing  that  the  greater  part  of  Hoke's 
force  was  in  his  front,  Ames's  division  was  taken  back  to  that 
side  on  the  19th,  while  Cox  continued  his  advance  to  Town 
Creek,  eight  miles  above  the  fort,  driving  a  rear  guard  be 
fore  him.  Town  Creek  is  a  deep,  unfordable  stream,  with 
marshy  banks,  which,  near  the  river,  had  been  dyked  and 
cultivated  as  rice-fields.  A  strong  line  of  earthworks  had 
been  built  on  the  north  bank  of  the  stream  before  the 
evacuation  of  Fort  Anderson,  and  in  them  were  a  "Whitworth 
rifled  cannon  and  two  smooth  twelve-pounder  field  pieces. 
Hagood's  brigade,  of  Hoke's  division,  strengthened  by  an- 
other  Confederate  regiment,  held  the  works,  and  had  re 
moved  the  planking  from  the  bridge.  The  artillery  swept 
the  long  causeway  through  the  marsh  by  which  the  bridge 
must  be  approached. 

Henderson's  brigade  was  advanced  to  the  edge  of  the  low 


CAPTURE   OF   WILMINGTON.  151 

ground,  and  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  worked  their  way 
through  the  marsh  to  the  edge  of  the  stream.  Careful 
reconnoissance  was  made  above  and  below,  and  during  the 
night  a  small  flat-boat,  of  the  kind  used  for  collecting  the 
rice  crop,  was  found  a  mile  or  two  down  the  creek,  and  was 
secured  and  guarded.  The  north  bank,  occupied  by  Hagood, 
was  a  bluff  near  the  bridge,  rising  twenty  or  thirty  feet  from 
the  water.  Farther  below  the  ground  falls  off  into  marsh 
and  rice  fields,  bordered  by  forest,  which  hid  them  from 
view.  The  situation  was  reported  to  General  Schofield,  with 
Cox's  purpose  to  cross  part  of  his  force  at  the  place  below 
the  bridge,  by  means  of  the  flat-boat,  in  the  morning.  The 
vessels  of  the  navy  had  ascended  the  river,  keeping  pace 
with  the  troops  on  the  shore,  removing  torpedoes  and  ob 
structions  as  they  advanced,  and  prepared  to  assist  the  army 
by  shelling  any  of  the  enemy's  positions  they  could  reach. 
The  Confederates  were  careful,  however,  to  select  their 
points  of  defence  out  of  range  from  the  river  after  the  evacua 
tion  of  Fort  Anderson. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  20th  Henderson's  brigade  re 
newed  active  demonstrations  on  Hagood's  front,  while  the 
slow  work  of  ferrying  the  other  brigades  went  on.  The  boat 
would  carry  only  fifty  men,  and  the  marshes  and  dykes  were 
impassable  for  animals,  so  that  the  mounted  officers  left 
their  horses  behind.  Casement's  and  Steii's  brigades  were 
all  the  morning  getting  over.  Henderson's  sharpshooters 
had  succeeded  in  getting  cover  so  close  to  the  creek  as  to 
prevent  any  of  the  enemy  from  showing  themselves  above 
the  parapet.  The  Whitworth  gun  had  also  been  disabled 
by  our  artillery  fire.  Moore  was  now  ordered  to  cross  his 
brigade,  and  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  Cox  assem 
bled  the  three  brigades  on  the  north  edge  of  the  swamp, 
which  they  had  succeeded  in  wading.  The  impracticability 


152  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

of  the  country  had  been  so  relied  upon  by  the  enemy  that 
no  pickets  were  found  posted,  and  the  division  was  marched 
rapidly  to  the  west  till  it  crossed  the  road  leading  to  Wil 
mington,  about  two  miles  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  position, 
Moore  was  ordered  to  march  still  farther  westward  to  reach 
a  parallel  road,  and  prevent  escape  in  that  direction.  Case 
ment  and  Sterl  were  formed  facing  toward  the  creek,  and 
marching  rapidly  forward,  made  the  attack.  The  brigade, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Simonton  in  Hagood's  absence, 
made  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  broken  by  a  charge.  Si 
monton  had  begun  a  line  of  breastworks  facing  to  the  rear, 
upon  hearing  of  the  presence  of  the  National  troops,  and 
leaving  a  small  force  to  hold  the  dismantled  bridge,  he  had 
formed  here  ;  but  the  charge  swept  everything  away,  and  he 
himself,  with  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  of  his  men  and 
both  his  cannon,  were  captured.  The  rest  of  the  brigade  fled 
by  the  "  old  public  road  "  toward  which  Moore  had  been  sent ; 
but  the  latter  did  not  reach  it  in  time  to  intercept  them. 

The  bridge  was  repaired  during  the  night,  and  Cox  re 
sumed  his  march  in  the  morning.  Hoke  held  stubbornly  to 
his  position  in  front  of  Terry,  and  the  column  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  was  therefore  directed  by  Schofield  to  pro 
ceed  cautiously  toward  Wilmington,  to  ascertain  the  condi 
tion  of  the  Wilmington  and  Manchester  Eailway,  and  take 
advantage  of  any  opportunity  to  get  possession  of  the  cross 
ing  of  Brunswick  Eiver,  which  is  the  name  given  to  the  west 
channel  of  Cape  Fear  Eiver,  where  it  passes  around  Eagle 
Island,  in  front  of  the  city.  About  noon  Mill  Creek  was 
reached,  six  miles  from  the  last  camp,  and  the  bridge  was 
found  to  be  burned.  This  caused  a  couple  of  hour's  delay 
till  it  could  be  repaired  so  that  the  artillery  could  pass. 
The  negroes  of  a  large  plantation  there  made  the  most  ex 
travagant  jubilation  over  the  advent  of  the  National  troops. 


CAPTURE  OF  WILMINGTON.  153 

The  forage  and  provisions  were,  as  usual,  applied  to  military 
use,  but  the  recent  slaves  assumed  ownership  of  the  house 
hold  goods  in  the  deserted  plantation  homestead,  and  comi. 
cal  disputes  were  witnessed  among  the  women,  as  they 
claimed  title  to  a  bed  or  a  table  because  they  had  long  since 
mentally  appropriated  it,  and  inwardly  determined  to  make 
it  theirs  when  this  eagerly  expected  day  should  come.  This 
novel  administration  upon  an  estate  was  conducted  as  if  the 
world  could  never  have  another  dark  day  for  them ;  but  ifc 
was  followed,  within  twenty-four  hours,  by  a  serious  revul 
sion  of  feeling,  when  they  learned  that,  in  a  country  eaten  up 
by  an  army,  ifc  became  a  troublesome  question  to  tell  how 
even  they  could  live. 

By  the  time  the  bridge  was  rebuilt  the  troops  had  eaten 
their  noon  meal  and  marched  more  rapidly  to  Brunswick 
ferry.  The  ruins  of  the  railway  bridge  were  still  smoking, 
for  it  had  been  burned  only  that  morning.  A  pontoon 
bridge  had  been  at  the  ferry,  and  in  the  hasty  retreat  the 
order  to  scuttle  and  destroy  the  boats  had  been  so  incom 
pletely  carried  out  that  more  than  half  of  them  were  unin 
jured,  and  many  of  the  rest  could  be  quickly  repaired. 
This  work  was  immediately  begun,  while  some  of  the  boats 
were  used  to  ferry  a  detachment  over  to  the  island,  which 
was  about  a  mile  wide,  but  an  almost  unbroken  marsh.  A 
causeway  led  to  the  city  ferry,  but  an  epaulement  had  been 
made  across  this  near  the  further  end,  and  a  cannon  or  two 
swept  the  narrow  road.  The  advanced  guard  was  ordered 
to  deploy  skirmishers  in  the  swamp  and  drive  off  the  gun 
ners  if  possible.  A  field  battery  of  rifled  guns  was  put  in 
position,  on  a  rise  of  ground  on  the  west  bank,  to  cover  the 
detachment  on  the  island,  and  the  explosion  of  some  of  its 
shells  in  the  city  helped  to  hasten  matters  by  showing  that 
the  town  was  within  range.  Meanwhile  the  work  of  repair- 


154  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

ing  the  pontoons  was  hurried,  and  reconnoissances  made  in 
the  vicinity.  Some  railway  employes  came  into  camp  and 
from  them  was  learned  the  falsity  of  a  rumor  that  General 
Hardee  had  brought  his  Charleston  troops  to  Wilmington. 
Great  columns  of  smoke  soon  began  to  ascend  in  the  city, 
telling  of  the  destruction  of  naval  stores,  and  of  preparation 
to  evacuate  the  town. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  a  despatch  was  received  from  Gen 
eral  Schofield,  stating  that  Terry  had  been  unable  to  make 
progress,  and  had  evidence,  which  seemed  reliable,  that 
Hoke  had  been  largely  reinforced.  Cox  was  therefore 
ordered  to  return  down  the  river,  and  be  ferried  over  to  the 
left  bank.  Sure  that  the  evidence  before  him  made  the  im 
mediate  evacuation  of  the  city  certain,  he  put  only  one  bri 
gade  in  motion,  and  reported  fully  the  circumstances.  The 
great  difficulty  couriers  found  in  reaching  the  points  on  the 
swamp-lined  river,  where  they  could  communicate  with  the 
fleet  and  get  a  boat  to  put  them  over,  made  it  midnight 
before  a  mutual  understanding  could  be  reached  and  differ 
ent  directions  from  Schofield  could  be  received ;  but  the 
latter  warmly  approved  his  subordinate's  exercise  of  discre 
tion,  in  remaining  with  the  greater  part  of  the  division  in 
apparent  disobedience  of  reiterated  orders.  Hoke's  appear 
ance  of  resuming  the  aggressive  proved  to  have  been  a  de 
monstration  to  cover  his  retreat  during  the  night,  and  the 
city  was  entered  without  opposition  at  daybreak  next  morn 
ing,  thus  celebrating  Washington's  birthday  by  the  comple 
tion  of  another  important  step  in  the  campaign. 

Several  things  combined  to  make  Newberne  a  more  useful 
base  of  supply  for  Sherman  than  Wilmington.  The  harbor 
at  Morehead  City  and  Fort  Macon  was  a  better  one  than 
that  at  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  Eiver,  and  would  admit  ves 
sels  of  deeper  draught.  The  railway,  between  the  harbor 


BATTLE   OF   KIXSTOtf.  155 

and  Newberne,  some  forty  miles  long,  was  in  operation,  with 
some  locomotives  and  cars  already  there,  while  nothing  of 
the  kind  was  at  Wilmington,  the  enemy  having  carefully  re 
moved  all  railway  rolling  stock  on  that  line.  From  New- 
berne,  much  of  the  way  to  Kinston  through  the  Dover 
Swamp,  the  iron  wras  not  so  injured  that  it  might  not  be 
used  again,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  railway  by  that 
route  would  be  both  easier  and  more  economical.  As, 
therefore,  a  safe  base  for  Sherman  was  assured  at  Wilming 
ton  in  case  of  need,  Schofield  turned  his  attention  to  the 
work  of  preparing  a  still  better  line  of  communication  from 
Newbern  to  Goldsboro. 

Several  thousand  convalescents  returning  to  Sherman's 
army  had  been  sent  from  Washington  to  Newbern,  and  a 
division  of  new  troops,  under  General  Ruger,  assigned  to  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  had  also  been  ordered  to  proceed  to 
that  place.  The  old  garrisons  of  the  district  would  furnish 
another  division.  On  February  26th  General  Cox  was  de 
tached  from  his  command  at  Wilmington,  and  ordered  by 
sea  to  Newbern  to  carry  out  the  purposes  described.  Col 
onel  Wright,  Sherman's  Chief  Engineer  of  Eailways,  was 
ordered  to  the  same  point  to  take  charge  of  the  railway 
rebuilding.  Beaching  Newbern  on  the  last  day  of  Febru 
ary,  the  organization  of  forces  was  immediately  made.  Tho 
convalescents  were  formed  into  temporary  battalions,  with 
as  much  reference  to  their  former  associations  as  practica 
ble,  and  these  were  distributed  among  the  brigades  of  the 
properly  organized  troops.  In  this  way  two  divisions  were 
formed,  and  Generals  I.  N.  Palmer  and  S.  P.  Carter  were, 
respectively,  assigned  to  their  command.  Euger's  division 
arrived  a  little  later.  On  March  1st  Classen's  brigade,  of 
Palmei's  division,  was  sent  to  Core  Creek,  sixteen  miles,  to 
be  followed  next  day  by  Carter's  division,  so  that  the  me- 


156  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

clianical  work  might  begin  at  once.  At  that  time  only  one 
Confederate  brigade  (Wliitford's)  was  known  to  be  in  the 
vicinity ;  but  the  almost  total  lack  of  wagons  made  it  neces 
sary  to  limit  operations  to  the  covering  of  the  railway  work. 
The  whole  number  of  wagon-teams  in  the  district  was  fifty, 
and  the  utmost  these  could  do  wras  to  supply  the  divisions 
at  points  near  the  end  of  the  completed  railway. 

About  three  miles  below  Kinstoii  a  considerable  stream, 
known  as  Southwest  Creek,  crosses  the  railway  and  wagon- 
roads  leading  to  Newbern.  The  upper  course  of  this  stream 
is  nearly  parallel  to  the  Neuse  River,  and  almost  the  whole 
country  between  the  Neuse  and  Trent  Rivers,  thirty  miles 
long,  is  a  great  marsh,  called  the  Dover  Swamp  in  the 
lower  part,  and  Gum  Swamp  in  the  upper.  It  was  impor 
tant  to  get  control  of  the  position  along  Southwest  Creek  as 
soon  as  possible,  for  the  slight  ridge  on  the  hither  side  of 
that  stream  was  the  only  dry  land  in  the  vicinity,  and  upon 
it  were  the  principal  roads  of  the  Neuse  Valley.  Informa 
tion  had  been  received  that  Hoke  had  reached  Kinston  with 
a  large  division,  and  rumors  of  still  further  reinforcements 
to  the  enemy  were  rife.  It  was  also  known  that  a  Confed 
erate  iron-clad  steamer  was  at  Kinston,  and  it  was  desirable 
to  get  positions  on  the  Neuse  where  batteries  could  be 
placed.  At  the  risk,  therefore,  of  being  short  of  rations, 
Cox  advanced  two  divisions  on  the  March  7th  to  the  upper 
margin  of  the  swamp  at  Wise's  Forks,  Palmers  on  the  right, 
covering  the  railroad,  and  Carter's  on  the  left,  covering  the 
Dover  Road,  with  an  interval  of  nearly  a  mile  between  them 
The  Twelfth  New  York  Cavalry,  the  only  mounted  men  in 
the  command,  were  used  to  patrol  the  roads  to  the  left,  and 
watch  the  crossings  of  Southwest  Creek  for  five  or  six  miles 
above,  the  stream  being  unfordable  at  this  season.  An  old 
road,  known  as  the  British  Road,  ran  parallel  to  the  creek  a 


BATTLE   OF  KINSTON. 


157 


mile  in  front  of  the  position,  and  Colonel  Upliam,  of  Car 
ter's  division,  was  placed  with  two  regiments  at  its  inter- 


Map  of  Battle  of  Kinston. 

section  with  the  Dover  Koad,  to  cover  approaches  from  the 
left     Some  artillery  fire  had  been  drawn  from  the  enemy 


158  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

on  the  other  side  of  Southwest  Creek  in  taking  these  posi 
tions,  both  at  the  railway  crossing  and  at  the  Dover  Road ; 
but  a  chain  of  pickets  was  established  along  the  stream,  and 
the  cavalry  reported  that  they  had  dismantled  all  the 
bridges  within  the  prescribed  distance  above,  and  had  out 
posts  at  the  crossings.  Kuger's  division  was  marched  to 
Gum  Swamp,  the  end  of  the  next  section  of  railroad  to  be 
rebuilt,  where  it  was  about  three  miles  from  the  lines  of 
Carter  and  Palmer,  and  could  support  either  in  case  of  need. 
General  Schofield  arrived  at  Newbern  the  same  day, 
coming  by  sea  from  TV'ilmington,  and  was  in  consultation 
with  his  subordinate  at  the  end  of  the  railway,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  8th,  when  a  rapid  artillery  fire  was  heard  at  tha 
left  front.  Kuger  was  ordered  to  march  quickly  to  Carter's 
support,  and,  hastening  in  that  direction  in  advance,  Cox 
found  that  the  enemy  had  suddenly  appeared  on  the  flank 
of  Upham,  and  attacked  him  without  warning.  The  cavalry 
had  failed  to  give  notice  of  the  advance,  and  Upham's  men, 
being  most  of  them  new  recruits,  had  been  unable  to  rally 
after  the  surprise.  He  succeeded  in  bringing  off  about 
one-fourth  of  his  whole  brigade  in  tolerable  order,  1mb 
the  rest  was  almost  wliolly  captured.  Carter's  line  was 
partially  protected  by  a  light  intrenchment,  and  the  divi 
sion  met,  without  flinching,  the  assault  which  quickly  fol 
lowed  the  rout  of  the  advanced  post.  Palmer  was  ordered 
to  send  one  brigade  rapidly  to  the  left,  to  support  Carter, 
and  with  the  rest  of  his  division  to  make  a  vigorous  demon 
stration  of  crossing  the  creek  in  his  front.  Some  prisoners 
taken  were  found  to  belong  to  both  Stew?art's  and  Lee's 
corps  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  and  it  wras  learned  that 
General  Bragg  was  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  in 
person,  with  the  troops  of  the  North  Carolina  district  under 
Hoke,  strengthened  by  that  part  of  Hood's  Army  of  Tennes- 


BATTLE   OF   KINSTON.  15i 

ROC  which  had  reached  North  Carolina,  under  Clayton  and 
D.  H.  Hill. 

The  fact  was  that  as  Sherman  was  rapidly  approaching 
from  the  South,  Johnston,  who  had  just  been  assigned  to 
the  command  of  all  the  forces  opposing  him,  had  authorized 
Bragg  to  take  the  troops  the  latter  had  assembled  at  Golds- 
boro,  with  the  available  part  of  Hood's  army,  which  had 
reached  Smithfield,  and  with  these  strike  fiercely  at  the  Na 
tional  column  coming  from  Newbern,  in  the  hope  of  routing 
and  driving  it  back  in  time  to  make  a  new  concentration  of 
the  whole  in  front  of  Sherman  before  he  should  reach  the 
Cape  Fear  Kiver.  The  success,  however,  was  limited  to  the 
surprise  of  Upharn's  little  command.  Carter's  division,  at 
Wise's  Forks,  aided  by  the  brigade  sent  from  Palmer,  main 
tained  the  fight  till  Ruger  arrived,  when  his  division  filled 
the  space  between  the  two  wings,  and  speedily  making  a 
barricade  with  fallen  timber  and  other  material  at  hand,  a 
connected  line  of  breastworks  soon  covered  the  whole  front. 
The  country  was  of  tangled  wood  and  swamp,  which  im 
peded  movement  and  prevented  either  side  from  seeing  far. 
The  success  of  Bragg's  first  onset  led  him  to  think  he  had 
the  whole  of  Cox's  command  broken,  though  the  x^rincipal 
line  had  not  been  reached  and  was  never  shaken.  Learning 
the  mistake,  the  Confederate  General  adjusted  his  lines 
anew  and  advanced  again,  but  was  easily  repulsed. 

As  the  information  received  from  prisoners  showed  at 
least  three  divisions  of  the  enemy  engaged,  Schofield  di 
rected  Cox  to  maintain  a  watchful  defensive  till  the  arrival 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was 
marching  across  the  country  from  Wilmington,  and  might 
.  be  expected  in  a  day  or  two.  He  himself  returned  to  New- 
bernfc  to  get  into  more  immediate  communication  with 
other  portions  of  the  Department.  During  the  9th  lively 


ICO  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

skirmishing  continued  :  Bragg  rebuilt  the  bridges  over  the 
creek  behind  him,  and  endeavored  to  push  detachments  be 
yond  Palmer's  right  flank,  between  it  and  the  river.  This 
was  prevented  without  much  difficulty,  though  it  kept  Pal 
mer  harassed.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th  a  serious  attack 
was  made  upon  Carter's  front  and  left  flank.  Anticipating 
this,  Carter's  line  of  breastworks  had  been  extended  a  long 
distance  on  the  left,  recurving  to  the  rear,  and  these  had 
been  occupied  by  a  skirmish  line.  As  soon  as  the  attack 
came  (which  proved  to  be  by  Hoke's  division)  McQuiston's 
brigade,  of  Euger's  division,  which  had  been  placed  in  re 
serve,  was  ordered  at  double  quick  step  to  Carter's  left. 
Hoke  was  met  by  a  severe  fire  of  canister  and  shrapnel  from 
the  artillery,  as  well  as  by  a  steadily  sustained  infantry  fire, 
and  after  a  vain  but  strenuous  effort  to  carry  the  line  he  was 
forced  to  withdraw.  McQuiston  was  ordered  to  charge  after 
him  from  the  flank  and  did  so,  capturing  several  hundred 
prisoners.  But  the  advance  of  the  enemy  upon  Euger  now 
came,  and  McQuiston  was  not  allowed  to  follow  Hoke  far, 
but  was  quickly  recalled  to  support  the  centre,  where  the 
line  was  very  thin.  Palmer  was  also  called  upon  for  several 
battalions  from  the  right,  and  Euger  was  made  strong 
enough  to  repulse  Hill's  and  Clayton's  men  in  their  turn. 
During  the  progress  of  this  latter  attack,  General  Schofield 
arrived  again  from  Newbern,  and  learning  the  persistent 
character  of  Bragg's  effort,  sent  urgent  messages  to  Couch 
to  hasten  the  marching  of  his  command.  Bragg,  however,, 
had  become  convinced  that  he  could  make  no  farther  im 
pression  on  the  line  before  him,  and  retreated  in  the  night 
to  Kinston,  where  a  small  detachment  was  left,  and  the  rest 
of  his  forces  were  moved  rapidly  through  Goldsboro,  to  join 
in  the  concentration  which  Johnston  was  making  in  front  of 
Sherman. 


BATTLE   OF   KINSTON.  1G1 

The  question  of  numbers,  whether  of  those  engaged  or  of 
the  casualties,  in  this,  as  in  all  the  later  engagements  of  the 
war,  is  not  easy  to  solve.  The  best  Confederate  authorities 
speak  of  the  forces  under  Bragg,  which  properly  belonged  to 
the  North  Carolina  district,  as  about  eight  or  ten  thousand 
men.1  The  number  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  who  were 
reported  as  being  with  Bragg  at  Smithfield  a  week  later,  was 
3,950.  It  is  probable  that  these  were  the  same  who  had 
been  in  the  engagement  at  Kinston,  diminished  by  their 
losses  in  that  action  ;  and  as  the  well-known  method  of  the 
Confederate  officers,  in  reporting  their  "  effective"  force,  al 
ways  reduced  it  ten  or  fifteen  per  cent,  and  often  much  more 
below  our  "  present  for  duty,"  the  figures  given  represent  a 
total  force  of  thirteen  to  fifteen  thousand.  Certainly  Bragg 
thought  they  were  enough  to  "  enable  him  to  win  a  victory," 
as  he  wrote  Johnston,  over  the  three  divisions  advancing 
from  Newborn,  and  the  recent  experience  of  the  enemy  in 
attacking  Schofield's  troops,  either  at  the  west  or  east,  had 
not  warranted  him  in  hoping  much  from  an  assault  with  in 
ferior  force,  even  if  he  had  been  aware  of  the  irregular  nature 
of  the  organizations  which  made  up  the  provisional  command. 

The  losses  on  the  National  side  were  1,257,  of  which  935 
were  captured  from  Colonel  Upham's  advanced  post.  The 
remaining  322  were  killed  and  wounded  in  defending  our 
breastworks  from  the  assaults  of  Bragg' s  troops.  No  part 
of  the  principal  line  was  for  a  moment  in  Ms  possession, 
and  the  character  of  the  engagement  was  the  oft-repeated 
one  of  a  destructive  repulse  from  a  stoutly  held  intrench- 
ment.  The  prisoners  taken  by  the  sally  from  our  left  were 
266.  and  the  overwhelming  presumption  is  that  Bragg's  total 

1  Johnston's  narrative,  p.  378,  says  they  were  ''  supposed  to  amount  to  six  or 
eight  thousand  men."  Beauregard  put  them  at  tan  thousand,  and  the  Army  of 
Tennessee  at  six  thousand.  See  Appendix  E,  II. 


162  FRANKLIN   AND   NASHVILLE. 

loss  must  have  equalled  or  exceeded  that  of  Schofield'a 
troops,  including  what  resulted  from  the  surprise  of  the 
advanced  guard,  and  which  was  primarily  occasioned  by  the 
inadequate  performance  of  outpost  duty  by  the  cavalry. 

After  Bragg's  retreat,  Schofield  steadily  pressed  the  woik 
of  rebuilding  the  railway.  Kinston  was  occupied  on  March 
14th,  and  a  large  force  was  set  at  work  to  build  a  wagon- 
bridge  over  the  Neuse  River  there,  as  well  as  in  assisting 
Colonel  Wright  in  renewing  the  railway  bridge  and  complet 
ing  the  railroad  to  that  point.  The  iron-clad  steamer  which 
had  been  at  Kinston  was  burned  and  sunk  when  Bragg  re 
treated,  and  its  remains  were  among  the  last  traces  of  the 
navy  which  at  one  time  had  swarmed  in  the  Southern  bays 
and  rivers. 

On  reaching  Kinston,  Schofield  had  ordered  Terry  to 
advance  from  Wilmington  along  the  line  of  the  railroad 
toward  Goldsboro.  This  was  done,  reaching  Faison's  Sta 
tion,  twenty  miles  south  of  the  Neuse,  on  the  20th,  and 
Terry  now  came  within  communicating  distance  of  Sher 
man,  by  whose  directions  he  marched  upon  Cox's  bridge  on 
the  22d,  and  secured  for  the  army  that  crossing  of  the  river. 
The  obstructions  in  the  Neuse  River  below  Kinston  were 
removed,  and  steamboats  reached  Schofield's  camp  on  the 
18th.  A  day  or  two  was  spent  in  the  accumulation  of  sup 
plies,  and,  during  the  19th,  the  dull  pounding  of  a  distant 
cannonade  was  heard,  which  proved  to  be  the  Battle  of 
Bentonville,  nearly  fifty  miles  away.  On  the  20th,  Scho 
field  marched  toward  Goldsboro,  which  he  entered  with 
little  opposition  on  the  21st,  and  there,  in  a  couple  of  days 
more,  was  reassembled  the  grand  army  under  Sherman, 
whose  march  from  Savannah  had  been  quite  as  remarkable 
as  the  former  one  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  and  the  outline 
of  which  we  have  now  to  trace. 


CHAPTER  X. 

SAVANNAH  TO   COLUMBIA. 

THE  occupation  of  Savannah  brought  with  it  many  ques 
tions  of  administration  of  a  semi-political  character,  which 
Sherman  was  glad  to  turn  over  to  the  civil  officers  of  the 
Government  as  quickly  as  possible.  Secretary  Stanton  vis 
ited  the  city  as  soon  as  its  capture  was  known,  and  authori 
tatively  announced  the  action  of  the  President  in  regard  to 
the  captured  cotton  and  other  stores,  the  abandoned  lands, 
and  the  refugee  negroes.  In  his  consultations  with  Sher 
man,  the  latter  learned  what  was  then  the  purpose  of  the 
Government  regarding  terms  of  peace  if  symptoms  of  a  de 
sire  to  submit  to  the  National  Constitution  should  be  shown 
by  any  of  the  States  in  rebellion.  The  General,  however, 
as  far  as  he  could,  avoided  all  affairs  that  were  not  strictly 
military,  and  devoted  himself  to  preparations  for  an  early 
renewal  of  the  campaign.  The  men  were  clothed  and  shod, 
the  artillery  and  wagon-trains  were  overhauled  and  repaired, 
and  supplies  were  collected  and  distributed.  The  experi 
ence  of  the  march  through  Georgia  was  turned  to  the  best 
account  in  determining  what  stores  should  be  taken  with 
the  columns,  and  what  could  probably  be  obtained  from  the 
country. 

Sherman's  plan  of  campaign  was  fixed  early  in  January, 
and  preliminary  movements  were  immediately  begun.  Gen 
eral  Howard  concentrated  most  of  the  right  wing  at  Beau- 


164  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

fort,  S.  C.,  by  means  of  transport  vessels,  part  of  one  corps 
being  ordered  to  march  from  Savannah  by  the  Union  Cause- 
way  in  the  same  direction.  The  left  wing,  under  General 
Slocum,  was  directed  to  move  up  both  banks  of  the  Savan 
nah  about  forty  miles,  then  to  unite  at  Eobertsville  in  South 
Carolina,  while  Howard  should  advance  from  Beaufort  to 
Pocotaligo,  driving  Hardee's  forces  over  the  Combahee 
River,  and  occupying  the  country  between  that  stream  and 
the  Coosawhatchie.  Howard's  movement  to  Beaufort  would 
thus  seem  to  threaten  Charleston,  while  Slocum's  looked 
toward  Augusta ;  and  the  enemy  would  be  left  in  doubt  as 
to  Sherman's  purpose,  though  the  positions  of  his  troops 
would  be  the  best  possible  for  the  advance  upon  Columbia, 
which  was  the  objective  for  the  first  stage  of  the  campaign. 
At  Pocotaligo,  Howard  would  be  fifty  miles  on  his  way,  yet 
he  would  still  be  near  a  water  base  for  supplies  until  the 
moment  of  beginning  the  long  march  into  the  interior. 
The  same  would  be  time  of  Slocum,  for  Bobertsville  was 
near  Sister's  Ferry,  on  the  Savannah,  and  the  wagons  of  all 
the  columns  could  therefore  be  full  when  communication 
with  Savannah  should  be  broken.  An  interior  line  of  de 
fences  about  the  city  was  prepared  by  Colonel  Poe,  Chief 
Engineer,  and  a  garrison  was  assigned  from  General  Foster's 
department,  so  that  the  army  in  the  field  might  not  be  dimin 
ished.  A  few  changes  were  made  in  the  organization  of  the 
corps.  Logan  returned  and  resumed  the  command  of  the 
Fifteenth ;  in  the  divisions  and  brigades  a  few  officers  were 
relieved  and  went  north  by  sea,  while  others,  who  had  been 
wounded  or  ill,  rejoined  the  army. 

Sherman's  purpose  was  to  feint  on  both  Augusta  and 
Charleston,  but  to  march  directly  upon  Columbia  and 
thence  to  Goldsboro,  where  he  hoped  to  open  communica 
tion  with  Newbern  and  Beaufort,  N.  C.  The  capture  of 


SAVANNAH  TO   COLUMBIA.  165 

Fort  Fisher  just  before  he  began  the  campaign,  and  the 
transfer  of  General  Schofield  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
to  the  Department  of  North  Carolina  were  steps  determined 
upon  by  General  Grant  to  facilitate  his  work,  and  gave  him 
greater  assurance  of  success.  His  plans  had  been  settled, 
however,  before  he  knew  of  either  of  these  auxiliary  move 
ments.  He  felt  sure  that  no  sufficient  force  could  be 
brought  by  the  Confederate  Government  to  oppose  him  till 
he  should  reach  the  Cape  Fear  River.  There,  the  contin 
gency  to  be  provided  for  was  that  Lee  might  break  away 
from  Richmond,  and  throw  himself  upon  his  army  before 
Grant  could  overtake  him  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
To  guard  against  this,  Grant  redoubled  his  efforts  to  extend 
his  left  to  the  westward  of  Petersburg,  so  that  no  direct 
Southern  route  could  be  open  to  Lee  ;  but  the  latter,  forced 
to  move  westward  before  turning  south,  might  be  no  nearer 
to  Sherman  than  himself.  If  this  should  not  prove  true, 
Sherman  would  still  be  abundantly  strong  to  make  a  dila 
tory  defensive  contest  with  the  combined  Confederate  forces 
in  the  East  till  Grant  could  reach  him.  The  controlling 
policy  of  this  campaign,  therefore,  was  activity  in  marching, 
with  great  caution  in  fighting  any  considerable  bodies  of 
the  enemy  until  a  new  base  were  established  and  rapid 
communication  opened  with  the  General-in-Chief. 

The  route  for  the  march  was  practically  determined  by 
the  topography  of  the  country,  which,  like  all  the  Southern 
seaboard,  is  low  and  sandy,  with  numerous  extensive  swamps 
and  deep  rivers  widely  swamp-bordered,  only  approachable 
by  long  causeways  on  which  the  narrow  head  of  a  column 
may  be  easily  and  long  resisted  by  a  small  force.  The 
livers  of  South  Carolina  are  nearly  parallel  to  the  Savannah, 
and,  co  avoid  frequent  and  difficult  crossings,  it  would  bq 
necessary  to  march  into  the  interior  upon  the  ridges  be- 


1G6  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

tween  two  or  more  streams,  till  the  tipper  and  narrowei 
waters  were  reached,  and  then  cross  to  the  watersheds 
which  lay  most  nearly  in  the  proper  direction.  Another 
important  object  was  to  cut  the  railway  system  of  South 
Carolina  in  a  way  similar  to  the  work  done  in  Georgia,  sc 
as  to  cripple  the  transportation  resources  of  the  country 
and  prevent  the  easy  concentration  of  Confederate  troops. 
An  examination  of  the  map  will  quickly  show  that  Sher 
man's  easiest  way  to  accomplish  his  purpose  was  to  march 
northwestward  between  the  Combahee  (or  Salkehatchie,  as 
its  upper  course  is  called)  and  the  Savannah,  as  if  going  to 
Augusta,  till  more  than  half  that  distance  is  made,  then  pass 
ing  the  Salkehatchies,  Big  and  Little,  strike  the  Charles 
ton  and  Augusta  Railway  near  its  crossing  of  the  Edisto 
River.  After  destroying  a  section  of  this  road,  the  south 
fork  of  the  Edisto  could  be  crossed,  and  no  other  deep  river 
would  be  met  till  the  Saluda  is  reached  at  the  capital  of  the 
State.  This  was  the  route  Sherman  adopted,  making  only 
the  deviation  by  which  he  reached  the  Columbia  branch  of 
the  railway  at  Orangeburg,  and  destroyed  a  portion  of  it  for 
twenty  miles  north  of  that  place. 

The  report  which  Generals  Taylor  and  Hardee  made  to  the 
Confederate  Government  at  the  beginning  of  December  has 
already  been  mentioned,  and  shows  that  the  principal  mili 
tary  officers  in  the  theatre  of  operations  made  a  good  fore 
cast  of  Sherman's  purposes  and  of  the  probable  results. 
Upon  the  news  of  the  great  disaster  to  Hood  at  Nashville, 
Beauregard  asked  to  be  relieved  of  the  care  of  South 
Carolina  and  Southern  Georgia,  so  that  he  might  give  his 
exclusive  attention  to  the  Army  of  Tennessee  and  the  Gulf 
States.  He  suggested  that  Augusta  naturally  belonged  to 
Hardec's  command,  and,  in  a  letter  of  final  instructions  to 
the  latter,  written  on  December  31st,  he  indicated  the  prob- 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  167 

able  necessity,  at  an  early  day,  of  evacuating  Charleston, 
and  uniting  all  the  available  troops  in  Hardee's  department 
to  oppose  Sherman's  advance.  He  directed  all  the  cotton  to 
be  removed,  and  if  any  remained  in  the  city  at  the  time  of 
evacuation,  it  should  be  burned.  This  was  in  accordance 
with  the  general  policy  of  the  Confederates  in  regard  to  the 
great  Southern  staple ;  that  of  the  National  armies,  in  like 
manner,  was  to  save  for  the  public  treasury  all  that  was  cap 
tured  in  seaports  or  in  territory  likely  to  remain  under  our 
control,  but  to  destroy  that  which,  by  the  passage  of  our 
armies,  could  fall  again  into  the  enemy's  hands.  It  often 
happened,  therefore,  that  both  armies  were  co-operating  in 
the  destruction  of  cotton  when  both  were  in  doubt  whether 
their  opponents  might  not  gain  something  by  its  preserva 
tion.  In  this  way  Wheeler  had  offered  to  spare  the  cotton 
in  the  Georgia  march  if  Sherman  would  give  assurances  as 
to  other  property  ;  but  Sherman  had  answered :  "  If  you 
don't  burn  it,  I  will." 

The  evacuation  of  Charleston  was  so  grave  a  question  of 
public  policy  for  the  Confederate  Government  that  it  could 
not  be  determined  as  a  purely  military  problem.  Beaure- 
gard  had  said,  in  the  letter  just  referred  to,  "  The  fall  of 
Charleston  would  necessarily  be  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Con 
federacy,  but  its  fall,  with  the  loss  of  its  brave  garrison, 
would  be  still  more  fatal  to  our  cause."  l  Knowing  the  opin 
ions  of  all  the  Confederate  generals,  as  we  now  do,  we  must 
conclude  that  the  Richmond  authorities  delayed  the  aban° 
donment  of  the  city  until  it  was  too  late  to  concentrate  in 
Sherman's  front.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  National 
commander  surprised  all  of  his  opponents  by  the  speed  at 
which  he  forced  his  way  northward,  and  that  Hardee  had 

1  Jones's  Chatham  Artillery,  p.  210. 


168  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

reported  the  Balkehatchie  swamps  to  be  entirely  impassably 
at  the  time  Sherman's  army  was  marching  through  them  at 
the  regular  pace  of  ten  or  twelve  miles  daily,  making  cor 
duroy  road  for  his  trains  nearly  every  mile  of  the  way.1 

Sherman  had  hoped  that  he  might  rely  upon  fair  weather 
after  the  middle  of  January,  and  had  planned  his  march  to 
begin  at  that  time.  The  season  disappointed  him,  for  it 
proved  to  be  a  winter  of  almost  continuous  rains.  The 
Savannah  rose  so  that,  at  Sister's  Ferry,  forty  miles  up  the 
river,  where  Slocum  laid  his  bridge,  the  stream  was  three 
miles  wide,  and  long  trestle  bridges  had  to  be  made  to  con 
nect  the  ends  of  the  pontoon  bridge  with  the  shores.  It 
was  also  almost  impossible  to  protect  the  structure  against 
the  force  of  the  current  and  of  the  drift-wood  brought  down 
by  the  freshet.  The  Union  Causeway,  on  which  one  or  two 
divisions  attempted  to  march  from  Savannah  to  join  General 
Howard  at  Pocotaligo,  was  under  water,  and  the  whole  re 
gion  was  more  like  a  great  lake  than  a  habitable  land.  On 
the  last  day  of  January,  Howard  had  concentrated  at  Poco 
taligo  the  right  wing,  except  Corse's  division  of  Logan's 
corps,  which  had  been  forced  by  the  high  water  to  join  Slo 
cum  and  cross  the  Savannah  at  his  bridge,  awaiting  an  op 
portunity  to  rejoin  the  corps  some  days  later.  This  concen 
tration  had  been  effected  with  but  little  fighting,  for  Hardee 
had  evidently  determined  to  take  up  the  line  of  the  Comba- 
hee  and  Salkehatchie,  and  to  make  no  serious  defence  west 
of  it.  Force's  division,  of  Blair's  corps,  was  sent  to  make  a 
demonstration  as  if  to  cross  the  Combahee  ten  miles  below 
the  railroad  bridge,  and  so  to  create  the  impression  that 


1  At  the  time  of  paroling  the  Confederate  Army  at  Greensboro,  N.  C.,  speaking 
of  this  part  of  Sherman's  march,  and  of  the  combination  of  physical  labor  with 
military  hardihood,  General  Johnston  said,  in  the  hearing  of  the  author,  that, 
when  he  heard  of  it,  "he  made  up  his  mind  that  there  had  been  no  such  army 
siuce  the  days  of  Julius  Ciesar." 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  169 

Charleston  was  aimed  at.  This  done,  the  order  was  given 
to  march  northward  on  the  route  already  described,  in  the 
expectation  that  Slocum  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  would  be 
over  Sister's  Ferry,  and  ready  to  join  the  movement  by  the 
time  Howard  should  be  opposite  that  crossing. 

It  happened  that  simultaneously  with  the  beginning  of 
the  new  campaign  by  Sherman,  a  conference  of  Confederate 
officers  was  held  near  Augusta  to  arrange  the  details  of  their 
own  plans.  Beauregard,  Hardee,  D.  H.  Hill,  and  G.  W. 
Smith  were  all  there,  and  a  careful  estimate  was  made  of 
the  effective  force  they  hoped  to  combine  against  Sherman. 
Of  18,000  men  under  Hardee's  command  in  South  Carolina, 
they  reckoned  14,500  as  available  for  concentration,  while 
the  heavy  artillery  and  some  other  troops  would  garrison 
Charleston  and  other  points  along  the  coast.  Beauregard 
promised  11,000  infantry  and  artillery  from  Hood's  army, 
though  only  half  of  these  were  then  present.  Wheeler's 
cavalry  was  6,700  strong,  besides  Butler's  division  which 
has  been  counted  among  Hardee's  men.  The  Georgia  mili 
tia  and  reserves  were  1,450.  A  total  of  33,450  was  the  force 
they  agreed  they  could  concentrate  by  February  4th  or 
5th,  though  about  three  thousand  from  the  Army  of  Ten 
nessee  were  not  expected  to  reach  Augusta  till  the  10th  or 
llth.1  It  was  not  expected  that  the  State  Militia  would 
serve  far  outside  their  own  States,  nor  does  there  seem  to 
have  been  any  hope  that  new  recruits  could  be  added  to 
their  army.  The  conscription  had  exhausted  itself,  and  the 
population  not  already  in  the  ranks  was  paralyzed  rather 
than  stimulated  to  exertion  by  the  presence  of  the  National 
army.  As  Hardee  afterward  expressed  it,  they  knew  that  it 
was  now  only  a  question  of  the  time  it  would  take  to  use  up 


1  See  Appendix  E,  II. 

VOL.  X— 8 


170  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  military   force   already   organized,    for  the   politicians 
could  not  face  the  thought  of  surrender.1 

The  outlook  was  surely  far  from  encouraging,  but  Beau- 
regard,  as  the  superior  officer  present,  though  sick  in  body 
and  in  mind,  was  forced  to  assume  command,  and  make 
such  dispositions  as  he  could  to  obstruct  Sherman's  march. 
But  while  their  somewhat  tardy  consultation  was  going  on, 
the  opportunity  for  an  effectual  concentration,  even  of  the 
little  force  at  their  disposal,  had  passed,  for  Sherman  was 
in  motion.  On  February  7th,  General  Howard  was  upon  the 
line  of  the  Charleston  and  Augusta  Eailway  at  Midway,  and 
on  the  12th  he  had  crossed  both  forks  of  the  Edisto  and 
had  broken  the  Columbia  branch  of  the  road  at  Orangeburg. 
Butler's  division  of  cavalry,  a  light  battery  or  two,  and 
some  small  detachments  of  infantiy  were  all  of  Hardee's 
that  succeeded  in  getting  in  front  of  Sherman.  These 
joined  Wheeler,  and  did  what  they  could  to  burn  bridges 
and  hold  the  long  causeways  through  the  swamps ;  but  the 
leading  division  of  a  column  was  usually  strong  enough  to 
outflank  them  and  drive  them  off  with  little  loss,  so  that  the 
laying  of  the  corduroy  road  never  ceased,  and  Sherman's 
twenty-five  hundred  wagons  rolled  on  unchecked.  Leaving 
the  Georgia  militia  to  garrison  Augusta,  where  they  were 
useless,  Beauregard  could  only  lead  the  remnants  of  the 
Army  of  Tennessee  by  the  country  roads  and  by  a  long 
detour  through  Newberry  and  Chester  to  Charlotte  in  North 
Carolina,  while  Hardee  at  Charleston  was  awaiting  the  in 
evitable  day  when  he  must  abandon  Sumter  and  the  cradle 
of  the  rebellion,  to  make  haste  by  his  only  remaining  rail 
way  through  Florence  to  Cheraw,  that  the  concentration 
talked  of  at  Augusta  might  be  finally  made  near  the  capita] 

1  This  was  said  by  Hardee  to  the  author  after  the  close  of  hostilities. 


SAVANNAH   TO   COLUMBIA.  171 

of  North  Carolina.  General  Wade  Hampton  had  been  sent 
from  Virginia  to  command  the  cavahy  in  South  Carolina,  in 
the  hope  that  his  great  personal  influence  would  rouse  the 
people  from  their  despair,  and  do  what  proclamations  and 
levies-in-mass  had  so  signally  failed  to  do  in  Georgia;  but 
the  only  result  was  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  somewhat  bit 
ter  dispute  whether  he  or  the  National  soldiery  caused  the 
burning  of  Columbia,  the  beautiful  city  of  his  home. 

An  itinerary  of  the  march  through  South  Carolina  would 
furnish  interesting  daily  illustrations  of  the  expedients  by 
which  an  army  of  expert  woodsmen  can  overcome  difficul 
ties  in  logistics  commonly  thought  insurmountable.  In  a 
country  where  many  of  the  rivers  are  known  by  the  name  of 
swamps,  continuous  rains  so  raised  the  waters  that  scarce  a 
stream  was  passed  without  deploying  the  advanced  guard 
through  water  waist  deep,  and  sometimes  it  reached  even  to 
their  armpits,  forcing  them  to  carry  the  cartridge-box  at 
the  neck  and  the  musket  on  the  head.  The  fitness  of  the 
name  swamp  for  even  the  rivers  will  be  felt  when  it  is  re 
membered  that  at  the  crossing  of  the  Salkehatchie  at  Beau 
fort's  Bridge  the  stream  had  fifteen  separate  channels,  each 
of  which  had  to  be  bridged  before  Logan's  corps  could  get 
over.  Whoever  will  consider  the  effect  of  dragging  the 
artillery  and  hundreds  of  loaded  army  wagons  over  mud 
roads  in  such  a  country,  and  of  the  infinite  labor  required 
to  pave  these  roads  with  logs,  levelling  the  surface  with 
smaller  poles  in  the  hollows  between,  adding  to  the  struc 
ture  as  the  mass  sinks  in  the  ooze,  and  continuing  this  till 
the  miles  of  train  have  pulled  through,  will  get  a  constantly 
growing  idea  of  the  work,  and  a  steadily  increasing  won 
der  that  it  was  done  at  all.  Certainly  he  will  not  wonder 
that  the  Confederate  generals  believed  they  could  count 
upon  Sherman's  remaining  at  his  base  till  the  rains  ceased 


172  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

and  the  waters  subsided.  If  the  march  through  Georgia  re« 
mained  pictured  in  the  soldiers'  memories  as  a  bright,  frol 
icsome  raid,  that  through  South  Carolina  was  even  more 
indelibly  printed  as  a  stubborn  wrestle  with  the  elements, 
in  which  the  murky  and  dripping  skies  were  so  mingled 
with  the  earth  and  water  below  as  to  make  the  whole  a  fit 
type  of  "  chaos  come  again  ; "  but  where,  also,  the  indomitable 
will  of  sixty  thousand  men,  concentrated  to  do  the  inflexible 
purpose  of  one,  bridged  this  cliaos  for  hundreds  of  miles, 
and,  out-laboring  Hercules,  won  a  physical  triumph  that 
must  always  remain  a  marvel.  And  mile  by  mile  as  they 
advanced,  the  General  and  his  men  were  equally  clear  in  the 
conviction  he  had  expressed  to  Grant  before  starting,  that 
every  step  they  took  was  "as  much  a  direct  attack  upon 
Lee's  army  as  though  I  were  operating  within  the  sound  of 
his  artillery." 

Sixteen  days'  marching,  working,  and  skirmishing  brought 
the  army  to  the  Saluda  River,  just  above  Columbia.  The 
Augusta  Railway  had  been  destroyed  from  the  Edisto  nearly 
to  Aiken,  some  fifty  miles,  The  Columbia  branch  had  been 
ruined  from  a  point  five  or  six  miles  south  of  Orangeburg 
to  the  Congaree  River,  about  thirty  miles.  These  great 
gaps  in  the  interior  lines  of  communication  effectually  sepa 
rated  the  Confederate  forces,  and  were  by  far  too  great  to  be 
repaired  during  the  campaign.  A  few  hours  were  enough 
to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Saluda  and  Broad  Rivers, 
which  unite  just  above  Columbia  to  form  the  Congaree. 
This  was  easier  than  to  cross  the  latter  stream,  for  it  is  bor 
dered  by  the  wide  Caw-caw  swamp,  and  the  approaches 
were  very  difficult. 

On  the  approach  of  the  National  troops,  the  Confederate 
cavalry  burned  the  bridges,  sprinkling  them  first  with  resin 
and  tar,  so  as  to  make  a  quick  fire :  indeed,  it  was  so  quick 


SAVANNAH  TO  COLUMBIA.  173 

that  some  of  the  rear  guard  could  not  pass,  and  had  to  gallop 
oft'  by  a  long  circuit  to  escape  capture.  In  Columbia  they 
burned  the  two  railway  stations  and  depot  buildings,  one  at 
the  south  and  the  other  at  the  north  of  the  place.  Long, 
narrow  piles  of  cotton  bales  were  made  along  the  middle  of 
the  streets,  and  these  were  cut  open  and  fired.  Some  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  acting  upon  the  rule  they  had  often 
avowed,  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to  leave  what  they  wanted 
for  an  enemy  to  take,  broke  open  the  shops  and  pillaged  them.1 
Before  entering  the  city,  Sherman  issued  orders  that  pri 
vate  dwellings  and  property,  colleges,  libraries,  charitable 
institutions,  and  the  like,  should  be  respected,  but  that  the 
arsenals,  foundries,  machine-shops,  and  public  workshops 
should  be  destroyed.  The  order  was  in  substance  the  same 
as  he  had  issued  at  Savannah,  and  was  appropriate  both 
because  Columbia  was  the  first  city  of  any  considerable  size 
the  army  occupied  after  leaving  the  coast,  and  because  the 
long  continuance  of  a  march  in  which  the  troops  were  living 
on  the  country  had  gradually  increased  the  number  of  strag 
glers,  and  relaxed  the  bands  of  discipline  in  portions  of  the 
command.  General  C.  R.  Woods's  division  of  Logan's  corps 
entered  the  city,  Stone's  brigade  being  the  advanced  guard. 
The  other  troops  passed  on  and  encamped  beyond.  A 
strong  wind  from  the  northwest  was  blowing,,  scattering  the 
loose  cotton  about,  and  Colonel  Stone  directed  his  men  to 
assist  the  citizens,  who,  with  a  wretched  hand-engine  and 
buckets,  were  trying  to  quench  the  fire  in  the  cotton,  which 
the  wind  was  making  dangerous.  Sherman  himself  entered 
the  town  soon  after  the  advanced  guard,  with  Howard  and 
Logan.  The  mayor  presented  himself,  and  was  informed  of 
the  orders  for  the  protection  of  private  property.  Some 

1  Testimony  before  Mixed  Commission  on  American  and  British  Claims.     See 
also  Appendix  C. 


174  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

foolish  persons,  thinking  to  please  the  soldiers,  brought  out 
whiskey  by  pailfuls,  and  before  the  superior  officers  were 
aware  of  it,  a  good  many  men  of  Stone's  brigade  were  in 
toxicated.  Woods  immediately  ordered  the  brigade  re 
lieved,  and  that  of  W.  B.  Woods  l  was  substituted  as  provost 
guard.  All  the  whiskey  that  could  be  found  was  emptied 
on  the  ground,  and  the  intoxicated  men  were  put  in  arrest. 
The  wind  continued  to  rise,  and  before  night  was  blowing  a 
gale.  The  cotton  bales,  tenacious  of  fire,  were  smoldering. 
It  would  seem  that  a  flake  from  one  of  these  set  fire  to  a 
shed  or  building  near  by,  and  the  flames  soon  spread. 
Sherman  himself  gave  prompt  orders  to  do  all  that  could  be 
done  to  conquer  the  fire,  and  the  whole  division  was  put  at 
work  to  quench  or  to  girdle  it.  The  houses  of  the  city  were 
built  of  pine  wood,  and,  from  the  place  of  starting,  the  south 
eastern  part  of  the  town  was  soon  a  roaring,  leaping  mass  of 
flame,  utterly  beyond  control.  But  there  were  not  wanting 
intoxicated  men  among  the  soldiers,  and  others  equally  ex 
cited  by  the  tales  of  horror  which  the  escaped  military  pris 
oners  had  to  tell  of  their  cruel  sufferings  in  a  prison  pen 
near  the  city,  where  they  had  been  exposed  to  the  weather 
and  forced  to  burrow  in  the  ground  for  their  only  shelter. 
These  seized  upon  the  idea  that  the  destruction  of  the  capi 
tal  of  South  Carolina  was  a  fit  retribution  upon  the  State  for 
its  leadership  in  the  great  rebellion,  and  carried  the  fire  to 
windward  of  its  starting-place  to  make  the  destruction  more 
complete.  Drunken  soldiers,  camp  followers,  and  escaped 
convicts  from  the  penitentiary,  made  a  dangerous  mob,  and 
the  fire  which  began  by  accident  was  becoming  the  occasion 
of  mischiefs  of  other  kinds.  Noticing  this,  Howard  ordered 
a  brigade  from  Hazen's  division  to  be  deployed  as  skirmish- 

1  Now  Justice  of  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court. 


SAVANNAH   TO   COLUMBIA.  175 

ers,  to  sweep  through  the  town,  arresting  all  disorderly  per 
sons,  citizens  and  soldiers,  white  and  black,  and  to  hold 
them  under  guard.  After  midnight  the  gale  subsided  and 
the  progress  of  the  fire  was  stopped,  but  the  greater  part  of 
the  city  was  in  ashes. 

Sherman  was  sincerely  grieved  at  the  misfortune  of  Co 
lumbia,  and  did  what  he  could  to  lighten  the  trouble  of  the 
citizens.  He  gave  them  a  large  herd  of  cattle  and  other 
provisions  to  supply  their  immediate  wants,  and  directed 
the  issue  of  these  to  be  made  by  the  city  authorities  to  the 
destitute.  No  one  was  more  unbending  than  he  in  the 
destruction  of  whatever  could  be  of  military  assistance  to 
the  enemy ;  but  no  one  drew  more  clearly  the  line  between 
the  destruction  which  was  useful  to  a  cause  and  that  which 
would  merely  make  private  suffering  and  irritation.  The 
Confederate  authorities  made  haste  to  proclaim  the  burning 
of  Columbia  as  a  deliberately  planned  and  ordered  piece  of 
incendiarism  ;  but  no  event  was  ever  more  fully  investigated, 
and  no  conclusion  can  well  be  more  solidly  established  by 
testimony  than  that  which  is  given  in  the  foregoing  narra 
tive  of  the  occurrence.  Orangeburg  had  been  partly  burned 
by  fire,  set  by  an  exasperated  resident  trader  in  revenge  for 
the  destruction  of  his  cotton  by  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and 
this  too  was  loudly  charged  to  the  National  army.  An  even- 
handed  justice  will,  however,  admit  that  the  stragglers  from 
the  army  were  increasing  in  number  and  in  familiarity  with 
pillage,  through  the  natural  education  of  such  a  war,  and 
that  there  were  some  officers  among  the  infantry  who  were 
not  unwilling  to  compete  with  Kilpatrick  in  his  effort  to 
leave  the  route  marked  by  "  chimney-stacks  without  houses, 
and  the  country  desolate." l  Some  careless  expressions  of 

1  In  the  "  Ninety -second  Illinois,"  commonly  attributed  to  General  Atkins  who 
was  one  of  Kilpatrick's  brigade  commanders  (p.  211),  it  is  said  that  ou  the  eveiiiutf 


176  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

tSherman,  in  a  letter  to  General  Halleck,  have  been  seized 
upon  as  evidence  of  his  approval  of  lawless  pillaging ;  but 
the  consistent  character  of  his  commands  to  his  subordinates 
from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  and  the  treatment  of 
all  the  cities  on  the  line  of  his  march  from  Atlanta  to  Savan 
nah,  and  from  Savannah  to  Raleigh,  show  that  his  policy 
was  one  of  mildness  to  the  individual  citizen  and  of  destruc 
tion  only  to  the  public  resources  of  the  country.  The  city 
of  Atlanta  is  to-day  proof,  to  him  who  cares  to  see,  that  the 
far-echoed  assertions  that  it  was  destroyed  are  consistent 
with  the  continued  existence  of  its  original  buildings,  except 
the  depots,  machine-shops,  and  military  factories,  with  a 
very  few  houses  that  were  immediately  contiguous  to  them. 
War  cannot  be  other  than  a  fearful  scourge,  but  the  asser 
tion  that  the  late  civil  war  surpassed  others  of  modern  times 
in  wanton  destruction  or  cruelty  is  the  reverse  of  true. 

In  Columbia  there  were  factories  of  powder  and  fixed 
ammunition,  an  arsenal,  armory  and  machine-shops,  and  an 
establishment  for  the  engraving  and  manufacture  of  Con 
federate  paper  money.  All  these  were  destroyed  on  the  18th 
and  19th  of  February,  for  their  detached  positions  about  the 
town  had  saved  them  from  the  general  conflagration.  On 
the  20th  the  army  resumed  its  march,  leaving  behind  it  a 
community  overwhelmed  with  its  losses,  almost  stupefied  by 
the  terrible  change  a  few  days  had  wrought,  and  only  saved 
from  starvation  by  the  store  of  food  which  the  National  com= 
mander  took  from  his  army  supplies  to  give  them. 

of  January  27th,  near  Savannah,  "  General  Kilpatrick  gave  a  party  to  the  officers 
of  his  command,  and  in  his  speech  said,  'In  after  years,  when  travellers  passing 
through  South  Carolina  shall  see  chimney-stacks  without  houses,  and  the  country 
desolate,  and  shall  ask,  Who  did  this  ?  some  Yankee  will  answer,  Kilpatrick'e 
cavalry.1"  The  same  narrative,  pp.  212,  215,  seems  to  claim  for  the  cavalry  the 
burning  of  t^e  villages  of  Barnwcll,  Lexington,  and  Monticello,  beside  the  de 
struction  of  plantation  houses. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.—  REUNION"  OF  THE 
GRAND  ARMY. 

THE  military  operations  in  the  first  part  of  the  campaign 
had  not  cost  many  lives,  though  the  skirmishing  had  been 
incessant.  Occasionally  a  determined  stand  would  be  made, 
as  at  Rivers'  Bridge  on  the  Salkehatchie,  where,  in  a  can 
nonade  upon  our  advanced  guard,  Colonel  Wager  Swayne,  an 
esteemed  and  valuable  officer,  lost  a  leg.  More  commonly, 
the  trees  and  thickets  made  safe  cover  for  the  troops,  and 
detachments  sent  a  mile  or  two  above  or  below  would  gain 
the  farther  bank  of  the  stream  by  ferrying  men  over  in  pon 
toons,  and  the  enemy  would  retreat  as  soon  as  this  was  done. 
After  passing  Columbia  the  face  of  the  country  changed. 
It  became  more  rolling,  the  streams  were  narrower  and  less 
difficult,  the  plantations  were  more  numerous  and  richer, 
and  the  foragers  collected  more  abundant  supplies.  The 
Fifteenth  Corps  (Logan's)  returned  upon  the  line  of  the 
Charleston  Railway  to  Cedar  Creek,  destroying  about  twenty 
miles  of  the  road  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Congaree,  in  addi 
tion  to  the  injury  already  done  it  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river.  Howard  then  turned  this  column  northward  to  over 
take  Blair's  (Seventeenth)  Corps,  which  had  marched  along 
the  railroad  toward  Charlotte,  and  had  torn  it  up  almost  to 
Winnsboro,  forty  miles  from  Columbia,,  The  only  other 
railway  running  out  of  Columbia  was  a  branch  road  going 
8* 


178  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

westward  to  Abbeville,  and  this  was  committed  to  General 
Slocum  witli  the  left  wing  and  the  cavalry,  who  ruined  it  for 
a  distance  about  equal  to  that  destroyed  by  Blair  on  the 
Charlotte  road.  This  part  of  the  army  then  turned  toward 
Winnsboro,  where  they  supplemented  Blair's  work  by  tear 
ing  up  ten  or  fifteen  miles  more  of  the  Northern  line.  While 
Sherman's  chief  purpose  in  making  this  strong  demonstra 
tion  northward  was  to  make  thorough  work  of  the  interrup 
tion  of  the  railway  communications  between  Beauregard's 
and  Hardee's  forces,  it  also  had  the  effect  of  creating  the  im 
pression  that  he  would  continue  his  march  on  Charlotte,  and 
delayed  any  concentration  of  the  enemy  toward  Raleigh. 
The  National  columns  were  now  turned  sharply  to  the  east, 
crossing  the  Catawba  River  and  making  for  the  Great  Pedee 
at  Cheraw,  while  the  cavalry  kept  well  out  on  the  left  flank. 
The  extreme  right  visited  Camden,  and  while  moving  be 
tween  the  two  rivers,  the  flanks  of  the  army  were  often  forty 
miles  apart.  There  was  scarcely  any  cessation  of  rain,  and 
the  marching  was  hardly  less  laborious  than  before,  though 
the  swamps  were  not  so  continuous. 

As  soon  as  Hardee  knew  of  Sherman's  occupation  of  Co 
lumbia,  he  evacuated  Charleston,  moving  his  troops  by  rail 
to  Cheraw,  where  great  quantities  of  stores,  both  public  and 
private,  had  been  sent.  The  cotton,  which  was  stored  in 
the  city  in  large  quantities,  he  burned  in  the  warehouses,  and 
the  fire,  spreading,  did  a  good  deal  of  mischief  to  the  city. 
A  great  store  of  powder  and  ammunition  blew  up,  killing 
two  hundred  of  the  citizens  who  were  crowding  about  the 
conflagration.1  Admiral  Dahlgren  and  General  Foster  had 
kept  up  active  demonstrations  along  the  coast,  and  occupied 
the  city  on  February  18th,  the  day  after  its  evacuation. 

1  Follurd's  Southern  Hist,  of  the  War,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  150,  151. 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  179 

Hardee  had  constructed  strong  works  at  the  Pedee,  behind 
Cheraw,  but  they  met  the  usual  fate  of  fortifications  made  by 
a  very  inferior  force.  The  advance  of  Slocum.  with  the  left 
wing  turned  the  position,  and  the  right  wing,  under  Howard 
entered  Cheraw  on  March  3d,  capturing  28  pieces  of  artillery, 
6,000  stands  of  small  arms,  and  an  immense  quantity  of  am 
munition  and  stores.1  Hampton,  with  the  Confederate  cav 
alry,  at  first  moved  off  toward  Charlotte,  but  making  a  wide 
circuit,  he  joined  Hardee  again  before  the  latter  crossed  the 
Cape  Fear  River  at  Fayetteville,  on  the  llth,  retreating  before 
Slocum,  who  entered  that  place  with  the  Fourteenth  (Davis's) 
Corps  on  that  day.  Hampton  appears  to  have  been  deceived 
regarding  Sherman's  intended  line  of  march,  and  to  have 
thought  he  was  aiming  at  Charlotte,  where  Hood's  Army  of 
Tennessee  was  assembling;  and  in  the  effort  to  return  to 
his  place  in  front  of  the  National  army,  he  unexpectedly  ran 
into  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  in  the  night  of  the  9th,  not  far 
from  a  hamlet  called  Solemn  Grove.  Kilpatrick  had  assigned 
to  his  three  brigades  halting  places  at  the  corners  of  a  tri 
angle,  where  they  would  hold  different  cross-roads  and  mu 
tually  protect  each  other,  but  Atkins  and  his  brigade  were 
anticipated  by  the  Confederates  at  his  intended  position,  and 
notwithstanding  the  most  industrious  efforts  to  reach  Spen 
cer's  brigade  by  a  circuit  in  the  night,  he  was  unable  to  do  so 
in  time  to  warn  it  of  an  attack  by  Hampton  from  the  side  sup 
posed  to  be  covered.  Kilpatrick  was  with  Spencer,  and 
Hampton  having,  as  he  thought,  made  dispositions  of  his 
force  to  assure  success,  charged,  with  Butler's  division,  upon 
the  camp  a  little  before  daybreak.  It  was  a  complete  sur 
prise.  A  house  in  which  Kilpatrick  and  Spencer  were  sleep 
ing  was  surrounded;  a  battery  near  headquarters  was  in  the 

1  Howard's  official  report. 


180  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

enemy's  hands,  and  the  brigade  was  routed,  and  fled  into 
the  swanap.  Kilpatrick  himself  managed  to  escape  from  the 
house  in  the  darkness,  half -dressed  and  unarmed ;  but  tha 
hardy  troopers  were  used  to  rough-and-tumble  fighting,  and 
began  to  rally  as  soon  as  they  reached  the  protection  of  the 
cypress  trees.  Kilpatrick  was  soon  among  them,  and,  after 
a  little  organizing  under  cover  of  the  train  guard  and  of  volun 
teer  skirmishers,  they  charged  back  upon  Hampton,  whose 
men  were  too  eager  for  plunder,  retook  the  cannon,  with 
which  they  fired  upon  their  adversaries,  and  turned  the  rout 
into  a  victory.  Spencer  and  the  staff  officers  had  taken 
refuge  in  the  upper  part  of  the  house,  where  they  had  barri 
caded  themselves,  and  were  released  by  the  unexpected  suc 
cess  of  their  friends.  Atkins,  guided  by  the  sound  of  the 
'  combat,  came  up  as  the  affair  ended,  and  Jordan's  brigade 
arrived  soon  after,  as  did  also  a  brigade  of  infantry  sent 
from  Slocum's  column  at  the  noise  of  the  fight.  With  all 
their  cool  courage,  the  routed  camp  would  hardly  have  been 
able  to  reform  but  for  the  fact  that  four  hundred  dismounted 
men  had  been  armed  with  rifled  muskets  and  bayonets  at 
Savannah,  and  these,  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stough,  of  the  Ninth  Ohio  Cavalry,  were  with  the  train,  a 
little  way  from  the  general  camp.  At  the  noise  of  the  attack 
they  formed,  making  a  line  to  which  the  rest  rallied,  and  ad 
vanced.  When  the  gleaming  bayonets  were  seen  in  the 
gray  light,  the  cry  was  raised  that  the  infantry  were  upon 
them,  and  the  disconcerted  Confederates  were  thrown  into 
confusion.  Then  came  the  general  rally  of  Kilpatrick's  men, 
and  the  tables  were  completely  turned.  The  affair  had  no 
special  importance,  but  is  a  fair  type  of  the  cavalry  combats 
which  enlivened  the  laborious  march.  Hampton  released 
a  number  of  prisoners,  and  claimed  to  have  captured  five 
hundred,  though  Ki'patrick  only  reported  two  hundred 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  181 

missing.  The  Confederates  suffered  severely,  "  especially 
in  officers,"  Johnston  says,  but  the  exact  number  of  casual 
ties  is  not  given.  Over  a  hundred  killed,  and  many  wounded, 
were  left  upon  the  field,  arguing  a  loss  probably  greater  than 
that  which  was  inflicted  upon  Kilpatrick.1 

At  Fayetteville  Sherman  destroyed  the  Arsenal,  originally 
built  by  the  National  Government,  but  which  had  been 
greatly  enlarged  by  the  Confederates  and  filled  with  ma 
chinery  for  the  manufacture  of  weapons,  brought  from  Har 
per's  Ferry  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Here,  also,  he 
heard  the  whistle  of  a  steamboat  which  opened  communi 
cation  by  the  Cape  Fear  River  with  Wilmington,  and  got 
news  of  the  progress  Schofield  was  making  on  both  his  lines. 
He  had  thought  of  the  possibility  that  he  might  have  to 
move  down  the  right  bank  of  the  river  to  make  his  intended 
junction,  and  establish  a  new  base  ;  but  the  retreat  of  Hardee 
northward,  and  the  certainty  that  Kinston  was  soon  to  be  in 
our  possession,  now  removed  the  last  doubt  of  a  successful 
concentration  at  Goldsboro.  He  did  not  know  of  Bragg's 
effort  to  overwhelm  the  corps  operating  from  Newbern,  but 
he  believed  that  his  own  advance  must  now  bring  all  the  de 
tachments  of  the  enemy  together  to  resist  his  progress.  He 
determined,  therefore,  to  march  the  left  wiDg  up  the  river 
by  the  east  bank  for  some  distance,  as  if  aiming  at  Raleigh, 
and  then  to  move  rapidly  to  the  right  and  meet  Schofield  at 
Goldsboro. 

The  news  of  the  assignment  of  General  Johnston  to  the 
command  of  all  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  Carolinas 
reached  Sherman  at  Cheraw  on  March  3d,  though  the  ap 
pointment  had  been  made  on  February  23d,  when  the  news 
of  the  presence  of  the  National  army  at  Winnsboro  had  pro- 


General  Atkins  in  Ninety-second  Illinois,  p.  228. 


182  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

duced  in  Eichmond  the  belief  that  Sherman  meant  to  follow 
the  line  of  the  railway  through  Charlotte.  Every  effort  had 
been  made  by  the  Confederate  Government  to  accumulate 
army  supplies  along  that,  its  only  remaining  available  line, 
and  nearly  four  months'  food  and  clothing  for  Lee's  army 
was  collected  in  its  depots.  The  Confederate  Congress  had, 
in  the  emergency,  made  Lee  General-in-Chief  of  all  their 
armies,  and  he  had  called  Johnston  from  the  retirement  in 
which  he  had  lived  since  the  preceding  July  to  assume  the 
direction  of  the  forces  which  were  trying  to  prevent  Sher 
man  from  closing  in  upon  the  rear  of  Eichmond.  Mr. 
Davis,  the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  had  openly  declared 
that  he  would  never  give  Johnston  a  military  command 
again,  but  the  responsibility  was  now  with  Lee,  and  Mr. 
Davis  could  only  acquiesce. 

It  is  not  overstating  the  truth  to  say  that  the  news  of 
Johnston's  assignment  was  received  throughout  Sherman's 
army  as  a  note  of  warning  to  be  prepared  for  more  stubborn 
and  well-planned  resistance  to  their  progress.  Officers  and 
men  were  agreed  in  the  opinion  that  the  Eichmond  Govern 
ment  had  at  last  taken  a  wise  step,  though  they  were  quite 
sure  it  was  too  late  for  even  Johnston  to  save  the  campaign. 
Sherman's  estimate  of  the  forces  Johnston  might  concentrate 
to  meet  him  was  about  forty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms ; 
and  reckoning  those  under  Bragg  in  North  Carolina  at  ten 
thousand,  his  figures  will  be  found  to  be  almost  exactly  those 
which  the  Confederate  generals  had  set  down  in  their  con 
ference  near  Augusta  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.1 
But  Hardee's  eighteen  thousand  had  dwindled  rapidly  since 
the  evacuation  of  Charleston,  the  militia  of  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia  had  gone  home,  the  cavalry  had  suffered  con- 

1  See  Appendix  E,  II. 


AVERASBORO   AXD  BENTONVILLE.  183 

siderable  losses,  the  remnants  of  Hood's  army  had  grown 
less  as  they  travelled  northward,  and  when  Beauregard  sub 
mitted  his  estimates  to  Johnston  at  Charlotte  in  the  begin 
ning  of  March,  about  twenty-six  thousand  infantry  and  artil 
lery,  and  about  six  thousand  cavalry,  was  the  extent  of  the 
army  on  which  they  could  depend. 

Johnston  soon  satisfied  himself  that  Sherman's  course  lay 
toward  Fayetteville,  and  leaving  Beauregard  with  some 
force  at  Charlotte  to  protect  the  railway  to  Danville,  went 
in  person  to  Fayetteville  to  meet  Hardee  and  Hampton,  giv 
ing  orders  for  the  concentration  of  other  troops  near  Smith- 
field.  It  was  at  this  time  that  he  authorized  Bragg  to  take 
the  troops  of  Stewart's  and  Lee's  corps  to  unite  with  Hoke's 
and  make  the  movement  against  Schofield  near  Kinston, 
calculating  that  there  would  still  be  time  to  reassemble  in 
front  of  Sherman  before  he  could  reach  the  Neuse  River. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  better  his  plan,  but  his  numbers 
were  not  enough  to  make  either  part  of  it  successful,  though 
he  did  everything  that  courage  and  activity  could  do. 

Sherman  had  waited  at  Fayetteville  a  day  or  two,  in  the 
hope  of  receiving  from  Wilmington  some  shoes  and  clothing 
of  which  his  men  were  almost  destitute,  but  110  supply  of 
these  could  yet  be  got,  and  he  pushed  forward.  Slocum's 
columns  with  the  cavalry  crowded  Hardee  closely  on  the 
15th  of  March,  capturing  Colonel  Ehett,  the  commander 
of  the  brigade  acting  as  rear  guard.  They  approached 
Averasboro  on  the  16th,  where  Hardes  had  intrenched  on  a 
narrow  ridge  between  the  river  and  swamp,  and  Slocum 
ordered  Jackson's  and  Ward's  divisions  of  the  Twentieth 
(Williams')  Corps  to  be  deployed,  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  being 
on  the  right  flank.  Sherman,  being  present,  directed  a 
brigade  of  infantry  to  be  sent  well  to  the  left  to  attack  the 
line  in  flank.  This  was  vigorously  done  by  Case's  brigade, 


184:  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

and  Taliaferro's  division  was  rented,  falling  back  in  haste 
upon  a  line  about  a  third  of  a  mile  in  rear,  where  Hardee 
had  intrenched  McLaws'  division.  The  chief  weight  of  the 
stroke  fell  upon  Rhett's  brigade,  which  had  lost  its  com 
mander  the  day  before,  and  it  fled  with  a  loss  of  over  a  hun 
dred  left  dead  upon  the  field,  and  more  than  two  hundred  cap 
tured.  A  battery  of  three  field  guns  was  also  among  the 
trophies  of  this  brilliant  affair.  Williams's  divisions  pressed 
on,  found  Hardee's  lines  again  intrenched,  and  a  warm  en 
gagement  began;  but  darkness  put  an  end  to  the  day's 
operations.  Hardee  retreated  during  the  night,  and  Sher 
man's  movements  were  resumed  in  the  morning.1  The  Na 
tional  loss  in  the  affair  at  Averasboro  had  been  seventy-seven 
killed  and  nearly  five  hundred  wounded.  Hardee  admitted 
a  loss  of  about  the  same  number.  Seriously  encumbered 
with  his  own  injured  men,  Sherman  directed  the  Confederate 
wounded,  who  numbered  about  seventy,  to  be  left  in  a  field 
hospital  in  charge  of  an  officer  and  some  of  their  own  men, 
after  proper  surgical  attention  had  been  given  them. 

The  two  or  three  days  that  followed  are  remembered  by 
the  officers  and  men  of  that  army  as  among  the  most  weari 
some  of  the  campaign.  Incessant  rain,  deep  mud,  roads 
always  wretched  but  now  nearly  impassable,  seemed  to  cap 
the  climax  of  tedious,  laborious  marching.  Sherman  had 
changed  his  order  of  movement  at  Fayetteville,  directing 
four  divisions  of  each  wing  to  march  light,  and  the  remain 
der  to  accompany  the  trains  and  assist  them  forward.  By 
this  arrangement  he  reckoned  upon  having  a  force  ready  for 
battle  on  either  flank,  large  enough  to  hold  at  bay  the 
whole  of  Johnston's  army  if  the  Confederate  commander 

1  Khetfs  brigade,  which  suffered  so  severely,  was  an  organization  of  heavy  ar 
tillery  lit  Charleston,  and  had  been  the  garrison  of  Sumter.  It  took  the  field  as 
infantry  when  Charleston  was  evacuated. 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  185 

should  suddenly  assail  one  wing.  In  spite  of  every  exer 
tion,  however,  the  columns  were  a  good  deal  drawn  out,  and 
long  intervals  separated  the  divisions.  On  the  morning  of 
the  19th,  two  divisions  of  Davis's  corps  (Fourteenth)  were 
about  eight  miles  from  Bentonville,  a  hamlet  on  the  south 
east  side  of  Mill  Creek,  a  small  tributary  of  Neuse  River, 
where  the  north  and  south  road  from  Smithfield  to  Clinton 
crosses  one  leading  from  Averasboro  to  Goldsboro.  Two 
divisions  of  Williams's  (Twentieth)  corps  were  eight  miles 
farther  at  the  rear.  Kilpatrick  with  his  cavalry  had  fol 
lowed  the  retreat  of  Hardee  to  the  north,  and  was  at  the  left 
and  rear  of  Williams,  making  his  way  back  to  the  principal 
column.  Howard  with  the  four  light  divisions  of  the  right 
wing  was  upon  parallel  roads  to  the  southward,  if  they  can 
be  called  parallel  when  they  were  sometimes  six  miles  apart 
and  sometimes  ten  or  twelve.  The  trains  with  their  guards 
were  toiling  along,  somewhat  farther  back,  taking  inter 
mediate  roads  when  they  could. 

Sherman  reasoned  that  Hardee's  affair  at  Averasboro  had 
been  made  to  delay  his  approach  to  Raleigh  till  Johnston 
could  unite  his  forces  in  front  of  the  State  capital,  and  the 
fact  that  battle  was  given  with  only  Hardee's  command 
seemed  to  prove  that  his  adversary  would  be  in  no  condi 
tion  to  venture  south  of  the  Neuse  River  before  his  own 
concentration  at  Goldsboro  could  be  made.  He  did  not 
know,  however,  that  Johnston  had  just  struck  fiercely  at 
the  column  advancing  from  Newbern,  and  that  Hardee's 
stand  at  Averasboro  had  been  made  to  give  time  to  get 
Bragg's  forces  back  and  deliver  him  a  blow  before  his 
junction  with  Schofield  could  be  made.  The  Confederate 
commander,  from  his  central  position,  was  in  telegraphic 
communication  with  his  subordinates,  and  knew  better 
than  Sherman  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  what  progress 


186  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

Schofield's  two  columns  were  making.  He  could  therefore 
make  his  combinations  knowingly,  while  the  National  com 
mander  was  still  left  to  conjecture.  If  Johnston  meant  to 
do  anything  more  than  make  a  purely  defensive  retreat,  it 
was  essential  to  him  to  gather  his  forces  and  strike  quick  ; 
twenty-four  hours  later  would  have  been  too  late,  for  Slo- 
cuna  and  Howard  would  have  been  together  at  Cox's  bridge, 
and  Terry  would  have  joined  with  the  two  fresh  divisions. 
Johnston  was  now  giving  good  proof  that  if  he  could  not 
be  made  to  fight  unless  he  chose,  he  could  assume  the 
most  active  offensive  when  it  was  necessary.  He  knew  on 
the  17th  that  Sherman  had  turned  off  from  Averasboro 
toward  Goldsboro,  and  that  Hardee  was  resting  at  Eleva 
tion  about  two-thirds  of  the  way  on  the  road  from  his  late 
battle-ground  to  Smithfield.  Bragg  had  reached  the  last- 
named  place,  and  the  information  from  Hampton  was  that 
Slocum's  two  corps  were  nearly  a  day's  march  apart,  and  as 
far  from  Howard's.  They  must  pass  by  the  flank  three 
miles  in  front  of  Bentonville,  the  little  village  whose  posi 
tion  has  already  been  described.  He  saw  that  this  was  the 
only  opportunity  likely  to  occur  for  fighting  Sherman's 
several  corps  in  detail,  and  gave  orders  to  concentrate 
everything  at  Bentonville  on  the  18th. 

Sherman  had  been  loth  to  widen  the  lines  of  his  march, 
but  to  do  so  was  the  condition  of  feeding  his  men  on  the 
country  as  he  still  had  to  do,  and  for  the  same  reason  he 
must  keep  moving  till  he  should  get  upon  a  railway  line  of 
communication  with  the  base  Schofield  was  establishing. 
But  he  frankly  tells  us,  also,  that  the  evidence  before  him 
induced  a  confident  belief  that  Johnston  would  hold  to  the 
north  line  of  the  Neuse  and  dispute  its  passage.  This 
belief  induced  him  to  leave  Slocum's  line  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  and  make  his  way  across  to  Howard's. 


AVERASBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  187 

In  accordance  with  his  habit,  he  had  remained  with  the 
exposed  flank  till  he  thought  the  point  of  danger  passed, 
and  now  went  to  the  right  wing  because  he  would  thus  get 
quickest  into  communication  with  Schofield,  and  be  nearer 
to  the  point  where  he  meant  to  cross  the  Neuse  and  reach 
Goldsboro.  His  reasoning  was  strictly  in  accord  with  sound 
principles,  but  as  constantly  happens  in  war,  the  facts  which 
he  did  not  know  were  essential  to  a  right  conclusion.  It 
would,  however,  have  been  more  prudent  to  have  delayed 
Slocum's  advance  with  the  two  divisions  of  Davis's  corps  till 
Williams  with  the  Twentieth  should  have  come  nearer,  and 
a  little  carelessness  in  this  respect  must  be  attributed  to 
over-confidence  in  the  belief  that  Johnston  would  not  now 
take  the  aggressive. 

But  Johnston  also  found  his  calculations  fail  in  some  re 
spects.  He  intended  to  have  his  troops  ready  to  attack  the 
head  of  Slocurn's  column  early  in  the  morning,  but  the  maps 
were  wrong,  as  they  uniformly  were,  and  Hardee's  road  to 
Bentonville  proved  to  be  too  long  to  be  marched  by  day 
light  after  his  orders  were  received.  Consequently  Hanip  - 
ton  was  directed  to  obstruct  Slocum's  advance,  and  prevent 
his  reaching  the  cross-roads  before  Hardee.  The  Confed 
erate  cavalry  under  Wheeler  was  therefore  close  in  front  of 
Davis's  corps  when  his  march  began  on  the  19th,  and  had 
made  breastworks  at  some  points,  behind  which  they  offered 
an  unusually  stubborn  resistance.1  Carlin's  division  had  the 
lead,  and  as  his  men  went  forward  the  foragers  were  found 
on  right  and  left  of  the  road,  having  been  unable  to  drive  off 

1  The  first  prisoners  captured  were  from  Dibrell's  division.  Johnston  says 
(Narrative,  p.  392)  that  Butler's  division  was  in  front  of  Howard,  yet  he  also  says 
that  Wheeler's  command  was  not  engaged  on  the  19th.  There  must  be  error  in 
this,  unless  the  organization  of  Wheeler's  corps  had  recently  been  changed. 
Slocum  was  certainly  fighting  some  mounted  force,  which  resisted  stubbornly  all 


188  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

the  enemy  or  get  out  beyond  his  flanks.  This  was  an  omm 
ous  sign,  for  where  these  enterprising  skirmishers  could  not 
go,  the  opposition  must  be  stronger  than  a  cavalry  rear  guard 
usually  was.  As  Carlin  pushed  on,  however,  Hampton  gave 
way  slowly,  and  it  was  seen  that  the  opposition  came  from 
horsemen  only.  On  this  report,  Sherman  started  on  his  ride 
to  the  right  wing.  About  noon,  he  was  overtaken  by  a  mes 
senger  from  Slocum,  who  still  announced  that  they  were 
resisted  by  nothing  but  cavalry ;  but  the  firing  of  artillery 
now  began  to  be  more  rapid,  and  to  indicate  more  serious 
work. 

As  one  goes  southward  from  Bentonville,  a  country  road 
forks  to  the  right  from  the  Clinton  road,  about  half  a  mile  be 
fore  the  crossing  of  the  Goldsboro  road  is  reached.  This  turns 
toward  Averasboro,  and  a  triangle  of  roads  is  thus  made  hav 
ing  sides  of  half  a  mile.  Hoke's  division  of  the  Confederate 
forces  was  first  on  the  ground,  and  was  ordered  to  take  this 
route,  cross  the  Averasboro  road  and  continue  seven  or  eight 
hundred  yards  farther.  Here  he  halted  and  intrenched,  his 
line  slightly  recurved,  but  still  at  an  acute  angle  to  the  road 
on  which  Davis  was  advancing.  Stewart  with  the  troops  of 
his  own  and  Lee's  corps  of  Hood's  army,  came  next  and  in 
trenched  the  line  of  the  road  they  had  travelled,  showing  a 
front  of  four  or  five  hundred  yards.  From  this  point  the 
right  was  swung  forward  along  the  margin  of  woods  looking 
into  the  open  farm-lands  of  Cole's  farm.  Hardee,  when 
he  came  up,  found  General  Bate  with  two  divisions  of 
Cheatham's  corps  (his  own  and  Smith's,  formerly  Cleburne's) 
placed  on  the  extreme  right,  and  put  Talliaferro's  division  in 
reserve  in  support  of  Bate :  his  other  division  (McLaws5)  was 
ordered  by  Johnston  to  the  left  wing.  The  centre  of  John 
ston's  position,  therefore,  was  not  on  the  Averasboro  road, 
but  at  the  corner  of  Cole's  fields,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  north. 


AVERASBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  189 

Tli9  two  wings  wrent  forward  from  this  point,  the  left  cross 
ing  diagonally  the  road  on  which  Davis's  corps  was  advan 
cing,  and  the  right,  hidden  in  the  thicket,  reached  forward 
ready  to  envelop  any  force  that  might  attempt  to  pass  to  the 
west  of  the  Cole  farm.  The  country,  except  at  the  farm 
mentioned,  was  covered  with  a  dense  thicket  and  wood,  with 
marshes  from  which  small  streams  ran  in  all  directions. 

It  was  nearly  noon  when  General  Davis,  with  Caiiin's  di 
vision  slowly  driving  Hampton's  cavalry  back,  came  upon 
the  breastworks  crossing  the  road.  Hobart's  brigade  had 
been  deployed  some  time  before,  and  was  in  line  across  the 
road,  on  which  w7as  moving  a  four-gun  battery.  To  the  right 
of  the  road  but  little  could  be  seen ;  but  on  the  left  the 
enemy's  line  could  be  traced,  apparently  bending  back  along 
the  farther  side  of  Cole's  field.  Still  thinking  he  had  before 
him  only  the  cavalry  which  he  had  slowly  followed  for  five 
miles,  Davis  ordered  Buell's  brigade  to  make  a  detour  to  the 
left  around  the  open  farm  lots  and  take  the  enemy  in  flank. 
But  Hobart's  skirmishers  were  developing  a  line  of  fire 
farther  to  the  right,  reaching  towrard  our  flank,  and  Ham- 
bright's  brigade  (Colonel  Miles  in  command)  was  deployed 
on  Hobart's  right.  Carlin  now  advanced  with  his  two  bri 
gades  to  charge  the  works  before  him,  but  soon  recoiled 
before  a  fire  which  had  another  sound  than  that  of  the  cav 
alry  carbines.  A  few  prisoners  had  been  taken,  among  them 
one  who  had  been  a  national  soldier  and  had  been  induced 
to  enlist  to  escape  from  a  Confederate  prison.  From  him 
the  fact  that  Johnston  was  present  in  person  with  his  wrhole 
army  was  learned.  Slocuni  had  come  up,  and  after  consulta 
tion  with  Davis,  Morgan's  division  was  ordered  to  deploy 
forward  on  the  right  of  Carlin,  with  Mitchell's  and  Vande- 
ver's  brigades  in  front  and  Fearing1  s  in 'second  line.  Heavy 
lines  of  skirmishers  engaged  the  enemy,  while  the  troops  of 


190 


THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 


the   deployed  lines   hastened  to   cover  themselves  with  a 
breastwork. 

It  was  now  about  two  o'clock,  and  Slocnm  wrote  a  dispatch 
to  Sherman  telling  of  the  situation,  and  sent  Colonel  Me- 


Battle  of  Bentonville. 

Clurg,  of  Davis's  staff,  to  hasten  up  the  divisions  of  Williams's 
corps.  Buell's  brigade  wras  making  its  way  slowly  through 
the  marsh  and  thicket  on  the  left,  when  the  crash  of  mus 
ketry  there  gave  warning  of  an  assault.  Hardee  had  sent 
Talliaferro's  division  still  beyond  Bate's  right  upon  the  flank 


AVERASBORO   AND  BENTONVILLE.  19J 

of  Buell's  brigade,  and  Bate,  now  attacking  in  both  front 
and  flank,  that  single  brigade  was  overwhelmed,  and  driven 
to  the  rear  in  confusion.  The  attack  was  taken  up  in  turn 
by  Stewart's  divisions,  sweeping  across  the  Cole  farm  diag 
onally  upon  Davis's  left,  taking  Carlin's  brigades  successively 
in  flank  and  rear,  and  pushing  them  back.  But  this  took 
time,  for  there  was  no  panic,  and  our  men  were  not  used  to 
be  beaten.  The  enemy  suffered  terribly  as  he  crossed  the 
fields,  played  upon  by  the  battery  in  the  road  near  Cole's 
house,  and  cut  down  by  Hobart's  infantry  fire.  Step  by  step 
they  advanced,  each  regiment  of  Hobart's,  as  it  found 
itself  attacked  in  rear,  retreating  and  fighting,  forming  a 
new  line  of  its  own,  and  again  making  a  stand,  till  all  of  this 
brigade  also  had  thus  been  pushed  off  in  detachments,  and 
the  left  was  curved  a  full  mile  to  the  rear.  Now  a  rush  upon 
the  road  captured  the  battery.  Miles's  brigade  was  also 
driven  from  its  line,  and  all  connection  between  Carlin  and 
Morgan  was  broken.  Davis,  whose  soldierly  qualities  came 
out  brilliantly  in  the  trial,  now  rode  rapidly  to  Morgan  and 
ordered  Fearing  to  move  his  brigade  toward  the  left,  deploy 
ing  parallel  to  the  road  as  he  went,  and  to  charge  headlong 
upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy,  who  was  following  Carlin. 
The  work  could  not  have  been  put  into  better  hands  than 
those  of  the  unfearing  descendant  of  Israel  Putnam.  He 
changed  front  upon  the  run,  swept  everything  before  him  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet  till  the  road  was  reached,  and  form 
ing  there,  his  destructive  volleys  drove  the  Confederate  cen 
tre  in  confusion  upon  its  right  and  into  the  swamp. 

At  the  sound  of  fighting,  Williams  had  hurried  forward 
the  troops  of  his  corps.  Robinson's  brigade,  of  his  own 
division,  was  the  first  to  arrive,  and  it  formed  across  the  road 
in  front  of  the  Moms  farmhouse,  about  a  mile  from  Cole's 
house.  The  ground  here  was  a  little  higher,  and  the  Twen- 


192  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

tisth  Corps  artillery  was  put  in  position  as  it  came  up. 
Robinson  connected  with  Fearing's  left,  and  Carlin's  brigades 
were  rallied  upon  this  line,  still  farther  to  the  left.  A 
countiy  road  ran  along  this  point,  and  Bate  attacked  the  line 
again  and  again,  now  advancing,  now  driven  back,  until 
Hardee  withdrew  him  some  distance  in  consequence  of  the 
rout  of  the  troops  in  the  centre. 

The  rest  of  Morgan's  division  had  not  been  idle  while 
Fearing's  brigade  had  been  so  sharply  engaged.  Their  first 
assault  upon  Hoke's  division  had  been  a  vigorous  one,  and 
Bragg,  who  commanded  that  wing,  had  called  for  reinforce 
ments.  Hardee  was  just  coming  on  the  field,  and  Johnston 
ordered  McLaws'  division  to  the  support  of  Hoke,  while 
Talliaferro  took  the  position  in  rear  of  Bate  already  indi 
cated.1  Morgan  had  not  been  able  to  break  through  the 
enemy's  left,  and  had  resumed  his  own  line  and  strength 
ened  it  during  the  lull  which  followed  the  severe  check 
given  to  Stewart's  advance  in  the  centre. 

Coggswell's  brigade,  of  "Williarns's  corps,  came  up  about 
four  o'clock,  and  formed  on  Fearing's  right,  though  the  line 
was  still  too  short  to  reach  to  Mitchell,  whose  left  was  a  lit 
tle  refused,  so  as  not  to  present  an  uncovered  flank.  Soon 
after  five  a  general  attack  on  our  lines  was  again  made,  and 
was  persistently  kept  up  till  night.  Hoke's  division  charged 
upon  Morgan's  works,  but  was  again  repulsed,  and  Vande- 
ver's  brigade  made  a  return  charge,  capturing  the  colors  of 
the  Fortieth  North  Carolina  Regiment.  But  the  Confeder 
ates  had  found  the  gap  between  Morgan  and  the  rest  of  the 
line,  and  pushed  fiercely  upon  Coggswell,  who  stoutly  held 
his  ground ;  but  some  of  them,  passing  through  the  interval, 

1  Johnston  says  that  he  yielded  "very  injudiciously"  to  Bragg's  call  for  help. 
The  effect  of  strengthening  Hardee's  right  by  another  division  might  well  have 
been  iatal  to  Slocum's  defence  under  the  circumstances. 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  193 

tried  to  take  Morgan  in  reverse.  Colonel  McClurg,  chief  of 
staff,  who  was  taking  a  warning  of  this  to  Morgan,  narrowly 
escaped  capture  by  them.  Mitchell  and  Vandever  no^ 
faced  to  the  rear  and  quickly  routed  these,  the  Fourteenth 
Michigan  Eegiment,  the  same  which  had  taken  the  colors 
in  the  preceding  charge,  now  capturing  those  of  the  Fifty- 
fourth  Virginia  in  the  charge  to  the  rear.  The  Confederate 
troops  had  exhausted  their  power  upon  Davis's  corps,  and 
Johnston,  knowing  well  that  by  this  time  heavy  reinforce 
ments  were  approaching,  directed  Hardee  and  Bragg  to  re 
call  their  men  as  soon  as  the  wounded  could  be  carried  from 
the  field.  Even  after  dark  a  detachment,  seeking  its  way 
back,  came  again  in  rear  of  Mitchell's  brigade,  but  was  re 
ceived  with  a  volley  which  made  them  drop  their  arms  and 
fly  precipitately.  Hardee's  wing  reoccupied  the  line  along 
the  north  of  the  Cole  farm,  but  early  next  morning  Bragg 
was  drawn  back  till  the  angle  at  the  centre  was  salient  in 
stead  of  re-entrant,  and  the  left  flank  rested  near  Mill  Creek 
facing  toward  the  East,  whence  Sherman  was  to  be  looked 
for  with  Howard's  troops. 

Slocum's  dispatch  of  two  o'clock,  which  seems  to  have 
reached  his  commander  about  five,  was  written  before  the 
battle  was  fairly  opened ;  and  Sherman,  while  determining 
to  concentrate  upon  Johnston  next  day  unless  he  retreated, 
made  no  immediate  change  in  his  dispositions,  except  to 
direct  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  to  remain  with  Slocum  instead 
of  passing  to  the  right  flank,  as  had  been  intended.  At  two 
in  the  morning  of  the  20th,  however,  Sherman  was  roused 
by  a  message  from  Slocum,  dated  at  eight  o'clock,  telling  of 
the  hard  fighting  of  the  latter  part  of  the  day.  A  courier 
was  at  once  sent  to  Hazen's  division  (which  was  with  How 
ard's  trains,  and  nearest  Slocum)  to  hasten  instantly  to  his 
assistance.  The  other  divisions  of  Logan's  corps  were  at 
VOL.  X.— 9 


194  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

Falling  Creek  Church,  where  the  roads  the  two  wings  were 
upon  crossed,  about  three  miles  from  Cox's  bridge.  These 
were  directed  to  march  at  break  of  day,  and  Blair's  corps, 
which  had  gone  further  on  the  Wilmington  road,  was  re 
called. 

Hazen  reached  Slocum  at  dawn,  and  found  that  the  whola 
of  the  left  wing  was  up,  and  a  good  defensive  line  had  been 
made  to  connect  the  position  so  stubbornly  held  by  Morgan 
with  that  which  Carlin  reformed  upon  before  night.  By 
noon  Sherman  himself  had  come  with  the  head  of  Logan's 
column,  and  the  rest  of  the  day  was  fully  occupied  with  de 
ployments  in  the  woods  and  swamps,  and  a  sharp  skirmish 
ing  fight,  while  communication  was  made  with  Slocum  and 
the  lines  adjusted.  Hazen  had  been  placed  by  Slocum  on 
the  right  of  Morgan,  so  that  he  was  in  line  with  his  own 
corps  when  Logan  approached.  The  whole  of  Johnston's 
left  flank  was  covered  by  a  brook  running  through  a  very 
difficult  swamp,  and,  under  his  skilful  direction,  his  men 
had  built  intrenchments  covered  by  abatis  of  the  formid 
able  sort  with  which  he  had  made  us  familiar  in  Georgia. 
His  position  was  in  the  nature  of  a  bridge-head  covering 
Bentonville  and  the  bridge  over  Mill  Creek,  which  he  only 
intended  to  hold  till  he  could  carry  off  his  wounded  and 
prepare  a  safe  retreat  to  Smithfield. 

Sherman  found  that  Slocum's  wounded  men  were  numer 
ous  enough  to  fill  his  ambulance  train,  and  that  Johnston's 
line  was  one  to  manoauvre  against  rather  than  to  attack  in 
front.  He  contented  himself,  therefore,  with  pushing  his 
lines  close  to  his  adversary's,  especially  on  the  right,  where 
Blair's  corps  extended  Logan's  deployment.  Orders  were 
sent  by  courier  to  Schofield  to  march  at  once  from  Kinston 
upon  Goldsboro.  Terry  was  directed  to  move  from  Faison'p 
Depot  to  Cox's  bridge,  and  make  a  strong  effort  to  secure  a 


AVERASBORO   AND   BENTONVILLE.  195 

crossing  of  the  Neuse  Kiver  there.  Shortly  after  noon  on 
the  21st,  General  Mower,  who  had  the  extreme  right  of  the 
line,  managed  to  thread  the  swamp  before  him,  and  finding 
but  a  weak  force  opposing,  advanced  rapidly  wTith  two  bri 
gades  till  he  was  within  musket  range  of  the  bridges  behind 
Johnston.  The  movement  was  made  without  concert  with 
the  rest  of  the  corps,  and  was  not  known  to  Howard  till  the 
rapid  firing,  as  Mower  was  met  by  Johnston's  reserves,  told 
of  his  position.  It  was  one  of  peril  for  the  division  as  well 
as  of  possibilities  of  great  results  had  Mower's  movement 
been  made  by  understanding  with  his  superior  officers. 
Johnston  first  threw  Wheeler's  cavalry  against  this  division, 
following  it  with  Lowry's  (formerly  Cheatham's)  division  of 
the  Army  of  Tennessee,  which  had  just  arrived.  Howard 
ordered  General  Blair  to  support  Mower,  and  directed  an 
advance  of  Logan's  line  by  way  of  a  strong  demonstration. 
A  line  of  rifle-pits  for  skirmishers  was  taken  and  Logan's 
men  intrenched  within  fifty  yards  of  Bragg's  front.  The 
topography,  however,  was  so  blind  and  unknown  that  full 
advantage  could  not  be  taken  of  Mower's  partial  success. 
He  was  recalled  by  Sherman's  order,  the  National  commander 
preferring  to  rest  for  the  present  upon  the  certainty  that 
Johnston  must  retreat,  and  that  he  himself  could  unite  his 
whole  army  in  the  open  countiy  north  of  the  Neuse,  rather 
than  rush  blindly  into  a  general  engagement  in  the  thickets 
and  swamps  about  him. 

He  afterward  blamed  himself  for  not  following  up  Mower's 
movement,  and  with  more  knowledge  of  the  ground  he 
would  no  doubt  have  done  so ;  but  with  his  lack  of  informa 
tion  of  the  topography  as  well  as  of  the  force  before  him,  his 
prudence  was  wiser  than  impetuosity.  His  game  was  a  per 
fectly  sure  one  with  patience,  and  unless  Johnston's  rout  had 
been  complete,  the  sacrifice  of  life  in  a  general  and  des- 


196  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

perate  charge  upon  the  intrenchments  would  have  been 
frightful  and  unjustifiable.  The  Confederate  army  had  pre« 
served  the  organization  of  the  troops  which  had  come  from 
Hood,  and  down  to  the  time  of  the  surrender,  a  month  later, 
Cheatham's,  Stewart's,  and  Lee's  corps  kept  their  complete 
roster  of  divisions  and  brigades,  notwithstanding  the  very 
great  reduction  of  their  numbers.  The  common  method  of 
judging  of  the  enemy's  force  by  the  number  of  brigades  rep 
resented  by  captured  prisoners,  is  one  of  the  most  trust 
worthy  ;  but  in  this  instance  it  was  misleading,  as  it  was  no 
doubt  intended  to  be.  Sherman,  therefore,  from  this  and 
other  causes  which  have  already  been  mentioned,  somewhat 
overestimated  Johnston's  army,  and  was  the  more  inclined 
to  leave  nothing  to  hazard,  but  to  hasten  the  concentration 
which  would  give  him  an  overwhelming  force,  and  which  in 
fact  enabled  him  to  close  the  campaign  and  the  war  without 
another  sanguinary  engagement. 

Johnston  retreated  in  the  night,  and  Sherman  resumed  his 
march  on  the  22d.  Schofield  had  entered  Goldsboro  on  the 
preceding  day,  placing  Cox's  corps  on  the  north  of  the  town, 
covering  the  Smithfield  road.  Terry's  corps  reached  the 
Neuse  at  Cox's  bridge  at  the  same  time,  and  laid  a  pontoon 
bridge  there,  so  that,  on  the  23d,  Sherman  rode  with  the 
head  of  his  column  into  the  place,  bringing  together  his 
whole  army,  now  nearly  ninety  thousand  strong.  The  casu 
alty  lists  were  heavy  for  the  numbers  engaged.  On  the  Na 
tional  side  the  total  loss  was  1,604,  of  which  1,196  were  in 
Slocum's  command.  Among  them  was  General  Fearing, 
who  was  severely  wounded  in  his  charge  upon  the  Con 
federate  centre.  Of  the  Confederates,  267  dead  and  1,625 
prisoners  fell  into  Sherman's  hands.  Johnston  states  tho 
number  of  his  wounded  at  1,467,  but  puts  the  dead  and 
missing  at  only  876,  which  is  1,000  less  than  the  number  in 


AVERASBORO  AND  BENTONVILLE.  ]91 

our  possession.  A  similar  discrepancy  is  found  in  the  state 
ments  of  numbers  engaged.  Johnston  states  Slocum's  force 
in  the  battle  on  the  19th  as  35,000,  and  his  own  at  about 
14,100  infantry  and  artillery.  Slocum's  troops  on  the  field 
during  the  action  of  the  19th,  were  two  out  of  three  divisions 
of  Davis's  corps,  and  two  brigades  of  Williams's.  The  casu 
alty  lists  show  that  none  others  arrived  in  time  to  take  part 
in  the  fight.  Their  numbers  were  therefore  about  1,000 
less  than  those  of  the  whole  Fourteenth  Corps,  which  num 
bered  13,000  when  it  left  Savannah,  infantry  and  artillery. 
Johnston's  official  report  for  31st  March  shows  22,000  of 
these  arms  present,  besides  5,500  cavalry.1  As  the  army 
was  freshly  assembled,  his  sick  who  were  present  when 
this  report  was  made  up  must  represent  his  wounded 
men  ;  and  when  his  trains  were  parked,  most  of  his  "  extra- 
duty"  men  must  be  supposed  to  be  at  the  breastworks. 
Letting  the  dead  and  prisoners  in  our  hands  offset  the  de 
tachments  which  joined  him  afterward,  and  it  would  appear 
that  about  22,000  men,  besides  the  cavalry,  will  fairly  repre 
sent  the  force  with  which  he  attacked  Slocum's  12,000. 

In  Slocum's  disposition  of  his  troops  the  only  point  open 
to  criticism  is  suggested  by  the  question,  whether  it  was  wise 
to  deploy  both  of  Davis's  divisions  upon  the  line  of  the  ad 
vanced  brigade  when  it  came  in  contact  with  an  intrenched 
infantry  line,  and  when  the  best  information  showed  all  of 
Johnston's  army  present.  It  would  seem  to  be  better  to 
have  placed  Morgan's  division  and  two  of  Carlin's  brigades 
upon  the  line  near  the  Morris  house,  wThere  Carlin's  men 
rallied  in  the  afternoon,  and  to  have  withdrawn  Hobart  s 
brigade  to  the  same  point.  Johnston  would  then  have  had 
to  move  in  line  over  a  mile  of  swamps  and  thickets,  to  be 

»  See  Appendix  E,  III. 


198  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

received  at  a  barricade  which  would  by  that  time  have  been 
strong,  while  his  own  attack  would  be  disjointed  by  such  a 
march.  To  rush  against  an  unknown  line,  without  full 
reconnoissance,  is  always  full  of  risk,  and  in  such  a  marshy 
wilderness  is  much  like  falling  into  an  ambuscade.  Johnston 
had  intrenched  to  receive  an  attack,  and  would  have  been 
somewhat  slow  to  move  out  in  the  presence  .of  an  active 
skirmishing  reconnoissance.  This  would  have  gained  time, 
both  for  intrenching  Davis's  rear  line  and  for  Williams  ta 
approach.  The  situation,  however,  was  full  of  difficulty, 
and  the  left  wing  came  off  with  honors  of  which  it  had  a 
right  to  be  proud. 


CHAPTER  XII 

STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  CAVALRY  EXPEDITIONS. 

BEFORE  resuming  the  narrative  of  the  closing  events  of  the 
war  in  North  Carolina,  let  us  go  back  to  the  portion  of 
Sherman's  territorial  command  which  General  Thomas  was 
now  directing,  and  trace  briefly  the  current  of  events  there, 
so  that  the  general  relation  of  the  final  movements  may  be 
clearly  understood. 

It  had  been  part  of  the  plan,  both  of  Grant  and  of  Sher 
man,  that  the  battle  of  Nashville  should  be  followed  by  an 
active  winter  campaign  in  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  press 
ing  the  defeated  army  of  Hood  and  giving  it  no  rest  or  time 
to  reorganize.  The  natural  plan  of  this  campaign  would 
have  been  for  Thomas  to  march  through  Alabama  as  Sher 
man  had  done  through  Georgia,  reaching  Mobile  as  Savan 
nah  had  been  reached,  and  uniting  forces  with  Canby,  who 
would  have  been  prepared  to  establish  a  new  base  of  sup 
plies  upon  the  Gulf.  The  belief  of  General  Thomas  that  his 
army  was  not  prepared  for  this  work  brought  General  Grant 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  plan  which  promised  results  most 
nearly  equal,  would  be  to  send  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps 
with  Knipe's  division  of  cavalry  to  reinforce  General  Canby 
at  New  Orleans  for  a  decisive  campaign  against  Mobile,  to 
transfer  Schofield  to  the  seaboard,  and  to  limit  the  ag^ 
gressive  movements  of  Thomas's  department  to  cavalry  ex 
peditions  to  be  made  by  Generals  Stoneman  and  Wilson, 


200  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

one  from  East  Tennessee  into  the  Carolinas,  and  the  othei 
from  Florence  and  Tuscumbia  into  Central  Alabama.  In 
any  event,  the  purpose  was  to  maintain  such  activity  in  all 
portions  of  the  theatre  of  war  as  to  allow  no  reinforcement 
of  the  Confederate  armies  in  the  east  because  of  lack  of 
active  and  incessant  occupation  for  the  troops  the  enemy 
still  had  in  the  Gulf  States. 

Before  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  had  been  consolidated 
with  that  of  the  Cumberland  by  Schofield's  transfer  to  North 
Carolina,  the  latter  (acting  under  Thomas),  had  directed 
General  Stoneman,  commanding  in  East  Tennessee,  to  drive 
out  the  forces  with  which  Breckenridge  had  been  making  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  Hood.  Stoneman  started  from  Knox- 
ville  on  December  9th  with  two  brigades  of  mounted 
men  under  Generals  Gillem  and  Burbridge,  and  quickly 
cleared  East  Tennessee  of  the  enemy.  Following  up  his 
advantage  promptly,  he  penetrated  Virginia,  ascending  the 
valley  of  the  Holston  to  Abingdon,  Wytheville,  and  Salt- 
ville.  At  the  latter  place  he  destroyed  the  salt  works, 
which  were  of  great  value  to  the  Confederacy,  and  which 
had  been  the  coveted  object  of  many  a  raid  before.  At 
Marion,  extensive  iron  works  were  burned,  and  the  lead 
works  of  Wythe  County  were  ruined.  Two  railway  trains 
were  captured,  the  railway  bridges  along  many  miles  of 
road  were  burned,  and  large  amounts  of  military  stores 
were  also  taken.  Ten  pieces  of  field  artillery  and  two 
hundred  prisoners  were  also  captured.  Breckenridge  was 
forced  to  escape  by  a  rapid  retreat  into  North  Carolina, 
and  at  the  end  of  December  Stoneman  returned  to  East 
Tennessee. 

In  accordance  with  the  policy  of  activity  already  stated, 
Grant  directed  Thomas  on  February  6th  to  send  Stone- 
man  with  his  cavalry  through  the  Great  Smoky  Mountains 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.        201 

into  South  Carolina,  to  interrupt  railway  communica 
tion  between  Columbia  and  Charlotte,  N.  C.,  and  by  oc« 
cupying  the  attention  of  part  of  the  Confederate  forces  m 
that  region,  assist  the  movement  of  Sherman.  Delays 
occurred  in  preparation,  and  it  was  not  till  March  22d, 
when  Sherman  had  already  reached  his  new  communica 
tions  with  the  North  Carolina  coast,  that  this  column  was 
ready  to  start.  The  great  progress  of  the  Eastern  cam- 
paigL.  changed  its  object  somewhat,  and  Stoneman  was  di 
rected  toward  Lynchburg,  Va.,  with  the  purpose  of  increas 
ing  the  damage  done  by  him  to  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee 
Railway  in  December,  and  making  it  useless  as  a  line  of 
retreat  for  Lee's  army,  if  Richmond  should  be  evacuated. 
Thomas  was  ordered  to  send  also  the  infantry  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  into  East  Tennessee  to  oppose  and  delay  Lee  if  ha 
should  escape  from  Virginia  by  that  route.  The  troops  now 
at  Stoneman's  disposal  were  Gillem's  division  of  cavalry, 
which  consisted  of  the  three  brigades  of  Brown,  Palmer, 
and  Miller. 

The  upper  valley  of  the  Holston  had  been  reoccupied  by 
a  small  Confederate  force  under  General  Jackson,  and  the 
local  militia  and  reserves  were  out.  Railway  bridges  had 
been  rebuilt  in  anticipation  of  Lee's  probable  necessities. 
On  the  26th,  Stoneman  was  with  the  division  at  Jonesboro, 
in  the  extreme  northeast  corner  of  Tennessee.  Here  he 
took  the  valley  of  the  Watauga  River,  following  the  moun 
tain  gorges  through  which  it  flows,  to  Boone,  in  North  Caro 
lina.  He  now  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  to  the  upper  waters  of 
the  Yadkin,  and  turning  northward  reached  New  River  and 
Wytheville  by  a  long  detour,  in  which  he  had  turned  all  the 
hostile  positions  of  Jackson's  forces.  At  "\Vytheville  a 
d6pot  of  supplies  for  the  Confederate  army  was  destroyed, 
and  detached  parties  burned  the  railTV/jr  bridges  along 


202  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

ninety  miles  of  road,  and  within  fifty  miles  of  Lynchburg. 
This  work  was  continued  on  April  6th  and  7th,  when  Lee, 
who  had  retreated  from  Petersburg  in  the  night  of  tho 
2cl,  had  already  been  anticipated  by  Grant's  forces  on  the 
Danville  road  at  Burke's  Station,  had  thus  been  cut  off  from 
the  supplies  accumulated  in  depots  on  that  line,  and  was 
shut  up  to  the  Lynchburg  route  as  his  last  resource.  The 
speed  with  which  Grant's  columns  surrounded  him  at  Appo- 
mattox  gave  the  coup-de-grace  to  his  valiant  army,  but  the 
knowledge  he  had  for  a  day  or  two  before,  that  Stoneman 
was  destroying  his  railway  and  stores  beyond  Lynchburg, 
must  have  added  to  his  despair.  On  the  9th,  Stoneman  re 
assembled  his  brigades  in  the  edge  of  North  Carolina,  and 
struck  southward  for  the  Danville  and  Charlotte  road,  which 
was  the  line  by  which  Lee  would  have  united  his  forces 
with  Johnston  had  he  succeeded  in  evading  Grant  at  the 
Burkesville  Junction.  He  passed  southward  through  Ger- 
manton  toward  Salisbury,  sending  detachments  right  and 
left  to  destroy  factories  of  clothing  and  the  like.  One  of 
these  columns  narrowly  missed  capturing  Davis  and  his 
Cabinet  at  Greenesboro.  On  the  12th  he  captured  Salisbury, 
after  a  brisk  skirmishing  engagement,  in  which  the  locaj 
troops  made  but  a  feeble  resistance,  being  manifestly  dis 
heartened  by  the  surrender  of  Lee,  which  had  occurred  on 
the  9th.  The  captures  at  Salisbury  were  enormous,  and  had 
Stoneman  been  fully  aware  of  the  situation  in  Virginia  and  at 
Goldsboro,  it  is  possible  they  might  have  been  preserved ; 
but  he  acted  wisely  according  to  the  information  he  nad, 
and  destroyed  them.  The  Confederate  forces  under  Gardi 
ner  and  Pemberton  were  routed,  and  1,300  prisoners  were 
captured.  Eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  10,000  stands  of 
small  arms,  and  vast  stores  of  ammunition,  provisions,  cloth 
ing  and  blankets  which  had  been  accumulated  as  a  reserve 


STONEMAN'S  AND   WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.        20,1 

stock  for  Lee's  army  fell  into  Stoneman's  hands.  From 
Salisbury,  after  destroying  the  railway  bridges  for  many 
miles  he  retired  toward  East  Tennessee,  learning,  on  the 
way,  of  the  armistice  which  resulted  in  Johnston's  surren 
der. 

The  expedition  into  Alabama  was  led  by  General  Wilson, 
and  was  of  much  larger  proportions.  It  also  was  much  later 
in  starting  than  General  Grant  had  intended,  his  directions 
being  that  it  should  march  as  soon  after  February  20th  as 
possible.  Wilson  had  four  divisions  of  cavalry  in  canton 
ments  at  Gravelly  Springs,  nine  miles  below  Florence  on  the 
Tennessee  River,  where  they  had  been  refitting  and  drilling 
since  the  retreat  of  Hood  in  the  beginning  of  January.  One 
of  these,  Hatch's,  had  been  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  to 
Knipe's  division,  which  had  been  sent  to  Vicksburg  to  move 
inland  from  that  point,  in  co-operation  with  Canby  and  with 
the  movement  Wilson  himself  was  preparing.  The  other  three 
divisions  were  commanded  by  Generals  Long,  Upton,  and 
McCook.  All  these  subordinate  campaigns  were  too  late  to 
hold  any  part  of  Hood's  infantry  in  Alabama,  for  the  rem 
nants  of  the  Confederate  Army  of  Tennessee  had  already 
fought  with  Schofield  at  Kinston,  and  with  Sherman  at  Ben- 
tonville,  before  Wilson's  columns  moved  southward  on  March 
23d.  But  General  Richard  Taylor  was  assembling  the  re 
serves  and  the  militia  under  the  conscription  laws  of  the 
Confederacy,  and  Forrest,  who  had  also  been  busy  in  recruit 
ing  and  refitting  his  cavalry  corps,  had  four  divisions  under 
his  command,  and  was  confident  of  his  ability  to  defeat  any 
mounted  force  Wilson  could  lead  into  Alabama  or  Mississippi. 
Taylor  had  to  detach  some  brigades  from  these  to  watch 
Canby's  movements  and  to  assist  General  Maury  at  Mobile, 
but  this  did  not  detract  from  Forrest's  faith  that  in  the  cam 
paign  with  Wilson  he  could  "  get  there  first  with  the  most 


204  THE   MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

men,"  to  use  a  pithy  saying  of  his  own  in  which  he  embodied 
the  essence  of  the  art  of  war.1 

But  "  to  get  there  first "  it  is  necessary  that  detachments 
should  be  nearest  the  threatened  point,  and  this  was  not  now 
the  case  with  Forrest.  Selma  was  the  one  remaining  great 
manufacturing  arsenal  of  the  Confederacy.  It  is  upon  the 
north  bank  of  the  Alabama  River,  about  a  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  above  Mobile,  in  the  heart  of  the  richest  part  of  the 
State,  the  "  cane-brake  region."  The  river  is  navigable,  and 
it  had,  besides,  railway  connection  with  the  coast  through 
Demopolis  (on  the  Tombigbee  Elver),  and  with  Talladega  to 
the  northeast*.  On  the  latter  railway,  about  fifty  miles  north, 
is  Montevallo,  which  was  then,  as  now,  a  centre  for  the  manu 
facture  of  iron  of  a  superior  quality.  Forrest's  men  were  a 
good  deal  scattered  through  the  central  and  eastern  region 
of  Mississippi,  collecting  remounts,  bringing  in  deserters 
and  enforcing  the  conscription.  Jackson's  division  had 
headquarters  at  West  Point,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Rail 
way,  and  Chalmers's  near  Columbus,  Miss.  Two  of  Roddey's 
brigades  were  near  Mobile,  but  Roddey  himself,  with  the  re 
maining  one,  was  picketing  North  Alabama.  Buf  ord's  division 
had  not  been  fully  re-organized  since  the  campaign  of  Nash 
ville,  and  Grassland's  brigade  was  the  only  part  of  it  which 
seems  to  have  taken  part  in  this  campaign.  One  of  Chalmers's 
brigades  (Wirt  Adams's)  was  on  the  march  from  Jackson, 
Miss.,  to  Columbus,  but  it  was  ordered  to  remain  upon  the  line 
of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway  as  a  guard.  Seven  or  eight 
thousand  men  would  therefore  be  all  the  cavalry  Forrest 
could  hope  to  have  in  hand  to  meet  Wilson's  twelve  thousand. 

The  winter  had  been  well  spent  by  Wilson  in  organizing, 
and  his  train  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  wagons  was  carefully 

1  Taylor's  Destruction  and  Reconstruction,  p.  200. 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.        205 

selected  and  packed  with  a  view  to  rapid  movement.  The 
*  small  rations '  and  ammunition  had  the  preference,  as  the 
country  would  be  foraged  for  meat  and  bread.  A  pontoon 
train  of  thirty  canvas  boats  accompanied  the  column,  and 
the  wheel  vehicles  were  guarded  by  fifteen  hundred  dis 
mounted  men.  The  three  divisions  started  southward  on 
separate  roads,  but  united  at  Jasper,  about  eighty  miles 
southeast  of  Tuscumbia.  From  information  he  here  received, 
Wilson  felt  the  need  of  haste,  so  filling  his  men's  haversacks 
he  left  the  train  behind  and  pushed  hard  for  Montevallo. 
Roddey's  brigade  began  to  make  some  opposition  at  Elyton, 
but  it  hardly  amounted  to  delay.  McCook  was  ordered  to 
detach  Croxton's  brigade  and  send  it  to  Tuscaloosa  to  de 
stroy  stores  and  public  property  there,  including  a  military 
school.  A  railway  bridge  at  Hillsboro  was  seized  before  it 
could  be  destroyed,  and  the  column  crossed  upon  it,  flooring 
it  with  plank  from  the  covering  of  the  sides  of  the  structure. 
Montevallo  was  reached  on  the  31st,  Roddey's  brigade  and  a 
militia  force  under  General  Daniel  Adams  retreating  before 
the  advance  of  Upton's  division.  In  the  vicinity  five  iron 
furnaces  and  as  many  collieries  were  destroyed ;  but  Wilson 
felt  that  hours  were  precious  and  hurried  southward.  Cross- 
land's  brigade  had  joined  Roddey,  and  Forrest  was  hastening 
in  person  to  them,  but  the  heavy  National  columns  gave 
them  no  rest,  charging  them  without  hesitation  when  they 
formed  and  hurrying  them  back  toward  Randolph,  fourteen 
miles,  during  the  first  of  April.  Next  day  Randolph  was 
reached,  and  a  lucky  capture  of  a  courier  gave  WTilsoii  knowl 
edge  of  his  adversary's  positions  and  moves.  He  learned 
from  the  captured  despatches  that  Forrest  had  now  joined  in 
person  the  force  in  front  of  him,  but  that  Jackson's  division 
was  harassed  by  Croxton's  brigade  at  Trion,  thirty  miles 
northwest,  between  the  Cahawba  and  Black  Warrior  Rivers, 


206  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

He  also  learned  that  Chalmers's  division  was  at  Marion,  about 
as  far  to  the  southwest,  and  was  marching  toward  Selma,  in 
tending  to  cross  the  Cahawba  near  his  present  position. 
Croxton  also  sent  word  that  he  should  follow  Jackson  and 
bring  him  to  an  engagement.  Wilson  had  evidently  "  got 
there  first,"  and  with  the  most  men.  He  at  once  sent  Mc- 
Cook  with  the  rest  of  his  division  to  co-operate  with  Crox 
ton  by  attacking  Jackson  in  front,  crossing  the  Cahawba  at 
Centreville,  fifteen  miles  west  of  Randolph,  for  this  purpose. 
McCook  drove  off  a  militia  guard  from  the  Centreville  bridge 
and  advanced  toward  Trion,  but  finding  that  Croxton  was  no 
longer  fighting  Jackson,  and  that  the  latter  greatly  outnum 
bered  him,  he  retired  to  the  bridge  and  burned  it,  after  cross 
ing  to  the  east  bank.  The  river  was  unfordable,  and  as 
Jackson  must  go  nearly  to  Marion  to  get  over,  Wilson  was 
relieved  of  any  fear  of  his  joining  Forrest  north  of  Selma. 
He  accordingly  advanced  with  increased  vigor  against  For 
rest,  who  had  selected  an  excellent  defensive  position  six 
miles  north  of  Plantersville.  Fortune  here  favored  Wilson 
again,  as  she  usually  does  the  bold,  for  by  a  mistake  in  tele 
graphing  Forrest  had  supposed  that  Chalmers  was  on  the 
Selma  road  behind  him,  and  had  ordered  him  to  move  on 
Randolph.  This  dispatch  being  forwarded  to  Chalmers  from 
Selma,  that  officer,  who  was  upon  the  west  side  of  the  Ca 
hawba,  took  the  direct  road  up  the  river,  separating  himself 
from  his  commander  instead  of  going  to  his  assistance. 
This  accident  kept  Forrest's  force  down  to  the  two  brigades 
of  cavalry  and  the  militia  under  General  Adams,  besides  the 
battalion  of  his  escort ;  but  he  was  a  host  in  himself.1  Wil- 


1  Wilson's  report  says  that  Armstrong's  brigade  from  Chalmers  had  joined 
Forrest ;  but  the  authors  of  Forrest's  Campaigns  (pp.  6(56  and  671)  are  so  explicit 
in  stating  the  contrary  that,  without  access  to  Chalmers's  official  report^  I  feel 
obliged  to  yield  to  their  authority. 


STONEMAN'S   AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.         201 

son  had,  for  ease  of  marching,  put  Upton's  and  Long's  divi 
sions  upon  separate  roads  at  Randolph,  and  these  converged 
near  the  enemy's  position.  Long  was  up  first  and  allowed 
no  delay.  His  advanced  guard  pushed  forward  on  foot  and 
broke  the  first  line  of  Roddey's  brigade,  and  he  then  sent  a 
battalion  of  the  Seventeenth  Indiana  mounted,  with  drawn 
sabres,  to  charge  the  retreating  foe.  Roddey's  men  were 
thrown  into  confusion,  but  Forrest  advanced  in  person  with 
his  escort,  their  repeating  carbines  proved  too  much  for  the 
sabres,  and  Roddey  and  Adams  succeeded  in  reforming  their 
lines.1  Colonel  White  had  ridden  with  his  Indianians  over 
the  guns,  crushing  the  wheel  of  one  of  them  by  a  blow 
which  crushed  the  breast  of  a  horse  as  well,  but  turning  to 
the  left  he  cut  his  way  out.  A  gallant  man,  however,  Captain 
Taylor,  did  not  hear  the  order  in  the  melee,  and,  followed  by 
his  company,  rode  straight  at  Forrest,  his  men  falling  at 
every  step.  Forrest  used  only  his  pistols,  warding  and  firing, 
but  he  received  several  sabre  cuts,  and  finally  broke  loose  by 
a  great  bound  of  his  horse  in  answer  to  the  spur,  and  killed 
Taylor  by  a  fatal  shot  before  he  could  reach  him  again. 

Upton's  men  had  come  up  on  Long's  right  and  all  dashed 
forward  together,  when  Forrest's  lines  gave  way  and  crowded 
in  a  confused  rout  toward  Selma.  Three  guns  and  some  two 
hundred  prisoners  fell  into  Wil  on's  hands.  About  midnight 
Forrest  found  Armstrong's  brigade  and  hurrying  it  to  Selma 
sent  urgent  orders  to  Chalmers  to  march  the  rest  of  his  di 
vision  instantly  in  the  same  direction.2  Wilson's  movements 

1  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  Forrest,  whose  experience  was  equal  to  that  of 
any  one,   had  reached  the  conclusion  that  repeating  fire-arms  were  the  proper 
weapons  for  mounted  troops,  and  that  he  rejected  sabres,  using  his  force,  by  pre 
ference,  as  a  mounted  infantry. 

2  Forrest's  biographers  suggest  (Campaigns,  p.  671)  that  the  hospitality  of  hie 
reception  at  Marion  had  made  Chalmers  forget  the  need  of  haste  in  the  previous 
movements. 


208  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

are  an  admirable  proof  of  the  value  of  time  in  such  a  cam 
paign.  After  figlitiug  and  chasing  till  late  in  the  night  of 
April  1st,  making  twenty-four  miles  of  progress  during 
the  day,  he  marched  at  dawn  of  the  2d,  and  closed  in  upon 
Selma  early  in  the  afternoon,  in  time  to  prevent  Chalmers 
and  Jackson  from  entering  the  city.  Forrest,  covered  with 
the  blood  and  dust  of  the  battle,  had  a  hurried  conference 
with  General  Taylor,  the  department  commander,  and  the 
latter  quickly  left  for  Demopolis  on  the  Western  Railway,  to 
see  what  resources  he  could  gather  to  assist  his  heroic  but 
badly  worsted  lieutenant.  The  locomotive  on  which  he  went 
had  hardly  passed  beyond  the  city  when  Wilson's  lines  ad 
vanced,  and  these  sent  a  volley  after  Taylor,  who,  however, 
sped  on  his  way  unhurt. 

Forrest  now  disposed  his  little  garrison  as  best  he  could, 
though  they  made  but  a  thin  line  in  the  long  parapet, 
and  the  militia,  composed  of  old  men  and  young  boys,  were 
so  demoralized  that  he  placed  no  reliance  on  them.  The 
works  were  strong  and  carefully  built,  with  good  ditch  and 
palisade,  and  many  heavy  guns  were  in  position.  Steamboats 
and  trains  had  worked  hard  to  carry  away  the  ordnance  and 
stores  which  were  worth  their  weight  in  gold  to  the  Confeder 
acy  now  ;  but  these  had  all  steamed  away  and  the  city  was 
left  to  its  fate. 

Wilson  placed  Long  on  the  right  and  Upton  on  the  left, 
but  despite  their  utmost  exertions,  it  was  near  evening  when 
their  lines  had  been  established  and  the  works  reconnoitred. 
The  plan  had  been  to  pick  the  way  through  swamps  on  the 
left,  where  Upton  thought  he  could  reach  a  less  guarded  part 
of  the  fortifications,  but  Long  heard  that  a  force  was  threat 
ening  his  rear  and  sending  a  regiment  to  protect  his  pack 
train  and  led  horses,  he  pushed  headlong  at  the  works.  The 
noise  of  his  attack  was  the  signal  for  the  rest,  the  audacity 


STONEMAN'S  AND  WILSON'S  EXPEDITIONS.         209 

of  the  thing  confounded  the  already  demoralized  Confeder 
ates,  and  after  a  short  struggle,  the  lines  were  carried  every 
where,  and  Wilson's  men  entered  the  town  on  all  sides  amid 
a  scene  of  indescribable  confusion.  Forrest  had  again  ex 
posed  himself  like  a  trooper  in  the  line ;  but  it  was  of  no 
use?  and  with  a  mere  handful  of  the  best  of  his  men  and 
some  of  his  principal  officers,  he  cut  his  way  out  by  the 
Montgomery  road  to  the  east.  During  the  night  he  made 
the  circuit  of  the  National  Army  by  the  north  and  reached 
Plantersville  in  the  morning,  the  scene  of  his  hasty  retreat 
the  day  before.  Kesting  here  a  few  hours,  he  led  his  men 
toward  Marion,  but  was  soon  confronted  by  McCook's  divis 
ion,  marching  to  rejoin  Wilson  at  Selma.  Skirmishing  to 
gain  time,  he  again  evaded  by  the  left,  and  by  another  night 
march  crossed  the  Cahawba  Kiver  and  joined  Chalmers  and 
Jackson  at  Marion,  on  the  morning  of  the  4th. 

Wilson's  prize  was  an  enormous  one,  and  it  had  been  most 
skilfully  won.  His  rapid  movements,  his  prompt  attacks, 
his  untiring  pursuit  had  made  his  preponderance  of  force  of 
double  value.  He  had  always  anticipated  his  adversary  in 
time  and  overpowered  him  in  strength,  so  that  for  once  in 
his  career  the  doughty  Forrest  had  his  own  tactics  com 
pletely  turned  upon  him,  and  had  been  thoroughly  beaten 
in  detail.  Forty  guns,  twenty-seven  hundred  prisoners,  and 
great  stores  of  material  of  war  were  captured  ;  but  the  sever 
est  loss  to  the  Confederacy  was  the  destruction  of  their  great 
manufacturing  arsenal. 

Wilson  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Alabama  Kiver 
with  great  difficulty,  for  the  stream  was  deep  and  swift. 
After  destroying  the  workshops  and  public  stores,  he  deter 
mined  to  move  on  Montgomery  and  thence  into  Georgia, 
with  the  ultimate  purpose,  he  says,  of  using  the  discretion 
allowed  him,  to  march  through  the  Carolinas  to  the  armies  in 


210  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

the  east.  The  militia  and  reserves  made  but  feeble  resist 
ance,  the  evacuation  of  Eichmond  and  surrender  of  Lea 
were  soon  rumored  through  the  country,  and  the  march  to 
Macon  had  none  of  the  military  significance  of  the  brilliant 
and  instructive  campaign  against  Forrest.  In  a  strategic 
point  of  view,  it  was  a  departure  from  the  sound  principles 
which  had  guided  the  preceding  part  of  the  campaign.  Two- 
thirds  of  Forrest's  corps  was  still  intact  between  the  Cahawba 
and  Tombigbee  Rivers,  and  Mobile  was  not  yet  taken.  His 
true  objectives  were  west  and  south,  not  east  and  north. 
But  the  exhausted  Confederacy  was  collapsing  from  all  sides, 
its  President  was  fleeing  for  his  life,  as  he  thought,  and  it 
was  the  fortune  of  a  detachment  of  Wilson's  command  to 
arrest  him  in  the  far  southern  part  of  Georgia,  near  the 
Florida  line.  Mobile  soon  fell,  and  Forrest,  sore  with  his 
wounds,  but  more  sore  with  the  chagrin  of  terminating  his 
military  career  with  so  great  a  defeat,  gave  his  parole,  dis 
banded  his  hardy  troopers,  and  like  most  of  the  good  soldiers 
of  the  South,  taught  the  people  by  word  and  by  example  to 
submit  without  reserve  to  the  triumphant  National  Govern 
ment. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

GOLDSBORO  TO  RALEIGH.— SURRENDER  OF  JOHNSTON'S 
ARMY. 

UPON  assembling  his  army  at  Goldsboro,  the  first  work 
demanding  Sherman's  attention  was  to  supply  with  clothing 
and  shoes  the  four  corps  which  had  become  nearly  naked 
and  barefoot  in  the  march  from  Savannah.  Colonel  Wright 
had  worked  so  industriously  upon  the  Neuse  River  Railway 
that  a  train  reached  Goldsboro  the  day  of  Sherman's  arrival 
there ;  but  the  line  was  so  poorly  stocked  with  locomotives 
and  cars  that  it  could  not  be  depended  upon  to  supply  the 
army.  Kinston  was  therefore  made  a  secondary  base  for  a 
time,  steamboats  carried  stores  there  from  Beaufort,  More- 
head  City,  and  Newbern,  and  the  army  trains  were  kept 
busy  between  Kinston  and  Goldsboro.  The  Wilmington 
Railway  was  not  badly  damaged,  and  a  few  days  sufficed  to 
put  its  track  in  order,  but  it  was  bare  of  equipment.  Loco 
motives  and  cars  could  not  be  procured  and  shipped  in  a 
moment.  Some  interval  must  necessarily  elapse  before  a 
new  campaign  could  open,  and  after  establishing  his  camps, 
Sherman  left  Schofield  in  command  and  made  a  swift  jour 
ney  to  City  Point,  where  he  had  a  personal  consultation  with 
General  Grant,  and  plans  for  the  final  campaign  were  defi 
nitely  arranged.  The  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
about  Petersburg  was  such  that  Lee's  army  must  necessarily 
follow  the  Danville  and  Charlotte  line  in  retreat,  or  make  its 


(UNIVERSITY 


212  THE  MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

way  by  Lynchburg  into  the"  valley  of  East  Tennessee.  To 
meet  the  latter  contingency,  General  Thomas  had  been  or 
dered,  as  has  already  been  noted,  to  send  the  Fourth  Corps 
(Wood's)  to  Bull's  Gap,  fifty  miles  northeast  of  Knoxville, 
where  it  could  hold  the  passes  through  which  the  principal 
routes  ran,  long  enough  to  enable  Grant  to  close  upon  the 
rear  of  Lee's  army.  To  meet  the  first  contingency,  Sheridan 
was  already  ordered  into  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  where  he  was  soon  to  fight  the  series 
of  brilliant  engagements  near  Five  Forks,  and  to  get  where 
he  could  beat  Lee  in  the  race  for  Danville  when  the  forced 
evacuation  of  Eichmond  and  Petersburg  should  take  place. 
In  this  final  combination,  Sherman's  part  was  to  move  his 
whole  army  a  little  north  of  Raleigh  and  thence  to  "Weldon 
on  the  Roanoke  River,  unless  changes  in  the  situation  should 
induce  General  Grant  to  modify  the  orders. 

Sherman  also  had  the  fortune  to  meet  President  Lincoln 
at  City  Point,  and  in  an  unreserved  conversation  upon  the 
situation,  he  learned  that  that  great  man's  heart  was  set 
upon  restoring  peace  without  more  bloodshed,  if  that  were 
possible  ;  the  only  terms  which  he  demanded  being  submis 
sion  to  the  National  Constitution,  disbanding  of  Confederate 
armies  and  governments,  acknowledgment  of  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  and  the  speedy  resumption  of  the  relations  of  the 
States  to  the  Federal  Government,  the  existing  State  govern 
ments  continuing  to  act  de  facto  till  necessary  legislation  by 
Congress  could  be  had.  A  general  amnesty  would  follow 
such  submission,  but  he  hoped  to  be  relieved  of  embarrass 
ment  as  to  the  political  chiefs,  by  the  voluntary  expatriation 
of  Mr.  Davis  and  a  few  of  the  most  prominent. 

Sherman  returned  to  Goldsboro  on  March  30th,  with  au* 
thority  for  some  changes  in  his  army  organization  which 
were  essential  to  its  easy  administration.  His  left  wing, 


GOLDSBORO   TO  RALEIGH.  213 

under  blocum,  was  formally  constituted  the  Army  of  Georgia ; 
the  centre  remained  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  Schofield, 
including  the  divisions  under  General  Terry,  which  were  per 
manently  organized  as  the  Tenth  Corps ;  and  the  right  wing 
retaining  the  organization  it  had  as  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
These  were  not  merely  nominal  distinctions,  but  were  neces 
sary,  under  the  laws,  to  give  the  commanders  of  these  three 
grand  divisions  the  power  to  relieve  Sherman  of  the  details 
of  business  administration  of  the  whole.  The  only  change 
in  the  commanders  of  corps  was  the  assignment  of  Major- 
General  Mower  to  the  Twentieth  Corps.  The  accumulation 
of  supplies  and  refitting  of  the  troops  had  so  far  progressed 
that,  on  April  5th,  confidential  instructions  were  issued,  or 
dering  the  new  campaign  to  open  on  the  10th.  But  next 
day  came  the  news  that  Richmond  was  evacuated,  Lee  was 
struggling  to  reach  Danville,  and  Sherman's  line  was  accord 
ingly  changed  to  Ealeigh,  with  Greensboro  and  Charlotte  as 
his  objective  points  beyond. 

The  march  began  on  the  10th,  and  on  the  llth,  at  Smith- 
field,  the  army  was  electrified  by  the  announcement  that 
Lee  had  surrendered  at  Appomattox  on  the  9th.  The  day 
was  a  warm  and  bright  spring  day ;  the  columns  had  halted 
for  the  usual  rest  at  the  end  of  each  hour's  march ;  the  men 
were  sitting  or  lying  upon  the  grass  on  either  side  the  road, 
near  Smithfield,  when  a  staff  officer  was  seen  riding  from 
the  front,  galloping  and  gesticulating  in  great  excitement, 
the  men  cheering  and  cutting  strange  antics  as  he  passed. 
When  he  came  nearer  he  was  heard  to  shout,  "  Lee  has  sur 
rendered  !  "  The  soldiers  screamed  out  their  delight ;  they 
flung  their  hats  at  him  as  he  rode  ;•  they  shouted,  "You're 
the  man  we've  been  looking  for  these  three  years  ! "  They 
turned  somersaults  like  over-excited  children.  They  knew 
the  long  Civil  War  was  virtually  over.  Another  phase  of 


214  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

the  universal  rejoicing  in  the  land  was  quite  as  well  illus^ 
trated  by  the  roadside.  A  Southern  woman  had  come  to  the 
gate  with  her  children,  to  ask  of  a  corps  commander  the 
usual  protection  for  her  family  while  the  column  was  pass 
ing,  and  as  she  caught  the  meaning  of  the  wild  shout,  she 
looked  down  upon  the  wondering  little  ones,  while  tears 
streamed  down  her  cheeks,  saying  to  them  only,  "  Now  father 
will  come  home." 

From  this  time  the  march  had  military  importance  only 
as  it  led  to  the  quickly  approaching  end.  The  skirmishing 
of  advance  and  rear  guards  continued,  but  Johnston  was 
only  delaying  Sherman's  movements  till  he  could  communi 
cate  with  the  Confederate  President,  who,  with  some  of 
his  Cabinet  and  the  more  important  archives  of  the  dissolv 
ing  Government,  was  upon  a  railway  train  at  Greensboro. 
Ealeigh  was  occupied  on  the  13th,  and  on  the  next  day  a 
flag  of  truce  from  General  Johnston  opened  the  final  nego 
tiations  for  surrender.  It  was  on  the  evening  of  that  day 
that  President  Lincoln  was  assassinated.  The  conjuncture  of 
events  was  one  of  the  strangest  that  the  strange  current  of 
human  history  has  ever  presented,  and  we  puzzle  our  brains 
in  the  vain  effort  to  conjecture  how  the  destiny  of  the  coun 
try  might  have  been  modified  if  that  horrible  murder  had 
not  been  committed. 

Sherman  met  Johnston  at  Durham  Station  in  the  spirit  of 
tie  lenient  policy  Lincoln  had  indicated  to  him  a  fortnight 
before,  and  an  outline  of  a  convention  was  arranged  before 
he  knew  of  the  President's  death.  Knowing  the  danger 
that  the  war  would  take  a  more  revengeful  and  destructive 
form  if  the  campaign  were  continued,  and  deeply  impressed 
by  the  dismay  and  sorrow  with  which  General  Johnston  re 
ceived  the  terrible  news  of  the  assassination,  he  felt  that 
this  was  only  a  new  reason  for  ending  the  strife  before  it  de* 


GOLDSBORO  TO   RALEIGH.  215 

generated  into  one  of  extermination  on  the  one  side,  and 
despair  on  the  other.  Both  generals  recognized  the  use- 
lessness  of  any  further  destruction  of  human  life,  and  agreed 
in  regarding  it  as  criminal.  Johnston  and  the  prominent 
men  with  him  were  explicit  in  admitting  the  abolition  of 
slavery  as  an  accomplished  fact,  but  the  negotiating  parties 
made  the  error  of  failing  to  see  that  the  embodiment  of 
such  a  statement  in  the  terms  of  the  convention  would  have 
increased  greatly  the  chances  of  its  approval  by  the  National 
Administration. 

The  history  of  the  armistice  and  of  its  disapproval  are 
part  of  the  political  history  of  the  country  rather  than  of 
the  military  campaign.  It  is  enough  to  say  here  that  the 
agreement  reached  Washington  when  the  members  of  the  Ad 
ministration  and  the  leaders  in  Congress  were  under  the 
influence  of  a  panic  resulting  from  the  belief  that  the  Con 
federate  leaders,  conscious  of  the  desperation  of  their  cause, 
had  organized  a  plot  for  the  murder  not  only  of  the  Presi 
dent,  but  of  all  his  Cabinet  and  the  principal  generals  of 
the  army.  We  now  know  that  the  leading  southern  men 
felt  Lincoln's  murder  to  be  the  most  grievous  misfortune 
that  could  then  have  befallen  them ;  and  Sherman  was  in 
fluenced  by  the  conviction  of  this,  as  he  saw  it  involuntarily 
expressed  in  the  countenances  of  General  Johnston  and  the 
men  about  him.  But  panic  is  unreasoning,  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  whose  position  at  the  moment  was  a  dominant 
one  in  the  Government,  seems  to  have  rushed  to  the  conclu 
sion  that  Sherman  was  ready  to  betray  the  cause  he  had  so 
greatly  served,  and  acted  accordingly. 

No  trait  of  Sherman's  character  was  more  marked  than  his 
loyal  subordination  to  his  superiors  in  army  rank  or  in  the 
State.  Full  of  confidence  in  his  own  views,  and  vigorous  in 
urging  them,  he  never  complained  at  being  overruled,  and 


216  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

instantly  adapted  his  military  conduct  to  the  orders  he  re> 
ceived  when  once  debate  was  closed  by  specific  directions 
from  those  in  authority.  He  had  shown  this  in  the  Vicks- 
burg  campaign  and  at  Savannah ;  and,  hurt  and  humiliated 
as  he  now  was,  his  conduct  as  an  officer  was  the  same, 
though  he  resented  the  personal  wrong.  He  had  not  known 
that  General  Grant  had  been  directed  to  have  no  negotia 
tions  with  Lee  except  for  the  military  surrender  of  his  army, 
and  he  overestimated  the  importance,  as  a  guard  against 
anarchy,  of  having  a  formal  agreement  of  submission  made 
in  the  name  of  all  the  Southern  people.  His  armistice  and 
convention  with  Johnston  was  subject  to  confirmation  or  re 
jection.  He  had  given  to  his  Government  the  opportunity 
of  doing  either,  or  of  taking  the  negotiation  into  the  control 
of  civil  officers  and  modifying  it.  Had  President  Johnson 
simply  said  to  him  that  the  arrangement  was  inadmissible, 
and  that  he  must  resume  the  campaign  unless  the  Confed 
erate  General  made  an  unconditional  surrender,  he  would 
have  obeyed,  not  only  without  protest,  but  without  any 
thought  of  complaint. 

Instead  of  this,  the  Secretary  of  War  published  the  agree 
ment  as  if  he  were  proclaiming  a  discovered  treason  and 
were  appealing  to  the  country  to  sustain  the  Government 
against  a  formidable  enemy  in  its  own  camp.  General 
Grant  was  hurried  to  Ealeigh  to  supervise  Sherman  in  the 
control  of  his  army  and  to  take  away  his  responsibility, 
leaving  only  the  nominal  command.  Even  this  would  per 
haps  have  been  taken  from  him  had  not  the  same  un 
founded  fears  made  the  authorities  do  the  army  the  injustice 
of  supposing  it,  too,  might  rebel.  Grant's  practical,  cool 
judgment  made  him  turn  his  presence  at  Ealeigh  into  an 
apparent  visit  of  consultation  with  Sherman,  who  had 
promptly  given  the  stipulated  notice  of  the  termination  of 


GOLDSBORO  TO  RALEIGH.  217 

the  armistice  before  Grant's  arrival,  and  soon  after  received 
the  final  surrender  of  the  Confederate  army.  When  the 
panic  was  over,  the  Secretary  of  War  gave  public  evidence 
of  his  sorrow  for  the  offensive  incidents  in  the  course  pur 
sued,  but  Sherman  could  not  at  once  forgive  the  imputation 
upon  his  personal  loyalty  to  the  Government. 

The  duty  of  receiving  the  arms  of  the  late  Confederates 
and  of  issuing  the  paroles  was  committed  to  General  Scho- 
field,  and  was  performed  at  Greenesboro,  in  close  neighbor 
hood  of  the  battlefield  of  Guilford  Court  House,  where,  in 
the  War  of  the  Eevolution,  General  Greene  had  won  laurels 
in  an  important  engagement  with  Lord  Cornwallis.  Gen 
eral  Hardee  met  Schofield  and  a  small  detachment  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  on  the  railway  near  Hillsboro,  and  con 
ducted  him  to  Johnston's  headquarters  in  a  grove  in  the 
edge  of  Greenesboro.  The  Confederate  General  had  declined 
the  use  of  a  house  for  his  headquarters,  and  a  few  war-worn 
tents  sheltered  him  and  his  staff.  Hampton,  still  irrecon 
cilable,  had  refused  to  bring  in  the  cavalry  for  surrender, 
and  these  were  scattering  over  the  country,  making  their 
way  home  as  they  might.  Some  four  thousand  horsemen, 
and  nearly  or  quite  as  many  of  the  infantry,  had  deserted 
since  the  beginning  of  the  armistice,  fearing  it  might  end  in 
their  being  held  as  prisoners  of  war.1  Those  who  remained 
found  the  advantage  of  having  a  respected  and  responsible 
head  to  represent  them,  for,  after  receiving  their  paroles, 
they  were  furnished  with  transportation  on  the  railways,  and 
with  rations  from  the  National  stores.  Johnston  scrupu 
lously  distributed  to  each  officer  and  man  a  coined  dollar 
out  of  a  small  sum  of  money  he  had  received  from  the  Con 
federate  treasury,  and,  with  this  token  of  the  unpaid  ser- 


1  Johnston's  Narrative. 

VOL.  X.— 10 


218  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE. 

vices  they  had  given  to  the  lost  cause,  the  men  in  gray, 
scattering  on  different  routes,  took  up  the  journey  home 
ward — to  many  of  them  a  long  and  weary  one — to  begin 
anew  the  struggle  of  life  in  an  almost  universal  impoverish 
ment.  The  National  columns  marched  northward  with 
flying  colors  and  swell  of  martial  music,  full  of  hope  and 
enthusiasm,  to  take  part  in  the  memorable  review  at  Wash 
ington,  where  their  sorrow  that  Lincoln  could  not  have 
returned  their  salute  from  the  front  of  the  White  House 
was  a  representative  sorrow  for  all  the  comrades  who  could 
not  answer  to  that  morning's  roll-call. 


APPENDIX  A. 


FORCES  OF    THE    OPPOSING  ARMIES 

TENNESSEE. 


IN 


I. — Forces  ^''present  for  duty"  under  the  immediate  command  oj 
MA JOK-GENEHAL  GEOHGE  H.  THOMAS,  October  31,  November'^ 
and  30,  and  December  10,  18(54,  as  reported  by  the  returns  on 
file  in  the  office  of  the  Adjutant- General,  Washington,  I).  U. 


COMMANDS. 

OCT.  31sT. 

NOV.  20TH. 

Nov.  30TH. 

DEC.  10iH. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

lg 
I1 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

la 

w 

Fourth  Corps'    
Twenty-third  Corps  *  
Cavalry 

719 
461 
22? 

7-48 

248 

11.612 
10,163 
5,364 
17,913 
7,111 

775 
455 
225-> 

792 

n,940 
9,903 
5  551 
19,141 

766 
494 
3431 

704 

10,200 
10,033 
10.453 
1  b,911 

6^864 

880 
1,122 
262 
60 

493 

8,843 

686 
49(5 
45(56 
653 

"  237 

25 
30 
3 
12 

15 
581 

8 

14,415 
9.781 
14.1.33 
15,850 

'  Tieia 

753 
1,060 
115 
57 

522 

11,345 

463 

District  of  Tennessee  5  .  . 
Unassigned  Detachments 
District  of  Etowah 

193 

29 

28 
7 
11 

3 

6,238 

891 
1,047 
268 
63 

327 

210 

25 
30 

7 
11 

15 

483 

Reserve  Brigade,  Chatta 
nooga 

CJnassigned  Infantry  

"            Artillery 

Signal  Corps,  Chattan'ga. 
Veteran   Reserve    Corps, 
Nashville 



Det.  Army  of  Tennessee  6. 
Reserve  Artillery,  Chatta 
nooga      

Total  present  for  duty  .  .  . 
Present  for  duty  equipped 

2,545 
2,509 

2,403 
2,293 

52,163 
51,122 

57,369 
57,025 

3,176 
3,129 

72,121 
68,323 

3,312 
3,092 

76,106 
67,180 

1  Second  and  Third  Divisions. 

2  Consisted  of  Hatch's  Division,  Croxton's  and  Capron's  Brigades,  and  Fourth, 
1T.  S.  Cavalry. 

3  Consisted  of  Hatch's  and  Johnson's  Divisions,  Croxton's  Brigade  and  Fourth 
U.  S.  Cavalry,  and  several  independent  cavalry  commands  not  specifically  enu 
merated.     Of  these  2,272  are  reported  '•  present  for  duty,"  but  not  "  present  for 
duty  equipped"  (dismounted). 

4  Composed  of  McCook's,  Hatch's,  Johnson's,  and  Knipe's  Divisions,  and  Fourth 
TJ.  S.  Cavalry.     Of  these (5,460  are  reported  "present  for  duty,"  and  not  "  present 
for  duty  equipped  "  (dismounted). 

6  See  abstract  in  detail. 

6  General  A.  J.  Smith's  divisions. 


220 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


II. — Forces  "present  for  duty"  as  reported  to  the  Adjutant- General 
of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  by  the  Commaridant  of  the  Dis 
trict  of  Tennessee,  November  20  and  30,  and  December  10, 1864. 


COMMANDS. 

STATIONS. 

NOV.  20TH. 

Nov.  30TH. 

DEC.  10iH. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

4^  1  Commiss'd 
8  ^oswocSS  1  officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

Enlisted 
men, 

Fourth  Division  Twen 
tieth  Corps  
Post  Forces 

Nashville,  Tenn  

Springfield,  Tenn.. 
Fort  Donelson,  Tenn 
Clarksville,  Tenn.  .  . 
Gallatin,  Tenn,  

Johnsonville,  Tenn.. 
Decatur,  Ala.  . 

172 

178 
6 
2 
3 
39 

96 
3 

3,916 

4.698 
380 
108 
60 
907 

2,617 

10,390 
2.0UO 
376 
106 
109 
144 

1,964 

424 
61 
12 
2 
3 
4 

9,210 
1.969 
539 
109 
111 
145 

(i 

ti 

Troops  on  N.  &*N."wl 
R.  R.  . 

District  of  N.Alabama.. 
Post  Forces 

106 
24 
1 
35 
152 
3 
32 
40 

2,285 
493 

'  810 
1,028 
128 
703 
1,008 

Troops  on  T.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Post  Forces  
Defences  N.  &  C.  R.  R.. 
Post  Forces  

a 

Larkinsville,  Ala  
Pulaski.  Tenn  
Columbia,  Tenn  
Tullahoma,  Tenn.  .  .  . 
Stevenson,  Ala  
Decherd,  Tenn  
Murfreesboro1,  Tenn. 
Stevenson,  Ala 

.... 

5 
2 

83 
124 

4 
2 

80 

122 

70 
3 

4 
1 

4 

1,361 
120 
134 

65 

3 

5 

1 

4 
63 

1,848 
117 

136 
1,964 

District  of  N.  Alabama  .  . 
Battery    F.    First  Ohio 
Artillery.. 

Troops  on  T.  &  A.  R.  R. 
Twenty  -  first      Indiana 
Volunteer  Battery  
Troops  on  N.  &  N.  W. 
R  R 

Nashville,  Tenn  

It                       U 

ti             (i 

Total  '  '  present  for  duty  "  

16,911 

792 

19,141 

704 

653 

15,850 

1  Post  of  Tullahoma  included. 


III. — Forces  "present  for  duty,"  as  reported  to  the  Adjutant- General 
of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  by  tfie  Commandant  of  the  Dis 
trict  of  Etowah,  December  10,  1864. 


COMMANDS. 

STATIONS. 

Commiss'd 
officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

First  Separate  Div.  Different  Corps. 
Fourteenth  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.  .  . 
Sixteenth          "                " 
Eighteenth        " 
Forty-second    "                 "             
Forty  -fourth     "                " 
Artillery  

Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
Nashville,  Tenn  

Bridgeport,  Ala... 
Chattanooga,  Tenn 
Nashville,*Tenn... 
Chattanooga,  Tenn 

Jutv  "... 

101 
16 
26 
11 

20 
14 
49 

3.9^9 
594 
655 
353 
399 
198 
1,474 

Total  "  present  for 

2o7 

7,612 

APPENDIX   A. 


221 


IV. — Abstract  of  officers  and  men  '''present,"  taken  from  GENERAL  J.  B. 
HOOD'S  return  of  December  10,  1864. 


PRESKNT 

FOB  DUTY. 

SICK. 

EXTRA. 
DUTY. 

IN 
ARREST. 

AGGREGATE 
PRESENT. 

8 
o 

a 
3 

Officers. 

I 

Officers. 

1 

i 

O 

B 

o> 
S 

General  and  Staff  

13 

18 

Lee's  Corps  : 
Staff                 

— 

19 

19 
3,688 
3,969 
3,175 

Johnson's  Division.  .  . 
Stevenson's  Division  1 
Clayton's  Division  .  .  . 

Stewart"  s  Corps  : 
Staff 

219 
246 
254 

2,530 
2.664 
2,053 

7,247 

9 

7 
3 

87 
177 
127 

56.       777 
31        736 
44       6o4 

5 

"3 
8 

5 

8 
7 

838 

q 

19 

391 

131    2,197 

20 

10,851 

9 
4.205 
1.016 
2,621 

Loring's  Division  .... 
French's  Division  2.  .  . 
Walthall's  Division... 

Cheatham*  s  Corps: 
Staff                 

25-2 

88 
160 

2,625 
002 
1,476 

52 

1 
21 

5ifi 
87 
296 

899 

26 
21 
33 

723 
215 
624 

3 

""a 

8 
2 

8 

509 

4,703 

74 

80 

1,562 

6 

18 

••'17 

10 
6 

7,851 

I9 

12 
3,923 

4,0-1-2 
2.  66'J 

Clcburne's  Division  3. 
Cheatham's   Division, 
(Brown)   ...          ... 

274 

267 
191 

2,539 

2,7'CO 
1,659 

9 

12 
15 

246 

215 
216 

41 

51 
46 

794 

751 
530 

8 

8 

.... 

Bate's  Division  

Engineer  Battalion  

Escorts  
Jackson's  Div.  Cavalry. 

Artillery  : 
Lee's  Corp1' 

744 

6,928 

36 

677 

138 
4 

2,078       6 

33 

10,640 

11 

377 

16 

76 

484 

44 

197 

272 
2,344 

'is 

11 
62 

2         52 

43       476 

381 
3,152 

4 

8 

241 

2,616 

18 

73 

45 

528 

4           8 

3,533 

42 
52 
39 
13 

726 
801 
730 
247 

15 
22 
1 
11 

8 
1 
2 
2 

122 

82 
108 
44 

1 

90S 
958 
880 
3-21 

Stewart's  Corps  
Cheatham's  Corps  
Jackson's  Cav.  Div.  .  . 

.... 

""4 

146 

2,504 

49       8 

356       1           4        3,C68 

i  Palmer's  brigade  not  included. 

8  Sears's  and  Cockrell's  brigades  not  included. 

8  Mercer's  brigade  not  included. 


222 


THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 


PRESENT 
FOB  DUTY. 

SICK. 

Officers,  i 

i  be 

[TRA 
UTY. 

c 

o> 

3 

IN 
ABREST. 

AGGREGATE 
PRESENT. 

i 
O 

1 

Officers. 

1 

1 

1 

Summary  : 
Gen.  Hood  and  Staff.. 
Lee's  CorpH  

1.3 
838 
509 
7-14 
241 
146 
11 

2,502 

18 

10,851 
7.851 
10,640 
3.533  * 
3.<  68 
484 

7.247 
4,703 
(i,928 
2.610 
2.504 
377 

19 
74 
36 

18 

391 
899 
617 
73 
49 
16 

131 
80 
138 
45 
8 
4 

406 

2.197 
I,5fi2 

2,078 
528 
S56 
76 

6,797 

8 
(i 
6 
4 
1 

20 
18 
33 
8 
4 

Stewart's  Corps 

Cheatham's  Corps.  .  .  . 
Cavalry    .      ... 

Artillery  

Engineers  

25 

83 

24,375 

147 

2,105 

26,4-10  2 

On  the  original  return  are  the  following  remarks  : 

"  Palmer's  brigade  of  Lee's  corps,  French's  (Mercer's)  brigade  of  Cheatham's 
corps,  and  Sears's  and  Cockrell's  brigades  of  Stewart's  corps,  are  on  detached 
service  and  not  herein  included." 

"  A  return  of  the  cavalry  under  Major-General  Forrest  has  not  been  furnished, 
and  consequently  not  included.  The  last  field  return  of  the  division  of  cavalry 
commanded  by  Brig. -General  Jackson  (of  November  6,  1864),  is  included." 

The  numbers  of  the  cavalry  corps  of  General  Forrest,  given  in  the  text,  page 
12,  are  taken,  as  there  stated,  from  his  official  return  made  just  before  entering 
upon  this  campaign,  and  are  the  only  ones  accessible.  While,  therefore,  the 
foregoing  table  should  be  increased  by  the  numbers  of  Sears's  brigade  to  give  the 
aggregate  force  of  Hood  in  the  battle  of  Nashville,  Forrest's  cavalry  must  also  be 
added,  and  the  three  other  infantry  brigades,  to  show  the  whole  of  his  army  in 
Tennessee. 

The  abstract  of  Hood's  forces  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  (November  20th), 
as  given  in  the  text,  is  also  made  up  from  official  returns  in  the  War  Records 
Office,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here. 


1  Error  in  original,  which  reads  3,532. 

2  Original  return  erroneously  footed  34,439. 


APPENDIX  B. 

ORGANIZATION"    OF    OPPOSING    ARMIES 
IN   TENNESSEE. 

I. — Organization  of  IT.  S.  forces  commanded  by  MAJOR-GENERAL 
GEORGE  H.  THOMAS  at  the  Battle  of  Nashville,  Tenn.,  December 
15  and  10,  1864. » 

FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  WOOD. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  NATHAN  KIMBALL. 


First  Brigade. 
Col.  ISAAC  M.  KIRBY. 
21st  Illinois. 
38th  Illinois. 
31st  Indiana. 
.  81st  Indiana. 
9()th  Ohio. 
10  1st  Ohio. 

Second  Brigade. 
Brig.  -Gen.  WALTER  C. 
WHITAKER. 
96th  Illinois?. 
115th  Illinois. 
35th  Indiana. 
21st  Kentucky. 
23d  Kentucky. 
45th  Ohio. 
51st  Ohio. 

Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  WM.  GROSE. 
75th  Illinois. 
80th  Illinois. 
84th  Illinois. 
9th  Indiana. 
80th  Indiana. 
36th  Indiana  (detach't). 
84th  Indiana. 
77th  Pennsylvania. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WASHINGTON  L.  ELLIOTT. 


First  Brigade. 

Second  Brigade. 

Third  Brigade. 

Col.  EMERSON  OPDYCKE. 

Col.  JOHN  Q.  LANE. 

Col.  JOSEPH  CON  RID. 

36th  Illinois. 

100th  Illinois. 

42d  Illinois. 

i4ih  Illinois. 

40th  Indiana. 

51st  Illinois. 

731  Illinois. 

57th  Indiana. 

79th  Illinois. 

74th  Illinois. 

28th  Kentucky. 

15th  Missouri. 

88th  Illinois. 

26th  Ohio. 

64th  Ohio. 

125th  Ohio. 

97th  Ohio. 

65th  Ohio. 

24th  Wisconsin. 

i  Compiled  from  the  Records  of  the  Adjutaut-General's  Office. 


224  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

BEIGADIER-GENEBAL  SAMUEL  BEATTY. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  ABEL  D.  STREIGHT.   (1)  Col.  P.  SIDNEY  Posr.1         Col.  FRED.  KNEFLEB. 
89th  Illinois.  (2)  Lt.-Col.  ROBT.  L.  KIMBERLY.      79th  Indiana. 

61st  Indiana.  59th  Illinois.  86th  Indiana. 

8th  Kansas.  41st  Ohio.  13th  Ohio. 

15th  Ohio.  71st  Ohio.  19th  Ohio. 

49th  Ohio.  93d  Ohio. 

134th  Ohio. 

ARTILLERY   BRIGADE. 
MAJOR  W1LBER  F.  GOODSPEED. 

Indiana  Light  Artillery.  25th  Battery.  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  6th  Battery. 

Kentucky  Light  Artillery,  1st  Battery.  Pennsylvania  Light  Artillery,  Battery  B, 

1st  Michigan  Light  Artillery,  Batt'y  E.  4th  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  M. 
1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  G. 


TWENTY-THIRD   ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  DARIUS  N.  COUCH. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gcn.  Jos.  A.  COOPEB.  Col.  ORLANDO  H.  MOORE.  Col.  JOHN  MEHRINGEB. 

130th  Indiana.                          107th  Illinois.  91st  Indiana 

28th  Kentucky.                        80th  Indiana.  123d  Indiana. 

25th  Michigan.                        129th  Indiana.  50th  Ohio. 

99th  Ohio.                                23d  Michigan.  183d  Ohio 
3d  Tennessee.                           lllth  Ohio. 
6th  Tennessee.                        118th  Ohio. 

ARTILLERY. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  15th  Battery.         Ohio  Light  Artillery,  19th  Battery. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JACOB  D.  COX. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  CHAS.  C.  DOOLITTLE.   Col.  JOHN  S.  CASEMENT.  Col.  ISRAEL  N.  STILES. 

12th  Kentucky.                       65th  Illinois.  112th  Illinois. 

Ifith  Kentucky.                       65th  Indiana.  63d  Indiana. 

100th  Ohio.                              124th  Indiana.  120th  Indiana. 

104th  Ohio.                               103d  Ohio.  128th  Indiana. 
8th  Tennessee.                        6th  Tennessee. 

ARTILLERY. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  23d  Battery.          1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D. 

J  Wounded. 


APPENDIX  B.  225 

DETACHMENT  OF  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ANDREW  J.  SMITH. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  McARTHTTR. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  WM.  L.  MCMILLEN.    Col.  Lucius  F.  HUBBARD.  (1)  Col.  S.  a.  HILL  (killed) 

Illinois  Lt.  Artillery,  Cogs-  Iowa   Light  Artillery,  2d  (2)  Col.WM.  R.  MARSHALL. 

well's  Battery.  Battery.  12th  Iowa. 

114th  Illinois.  6th  Minnesota.  35th  Iowa. 

93d  Indiana.  9th  Minnesota.  7th  Minnesota. 

10th  Minnesota.  llth  Missouri.  33d  Missouri. 

72d  Ohio.  8th  Wisconsin.  2d  Missouri  Light  Artillery, 

95th  Ohio.  Battery  I. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  KENNER  GARRARD. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  DAVID  MOORE.          Col.  JAMES  I.  GILBERT.  Col.  EDWARD  H.  WOLFE. 

119th  Illinois.  58th  Illinois.  49th  Illinois. 

122d  Illinois.  Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  3d  Bat.  117th  Illinois. 

89th  Indiana.  27th  Iowa.  2d  Illinois  Lt.  Art.,  Bat.  G. 

Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  9th  Bat.  32d  Iowa.  52d  Indiana. 

21st  Missouri.  10th  Kansas.  178th  New  York. 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
COLONEL  JONATHAN  B.  MOORE. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Artillery. 

Col.  LYMAN  M.  WARD.      Col.  LEANDER  BLANDEN. 

72d  Illinois.  81st  Illinois.  Indiana  Lt.  Art.,  14th  Bat. 

40th  Missouri.  95th  Illinois.  2d  Missouri  Light  Artillery, 

14th  Wi-consin.  44th  Missouri.  Battery  A. 

33d  Wisconsin. 


PROVISIONAL  DETACHMENT  (DISTRICT  OF  THE  ETOWAII). 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JAMES  B.  STEEDMAN. 

PROVISIONAL  DIVISIONS 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  CHARLES  CRUFT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  BENJAMIN  HARRISON.    Col.  JOHN  G.  MITCHELL.  Lt.-Col.  C.  H.  GROSVENORO 

Artillery. 

Second  Brigade  (Army  Tenn.)  68th  Indiana  Infantry.2       20th  Indiana  Battery. 
CoL  ADAM  G.  MALLOY.          18th  Ohio  Infantry.2  18th  Ohio  Battery. 

1  Composed  mainly  of  detachments  belonging  to  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth,  and  Twentieth  Army  Corps,  which  had  been  unable  to  rejoin  their 
proper  commands  serving  with  General  Sherman's  army,  oil  the  inarch  through 
Georgia. 


2  Attached  to  Third  Brigade. 

10* 


226  THE  MARCH  TO   THE  SEA. 

First  Colored  Brigade.  Second  Colored  Brigade. 

Col.  THOMAS  J.  MORGAN.  Col.  CHARLES  R.  THOMPSON. 

14th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.  12th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

16th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.*  13th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

17th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.  100th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 
18th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops  (battalion). 
44th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops. 

POST  OF  NASHVILLE. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  P.  MILLER 

SECOND  BRIGADE,  FOURTH  DIVISION,  TWENTIETH  ARMY  CORPS,  ' 

COLONEL  EDWIN  C.  MASON. 

142d  Indiana.  ITfith  Ohio.  182d  Ohio. 

45th  New  York.  179th  Ohio. 

UNATTACHED. 

3d  Kentucky.  173d  Ohio.  Veteran  Reserve  Corps. 

28th  Michigan.  78th  Pennsylvania.    44th  Wisconsin. 

45th  Wisconsin. 

GARRISON  -ARTILLERY. 
MAJOR  JOHN  J.  ELY. 

Indiana  Light  Artillery,  2d  Battery.         1st  Michigan  Light  Artillery.  Battery  P. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  4th  Battery.        1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  Battery  E. 
Indiana  Light  Infantry,  12th  Battery.      Ohio  Light  Artillery,  20th  Battery. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  21st  Battery.       1st  Tennessee  Light  Artillery,  Battery  C. 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  22d  Battery.        1st  Tennessee  Light  Artillery,  Battery  D, 
Indiana  Light  Artillery,  24th  Battery.      2d  U.  S.  Colored  Lt.  Artillery,  Battery  A. 

QUARTERMASTER'S   DIVISION,  a 
COLONEL  JAMES  L.  DONALDSON. 


CAVALRY  CORPS. 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON. 
ESCORT. 

4th  United  States. 

FIRST  DIVISION." 

First  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  JOHN  T.  CROXTON. 

Illinois  Lt.  Art..  Board  of  Trade  Bat.        8th  Iowa.         2d  Michigan. 
4th  Kentucky  (mounted  infantry).  1st  Tennessee. 

FIFTH  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  EDWARD  HATCH. 


First  Brigade. 
Col.  ROBERT  R.  STEWART. 
3d  Illinois, 
llth  Indiana. 
12th  Missouri. 
10th  Tennessee. 

Second  Brigade. 
Col.  DATTS  E.  COON. 
6th  Illinois. 
7th  Illinois. 
9th  Illinois. 
2d  Iowa. 
12th  Tennessee. 

Artillery. 
1st  Illinois,  Battery  I. 

1  Detached  with  pontoon  train. 

2  Composed  of  quartermaster's  employes. 

3  The  Second  and  Third  Brigades  of  this  division,  under  the  d-'vision  com 
mander,  Brigadier-General  E.  M.  McCook,  were  absent  on  an   expedition   into 
Western  Kentucky. 


APPENDIX  B.  227 

SIXTH   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Artillery. 

Col.  THOMAS  J.  HARBISON.      Col.  JAMES  BIDDLE.       4th  United  States,  Bat'y  I. 
16th  Illinois.  14th  Illinois. 

6th  Iowa.  6th  Indiana. 

7th  Ohio.  8th  Michigan. 

3d  Tennessee. 

SEVENTH  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOSEPH  F.  KNIPE. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Artillery. 

Col.  J.  H.  HAMMOND.         Col.  G.  M.  L.  JOHNSON.    Ohio  Lt.  Art.,  14th  Battery, 
9th  Indiana.  lath  Indiana. 

10th  Indiana.  13th  Indiana. 

19th  Pennsylvania.  6th  Tennessee. 

2d  Tennessee. 
4th  Tennessee. 

The  forces  under  Major-General  L.  H.  Rousseau  at  Murfreesboro  are  not  in- 
eluded  in  the  foregoing. 

II. — Organization  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee  (Confederate],  com 
manded  by  GENERAL  JOIIN  B.  HOOD,  for  the  period  ending 
December  10,  1864. 

LEE'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
LIEUT.  -GENERAL  S.  D.  LEE  COMMANDING. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  ED.  JOHNSON. 

Dean's  Brigade.  Manigaulfs  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  Z.  C.  DBAS  Commanding.    Lieut.-Col.  W.  L.  BDTLER  Commanding. 
19th,  22d,  25th,  39th,  and  50th  Alabama.          10th  and  19th  South  Carolina. 

24th,  28th,  and  34th  Alabama. 

Sharp's  Brigade.  Brantlei/'s  Brigade. 

7th,  9th,  10th,  41st.  and  44th  Mississippi.    24th,  34th,  27th,'29th.  and  30th  Missis- 
Sharpshooters,  Mississippi.  sippi  and  dismounted  Cavalry. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  C.  L.  STEVENSON. 
Gumming' a  Brigade.  Pettxx's  Brigade. 

Colonel  E.  P.  WATKINS  Commanding.   20th,  23d,  30th,  31st,  and  46th  Alabama. 
34th,  36th,  39th,  and  56th  Georgia. 

Brown  and  Reynolds' s  Brigade. 
Colonel  J.  B.  PALMER  Commanding. 

3d,  18th,  23d,  26th,  32d,  and  45th  Tennessee,  54th  and  63d  Virginia, 
60th  North  Carolina. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  D.  CLAYTON. 

StovalFs  Brigade.  Gibbon's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  M.  A.  STOVALL  Comd'g.        Brig.-Gen.  R.  L.  GIBSON  Commanding. 

40th,  41st,  42d,  43d,  and  52d  Georgia.     1st,  4th,  13th,  16th,  19th,  20th,  and  30th 

Louisiana. 

Holtzclaw's  Brigade.  Austin's  battalion  and  25th  Louisiana. 

18th,  36th,  38th,  32d,  and  5Sth  Alabama.   4th  battalion,  Louisiana. 


228  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

STEWART'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
LIEUT. -GENERAL  A.  P.  STEWART  COMMANDING. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  W.  LORING. 

Feather  ston's  Brigade,  Adams's  Brigade. 

Col.  I.  B.  PALMER  Commanding.  Col.  R.  LOWRY  Commanding. 

1st,  3d,  22d,  31st,  33d.  40th  Mississippi.        6th,  14th,  15th,  20th,  23d,  43d  Mies. 
1st  Mississippi  Battalion. 

Scott's  Brigade. 

Col.  JOHN  SNOD GRASS  Commanding. 
12th  Louisiana,  55th,  57th,  and  Consolidated  Alabama. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  S.  G.  FRENCH. 

Ector's  Brigade.  Cockrell's  Brigade. 

Col.  D.  COLEMAN  Commanding.  Col.  FLOURNOY  Commanding. 

9th  Texas  Infantry.  1st,  2d,   3d.  4th,  5th.  and  6th  Missouri 

10th,  1 1th,  32d  Texas  Dism'd  Cavalry.  Infantry. 

29th  and  39th  North  Carolina.  1st  and  3d  dismounted  Missouri  Cav'ry. 

Rearms  Brigade. 
4th,  35th,  36th,  39th,  and  46th  Miss.        7th  Battalion,  Mississippi. 

DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  C.  WALTHALL. 
Quarlen's  Brigade.  Canty's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  D.  JOHNSON  Comd'g.         Brig.-Gen.  C.  M.  SHELLEY  Comd'g. 
42d,  46th,  48th,  49th,  53d,  55th  Tennes-     17th,  2t>th,  29th  Alabama,  and  37th  Mia- 
see,  and  1st  Alabama.  s  ssippi. 

Reynolds's  Brigade. 
1st,  2d,  4th,  9th,  and  25th  Arkansas. 


CHEATHAM'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  B.  F.  CHEATHAM  COMMANDING. 

CHEATHAM'S  DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GENERAL  M.  P.  LOWRY  COMMANDING. 
Gist's  Brigade.  Man>  y's  Brigade. 

Lieut.-Col.  B.  L.  WATERS  Comd'g.  Colonel  H.  R.  FIELD  Commanding. 

IGth  and  24th  South  Carolina.  1st.  6th,  8th,  9th,   16th,  27th,  2Sth,  and 

2d,  5th,  and  8th  Georgia  Battalions.         50th  Tennessee. 
46th  Georgia.  4th  Confederates. 

StrahTs  Brigade.  Vaughn's  Brigade. 

Colonel  A.  J.  KELLER  Commanding.  Colonel  WATKINS  Commanding. 

4th,  5th,  19th,  24th,  31st,  33d,  38th,  41st,  llth,  12th,  13th.  29th,  47th,  51st,  52d, 

and  44th  Tennessee.  and  154th  Tennessee. 

CLEBURNE'S  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENEKAL  J.  H.  SMITH,  COMMANDING. 
Smith's  Brigade.  Loiory's  Brigade. 

Colonel  C.  H.  OLMSTEAD  Comd'g.  3d  Battalion,  6th,  8th,  and  32d  Miss. 

1st,  54th,  57th,  aud  63d  Georgia.  16th,  33d,  and  45th  Alabama. 


APPENDIX   B.  229 

Govan's  Brigade.  Granberrifs  Brigade. 

Brisr.-Gen.  I).  C.  GOVAN  Comd'g.  Captain  E.  T.  BROUGHTON  Comd'g. 

1st,  2d,  5th,  13th   15th,  and  25th  Ark.    6th,  7  h,  10th,  15th,  17th,  18th,  24th,  aaid 
6th,  rith,  8th,  and  19th  Arkansas.  25th  Texas. 

5th   Confederate,  35th    Tennessee,    and 
ISfutt's  Cavalry  company. 

BATE'S  DIVISION. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WILLIAM  B.  BATE  COMMANDING. 
Tylers  Brigade,  Vinleifs  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  T.  B.  SMITH  Commanding.  Major  J.  A.  LUSH  Commanding1. 

2rl,  10th.  20th,  and  37th  Tennessee.  1st,  3d,  4th,  6th,  and  7th  Florida. 

37th  Georgia  and  4th  Ga.  Sharpshooters. 

Jackson's  Brigade. 
1st  Confederate.     25th,  29th,  30th,  ami  66th  Georgia,  and  1st  Ga.  Sharpshooters. 


ARTILLERY. 

LEE'S  CORPS.— Commanded  by  MAJOR  J.  W.  JOHNSTON. 

Douglass's  Battery.                Fenner's  Battery.  Rowan's  Battery. 

Dent's                                     Eufaula           "  Corput's        " 

Garrity's          "                     Stanford's       "  Marshall's     " 

STEWART'S  CORPS.— Commanded  by  LiEUT.-CoLONEL  S.  C.  WILLIAMS. 

Selden's  Battery.                   Bonanchord's  Battery.  Raskin's  Battery. 

Tarrant's        "                       Cowan's  Battery.  Guibor's        " 

Lumsden's     "                       Darden's       "  Kalk's            " 

CHEATHAM'S  CORPS.— Commanded  by  COLONEL  M.  SMITH. 

Turner's  Battery.                   Bledsoe's  Battery.  Slocumb's  Battery. 

Phehm's          "                        Key's  Ferguson's       " 

Perry's           "                       Goldthwaite's  Battery.  Phillips's           " 


CAVALRY   CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  N.  B.  FORREST  COMMANDING. 

DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JAMES  R.  CHALMERS. 

Buckets  Brigade.  McCu^ocWs  Brigade. 

Col.  E.  W.  RUCKER  Commanding.        Col.  ROBT.  McCuLLOCH  Commanding. 

Keelifs  Brigade. 
Col.  J.  J.  NEELY  Commanding. 

DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  A.  BUFORD. 
Bell's  Brigade.  Grassland's  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  T.  H.  BELL  Commanding.     Col.  EDWARD  CROSSLANO  Commanding; 

DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  H.  JACKSON. 
Ross's  Brigade.  Armstrong's  Brigade. 

Brig.  .Gen.  Ross  Commanding.  Brig.-Gen.  F.  C.  ARMSTRONG  Comd'g. 

DIVISION. 
BRIG.-GENERAL  P.  D.  RODDEY. 


APPENDIX  C. 

CONFEDERATE  STRAGGLERS. 

THE  assertion  has  been  so  often  and  so  persistently  made  in  the  South,  since 
the  war,  that  devastation  of  property  was  only  practised  by  the  National  troops, 
that  it  is  well  to  preserve  for  reference  such  extracts  from  their  newspaper  press 
as  the  following : 

Extracts  from  a  letter  to  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  published  in  the 
Charleston  Courier  of  January  10,  1865,  and  in  the  Charleston  Mercury  (tri 
weekly)  of  January  llth : 

"  I  cannot  forbear  appealing  to  you,  in  behalf  of  the  producing  population  of 
the  States  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  for  protection  against  the  destructive 
lawlessness  of  members  of  General  Wheeler's  command.  From  Augusta  to  Har- 
deeville,  the  road  is  now  strewn  with  corn  left  on  the  ground  unconsumed. 
Beeves  have  been  shot  down  in  the  fields,  one  quarter  taken  off,  and  the  balance 
left  for  buzzards.  Horses  are  stolen  out  of  wagons  on  the  road,  and  by  wholesale 

out  of  stables  at  night Within  a  few  miles  of  this  neighborhood, 

Wheeler's  men  tried  to  rob  a  young  lady  of  a  horse  while  she  was  on  a  visit  to  a 
neighbor's,  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  a  citizen,  who  prevented  the  outrage 
being  perpetrated.  It  is  no  unusnal  sight  to  see  these  men  ride  late  into  camp 
with  all  sorts  of  plunder.  Private  houses  are  visited  ;  carpets,  blankets,  and 
other  furniture  they  can  lay  their  hands  on  are  taken  by  force  in  the  presence  of 
the  owners,"  etc. 

In  an  editorial  of  a  column  in  length  apropos  to  the*  above,  the  editor  of  the 
Mercury  says:  "There  must  be  radical  reform.  It  is  folly  to  talk  of  red-tape 
now.  We  want  tfie  thing  ;  we  must  have  it :  reform — shooting — cashiering — 
order— subordination— soldiers— not  runaways,  ragamuffins,  ruffians." 

The  following  is  from  the  Savannah  Republican  of  October  1,  1861 :  "  It  is 
notorious  that  our  own  army,  while  falling  back  from  Dalton,  was  even  more 
dreaded  by  the  inhabitants  than  was  the  army  of  Sherman.  The  soldiers,  and 
even  the  officers,  took  everything  that  came  in  their  way,  giving  the  excuse  that 
if  they  did  not.  the  enemy  would.  Subsequently,  stragglers  from  our  own  army 
almost  sacked  the  stores  in  Atlanta.  Now,  complaints  loud  and  deep  come  up 
from  that  portion  of  Georgia  in  the  neighborhood  of  our  army,  telling  of  outrages 
committed  by  straggling  squads  of  cavalry,  and  of  insults  offered  to  the  families 
of  the  best  and  most  patriotic  citizens." 


APPENDIX   C.  231 

The  following  is  from  the  Richmond  Whig,  being  part  of  a  letter  of  a  corre 
spondent  of  that  paper,  soon  after  Sherman  marched  north  from  Columbia.  Re- 
published  in  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  March  18,  1865.  Speaking  of  the  Con 
federate  evacuation  of  Columbia,  S.  C.,  the  writer  says:  "The  worst  feature  of 
the  entire  scene  occurred  on  the  day  of  which  I  write.  A  party  of  Wheeler's 
cavalry,  accompanied  by  their  officers,  dashed  into  town,  tied  their  horses,  and  as 
systematically  as  if  they  had  been  bred  to  the  business,  proceeded  to  break  into 
the  stores  along  Main  Street,  and  rob  them  of  their  contents.  Under  these  cir- 
cu  instances,  you  may  well  imagine  that  our  people  would  rather  see  the  Yankees, 
or  old  Satan  himself,  than  a  party  of  the  aforesaid  Wheeler's  cavalry.  The  bar- 
barities  committed  by  some  of  them  are  represented  to  be  frightful." 

The  Richmond  Enquirer  of  October  (i,  1864,  contained  the  following,  with 
reference  to  Early's  command  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  After  speaking  of  the 
drunkenness  habitnal  among  them,  from  the  chief  downward,  its  correspondent 
6ays :  '•  The  cavalry  forces  that  had  been  operating  in  the  Valley,  and  flitting 
hither  and  thither  along  the  Potomac  and  Shenandoah  were  already  demoralized, 
and  since  their  last  visit  to  Maryland,  they  Imve  been  utterly  worthless.  They 
were  in  the  habit  of  robbing  friend  and  foe  alike.  They  have  been  known  to 
strip  Virginia  women  of  all  they  had — widows  whose  sons  were  in  our  army — and 
then  to  burn  their  houses.  At  Hancock,  in  Western  Maryland,  they  stopped  a 
minister  of  the  Gospel  in  the  street  on  the  Sabbath  day,  and  made  him  stand  and 
deliver  his  money.  These  monstrous  truths  are  stated  in  the  official  report  of  the 
officer  commanding  a  part  of  these  cavalry  forces,  and  which  I  have  read." 


APPENDIX  D. 

BATTLE  OF  FKANKLIK 

THE  following  are  copies  of  the  orders  referred  to  in  the  text,  taken  from  the 
files  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  viz. : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  30,  1864. 
GENERAL  KIMBALL  : 

The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  report  with  your  command  to  Brig.- 
Gen.  J.  D.  Cox  for  position  on  the  line  to-day. 

Very  respectfully, 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 

Major  and  A.  A.  G. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  30,  1864. 
CAPT.  BRIDGES  : 

The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  report  four  (4)  batteries  from  your 
command  to  Brig.-Gen.  J.  D.  Cox,  for  position  on  the  line. 

Very  respectfully, 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL, 

Major  and  A.  A.  O. 

The  order  to  General  Wagner  does  not  appear  to  be  preserved  in  the  Adjutant- 
General's  files ;  but  General  Schofield  and  General  Stanley  are  both  perfectly  in 
accord  with  the  writer  as  to  its  tenor. 


The  interest  attaching  to  the  subject  makes  it  desirable  to  give  in  full  the  cor 
respondence  between  Generals  Thomas  and  Schoneld  on  the  23th,  29th  and  30th 
November,  RO  far  as  the  same  has  been  preserved  in  the  Adjutant-General's  office. 
It  is  as  follows : 

(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OP  THE  OHIO, 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864—8.45  A.M. 
MAJOR- GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

GENERAL — My  troops  and  material  are  all  on  the  north  side  of  Duck  River. 
The  withdrawal  was  completed  at  daylight  this  morning  without  serious  difficulty. 
Cox  holds  the  ford  in  front  of  Columbia,  and  Ruger  the  R.  R.  bridge,  which  I 
partially  destroyed.  Stanley  is  going  into  position  a  short  distance  in  rear  of 
Cox.  I  think  I  can  now  stop  Hood's  advance  by  any  line  near  this,  and  meet  in 
time  any  distant  movement  to  turn  my  position.  I  regret  extremely  the  necessity 
of  withdrawing  from  Columbia,  but  believe  it  was  absolute.  I  will  explain  fully 
in  time.  Reinforcements  will  have  to  march  from  Spring  Hill  or  Thompson's 
Station. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-General. 


APPENDIX  D.  233 

(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864—9  A.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

GENERAL — I  am  in  doubt  whether  it  is  advisable,  with  reference  to  future 
operations,  to  hold  this  position,  or  to  retire  to  some  point  from  which  we  can 
move  offensively.  Of  course  we  cannot  secure  the  river  here.  I  could  easily 
have  held  the  bridge-head  at  the  R.  R.,  but  it  would  have  been  useless,  as  wo 
co  aid  not  possibly  advance  from  that  point.  Please  give  me  your  views  an<J 
wishes. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864—9.10  A.M. 
MAJOR  GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

GENERAL — I  have  all  the  fords  above  and  below  this  place  well  watched,  and 
guarded  as  far  as  possible.  Wilson  is  operating  with  his  main  force  on  my  left. 
The  enemy  does  not  appear  to  have  moved  in  that  direction  yet  to  any  consider 
able  distance.  I  will  probably  be  able  to  give  you  pretty  full  information  this 
evening.  Do  you  not  think  the  infantry  at  the  distant  crossings  below  here 
should  now  be  withdrawn,  and  cavalry  substituted  ?  I  do  not  think  we  can  pre 
vent  the  crossing  of  even  the  enemy's  cavalry,  because  the  places  are  so  numerous. 
I  think  the  best  we  can  do  is  to  hold  the  crossings  near  us  and  watch  the  distant 
ones. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  Gen  eral. 

(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864—10  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Columbia  via  Franklin  : 

The  following  just  received  from  Lieut.-General  Grant :  "  City  Point,  Nov.  27, 
9  P.M. — Savannah  papers  just  received  state  that  Forrest  is  expected  in  the  rear 
of  General  Sherman,  and  that  Breckenridge  is  already  on  his  way  to  Georgia  from 
East  Tennessee."  If  this  proves  true,  General  Grant  wishes  me  to  take  the  offen 
sive  against  Hood,  and  destroy  the  railroad  into  Virginia  with  Stoneman's  force 
now  beyond  Knoxville.  General  Smith  will  certainly  be  here  in  three  days,  when 
I  think  we  will  be  able  to  commence  moving  on  Hood,  whetner  Forrest  goes  to 
Georgia  or  remains  with  Hood. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComcTg. 


(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville : 

The  enemy  was  crossing  in  force  a  short  distance  this  side  of  the  Lewisburg  Pike 
at  noon  to-day,  and  had  driven  our  cavalry  back  across  the  river  and  the  Pike  at 
the  same  time.  The  force  is  reputed  to  be  infantry,  but  I  do  not  regard  it  as 
very  probable.  Wilson  has  gone  with  his  main  force  to  learn  the  fact,  and  drivo 
the  enemy  back,  if  practicable. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


234  THE   MARCH   TO   THE   SEA. 

(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  near  Columbia : 

Your  despatch  of  3.30  is  just  received.  If  General  "Wilson  cannot  succeed  ia 
driving  back  the  enemy,  should  it  piove  true  that  he  has  crossed  the  river,  you 
will  necessarily  have  to  make  preparations  to  take  up  a  new  position  at  Franklin, 
behind  Harpeth,  immediately,  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  fall  back. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vote.,  ComcCg, 

(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

FRANKLIN  PIKE,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

GENERAL — I  am  informed  the  wagon  bridge  at  Franklin  has  been  carried  away. 
Would  it  not  be  well  to  replace  it  by  pontoon  bridge  during  the  rainy  season  ? 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General, 

(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD  : 

You  can  send  some  of  the  pontoons  yoti  used  at  Columbia  to  Franklin,  to  lay  a 
bridge  there.  I  will  answer  your  other  telegrams  in  a  few  moments. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComcCg. 


(Telegram.)  NEAR  COLUMBIA,  November  28,  1864 — 6  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  in  force  has  crossed  the  river  on  the '  Lewisburg  Pike,  and 
is  now  in  possession  of  Rally  Hill.  Wilson  is  trying  to  get  on  the  Franklin  Pike 
ahead  of  them.  He  thinks  the  enemy  may  swing  in  between  him  and  me  and 
strike  Spring  Hill,  and  wants  Hammond's  brigade  to  halt  there.  Please  give  it 
orders  if  you  know  where  it  is.  Also,  I  think,  it  would  be  well  to  send  A.  J. 
Smith's  force  to  that  place. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  28,  1864— 9  P.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS  : 

If  Hood  advances  on  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  Pike,  -where  do  you  propose 
to  fi.^ht  him  ?     I  have  all  the  force  that  is  necessary  here,  and  A.  J.  Smith's 
troops  should  be  placed  with  reference  to  the  proposed  point  of  concentration. 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  28,  1864—8  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD  : 

If  you  are  confident  you  can  hold  your  present  position  I  wish  you  to  do  so  un 
til  I  can  get  General  Smith  here.  After  his  arrival  we  can  withdraw  gradually, 
and  invite  Hood  across  Duck  River  and  fall  upon  him  with  our  whole  force,  or 
wait  until  Wilson  can  organize  his  entire  cavalry  force,  and  then  withdraw  from 


APPENDIX  D.  235 

your  present  position.  Should  Hood  then  cross  the  river  we  surely  can  ruin  him. 
You  may  have  the  fords  at  Centreville,  Beard's  Ferry,  Gordon's  Ferry,  and  Wil- 
liamsport  thoroughly  obstructed  by  filling  up  all  the  roads  leading  from  them  with 
trees,  and  then  replace  your  infantry  by  cavalry.  Send  an  intelligent  staff  officer 
to  see  that  the  work  is  properly  done.  As  soon  as  relieved  concentrate  your  in 
fantry.  The  cavalry  will  be  able  to  retard  if  not  prevent  Hood  from  crossing  after 
the  roads  are  thoroughly  obstructed,  if  they  do  their  duty.  The  road  leading 
from  Centreville  to  Nashville  should  be  thoroughly  obstructed.  I  am  not  sure 
but  it  would  be  a  good  plan  to  invite  Hood  across  Duck  River  if  we  can  get  him 
to  move  toward  Clarksville.  Is  there  no  convenience  for  unloading  beyond 
Thompson's  Station  ? 

(Signed)  GEO.  II.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComJg. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  29, 1864—3.30  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  near  Columbia : 

Your  despatches  of  ('»  P.M.  and  9  P.M.  yesterday  are  received.  I  have  directed 
General  Hammond  to  halt  his  command  at  Spring  Hill  and  report  to  you  for 
orders,  if  he  cannot  communicate  with  General  Wilson,  and  also  instructing  him 
to  keep  you  well  advised  of  the  enemy's  movements.  I  desire  you  to  fall  back 
from  Columbia  and  to  take  up  your  position  at  Franklin,  leaving  a  sufficient  force 
at  Spring  Hill  to  contest  the  enemy's  progress  until  you  are  securely  posted  at 
Franklin.  The  troops  at  the  fords  below  Williamsport,  etc.,  will  be  withdrawn 
and  take  up  a  position  behind  Franklin.  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  has  not 
yet  reached  Nashville ;  as  soon  as  he  arrives  I  will  make  immediate  disposition  of 
his  troops  and  notify  you  of  the  same.  Please  send  me  a  report  as  to  how  matters 
stand  upon  your  receipt  of  this. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S,  Vols.,  ComcCg. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  near  Columbia  via  Franklin: 

I  have  a  report  from  the  N.  W.  R.  R.  that  four  regiments  of  Forrest's  cavalry 
have  crossed  Duck  River  below  Williamsport.     Have  yon  any  such  information  ? 
(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  ComcCg. 


(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

FRANKLIN  PIKE,  TENN.,  November  29,  1864—8.20  A.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

The  enemy's  cavalry  has  crossed  in  force  on  the  Lewisburg  Pike,  and  General 
Wilson  reports  the  infantry  crossing  above  Hney's  Mill,  about  five  miles  from  this 
place.  I  have  sent  an  infantry  reconnoissance  to  learn  th'j  fact.  If  it  proves  true 
I  will  act  according  to  your  instructions  received  this  morning.  Please  send 
orders  to  General  Cooper  at  Centreville.  It  may  be  doubtful  whether  any  mes 
senger  from  here  will  reach  him. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 


236  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN  PIKE,  TENN.,  November  29,  1864—1  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville : 

1'lease  have  pontoons  put  down  at  Franklin  at  once. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 

(Telegram. )  NAS  H  v  i  L  LE,  November  29,  1 864— 2.SO  p.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin: 

Your  despatch  of  8  A.M.  received.  I  have  sent  orders  to  General  Cooper  as  you 
requested,  but  think  it  would  be  well  for  you  to  send  a  second  messenger  to  him 
to  make  sure  that  he  receives  his  orders. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Comd'g. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  29,  1864—11  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin : 

General  Wilson  telegraphed  me  very  fully  the  movements  of  the  enemy  yester- 
day  and  this  morning.  He  believes  Forrest  is  aiming  to  strike  this  place,  whilst 
the  infantry  will  move  against  you  and  attempt  to  get  on  your  flank.  If  you  dis 
cover  such  to  be  his  movement  you  had  better  cross  Harpeth  at  Franklin,  and 
then  retire  along  the  Franklin  Pike  to  this  place,  covering  your  wagon  train  and 
the  railroad.  I  directed  General  Cooper  in  accordance  with  your  wishes  yester 
day,  to  withdraw  from  Centreville  by  the  Nashville  road,  crossing  Harpeth  at 
Widow  Dean's,  and  report  to  you  from  that  place  for  further  orders.  You  had 
better  send  orders  to  meet  him. 

(Signed)  GEO.  II.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Comd'g. 


(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN,  November  30,  1864—5.30  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

I  hope  to  get  my  troops  and  material  safely  across  the  Harpeth  this  morning. 
We  have  suffered  no  material  loss  so  far.  I  shall  try  to  get  Wilson  on  my  flank 
this  morning.  Forrest  was  all  around  us  yesterday,  but  we  brushed  him  awi.y 
during  the  evening,  and  came  through.  Hood  attacked  in  front  and  flank,  but 
did  not  hurt  us. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major- General. 


(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN,  November  30,  1864—9.50  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville : 

My  trains  are  coming  in  all  right.  Half  the  troops  are  here,  and  the  other  half 
about  five  miles  out,  coming  on  in  good  order,  with  light  skirmishing.  I  will 
have  all  across  the  river  this  evening.  Wilson  is  here,  and  his  cavalry  on  my 
flank.  I  do  not  know  where  Forrest  is.  He  may  have  gone  east,  but  no  doubt 
will  strike  our  flank  and  rear  again  soon.  Wilson  is  entirely  unable  to  cope  with 
him.  Of  course,  I  cannot  prevent  Hood  from  crossing  the  Harpeth  whenever  he 
may  attempt  it.  Do  you  desire  me  to  hold  on  h*e  until  compelled  to  fall  back  ? 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


APPENDIX  D.  237 

(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  30. 180-1. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCIIOFIELD,  Franklin: 

Your  despatches  of  5.30,  5.50,  and  Wilson's  despatch,  forwarded  to  you,  have 
been  received.  It  will  take  Smith  quite  all  day  to  disembark,  but  if  I  find  there 
is  no  immediate  necessity  to  retain  him  here,  will  send  him  to  Franklin  or  Brent- 
wood,  according  to  circumstances.  If  you  can  prevent  Hood  from  turning  your 
position  at  Franklin,  it  should  be  held  ;  but  I  do  not  wish  you  to  risk  too  much. 
I  send  you  a  map  of  the  environs  of  Franklin. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vote.,  ConuTg. 

(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN,  November  30,  1864—12  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville: 

Your  despatch  of  10.25  A.M.  is  received.  I  am  satisfied  that  I  have  heretofore 
run  too  much  risk  in  trying  to  hold  Hood  in  check,  while  so  far  inferior  to  him  in 
both  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  slightest  mistake  on  my  part,  or  failure  of  a 
subordinate,  during  the  last  three  days,  might  have  proved  disastrous.  I  don't 
want  to  get  into  so  tight  a  place  again.  Yet  I  will  cheerfully  act  in  accordance 
with  your  views  of  expediency,  if  you  think  it  important  to  hold  Hood  back  as 
long  as  possible.  When  you  get  all  your  troops  together,  and  the  cavalry  in  effec 
tive  condition,  we  can  whip  Hood  easily,  and,  I  believe,  make  the  campaign  a 
decisive  one.  Before  that,  the  most  we  can  do  is  to  husband  our  strength  and 
increase  it  as  much  as  possible.  I  fear  the  troops  which  were  stationed  on  the 
river  below  Columbia  will  be  lost.  I  will  get  my  trains  out  of  the  way  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  watch*  Hood  carefully.  Possibly  I  may  be  able  to  hold  him  here, 
but  do  not  expect  to  be  able  to  do  so  long. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1S64. 

MAJOR  GENERAL  SOHOFIELD,  Franklin: 

General  Smith  reported  to  me  this  morning  that  one  division  of  his  troops  is 
still  behind.  We  must  therefore  try  to  hold  Hood  where  he  now  is  until  these 
troops  can  get  up  and  the  steamers  return.  After  that  we  will  concentrate  here, 
reorganize  our  cavalry,  and  try  Hood  again.  Do  you  think  you  can  hold  Hood 
at  Franklin  for  three  days  longer  ?  Answer,  giving  your  views ;  and  I  should 
like  to  know  what  Wilson  thinks  he  can  do  to  aid  you  in  holding  Hood. 
(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS: 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vote.,  Coriufg. 

(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN,  November  30, 1864—3  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS,  Nashville  : 

I  have  just  received  your  despatch  asking  whether  I  can  hold  Hood  here  three 
days.  I  do  not  believe  I  can.  I  can  doubtless  hold  him  one  day,  but  will  hazard 
something  in  doing  that.  He  now  has  a  large  force,  probably  two  corps,  in  my 
front,  and  seems  prepared  to  cross  the  river  above  and  below.  I  think  he  can 
effect  a  crossing  to-morrow  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts,  and  probably  to-night,  if  he 
attempts  it.  A  worse  position  than  this  for  an  inferior  force  could  hardly  be 
found.  I  will  refer  your  question  to  General  Wilson  this  evening.  I  think  he 
can  do  very  little.  I  have  no  doubt  Forrest  will  be  in  my  rear  to-morrow,  or 
doing  some  greater  mischief.  It  appears  to  me  that  I  ought  to  take  position  at 


238  THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 

Brentwood  at  once.  If  A.  J.  Smith's  division  and  the  Murfrcesboro'  garrison  join 
me  there,  I  ought  to  be  able  to  hold  Hood  in  check  for  some  time.  I  have  just 
learned  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  already  crossing  three  miles  below.  I  will 
have  lively  times  with  my  trains  again. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 


(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin: 

Your  despatch  of  3  P.M.  is  received.  Send  back  your  trains  to  this  place  at  onc<% 
and  hold  your  troops  in  readiness  to  march  to  Brentwood,  and  thence  to  this 
place  as  soon  as  your  trains  are  fairly  on  the  way,  so  disposing  your  force  as  to 
cover  the  wagon  train.  Have  all  R.  R.  trains  sent  back  immediately.  Notify 
General  Wilson  of  my  instructions.  He  will  govern  himself  accordingly. .  Relieve 
all  garrisons  in  blockhouses,  and  send  back  by  railroad  trains  last  over  the  road. 
Acknowledge  receipt. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major- General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Comd^g. 

(Telegram.)  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  30,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville,  Tenn. : 

GENERAL — Please  send  A.  J.  Smith's  division  to  Brentwood  early  to-morrow 
morning.  Also  please  send  to  Brentwood  to-morrow  morning  one  million  rounds 
of  infantry  ammunition,  2,000  rounds  three-inch  and  1.000  rounds  light  twelve 
artillery. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-  General. 

(Telegram.)  FRANKLIN,  November  30th — 7.10  P.M. 

MAJOR-GENEBAL  THOMAS,  Nashville : 

The  enemy  made  a  heavy  and  persistent  attack  with  about  two  corps,  com 
mencing  at  4  P.M.  and  lasting  until  after  dark.  He  was  repulsed  at  all  points, 
with  very  heavy  loss — probably  5,000  or  6,000  men.  Our  loss  is  not  probably 
more  than  one-fourth  that  number.  We  have  captured  about  1,000  prisoners,  in 
cluding  one  brigadier-general.  Your  despatch  of  this  P.M.  is  received.  I  had 
already  given  the  orders  you  direct,  and  am  now  executing  them. 

(Signed)  J.  M.  SOHOFIELD, 

Maj<,r-  General. 

(Telegram.)  NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin : 

Your  telegram  is  just  received.  It  is  glorious  news,  and  I  congratulate  you 
and  the  brave  men  of  your  command.  But  yon  must  look  out  that  the  enemy 
does  not  still  persist.  The  courier  you  sent  to  General  Cooper  at  Widow  Dean's 
could  not  reach  there,  and  reports  that  he  was  chased  by  rebel  cavalry  on  the 
whole  route,  and  finally  came  into  this  place.  Major-General  Steedman,  with  five 
thousand  men,  should  be  here  in  the  morning.  When  he  arrives,  I  will  start 
General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  and  General  Steedman's  troops  to  your  assistance 
at  Brentwood. 

(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 

Major-General  U.  S.  Vots.,  Comffg, 


APPENDIX  E. 


STRENGTH  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES  IN  THE 
CAROLINAS. 

I. — National  Army  under  GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN  on  entering  th« 
Campaign,  February  1,  1865. 


COMMANDS. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

Fifteenth  Army  Corps  

15.358 

16 

381 

15,755 

Seventeenth      •'          ... 

11,686 

47 

264 

11  91)7 

Right  Wing 

27,044 

63 

645 

27  75° 

Fourteenth  Army  Corps  
Twentieth              ''           

13,968 
12,1)11 

452 
523 

J4,420 
13,434 

Left  Wing 

26879 

975 

27  854 

" 

Cavalry  Division  

4*875 

98 

4,473 

Aggregate  

5-3,023 

4  438 

1  718 

(50  079 

The  Same,  April  10,  1865. 
RIGHT  WING — ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE — MAJOR-GENERAL  O.  O.  HOWARD. 


COMMANDS. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

Fifteenth  Army  Corps  
Seventeenth      "           

15,244 
12,873 

23 

30 

403 
261 

15,670 
13,164 

Aggregate 

28,117 

53 

664 

28,834 

LEFT  WING— ARMY  OF  GEORGIA— MAJOR- GENERAL  H.  W.  SLOCUM. 


Fourteenth  Army  Corps  
Twentieth             »•            

14,653 
12,471 

445 

494 

15.098 
12,965 

Aggregate 

27,124 

OS9 

28  063 

240  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

CENTRE— ARMY  OP  THE  OHIO— MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  AT.  SCHOFIELD. 


COMMANDS. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Artillery. 

Total. 

11  727 

372 

12,099 

14  QUO 

293 

14  293 

25,727 

6(!5 

26.392 

CAVALRY — BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  KILPATHICK. 


Cavalry  Division 

5,484 

175 

5,059 

Grand  aggregate  
Total  number  of  guns.  . 

80,968 

5,537 

2,443 

88,948 
91 

II. — Confederate  forces  available  to  resist  Sherman's  march  through 
the  Carolinas. 

Although  exact  data  are  not  easily  to  be  got,  we  are  not  wholly  without  evi 
dence  as  to  the  means  which  General  Beauregard  had  at  his  command  when 
Sherman's  movement  began.  In  the  "Historical  Sketch  of  the  Chatham  Artil 
lery,"  Colonel  C.  C.  Jones,  Jr.,  who  was  Hai  dee's  Chief  of  Artillery,  gives  the 
following  as  a  foot-note  to  p.  206.  His  authority  is  certainly  conclusive  as  to  the 
conference  and  the  estimates  made  at  it : 

"At  a  conference  held  on  the  second  day  of  February,  1865,  at  Green's  Cut 
Station,  on  the  Augusta  and  Waynesboro  Railroad,  in  Burke  County,  Georgia,  at 
which  General  Beauregard,  Lieut. -General  Hardee,  Major-General  D.  H.  Hill,  and 
Major-General  G.  W.  Smith  were  present,  the  following  was  the  estimated  strength 
of  the  forces  in  and  about  Augusta  and  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  which  it 
was  thought  could  be  relied  on  as  effective  to  resist  the  advance  of  General 
Sherman  : 


General  Hardee's  Regular  Infantry,  P.  A.  C.  S. 
"  Militia  and  Reserves 


8,000 
3.000 


"  Light  Artillery  2,000 

Butler's  division,  half  only  now  available 1,500 


Total  under  command  of  General  Hardee  in  S.  Carolina 

Major-General  Smith's  Georgia  Militia 1,200 

Colonel  Browne's  Georgia  Reserves 250 


Lieut.- General  Lee's  corps 

Lieut. -General  CheathanVs  corps  . 
Lieut.-General  Stewart's  corps 


{Only  abi 
were 
tive  d 


Only  about  half  of  which 
reported,  for  ac- 
duty. 


4,000 
3,000 
3,000 


Artillery,  Army  of  Tennessee. 
General  Wheeler's  Cavalry  . . . 


11,000 


3,500 
14,500 


1,450 


10,000 

800 

6,70(1 


APPENDIX  E.  241 

RECAPITULATION. 

Total  Infantry  22,450 

Light  Artillery 2,800 

Cavalry,  mounted  and  dismounted 8,200 


Grand  Total 33,450 

"  CheathanVs  corps  had  not  arrived.  The  head  of  Cheatham's  corps  was  ex 
pected  to  arrive  in  Augusta  on  the  4th  or  5th  inst.,  and  the  head  of  Stewart's  on 
the  10th  or  llth." 

In  the  text  to  which  the  above  is  a  foot-note,  the  same  writer  pays :  "  General 
Hardee,  with  his  eighteen  thousand  Confederate  troops  at  detached  points  along 
the  Carolina  coast  and  elsewhere,  composed  in  large  measure  of  reserves  and 
State  forces  recently  brought  into  and  unaccustomed  to  the  hardships  of  actual 
service,  and  of  artillerists  drawn  from  fixed  batteries,  who  for  the  first  time  were 
taking  the  field  as  infantry,  was  incapable  of  offering  effectual  resistance,"  etc. 

On  March  1,  1865,  General  Beanregard,  then  at  Charlotte,  N.  C.,  submitted  to 
General  J.  E.  Johnston,  at  the  same  place,  a  plan  of  operations  against  Sherman, 
in  which  he  estimated  their  effective  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  then  available 
at  20,OUO,  as  follows : 

"  Hardee's  corps  (infantry  and  artillery) 10,000 

Army  of  Tennessee 6.000 

Bragg's  forces 10.COO 


Infantry  and  Artillery 26,000  " 

The  full  plan  is  published  in  "  The  Land  we  Love."  a  monthly  mngazinc, 
Charlotte,  N.  C.,  Vol.  I.,  p.  188  (18G6).  In  it  Beauregard  distinctly  states  that 
the  6,000  are  then  at  Char'otte.  Detachments  from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
continued  to  arrive  much  later,  Cheatham  himself  reaching  Johnston  with  part 
of  his  corps  after  the  battle  of  Bentonville,  March  19th  and  20th  (see  Johnston's 
«•  Narrative,"  p.  393).  A  reinforcement  of  about  2,000  joined  on  the  20th  and  21st. 

Jefferson  Davis,  in  his  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government,"  Vol. 
II.,  p.  P32,  says,  on  this  subject:  "Genera!  Johnston's  force,  according  to  his 
estimate,  when  he  took  command,  amounted  to  about  16,000  infantry  and  artil 
lery  and  4.000  cavalry";  if  to  this  be  added  the  portion  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee, 
about  2,500  men,  under  command  of  .General  Stephen  D.  Lee,  which  afterward 
joined  the  Army  at  Smithfield,  N.  C.,  and  that  of  General  Bragg's  command  at 
Goldsboro,  which  amounted  to  about  8,000,  the  aggregate  would  be  about  30,500 
men  of  all  arms." 

As  bearing  upon  this  question,  see  also  the  table  of  paroles  issued  to  Johnston's 
army  upon  its  surrender,  p.  243,  infra. 

VOL.  X.— 11 


242 


THE  MARCH   TO   THE  SEA. 


III. — Abstract  from  return  of  the  Army,  GENERAL  J.  E.*  JOHNSTON, 
Commanding,  for  period  ending  March  31,  1865,  Headquarters^ 
timithjield,  N.  C. 


COMMAND. 

PRESENT 
FOR  DUTY. 

Effective  total 
present. 

Aggregate  pres 
ent. 

Aggregate  present 
and  absent. 

PRISONERS 
OF  WAR. 

Officers. 

a 
* 

Officers. 

I 

General  Staff  

Hardens  Army  Corps  :  1 
Staff         

15 

15 

15 

14 
10.145 
4.957 
1(),612 

3,353 

11 

274 
93 

409 

787 

11 

3,685 
1,907 
5,287 

179 

McLaw's  division 

2.592 
1.556 
4,217 

2,533 
1.534 
4,091 

8,158 

Taliaferro's   '•          
Hoke's2          "                 

Total 

8,865 

10.89031,088 

179 

3?353 

Army  of  Tennessee  : 
Staff                                 ...      . 

5 
503 
300 
129 

3,779 

2,386 
951 

3.589 
2,273 

8b3 

5 

5,201 
3.266 
1,544 

11 
24,711 
24,124 

10,139 

371 
410 
100 

881 

6.6f,6 
5,390 
1,027 

Lee's  corps  
Cheatharn's  corps  

Total                        

937 

7,116    6,745 

10,016  58,985 

13,083 

Total  Infantry  

1,759 

16,481 

14,903 

20,921 

90,088 

1,060^6,436 

Artillery  :  3 

36 
3 

716 

98 

~814 

697 
96 

847 
112 



959 

I,0r5 
152 

4 
4 

Army  of  the  Tennessee  
Total  Artillery  .                 .    . 

39 

793 

1,187 

Pioneer     Regiment      (Tucker's 
Confederate)  4  

25 

326 
—  ^ 
16,621 

318 



16,014 

398 

621 

Grand  total,  with  out  cavalry.5 

1,803 

22,278 

91,896 

1,060  16,440 

1  The  return  of  Hardee's  troops,  from  which  this  is  prepared,  is  dated  March 
27th,  that  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee  April  1st. 

2  The  Sixty-eighth  and  Sixty-seventh  Regiments,  North  Carolina  (State)  troops, 
and  the  First  North  Carolina  Battalion  (State),  operating  on  the  enemy's  com 
munications  with  Newberne  are  not  reported. 

3  The  artillery  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee  has  not  yet  arrived  from  Mississippi 
The  larger  portion  of  the  artillery  of  the  Departments  of  North  Carolina  and 
South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Florida,  has  been  sent  to  the  rear  for  reorganization, 
and  no  report  has  been  received. 

4  and  6.     See  next  page. 


APPENDIX  E. 


243 


IV. — Army  of  Tennessee,  and  other  forces  under  GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S 
command,  paroled  at  Greensboro',  N.  C.,  May  1  and  2, 1865. 


COMMANDS,  ETC. 

Officers. 

Men. 

Aggregate. 

Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  and  staffs  

275 
739 

533 
8,145 

808 
8,884 

550 

4,426 

4.9:6 

Hardee's  corps  .         

961 

8,101 

9,062 

«1 

1.191 

1,252 

175 

2.331 

2.506 

212 

1,033 

1,245 

106 

197 

303 

Medical  officers,  attendants,  and  patients  in  hospital 
General  Cooper  and  Brig.-Gen.  Colquitt  and  staff..  . 

135 

7 

867 

1,002 
7 

Total                       ...       .                

3  221 

26,824 

30,045 

279 

2,70S 

2  987 

"         Charlotte        ....                        

3b6 

3,629 

4,015 

Total 

665 

6,337 

7,OG2 

Grand  Total    .  .           ... 

3,S.S6 

33,161 

37,047 

General  Johnston,  in  his  "  Narrative,"  p.  410,  says  the  apprehension  of  being 
made  prisoners  or  war  "  caused  a  great  number  of  desertions  between  the  19th 
and  24th  of  April — not  less  than  four  thousand  in  the  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
almost  as  many  from  the  cavalry ;  many  of  them  rode  off  artillery  horses  and 
mules  belonging  to  the  baggage  trains."  If  this  estimate  of  eight  thousand  be 
added  to  those  paroled  at  Greensboro1,  the  number  of  his  troops  will  be  raised  to 
about  45,000. 

4  Companies  A  and  D,  Engineer  Regiment,  are  on  detached  service  and  not  in 
cluded,  as  no  report  has  been  received  from  them.  Effective  total  (about)  80. 

6  A  formal  return  of  the  cavalry  has  not  yet  been  furnished.  Effective  total, 
April  1,  5,105.  Total  present,  6,587.  Aggregate  present,  7,042. 

At  the  time  of  the  above  report  nearly  all  Johnston's  artillery  was  at  Hillsboro, 
N.  C.,  refitting.  Colonel  Jones  says  ("Chatham  Artillery,"  p.  215):  "Of 
thirty  light  batteries  there  concentrated — the  most  of  them  being  unfit  for  field 
service— ten  were  to  be  chosen  and  furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  others,  with 
the  best  battery  animals  and  equipments."  Thirty  batteries  would  make,  saj 
2,500  men.— J.  D.  C. 


APPENDIX  F. 

OEGANIZATION  OF  OPPOSING  ARMIES 
IN  THE   CAROLINAS. 

I. —  Organization  of  the  Armies  under  the  Command  of  MAJOR-GEN. 
W.  T.  SIIEKMAN,  April,  1865. 

ARMY  OF   THE   TENNESSEE. 
MAJOR- GENERAL  O.  O  HOWARD,  COMMANDING. 

FIFTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  A.  LOGAN  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 
BREVE*  MAJOR-GENERAL  C.  R.  WOODS. 


first  Brigade. 
Brevet  Brig-  Gen.  W.  B. 
WOODS. 
27th  Missouri. 
12th  Indiana. 
76th  Ohio. 
26th  Iowa. 
31  st  Missouri. 
32d  Missouri. 

Second  Brigade. 
Col.  R.  F.  CATTERSON. 
40th  Illinois. 
46th  Ohio. 
103d  Illinois. 
6th  Iowa. 
97th  Indiana. 
26th  Illinois. 
100th  Indiana. 

Third  Brigade. 
Col.  G.  A.  STONE. 
4th  Iowa. 
9th       " 
25th     " 
30th     " 
31st     " 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

MAA>R-GENEBAL  WILLIAM  B.  HAZEN. 

First  Brigade.                     Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Colonel  T.  JONES.             Colonel  W.  S.  JONES.  Brig.-Gen.  J.  M.  OLIVEB. 

6th  Missouri.                          c7th  Ohio.  15th  Michigan. 

55th  Illinois.                           47th     "  70th  Ohio. 

116th      "                                53d      "  48th  Illinois. 

127th      "                                54th     "  90th 

3tfth  Ohio.                             83d  Indiana.  99th  Indiana. 
57th     "                               lllth  Illinois. 


APPENDIX  F.  215 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  E.  SMITH. 
First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.- Gen.  \V.  T.  CLARK.  Colonel  J.  E.  TOURTELLOTTE. 

18th  Wisconsin.  56th  Illinois. 

59th  Indiana.  10th  Iowa. 

63d  Illinois.  80th  Ohio. 

48th  Indiana.  17th  Iowa. 

93d  Illinois.  Battalion  26th  Missouri. 

Battalion  10th        " 
4th  Minnesota. 

FOURTH  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  E.  W.  RICE. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  N.  B.  HOWARD.  Col.  R.  N.  ADAMS.  Col.  F.  J.  HURLBUT. 

2d  Iowa.  12th  Illinois.  7th  Illinois 

7th     "  66th       "  :-:»th  Iowa. 

With  Indiana.  81st  Ohio.  50th  Illinois. 

52d  Illinois.  57th      " 

110th  U.  S.  colored 

DETACHMENTS. 

Artillery  Brigade. 
Lieut-Col.  WILLIAM  H.  Ross. 

H,  1st  Illinois.  H,  1st  Missouri.  29th  Missouri  Infantry. 

12th  Wisconsin  Battery.  B,  1st  Michigan.  Signal  Detachment. 


SEVENTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  F.  P.  BLAIR,  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  M.  F.  FORCE. 

Ftrxt  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brrgade. 

Brig.-Gen.  J.  W.  FULLER.  Brig.-Gen.  J.W.  SPRAGUE.     Lt.-Col.  J.  S.  WRIGHT. 
1 8th  Missouri.  25th  Wisconsin.  10th  Illinois. 

27th  Ohio.  35th  New  Jersey.  25th  Indiana. 

39th     "  43d  Ohio.  32d  Wisconsin. 

64th  Illinois.  63d     ' 

THIRD  DIVISION. 

BREVET  MAJOR  GENERAL  M.  D.  LEGGETT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  CHARLES  EwiNG.  Brig.-Gen.  R.  K.  SCOTT, 

16th  Wisconsin.  C0:h  Ohio. 

45th  Illinois.  68th     " 

31st       "  78th     " 

20th      "  19th  Wisconsin. 
80th      " 
12th  Wisconsin. 


246  THE  MARCH   TO  THE  SEA. 

FOURTH   DIVISION. 
BREVET  MA.TOR-GENEBAL  G.  A.  SMITH. 
First  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  B.  F.  POTTS.  Brig.-Gen.  W.  W.  BELKNAF. 

23d  Indiana.  11th  Iowa. 

32(1  Ohio.  13th     " 

53d  Indiana.  15th     " 

14th  Illinois.  Kith     " 

53d        "  82d  Illinois. 

15th      " 

DETACHMENTS. 

Artillery  Brigade. 

Major  FREDERICK  WELKEB. 

C.  1st  Michigan  Artillery.  9th  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry. 

1st  Minnesota  Battery.  G  Company,  llth  Illinois  Cavalry0 

15th  Ohio  Battery.  Signal  Detachment. 


ABMY  OF  GEOEGIA. 
MA  JOB. -GENERAL  H.  W.  SLOCUM,  COMMANDING. 

FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  C.  DAVIS  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 

BRIGADIER- GENERAL  C.  C.  WALCUTT. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  HOBART.     Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  BUELL.          Colonel  HAMBRIGHT. 
21st  Wisconsin.  21st  Michigan.  21st  Ohio. 

.13d  Ohio.  13th        "  74th     " 

94th     •'  69th  Ohio.  38th  Pennsylvania. 

42d  Indiana.  79th 

88th      " 
104th  Illinois. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BBIGADIKR  GENERAL  J.  D.  MORGAN. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  WM.VANDEVEB.  Brig.-Gen.  J.G.  MITCHELL.    Lt. -Colonel  LANGLEY. 
10th  Michigan.  121st  Ohio.  85th  Illinois. 

14th        "  113th     4i  Sfith       " 

10th  Illinois.  108th     "  110th     " 

60th        »*  98th      "  125th     " 

17th  New  York.  78th  Illinois.  52d  Ohio. 

34th      "  22d  Indiana. 

37th        "      (det.) 


APPENDIX  F. 


247 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  BAIRD. 


First  Brigade. 
Colonel  M.  C.  HUNTER. 
17th  Ohio. 
31st      " 
89th      " 
92d       " 
82d  Indiana. 
23d  Missouri  (det). 
llth  Ohio. 


Second  Brigade. 
Lt.-Colonel  DOAN. 
2d  Minnesota. 
105th  Ohio. 
75th  Indiana. 
87th 
101st 


Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  S.  GREENE. 
14th  Ohio. 
38th      " 
lOtli  Kentucky. 
18th 
74th  Indiana. 


DETACHMENTS. 

Artillery  Brigade. 

Major  CHARLES  HOUGHTALING. 

Battery  I,  2d  Illinois.  5th  Wisconsin  Battery. 


C,  1st 


19th  Indiana 


TWENTIETH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  A.  MOWER  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  S.  WILLIAMS. 


First  Brigade 
Colonel  J.  L.  SELFRIDGE. 
4th  Pennsylvania. 
5th  Connecticut. 
123d  New  York. 
141st 


Second  Brigade. 
Colonel  WM.  HAWLEY. 
2d  Massachusetts. 
3d  Wisconsin. 
13th  New  Jersey. 
107th  New  York. 
150th        " 

SECOND   DIVISION. 


Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  S.  ROBINSON. 
31st  Wisconsin. 
61st  Ohio. 

82d       " 
82d  Illinois. 
101st     " 
143d  New  York. 


BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  W.  GEARY. 


First  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Bg.-Gen.  N.  PARDEE,  Jr. 
5th  Ohio. 
29th    " 
6t5th    " 

28th  Pennsylvania. 
147th  t 
Detactimeut  K.  P.  B. 


Second  Brigade. 
Col.  P.  H.  JONES. 
33d  New  Jersey. 
73d  Pennsylvania. 
109th 

3 19th  New  York. 
134th         t; 
154th        " 


Third  Brigade. 
Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  BARNUM. 
29th  Pennsylvania, 
lllth 

60th  New  York. 
102d 

137th       " 
149th       " 


THIRD   DIVISION. 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  WARD. 

First  Brigade.  Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  H.  CASE.  Col.  DANIEL  DUSTIN.   Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  COGGSWKLL. 

70th  Indiana.  19th  Michigan.  20th  Connecticut. 

79th  Ohio.  22d  Wisconsin.  2(ith  Wisconsin. 

102rt  Illinois.  33d  Indiana.  33d  Massachusetts. 

105th       "  85th       "  55th  Ohio. 

129th       "  73d      " 

136th  New  York. 


248  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


DETACHMENTS. 
Artillery  Brigade. 
Captain  C.  E.  WINEGAR. 
Battery    I,  1st  New  York.         Battery  C.  1st  Ohio. 

"       M,  1st  '•       E,  Independent  Pennsylvania. 

Pontoiners,  58th  Indiana  Veterans. 
Mechanics  rnd  Engineers,  1st  Michigan. 


AKMY   OF  THE   OHIO. 
MAJOB-GENEKAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD  COMMANDING. 

TENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  H.  TERRY  COMMANDING. 

FIEST  DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  H.  W.  BIRGE. 

First  Brigade.                     Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  H.  D.  WASHBURN.        Col.  HARVEY  GRAHAM.  Ccl.  N.  W.  DAT. 

8th  Indiana,                               159th  New  York.  38th  Massachusetts. 

18ih     "                                      13th  Connecticut.  150th  New  York. 

9th  Connecticut.                        22d  Iowa.  128th         " 

14th  New  Hampshire.              131st  New  York.  175th         " 

12th  Maine.                               28th  Iowa.  176th         " 

14th    "•  24th  Iowa. 
75th  New  York. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  A.  AMES. 

First  Brigade.                    Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Col.  R.  DAGGETT.                Col.  J.  S.  LITTELL.  Col.  G.  F.  GRANGER. 

3rt  New  York.                     47th  New  York.  4th  New  Hampshire. 

112th     "                             48th         "  9th  Maine. 

117th     "                               203d  Pennsylvania.  loth  Indiana. 

142d      "                             97th            "  115th  New  York. 

76th  169th        " 

THIRD  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  C.  J.  PAINE. 

First  Brigade.                   Second  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  D.  BATES.  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  S.  DUNCAN.  Col.  J.  H.  HOLMAN. 

1st  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.     4th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops.  5th  U.  S.  Colored  Troops 

10th     "                "                  6th     "  27th    '• 

107th  '*                                  £9th  "  37th   " 

DETACHMENTS. 

Brigade  (not  numbered). 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  ABBOTT. 

3d  New  Hampshire  Infantry.  6th  Connecticut  Infantry. 

7th  "  7th 

16th  New  York  Heavy  Artillery  (six  companies). 

16th        •'  Independent  Battery. 

22d  Indiana  Bartery. 

Light  Company  E,  3d  U.  S.  Artillery. 

Co.  A.  2d  Pennsylvania  Heavy  Artillery. 

Cos.  E  and  K,  12th  New  York  Cavalry. 

Detachment  Signal  Corps. 


APPENDIX  F. 

TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  D.  COX  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

INFANTRY. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOMAS  H.  RUGER. 


First  Brigade. 
Bvt.  Bg.-Gen.  I.  N.  STILES. 
120th  Indiana. 
124th 
128th        " 
180th  Ohio. 


Second  Brigade. 
Col.  J.  C.  McQuiSTON. 
123d  Indiana. 
129th       " 
130th       " 
28th  Michigan. 


Third  Brigade. 
Col.  M.  T.  THOMAS. 
8th  Minnesota. 
174th  Ohio. 
178th     " 


Battery  Elgin,  Illinois  Artillery. 


SECOND  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  N.  COUCH. 


First  Brigade. 

Col.  O.  H.  MOORE. 

25th  Michigan. 

26th  Kentucky. 


Second  Brigade, 
Col.  J.  MEITRINGEB. 
23d  Michigan. 
80th  Indiana. 
118th  Ohio. 
107th  Illinois, 
lllth  Ohio. 

19th  Ohio  Battery. 


Third  Brigade. 
Col.  S.  A.  STRICKLAND. 
91st  Indiana. 
182d  Ohio. 
181  si     " 
50th      " 


THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  S.  P.  CARTER. 


First  Brigade. 
Col.  0.  W.  STERL. 
8r.h  Tennessee. 
12th  Kentucky. 
Ifith 

100th  Ohio. 
104th    " 


Second  Brigade. 
Brevet  Brig.-Gen.  J.  S. 

CASEMENT. 
103.1  Ohio. 
177th     " 
65th  Indiana. 
65th  Illinois. 


Third  Brigade. 
Brevet  Brig. -Gen.  T.  J. 
HEN-DERSON. 
112th  Il'iiiois. 
63d  Indiana. 
140th      " 


Battery  D,  1st  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 


CAVALRY   DIVISION,  M.  D.  M. 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  JUDSON  KILPATRTCK. 


First  Brigad". 
Brevet  Brig.-Gen.  THOS.  J. 

JORDAN. 

9th  Pennsylvania. 
2d  Kentucky. 
3d        " 
3d  Indiana. 
8th      " 


11* 


Second  Brigade. 
Brevet  Brig.-Gen.  S.  D. 

ATKINS. 

9-2(1  Illinois  Mounted  Inf. 
10th  Ohio. 
9th       " 

1st  Ohio  Squadron. 
9th  Michigan. 

10th  Wisconsin  Battery. 


Third  Brigade. 
Col.  GKO.  E.  SPENCER, 
5th  Kentucky. 
5th  Ohio. 
1st  Alabama. 


250  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 


II. — Organization  of  the  Army  near  Smithftcld,  N.  C.,  Commanded  6g 
GEN.  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON,  March  31,  1805. 

HARDEE'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
LIEUT. -GENERAL  WILLIAM  J.  HARDEE  COMMANDING. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  L.  McLAWS'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades— BLANCHARD'S,  HARRISON'S,  KENNEDY'S,  FIXER'S. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  B.   TALIAFERRO'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades— ELLIOTT'S,  RHETT'S. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  F.  HOKE'S  DIVISION. 

Brigades— CLINGMAN'S,  HAGOOD'S,  COLQUITT'S,  KIRKLAND'S,  NETHEHCUTT'S 
Junior  Reserves. 


AKMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

STEWART'S,  LEE'S,  AND  CHEATHAM'S  CORPS. 

(These  corps  are  reported  as  having  the  same  organization  as  when  with  Hood, 
both  as  to  divisions  and  brigades,  except  that  Anderson's  Division  of  Lee's  Corpa 
was  under  command  of  Major-General  D.  H.  Hill,  and  the  whole  of  Stewart's 
Corps  was  under  the  command  of  Major-General  E.  C.  "Walthall.) 

ARTILLERY  ATTACHED  TO  HARDEE'S  CORPS. 

Batteries— ABELLE'S,  ANDERSON'S,  BROOKS'S,  MAXWELL'S  (section),  ATKIUS'S, 
PARVIS'S,  Detachment  10th  North  Carolina  Battalion,  LE  GARDEN'S, 
STUART'S. 

ARTILLERY  ATTACHED   TO  ARMY   OF  TENNESSEE. 
Battery— KANAPAUX'S.     For  memorandum  as  to  other  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  see  Appendix  E,  III. 

CAVALRY  CORPS. 

LIEUT.-GENERAL  WADE  HAMPTON  COMMANDING. 
WHEELER'S  Cavalry.     BUTLER'S  Cavalry.     Divisions  and  brigades  not  given.1 

1  It  is  regretted  that  it  has  not  been  practicable  to  procure  the  list  of  regiments 
in  Hardee's  Corps,  or  the  Cavalry. 


IIsTDEX. 


NOTE. — Regiment^  batteries^  etc.,  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captai?i's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  indexed  under  BATTERIES. 


ABBEVILLE,  S.  C.,  178 

Abbott,  brigade  of,  141,  144 

Abingdon,  Va.,  200 

Acklen  Place,  107  et  seq. 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  Daniel, 
205  et  seq. 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  John, 
mortally  wounded,  91,  97 

Adams,  Brigadier-General  Wirt, 
cavalry  brigade  of,  204 

Aiken,  S.  C.,  172 

Alatoona,  Ga.,  23 

Albany,  Ga.,  31 

Alexandria,  Va.,  147 

Ames,  Brevet  Major-General  Adel- 
bert,  division  of,  141  et  seq., 
145;  at  Fort  Fisher,  148;  be 
fore  Fort  Anderson,  149 

Anderson,  Colonel  E.  C.,  50 

Anderson,  Brigadier-General  R. 
H.,  cavalry  division  of,  33 

Anderson,  Fort,  145,  149  et  ,seq. 

Anderson,  Major  George  W.,  51 

Appomatto..,  Va.,  202,  2.3 

Argyle  Island,  44,  56,  59  et  seq. 


Armstrong,  Brigadier-General  F. 
C.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  124,  206 
(note)  et  seq. 

Athens,  Ala.,  133 

Athens,  Ga.,  17,  67 

Atkins,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Smith  D.,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
24,  33  ;  his  ''Ninety- second  Il 
linois  Volunteers,"  42  (note), 
175  (note),  179  et  seq. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  2  et  seq.,  7  et  seq., 
16 ;  map  of,  20,  21, 23  et  seq. ,  26 
et  seq.,  36,  40,  63,  79,  91,  137, 
102,  176 

Augusta,  Ga.,  10,  23,  25,  27etseq., 
32,  34,  49,  59,  61,  164,  166,  169 
et  seq.,  182 

Averasboro,  N.  C. ,  183  et  seq. 

BADEA.U,  Brigadier-General  Adam, 

2,  8  (note) 

Bainbridge,  Ala.,  125 
Baird,  General  Absalom,  division 

of  (Fourteenth  Corps),  24,  34 
Barnwell,  S.  C.,  176  (note) 


252 


INDEX. 


Bate,  Major-General  Wm.  B.,  di 
vision  of,  73,  76,  79,  88,  9:3,  96, 
103  et  seq.,  113, 115  et  seq.,  120, 
122  et  seq.,  128,  188,  190  et  seq. 

Batteries:  CockerelPs,  118;  De 
Gres's,  53  ;  Winegar's,  56 

Beatty,  Brigadier-General  Samuel, 
division  of,  98,  112,  117,  121 

Beaufort,  S.  C.,  46,  48,  163  etseq., 
171,  211 

Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  in  mili 
tary  command  between  middle 
Georgia  and  the  Mississippi, 
2  ;  put  over  Hood  and  Taylor, 
10  et  seq. ;  hastens  after  Hood, 
13  ;  repairs  railroad,  15 ;  his 
earnest  despatches  to  Hood,  17; 
despatches  of,  27  et  seq.,  49,  59, 
64;  reports  of,  101, 161  (note); 
suggestions  of,  166  et  seq. ;  at 
a  conference  at  Augusta,  169 
etseq.,  178,  183 

Bell,  Colonel  L.,  brigade  of,  143  et 
seq. 

Bell's  Landing,  Tenn.,  110,  119 

Bentonville,  N.  C.,  162, 185  et  seq., 
203 

Biffle,  Colonel  J.  B.,  demi-brigade 
of  cavalry,  71 

Blair,  Major-General  F.  P.,  corps 
of,  23 ;  constructs  a  flying 
bridge,  31 ;  at  Millen,  34  et 
seq.,  52,  168,  177  et  seq.,  194 

Boone,  N.  C.,  201 

Booneville,  Mo.,  6 

Boyd's  Neck,  S.  C.,  48  et  seq. 

Bradley,  Colonel  Lather  P.,  bri 
gade  of,  75  et  seq. 

Bragg,  General  Braxton,  8  ;  at  Au 
gusta,  49,  158  et  seq.  ;  retreats 
to  Kingston,  160  et  seq.,  181 
etseq.,  185,  192,  195 


Brantley,  Brigadier-General  W. 
F.,  brigade  of,  114 

Breckenridge,  Major-General  John 
C.,  63,  133,  200 

Breese,  Commander  K.  K,  142  et 
seq. 

Brentwood,  Tenn.,  98  et  seq.,  108, 
115,  121,  124,  128 

Briar  Creek,  Ga.,  32,  34 

Bridges,  Captain  Lyman,  Chief 
of  Artillery,  Fourth  Corps, 
75 

Brown,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
S.  B.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  201 

Brown,  Major-General  JohnC.,  di 
vision  of,  73,  76,  87  et  seq. ,  90, 
92  et  seq.,  96  et  seq.,  113 

Brown,  Governor  Joseph  E.,  of 
Georgia,  8,  11,  28  et  seq.  ;  army 
of,  47 

Buchanan,  Fort,  N.  C.,  138.  144 

Buell,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
G.  P.,  brigade  of,  189  et  seq. 

Buford,  Brigadier -General  A., 
cavalry  division  of,  12  (note), 
71  et  seq.,  103  et  seq.,  106,  204 

Bull's  Gap,  Tenn.,  212 

Burbridge,  Brigadier- General  S. 
G.,  200 

Burke's  Station,  Va.,  202 

Butler,  Major-General  M.  C.,  divi 
sion  of  cavalry,  169,  170,  179, 
187  i 

Butler,  General  B.  F.,  145 

CAMCEN,  S.  C.,  178 

Canby,  General  E.  R.  S.,  4,  199, 

203 
Capron,   Colonel  Horace,   brigade 

of,  65,  72  et  seq. 
Carlin,  Brigadier-General  W.    P., 

division  of  (Fourteenth  Corps), 


INDEX. 


253 


24,  187  et  seq.  ;  recoiled,  189, 

191  etseq.,  194,  197 
Carman,  Colonel  E.  A.,  brigade  of, 

57,  GO 
Carter,  Brigadier-General   S.    P., 

division  of,  155  et  seq.,  158  et 

seq. 
Carter's  house  (battle  of  Franklin), 

81  et  seq.,  84,  86,  88  et  seq.,  97 
Carter,    Brigadier-General   J.    C., 

wounded,  93 
Carthage,  Tenn.,  104 
Case,  Colonel  H.,  brigade  of,  183 
Casement,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen- 
.  eral  John   S.,  brigade  of,  84, 

91,  151  et  seq. 
Caswell,  Fort,  N.  C.,  138 
Catterson,  Colonel  R.  F.,  30 
Cave  Spring,  Ga.,  11 
Centreville,  Ala. ,  236 
Cjntreville,  Tenn.,  66,  98 
Chalmers,  Brigadier-GeneralJarncs 

R.,    cavalry    division    of,    12 

(note),  71  et  seq.,  106  et  seq., 

Ill,  115,  119  etseq.,  122,204, 

200  etseq.,  209 
Charleston,  S.  C.,  23,  28,  44,  46  et 

seq.,  55,  59,  61,  154,  164,  167, 

169  et  seq.,  178,  182, 184  (note) 
Charlotte,  N.  C.,  170,  177  et  seq., 

182  et  seq.,  201  et  seq.,  211,  213 
Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  3,  12,  17,  19, 

22,  99,  133,  135 
Cheathem,  Major-General  B.  P.,  12 

(note),  14,  71,  73  et  seq.,  77,  79 

et  seq.,  87  (note)  et  seq.,  91,  93 

et  seq.,  102  et  seq.,  113,  115  et 

seq.,  118  et  seq.,  188, 195 et  seq. 
Cheraw,  S.  C.,  170,  178,  181 
Cherokee  Station,   Ala.,  12,15  et 

seq.,  63 
Chester,  N.  C.,  170 


Cheves  plantation,  51,  53  et  seq. 

City  Point,  Va.,  212et  seq. 

Clarksville,  Tenn.,  67 

Clayton,  Major-General  H.  D., 
division  of,  114,  158,  160 

Classen,  Colonel  P.  P.,  brigade  of, 
155 

Cleburne,  Major-General  Patrick 
R.,  division  of,  73  et  seq.,  87 
etseq.;  death  of,  92,  96 et  seq., 
113,  115,  122,  188 

Clifton,  Tenn.,  129,  137 

Clinton,  Ga.,  27 

Clinton,  N.  C.,  185,  188 

Cobb,  General  Howell,  9,  11,  28 ; 
at  Macon,  30 

Cockerell,  Captain  Giles  J.,  battery 
of,  118 

Cockrell,  Brigadier-General  F.  M. , 
wounded,  97 ;  brigade  of,  106, 
115 

Coggswell,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gene 
ral  William,  brigade  of,  192 

Colbert  Shoals,  Ala.,  14 

Cole's  farm,  188  et  seq.,  191 

Coleman,  Colonel  D.,  brigade  of, 
111,  113,  115  et  seq.,  120,  124, 
125  (nobe) 

Columbia,  S.  C.,  21  etseq., 58, 164, 
166,  170  etseq.,  201 

Columbia,  Tenn.,  18,  64  et  seq.; 
map  of,  68  et  seq.,  71  et  seq., 
96,  125,  132  et  seq. 

Columbus,  Miss.,  204 
:  Comstock,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gene 
ral  C.  B.,  142 

'  Connecticut,  Fifteenth  Regiment, 
158 

Conrad,  Colonel  Joseph,  brigade 
of,  86,  88 

Coon,  Colonel  D.  E.,  cavalry  bri 
gade  of,  73,  111 


254 


INDEX. 


Cooper,  Brigadier-General  J.  A., 
division  of  (Twenty-third 
Corps),  17  et  seq.,  66,  98,  112 

Coosawhatchee,  S.  C.,  55 

Corinth,  Miss.,  11,  15,  28,  103 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  217 

Corse,  Brevet  Major-General  John 
M.,  division  of,  23,  168 

Couch,  Major-General  Darius,  divi 
sion  of,  112,  116  et  seq.,  120, 
122,  128,  149,  160 

Cowan,  Tenn.,  99 

Cox,  Major-GeneralJacob  D. ,  divi 
sion  of,  17;  at  Columbia,  18; 
sent  to  Lynnville,  64 ;  sent  to 
Hurricane,  65 ;  position  of,  67, 
74,  77  et  seq.  ;  at  Franklin.  81, 
85;  at  Nashville,  112,  116,  118 
et  seq.  ;  before  Wilmington, 
137;  at  Fort  Fisher,  147  et 
seq.  ;  before  Fort  Anderson, 
149  et  seq.  ;  ordered  to  New- 
bern,  185  et  seq.  ;  at  Golds- 
boro,  196 

Crossland,  Colonel  Edward,  caval 
ry  brigade  of,  204  et  seq. 

Croxton,  Brigadier-General  John 
T.,  cavalry  brigade  of,  14,  72 
et  seq.  ;  110,  205  et  seq. 

Cruft,  Brigadier-General  Charles, 
division  of,  101,  108,  134 

Cunningham,  Sergeant-Ma j or  S. 
A.,  126  (note) 

Curtis,  Brigadier-General  N.  M., 
brigade  of,  142  et  seq. 

DAHLGREN,  Rear  Admiral  J.  A., 

46,  53,  55,  178 
Dalton,  Ga.,7,  17 
Daly,  plantation  of,  44 
Danville,  Va.,  183,  202,  211  et  seq., 

213 


Davisboro,  Ga.,  31 

Davis,  Brevet  Major-General  Jeffi 
C.  (of  Fourteenth  Corps),  23, 
27,  31,  34 ;  leaves  negro  refu 
gees  behind,  37,  52,  185,  189 
et  seq.,  191, 193 

Davis,  President  Jefferson,  2,  8  ; 
at  Hood's  headquarters,  9  ;  at 
Augusta,  10,  182,  202;  ar 
rested  by  Wilson,  210,  212, 
214 

Decatur,  Ala.,  1,  6,  12  et  seq.,  15, 
17,  66  et  seq.,  102,  125  et  seq., 
133 

DeGres,  Captain  J.  C.,  battery  of, 
53 

Demopolis,  Ala.,  204,  208 

Dibrell,  Brigadier-General  G.  G., 
division  of  cavalry,  33,  187 
(note) 

Donaldson,  Brigadier-General  Jas. 
L.,100,  105,  108,  134 

Doolittle,  Brevet  Major-General 
C.  C.,  brigade  of,  14,  122  et 
seq. 

Dow,  Major  T.  T.,  79,  94 

Duncan,  Captain  William,  scout, 
52  et  seq. 

Duncan  farm,  Ga.,  30 

Durham  Station,  N.  C.,  214 

EAGLE   ISLAND,    N.    C.,    152   et 

seq. 

Eastport,  Miss.,  129 
Ector,  Brigadier-General,  M.    B., 

brigade  of,  111 
Edgefield,  Tenn.,  103 
Elevation,  N.  C.,  186 
Elliott,  Brigadier-General  W.  Lu, 

division  of,  112  et  seq.,  117 
Elyton,  Ala.,  205 
Ezra  Church,  Ga.,  9 


INDEX. 


255 


FMRBURN,  Ga.,  36 

Fayetteville,  N.  C.,  170,  181,  183 
et  seq. 

Fearing,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
B.  D.,  brigade  of,  189,  191  et 
seq. 

Featherston,  Brigadier  -  General 
W.  S.,  brigade  of,  125 

Piald,  Colonel  H.  B.,  brigade  of, 
135  (note) 

Fisher,  Fort,  N.  C.,  137  et  seq., 
147,  165 

Fitch,  Lieutenant-Commander  Le- 
roy,  104 

Florence,  Ala.,  11,  14  et  seq.,  17 
et  seq.,  63  et  seq.,  126,  133, 
170,  3JO,  303 

Force,  Brigadier-General  M.  F., 
division  of,  163 

Forrest,  Lieutenant-General N.  B., 
cavalry  corps  of,  11  ;  starts 
on  a  raid,  13  et  seq.,  15  et  seq.; 
joins  Hood,  63,  65  et  seq.,  71  et 
seq.,  81,  85  et  seq.;  his  skirmish 
with  Wilson,  98  et  seq.,  103  et 
seq.,  106,  111  (note),  115;  re 
treat,  134  ;  rejoins  Hood,  125, 
135,  303  et  seq.;  rout  of,  307  et 
seq. 

Forsyth,  Ga.,  36 

Fort  Anderson  (see  Anderson, 
Fort) 

Fort  Buchanan  (see  Buchanan, 
Fort) 

Fort  Caswell  (see  Caswell,  Fort) 

Fort  Fisher  (see  Fisher,  Fort) 

Fort  Granger  (see  Granger,  Fort) 

Fort  Henry  (see  Henry,  Fort) 

Fort  Jackson  (see  Jackson,  Fort) 

Fort  Johnson  (see  Johnson,  Fort) 

Fort  McAllister  (see  McAllister, 
Fort) 


Fort  Macon  (see  Macon,  Fort) 

Fort  Pulaski  (see  Pulaski,  Fort) 

Fortr<*ss  Monroe  (see  Monroe,  Fort 
ress) 

Foster,  Major-General  J.  G.,  46,  48, 
55  et  seq.,  59  et  seq.,  164,  178 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  69  et  seq.;  battle 
of,  81  et  seq.,  101  et  seq.,  124 
et  seq.,  135 

French,  Major-General  S.  G.,  divi 
sion  of,  88,  97,  103,  111  (note), 
113 

Frink,  Surgeon  C.  S.,  94 

GADSDEN,  Ala.,  1,  10  etseq.,  29 

Gallatin,  Tenn.,  104 

Gallup,  Colonel  G.  VV.,  brigade  of, 

18 
Gardiner,     Brigadier-General  W. 

M.,  203 
Garrard,   Brigadier-General   Ken- 

ner,  division  of,  111,  113 
Geary,  Brigadier-General  John  W., 

division  of,  33,  60 
Genesis  Point,  Ga.,  50 
Georgia,    regiment    of  :     Thirty- 
seventh,  123 
German  ton,  N.  C.,  203 
Gillem,  Brigadier-General  A.   C., 

cavalry  division  of,  63,  200  et 

seq. 

Gillem's  Station,  Tenn.,  18 
Gist,     Brigadier-General    S.    R., 

killed,  93 
Goldsboro,   N.  C.,   137,   147,   155, 

159  et  seq.,  163, 164, 181, 185  et 

seq.,  191,  196,  203,  211  et  seq. 
Gordon,  Brigadier-General  G.  W., 

93 

Gordon,  Ga.,  27,  30,  36 
Govan,    Brigadier-General  D.    C., 

brigade  of,  119  et  seq.,  122 


256 


INDEX. 


Graham ville,  S.  C.,  48 

Cranberry,  Brigadier-General  H. 
B.,  death  of,  97  . 

Granger,  Fort,  Tenn.,  83,  98 

Granger,  Brigadier-General  R.  S., 
1  ;  at  Decatur,  14,  17,  66,  100, 
125,  133 

Granny  White  Turnpike,  108,  111 
etseq.,  115,  119,  1.3  etseq. 

Grant,  Lieutenant-General  U.  S., 
assents  to  Sherman's  plan,  2  et 
seq  ,  21,  55,  58  et  seq.  ;  chafes 
under  Thomas's  delay,  105  et 
seq.,  129  et  seq.,  142,  146,  165, 
172,  li/9  et  seq.,  202  et  seq., 
211  et  seq.,  216  et  seq. 

Gravelly  Springs,  Ala.,  213 

Greene,  General  Nathaniel,  217 

Greenesboro,  N.  C..  1(58  (note),  202, 
21 3  etseq.,  217 

Griswold ville,  Ga.,  27,  30  et  seq. 

Grosvenor,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen. 
C.  H.,  brigade  of,  107,  121, 134 

Guntersville,  Ala.,  1,  9,  11  et  seq. 

HA  GOOD,  Brigadier-General  John 
son,  brigade  of,  150  et  seq. 

Hallcck,  Major-General  H.  W.,  6, 
58,  176 

Hambright,  Colonel  H.  A.,  brigade 
of,  189 

Hammond,  Colonel  J.  H.,  brigade 
of,  at  Spring  Hill,  70,  104 

Hampton,  Lieuten:int-G  e  n  e  r  a  1 
Wade,  171,  179  et  seq.;  meets 
Hardee  and  Johnston  at  Fay- 
ette ville,  183,  186  efc  seq.;  re 
fuses  to  bring  in  the  cavalry 
for  surrender,  217 

Hardee,  Lieutenant-General  W.  J., 
Hood's  unjust  charges  against, 
9  et  aeq. ;  hastens  back  to  Sa 


vannah,  28,  30 ;  his  orders  to 
Wheeler,  31,  46 et  seq.;  advised 
to  abandon  Savannah,  49  et 
seq.;  refuses  to  surrender,  59  ; 
begins  the  evacuation,  60,  131 ; 
at  Wilmington,  154,  164;  re 
port  of,  166  et  seq. ;  at  a  con 
ference  near  Augusta,  169  et 
seq.;  evacuates  Charleston,  178 
et  seq.,  181  et  seq.;  meets 
Johnston  and  Hampton  at 
Fayetteville,  183  et  seq.;  at 
Benton ville,  186  et  seq.;  meets 
Schofield,  217 

Hardeeville,  S.  C.,  47,56 

Harper's  Ferry,  Va.,  181 

Harris,  Governor  Isham  G. ,  101 

Hatch,  Brigadier-General  Edward, 
cavalry  under,  18,  64,  72,  110 
et  seq.,  119,  123,  203 

Hatch,  Brigadier-General  John  P., 
affair  at  Honey  Hill,  48  et  seq. 
60 

Havvley,  Colonel  William,  57 

Hazen,  Major-General  W.  B.,  di 
vision  of,  23  ;  capture  of  Fort 
McAllister,  53  etseq.,  174,  193 
et  seq. 

Heath,  Colonel  Thomas  T.,  33 

Heiskell,  Colonel,  C.  W.,  brigade 
of,  125  (note) 

Henderson,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Thomas  J.,  brigade  of,  78, 
84,  91, 150  et  seq. 

Henry,  Fort,  15 

j  Hiil,  Colonel  S.  G.,  death  of,  111 
'  Hill,  General  D.   H.,  159  et  seq.; 
at  a  conference  at  Augusta, 
169 

Hillsboro  Turnpike,   107  et  seq. 
205,  217 

Hilton  Head,  S.  C.,  60 


INDEX. 


257 


Hobart,  brigade  of,  189,  191, 
197 

Hoke,  Major-General  R.  F.,  144 
et  seq. ,  148  ;  retreat  of,  150, 
153, 154, 156,  158, 160, 183, 188, 
102 

Honey  Hill,  S.  C.,  48 

Hood,  General  John  B. ,  1  ;  subor 
dinate  to  General  Beauregard, 
2  ;  his  design  to  carry  the  war 
back  to  Tennessee,  4  et  seq.; 
demands  Hardee's  removal,  9  ;  i 
force  of,  11  et  seq.;  views  of 
his  subordination  to  Beaure 
gard,  13  ;  marches  to  Tuscum- 
bia,  Met  seq.;  delays,  17  ;  force 
of,  18  et  seq.;  Beauregard' s 
orders  to,  29 ;  joined  by  For 
rest,  63  ;  near  Lawrenceburg, 
64  et  seq. ;  moves  upon  Spring 
Hill,  73  ;  asks  to  have  Cheat- 
hem  relieved,  29  et  seq.;  ad 
vances  toward  Franklin,  84  et 
seq.;  losses  of,  96  et  seq. ;  apolo 
gies  of,  101  et  seq.;  before 
Nashville,  106;  position  of,  110 
ct  seq.;  forms  anew  line,  113  et 
seq.;  rout  of ,  126;  at  Tupelo, 
127  et  seq.,  132  et  seq.,  159, 
166  169,  179,  183,  196,  199  et 
seq.,  203 

Howard,  Major  -  General  O.  O. 
(commanding  Army  of  the 
Tennessee),  with  Sherman,  23  ; 
march  of,  26  et  seq.;  crosses 
the  Oconee,  81  et  seq.;  pro 
gress  of,  34,  47  ;  orders  King's 
Bridge  rebuilt,  52 ;  at  tak 
ing  of  Fort  McAllister,  53 
et  seq.;  preparations  before  | 
Savannah,  55  et  seq.;  at  Beau-  j 
fort,  163  et  seq.,  168  et  seq.;  ! 


enters  Columbia,  173  et  seq., 
177;  enters  Cheraw,  179,  185 
etseq.,  193,  195 

Hubbard,  Colonel  Lucius  F.,  bri 
gade  of,  111,  123,  128 

Huey's  Mill,  Tenn.,  69  et  seq. 

Hume,  Brigadier-General  W.  Y.  C., 
cavalry  division  of,  33 

Hunt's  Corners,  Tenn.,  72 

Huntsville,  Ala.,  17,  67,  129 

Hurricane,  Tenn.,  05 

Hutchinson  Island,  Ga.,  44,  47,  59 

ILLINOIS,  regiments  of  :  Ninety- 
second,  175,  181 ;  One  Hundred 
and  Eleventh,  55  ;  One  Hun 
dred  and  Twelfth,  78,  93 

Indiana,  regiments  of  :  Eighth,  82 ; 
Seventeenth,  207 ;  Sixty-third, 
78 

Indian  Spring,  Ga. ,  26 

Iowa,  regiment  of  :  Fifth,  72 

Izard'sMill,  Ga.,  60 

JACKSON,  Brigadier-General  Wm. 
H.,  cavalry  division  of,  11 
et  seq.,  71  et  seq.,  77;  with 
draws,  78  et  seq.,  103  etseq., 
205  etseq.,  208  etseq. 

Jackson,  Brigadier-General  H.  R. 
(commanding  brigade  in  Bate's 
division),  taken  prisoner,  123 

Jackson,  Brigadier-General,  com 
manding  forces  in  S.  W.  Vir 
ginia,  201,  203 

Jackson,  Brigadier- General  N  J., 
division  of  (Twentieth  Corps), 
23,  27,  52,  183 

Jackson,  Fort,  46 

Jackson,  Miss.,  204 

Jackson,  Tenn.,  13,  15 

Jasper,  Ala.,  205 


258 


INDEX. 


Johnson,  Major-General  Ed.,  divi 
sion  of,  74,  77,  93,  97,  114; 
prisoner,  126 

Johnson,  Brigadier-General  Geo. 
D.,  bri'wu*'*  "f,  113 

Johnson,  General  R.  W.,  cavalry 
division  of,  72,  110, 119 ;  pur 
sues  Hood,  125 

Johnson,  Fort,  N.  C.,  138 

Johnson,  President  Andrew,  216 

Johnsonville,  Tenn.,  10,  18,  66  et 
seq.,  135 

Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  3, 
22;  at  Newbern,  159  et  seq., 
168  (note),  180  et  seq.  ;  meets 
Hardee  and  Hampton  at  Fay- 
etteville,  183  et  seq.  ;  concen 
trates  at  Bentonville,  186  et 
seq.  ;  retreat  of,  196  et  seq., 
202,  203 ;  opens  negotiations 
for  surrender,  214  et  seq. 

Jonesboro,  Ga.,  26 

Jonesboro,  Tenn.,  201 

Jones,  Jr.,  Colonel  C.  C.,  his 
"  Siege  of  Savannah,"  29,  46, 
48  (note),  50,  51  (note),  167 
(note) 

Jones,  Colonel  Theodore,  brigade 
of,  53  et  seq. 

Jones,  Colonel  Wells  S.,  brigade  of, 
58 ;  severely  wounded,  54 

Jones,  General  S.,in  command  at 
Charleston,  S.  C.,  59 

Jordan  and  Prior's  "  Campaigns  of 
Forrest,"  13  (note),  71  (note) 

Jordan,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Thomas  J.,  cavalry  brigade  of, 
180 

KENTUCKY,  regiments  of :  Sec 
ond,  32;  Twelfth,  78;  Six 
teenth,  78 


Kilpatrick,  Brigadier  -  General  Jn  d- 
son,  commands  cavalry,  24 ; 
charges  the  artillery  at  Lovejoy 
on  foot,  26 ;  makes  a  feint  upon 
Macon,  27,  31  et  seq.;  rapa 
city  of,  40,  53,  169,  175  ;  sur 
prised,  179  et  seq.,  183,  185, 
193 

Kimball,  Brigadier  -  General  Na 
than,  division  of,  71,  74,  77; 
at  Franklin,  85,  92,  94,  08, 
112  et  seq.,  117 

King's  Bridge,  Ga.,  52  et  seq.,  57 

Kingston,  Ga.,  2,  16 

Kinston,  N.  C.,  155  et  seq.,  160 
et  seq.,  181,  183,  194,  203,  211 

Knipe,  Brigadier-General  Joseph 
F.,  cavalry  division  of,  111, 
123,  125,  199,  203 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  200,  212 

LAMB,  Colonel  William,  139,  144 

Lane,  Colonel  John  Q. ,  brigade 
of,  75etseq.,  86,  88 

Lavergne,  Tenn.,  103 

Lawrence  burg,  Tenn.,  63  et  seq. 

Lawton,  plantation  of,  44,  52 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  4,  21  et 
seq.,  50,  130,  165,  172,  182, 
201  et  seq.;  surrender  of,  210 
etseq.,  213,  216 

Lee,  Lieutenant-General  S.  D.,  12 
(note) ;  corps  of,  64,  71,  74; 
tries  to  force  a  crossing  of 
Duck  River,  78  et  seq.,  86, 
88,  93  et  seq.,  102,  113  et 
seq.,  158,  183,  188,  196 

Leggett,  Brevet  Major-General  M. 
D.,  division  of,  23 

Lewisburg,  Tenn.,  66,  69,  71  et 
seq. 

Lexington,  Ala.,  126,  176  (note) 


INDEX. 


259 


Lincoln,  President  Abraham,  5,  37, 
60,  104,  129  et  seq.,  103,  212; 
assassination  of,  214  etseq.,  218 
Logan,  Major-Generai  John  A.  ,23  ; 
ordered  to  Nashville,  106,  164, 
170,  173,  177,  193  et  seq. 
Long,  Brigadier-General  Eli,  cav 
alry  division  of,  203,  207  et  seq. 
Loring,    Major-General    W.     W., 
division  of,  88,  91,  94,  103,  113 
et  seq.,  125  (note) 
Louisville,  Ga.,  31,  33  et  seq.,  50 
Lovejoy  Station,  11  (note),  26,  33 
Lowry,   Brigadier-General  M.  P., 
division  of,  75,  113, 115  et  seq., 
122,  125  (note),  195 
Lynchburg,  Va.,  2JI  et  seq.,  212 
Lynnville,  Tenn.,  64  et  seq. 

MCALLISTER,    Fort,   46,    50,    53; 

fall  of,  54  et  seq.,  59 
Mo  Arthur,  Brigadier-General  John, 

division    of,  110  et  seq.,  120, 

123  et  seq. 

McClurg,  Colonel  A.  C.,  190,  193 
McCook,     Brigadier-General     Ed. 

M.,  cavalry  division  of,  203, 

205  et  seq.,  209 
McDonongh,  Ga.,  26 
McLaws,    Major-General    L.,    50, 

184,  188,  192 
McMillan  Brevet  Brigadier-General 

W.   L.,  brigade  of,  111,  120, 

122  etseq.,  127  et  seq. 
McQuiston,  Colonel  J.  C.,  brigade 

of,  16  J 

Macon,  Fort,  N.  C.,  154 
Macon,  Ga.,  23,  25  et  seq.,  63,  210 
Madison,  Ga. ,  27,  35 
Manigault,    Brigadier-General   A. 

M.,  93,  97 
Maps  :   Atlanta  to  Savannah,  20  ; 


Savannah  and  Vicinity,  45 ; 
Middle  Tennessee,  63;  Vicinity 
of  Columbia,  68  ;  Battle-field 
of  Franklin,  83;  Battle-field 
of  Nashville,  109  ;  Fort  Fisher 
and  Wilmington,  139;  North 
Carolina,  146 ;  Kinston,  157 ; 
Battle  of  Bentonville,  180 

Marion,  Ala.,  200,  206,  207  (note), 
209 

Martin,  Colonel  J.  S.,  55 

Maury,  Major-General  Dabney  K., 
203 

Mercer,  Brigadier-General  Hugh 
W.,  brigade  of,  104 

Michigan,  regiments  of :  Ninth, 
33 ;  Fourteenth,  193 

Midway,  S.  C. ,  170 

Miles,  Colonel  David,  189,  191 

Milledgeville,  Ga.,  23,  25,  27,  29, 
31  etseq.,  36 

Millen,  Ga.,  23,  31  et  seq.,  36 

Miller,  Colonel  J.  K. ,  cavalry  bri 
gade  of,  201 

Milroy,  Major-General  R.  S.,  ICO, 
103  et  seq. 

Mitchell,  Brigadier-General  J.  G., 
brigade  of,  1 89, 192  et  seq. 

Mobile,  Ala.,  3,  23, 199,  203  et  seq., 
210 

Monroe,  Fortress,  Va.,  146 

Monte vallo,  Ala.,  204  et  seq. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  209 

Monticello,  176  (note) 

Moore,  Colonel  O.  H.,  brigade  of, 
18,  84,  111,  117,  148,  151  et 
seq. 

Morehead  City,  N.  C.,211 

Morgan,  Brigadier-General  J.  D., 
division  of  (Fourteenth  Corps), 
24,  107,  189,  191  et  seq.,  194. 
197 


260 


INDEX. 


Morris  Island,  S. C.,  23 
Mount  Pleasant,  Tenn.,  65 
Mower,   Major-General  J.  A.,  di 
vision  of,  23,  195,  213 
Murfreesboro,    Term.,  72  et  seq., 
100,  1C3  et  seq.,  109  et  seq, 
126,  134 

Murray,  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Eli  H. ,  cavalry  brigade  of,  24, 
32  et  seq. 
Muscle  Shoals,  Ala.,  14 

NASHVILLE,  Tenn.,  2,  6  et  seq., 
1 2  et  seq. ,  1 7  et  seq. ,  07  et  seq. , 
93;  battle  of,  99  et  seq.,  126 
etseq.,132etseq.,  199 

Newbern,  N.  C.,  137,  147,  154  et 
seq.,  164,  181,  185,  211 

Newberry,  S.  C.,  170 

New  Orleans,  La.,  199 

New  York,  regiment  of  :  Twelfth, 
156 

Nichols,  Colonel  G.  W.,  his  "  Story 
of  the  Great  March,"  42  (note), 
58  (note) 

Nolensville  Turnpike,  103, 108, 110, 
117 

North  Carolina,  regiment  of :  For 
tieth,  192 

OHIO,  regiments  of :  Fifth,  33 ; 
Ninth,  180;  Eighteenth,  107 

Oliver,  Colonel  John  M.,  53 

Olmstead,  Colonel  C.  H.,  104 

Onslow  Island,  Ga.,  44 

Opdycke,  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Emerson,  brigade  of,  75 
et  seq.,  79,  86,  89  et  seq.,  94, 
155 

Orangeburg,  S.  C.,  166,  170,  172, 
175 

Ossabaw  Sound,  Ga.,  23 


Osterhaus,  Brevet  Major-General 
P.  J.,  commands  Logan's  corps, 
23,  34etseq.,  52 

PADUCAH,  Ky.,  6 

Paine,   Brigadier-General  Charles 

J.,  division  of.  141,  144 
Palmer,  Colonel  J.  B.,  brigade  of, 

103 
Palmer,    Colonel    W.    J.,    cavalry 

brigade  of  (Gillem's  division), 

201 
Palmer,  General  I.  N.,  155  et  seq., 

158  et  seq. 
Palmetto,  Ga.,  9 
Pemberton,  Lieutenant-General  J. 

C.,  213 

Pennypacker,  Brevet  Brigadier- 
General  G.  A.,  brigade  of,  143 

et  seq. 

Pensacola,  Fla.,  23 
Perry ville,  Tenn.,  16 
Petersburg,  Va.,  22,  165,  202,  211 

et  seq. 
Phillips,  Brigadier-General  P.  J., 

division  of  (Georgia  Militia), 

CO  et  seq. 

Planter's  Factory,  Ga.,  26,  28 
Plantersville,  Ala.,  206,  209 
Pocotaligo,  S.  C.,  59,  104,  168 
Poe,   Colonel  O.    M.,    Chief    En 
gineer,  24,  59,  164 
Porter,  Vice- Admiral  D.  D.,  141 

etseq.,  146,  149 

Port  Royal,  S.  C.,  46,  52,  55,  57 
Post,  Colonel  P.  Sidney,    brigade, 

of,  70,  74,  97,  112,  121 
Pulaski,  Fort,  45 
Pulaski,  Tenn.,   14,  17  et  seq.,  64 

et  seq.,  102,  124  et  seq.,  129, 

132  et  seq. 
Putnam,  Israel,  191 


INDEX. 


2f,l 


QUARLES,  Brigadier-General  Wm. 
A.,  brigade  of,  91,  97,  113 

RAINES,  house  of,  114 

Raleigh,  N.  C.,  176,  178,  181,  185, 

212  et  seq. 

Rally  Hill,  Tenn. ,  72  et  seq. 
Randolph,  Ala.,  205  et  seq. 
Reese,  Captain  C.  B.,  Chief  En 
gineer,  52 
Reilly,  Brigadier-General  J.   W., 

brigade  of,  78  et  seq.,    83  et 

seq.,  89  et  seq.,  94 
Resaca,  Ga.,  7 

Resolute,  the,  driven  ashore,  57 
Reynolds,  plantation  of,  33 
Reynolds,     Brigadier- General    D. 

H.,  brigade  of,  112,  124 
Rhett,  Colonel  Albert,  183et  seq. 
Richmond,  Va.,   9,   21  et  seq.,  28, 

35,  49,  58,  165,  167,  182,  201, 

210,  212  et  seq. 
Robertsville,  S.  C.,  164 
Robinson,  Brigadier-General  J.  S., 

brigade  of,  191  et  seq. 
Roddey,   Brigadier-General  P.  D., 

cavalry  division  of,  12  (note), 

67,  133,  204  et  seq.,  207 
Rome,  Ga.,  2,  11,  16,  21,  23,  133 
Rosecrans,  Major-General  W.  S.,  6 
Rousseau,   Major-General   L.   H., 

100, 103,  134 
Rucker.  Brigadier-General  E.  W., 

brigade  of,  16,  126 
Ruger,  Brigadier-General  T.   H., 

66,   71,   74,  77  etseq.,  84,  92, 

94, 155,  158  et  seq. 

ST.  Louis,  Mo.,  6 
Salisbury,  N.  C.,  202  et  seq. 
Saltville,  Va.,  200 
Sandersville,  Ga.,  31 


Savannah,  Ga,,  1,  2\  23,  25,  27  et 
seq., 43  et  seq. ;  fall  of,  60,  139, 
102  et  seq.,  168,  173,  176,  ISO, 
197,  1<!9,  21G 

Schofleld,  Major-General  John  M. 
(Army  of  the  Ohio),  6  et  seq.; 
Hood's  movement  against,  11 ; 
at  Nashville,  17  et  seq.  ; 
against  Hood,  63  et  seq. ;  at 
Spring  Hill,  69  et  seq.;  battle 
of  Franklin,  79  et  seq.;  losses 
of,  97;  at  Nashville,  99  et 
seq.  ;  advises  further  delay 
before  Nashville,  105  ;  prepa 
rations  for  battle,  106  et  soq. ; 
losses  of,  114 ;  second  day  at 
Nashville,  117  et  seq.  ;  pursues 
Hood,  124 et  seq.;  concentrates 
at  Corinth,  Miss.,  123  et  seq., 
1 37 ;  joins  Grant  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  147;  at  Fort  Fisher, 
147  et  seq.  ;  enters  Wilming 
ton,  154  et  seq.  ;  at  Newbern, 
158  et  seq.  ;  at  Kinston,  100 
et  seq.,  168  (note),  181,  183,  I>r5 
et  seq.  ;  ordered  to  Goldsboro, 
194  ct  seq.,  200,  2C3;  left  in 
command,  211,  213 ;  receives 
the  arms  of  Confederates,  217 

Scott,  Brigadier-General  Th.  M., 
brigade  oi  91,  97 

Sea  Island,  S.  C.,  38 

Sears,  Brigadier-General  G.  "W., 
brigade  of,  103,  111  (note), 
113. 115 

|  Selma,  Ala.,  204,  206  et  seq. 
i  Shelby ville,  Tenn.,  65  et  seq.,  72, 
124 

Shelley,  Brigadier-General  C.  M., 
brigade  of,  113 

Sheridan,    Major-General    P.    H., 


262 


INDEX. 


Sherman,  Major-General  W.  T., 
plans  of,  1  et  seq.;  moral 
courage  of,  4  et  seq.;  his 
confidence  in  Thomas,  6 ;  en 
emy's  plans  against,  9  et 
seq.  ;  letter  to  Thomas,  19 ; 
views  of  his  march  through 
Georgia,  2t  et  seq.  ;  force  of, 
23  et  seq.  ;  line  of  march,  26  et 
seq. ;  his  orders  to  Kilpatrick, 
33;  at  Milieu,  34;  his  destruc 
tion  of  railways,  35  et  seq.;  his 
plan  of  foraging,  38  et  seq.  ; 
before  Savannah,  49  et  seq.  ; 
opens  communication  with 
fleet,  52  ;  at  siege  of  Fort  Mc 
Allister,  53  et  seq.  ;  prepara 
tions  before  Savannah,  55  et 
seq.  ;  demands  surrender  of 
Hardee,  59,  100  et  seq.,  1~6, 
132  et  seq. ;  at  Goldsboro,  137, 
147,  154  et  seq.,  159  ;  his  plan 
of  campa;gn,  163  et  seq. ;  route 
of,  165  et  seq. ;  enters  Colum 
bia,  173  et  seq.,  178  et  seq.  ; 
destroys  arsenal  at  Fayette- 
ville,  181  et  seq.  ;  at  Averas- 
boro,  183  et  seq. ;  at  Benton- 
ville,  186  et  seq. ;  resumes  his 
march,  196  et  seq.,  201,  203; 
at  Goldsboro,  211;  meets  Grant 
and  Lincoln  at  City  Point,  212 ; 
meets  Johnston,  214  et  seq. 
Shy,  Colonel  T.  M.,  113  (note),  123 
Shy's  Hill,  113,  115  et  seq.,  118  et 

seq.,  127  et  seq. 
Silk  Hope  plantation,  Ga.,  44 
Simonton,  Colonel  C.  H.,  152 
Slocum,     Major-General     H.    W. 
(commanding  Army  of  Geor 
gia),    with  Sherman,    23,    27 
et     seq.  ;      before     Savannah, 


52;  arranging  earthworks,  57, 
59;  commands  lefc  wing,  164, 
108  et  seq.,  178  et  seq.  ;  at 
Averasboro,  1 83  ;  at  Benton- 
ville,  186  et  seq.  ;  losses  of,  19f 
et  seq.,  213 

Smith,  Captain  R.  D. ,  69  (note) 

Smithfield,  N.  C.,  159,  161,  183  et 
seq.,  186,  194,  196.  213 

Smith,  Major-General  A.  J.,  or 
dered  to  join  Thomas,  6,  18  et 
seq.,  65 ;  at  Nashville,  99  et 
seq.,  107  etseq.  ;  losses  of,  114, 
116  et  seq.;  ordered  to  pursue 
Hood,  124  et  seq.;  concen 
trates  at  Eastport,  129  et  seq., 
132  et  seq.,  199 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  Giles  A., 
division  of  (in  Blair's  corps), 
23 

Smith,  Major-General  G.  W.,  26, 
28,  30  et  seq.,  48,  50;  at  a  con 
ference  near  Augusta,  169 

Smith,  General  J.  E.,  division  of, 
joins  Sherman,  23 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  J.  H., 
division  of,  113,  115;  taken 
prisoner,  126,  188 

Smith  Island,  N.  C.,  138 

Smith ViUe,  N.  C.,138,  145 

Solemn  Grove,  N.  C.,  179 

Spencer,  Colonel  George  E.,  cavalry 
brigade  of,  179  et  seq. 

Spring  Hill,  Tenn.,  69  et  seq.,  96 
et  seq.,  102 

Stafford,  Colonel  F.  E.  P.,  93,  95, 
97 

Stanley,  Major-General  D.  S. 
(Fourth  Corps),  6,  17;  at 
Lynnville,  65  ;  at  Spring  Hill, 
70  et  seq.,  77,  79;  at  Frank 
lin,  85,  88  et  seq. 


INDEX. 


263 


Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of 
War,  104,  130,  163,  215  et  seq. 

Steedman,  Major-General  J.  B.,  18 
(note) ;  at  Chattanooga,  99 ;  at 
Nashville,  100  et  seq.,  107  et 
seq.,  114,  117,  121  ;  in  Ala 
bama,  126  et  seq. ,  133,  135 

Bterl,  Colonel  O.  W.,  brigade  of, 
151  et  seq. 

Stevenson,  Ala.,  1,  17,  67,  100,  104 

Stevenson,  Major-General  C.  L., 
division  of,  114 

Stewart,  Colonel  R.  R.,  cavalry 
brigade  of,  at  Spring  Hill,  70 

Stewart,  Lieutenant  -  General  A. 
P.,  12  (note),  13,  71,  73  et  seq., 
77,  88,  91  et  seq.,  102,  111,  114 
et  seq.,  126,  156,  183,  188,  191 
etseq.,  198 

Stiles,  Brevet  Brigadier  -  General 
I.  N.,  brigade  of,  78,  84  et 
seq.,  87  et  seq.,  91,  93,  112, 
118  et  seq. 

Stone,  Colonel  George  A.,  brigade 
of,  173  et  seq. 

Stoneman,  Major-General  George, 
cavalry  expedition  of,  199  et 
seq. 

Stone's  River,  battle  of,  13 

Stough,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wil 
liam,  180 

Strahl,  Brigadier-General  O.  F., 
92  efc  seq.,  95 

Streight,  Colonel  A.  D.,  brigade 
of,  98,  121 

Strickland,  Colonel  S.  A.,  brigade 
of,  18,  64,  84,  89  etseq.,  93 

Sumter,  Fort,  170,  184  (note) 

Swayne,  Colonel  Wager,  177 

TALlAFEiiuo,Brigadier-GenoralW. 
B., division  of,  184, 188, 190, 192 


Talladega.  Ala..  304 

Taylor,  Captain  J.  D.  M.,  Seven- 
teenth  Indiana,  207 

Taylor,  Lieutenant-General  Rich 
ard,  9  et  seq.  ;  puts  railroad  in 
repair,  15 ;  ordered  to  Macon, 
28,  30  et  seq.;  at  Savannah, 
47  et  seq.,  59 ;  report  of,  166 ; 
203,  208 

Tennessee,  regiments  of :  Elev 
enth,  16  (note) ;  Forty-first,  95 

Tennille,  Ga.,  31 

Terry,  Major-General  A.  H.  (Tenth 
Corps),  137,  140  (note),  141 
et  seq.,  144,  147,  148,  150, 
152,  154,  162,  186,  194,  196, 
213 

Thomas,  Major-General  George  H.7 
4  et  seq. ;  Sherman's  confidence 
in,  6  et  seq.,  12  ;  Forrest's  ex 
pedition  against,  15  et  seq.  ; 
receives  news  of  disaster  at 
Johnsonville,  18  et  seq.  ;  his 
despatches  to  Schofield,  65  et 
seq.,  81 ;  sends  congratulations 
to  Schofield,  98  ;  at  Nashville, 
99  et  seq. ;  urged  to  assume 
the  aggressive,  104  et  seq.  ; 
preparations  for  battle,  1C6  et 
seq. ;  holds  council  of  com 
manders,  116;  second  day  at 
Nashville,  117  et  seq. ;  pursues 
Hood,  124  et  seq.  ;  prepares 
for  a  new  campaign,  126  et 
seq.,  199  et  seq.,  212 

Thomasville,  Ga.,  31 

Thompson,  Colonel  C.  R.,  of 
Twelfth  U.  S.  Colored,  16 
(note),  121,  127 

Thompson's  Station,  Tenn.,  77  et 
seq. 

Toombs,    Brigadier-General    Rob- 


264 


INDEX. 


ert,  28,  30,  et  seq.,  42  (note), 

47  et  seq. 

Town  Creek,  N.  C.,  150 
Trion,  Ala. ,  205  et  seq. 
Tullahoma,  Tenn.,100 
Tupelo,  Miss.,  127 
Tuscaloosa,  Ala.,  205 
Tuscumbia,  Ala.,  2,  11,  13  et  seq., 

17,  19,  63,  200,  205 
Twining,  Major  William  J.,  Chief 

Engineer,  82 

UNDINE,  the,  burned,  15 

United  States,  Colored  regiments 
of :  Twelfth,  16  (note) ;  Four 
teenth.  107 

Upham,  Colonel  S.  C.,  156,  158  et 
seq. 

Upton,  Brevet  Major-General  E., 
203, 205,  207  et  seq. 

VANDEVEB,  Brigadier-General 
William,  brigade  of,  189,  192 
et  seq. 

Vicksburg,  Tenn.,  203,  216 
Virginia,     regiment     of :     Fifty- 
fourth,  193 

WAGNER,  Brigadier-General  G.  D., 
division  of  (Fourth  Corps),  64, 
71,  75,  77,  79,  86  et  seq.,  92, 
97,  113;  at  Franklin,  135 

Walcntt,  Brigadier-General  C.  C., 
brigade  of,  30  et  seq. 

Walthall,  Major-General  E.  C., 
division  of,  88,  91  et  seq.,  97, 
107,  111  et  seq.;  retards  our 
pnrsuit,  125 

Ward,  Brevet  Major-General  W. 
T.,  division  of  (in  Twentieth 
Corps),  23,  183 

Warreusburg,  Ala.,  6 


Warrenton,  Ga.,  32 

Washington,  D.  C.,  6  et  seq.,  12, 
105,  126,  129  et  seq.,  146  ei 
seq.,  155,  215,  218 

Washington,  General  George,  130, 
154 

Waynesboro,  Ga.,  32  et  seq. 

Waynesboro,  Tenn.,  18,  63  et  seq. 

Weldon,  N.  C.,  212 

West  Point,  Miss.,  64,  204 

Wheeler,  Major-General  Joseph, 
cavalry  corps  of,  11,  26,  28, 
30  et  seq.,  39  et  seq.;  concen 
trates  on  Carolina  shore,  57, 
133,  167,  169  et  seq.,  173,  187, 
•195 

Whitford,  Colonel  J.  N.,  brigade 
of,  156 

White,  Colonel  Samuel,  Sixteenth 
Kentucky,  79,  89  et  seq.,  135 

White,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frank, 
Saventeenth  Indiana,  207 

Whiting,  Major-General  W.  H.  C., 
1 40,  144  et  seq. 

Whittaker,  Brigadier-General  W. 
C.,  brigade  of,  77 

Williams,  Brevet  Major-Genera] 
A.  S.,  under  Slocum,  23,  27, 
31,  35,  52,  56,  183  et  seq.,  187, 
190  et  seq.,  197  et  seq. 

Williamson,  plantation  of,  Ga.,  44, 
50 

Wilmington,  N.  C.,  137,  147,  152; 
evacuation  of,  154  et  seq.,  181, 
183,  194,  211 

Wilson,  Brevet  Major-General 
James  H.  (cavalry  corps),  joins 
Schofield.  66  et  seq.,  72  et  seq. ; 
at  Franklin,  85,  87 ;  skirmish 
with  Forrest,  98  et  seq.,  103  et 
seq.,  107,  110,  114,  117,  119, 
122  et  seq.;  concentrates  at 


INDEX. 


265 


Eastport,  129  et  seq.,  199; 
cavalry  expedition  into  Ala 
bama,  203  et  seq. ;  enters  Sei- 
ma,  209  et  seq. 

Winegar,  Captain  Charles  E.,  bat 
tery  of,  56 

Winnsboro,  S.  C.,  177  et  seq., 
181 

Wisconsin,  regiments  of  :  Third, 
50  ;  Forty-third,  10  (note) 

Wright,  Colonel  W.  W.,  Chief 
Engineer,  155,  162,  211 

Wright,  Major-General  A.  R. 
(Lieutenant-Governor  of  Geor 
gia),  29,  50 

Wood,  Brigadier-General  Thomas 


J. ,  division  of,  70  el  seq.,  77, 
79;  at  Franklin,  85,  88,  98; 
at  Nashville,  102,  107  et  seq., 
112  et  seq.;  losses  of,  114,  117 
et  seq.;  pursues  Hood,  124  et 
seq.;  ordered  to  assemble  the 
Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville, 
129,  212 

Woods,  Brevet  Major- General  C. 
R.,  division  of,  17,  23,  27,  30 

Woods,  Brigadier-General  W.  B., 
brigade  of,  174 

Wytheville,  Va.,  200  et  seq. 

YOUNG,  Major  J.   M. ,  Fifth  Iowa 

Cavalry,  72 


UNIVERSITY 


MESSRS.  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

publish,  under  the  general  title  of 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR, 

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£. — The  OufbreaJc  of  Rebellion.  By  JOHN  G.  NICOLAY, 
Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late  Consul- 
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A  preliminary  volume,  describing  the   opening  of  the  war,  and   covering  tb? 
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JI.—From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth.  By  the  Hon.  M. 
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III. — The  Peninsula.  By  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,  LL.D., 
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The  history  of  McClellan's  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
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From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint 
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V.—The  Antiefam  and  Fredericksburg.  By  FRANCIS 
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From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  September,  i862,'to 
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Vl.—CJiancellorsville  and  Gettysburg.  By  ABNER 
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From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  battle. 

VII.—  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  By  HENRY  M. 
CIST,  Brevet  Brig.  Gen'l  U.S.V.  ;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  ot' 
Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterwards  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 
Thomas  ;  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
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From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  a« 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 


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JTAT. — Atlanta.  By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of 
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From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to  the  beginning  of 
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X.—The  March  to  the  Sea— Franklin  and  Nashville. 

By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XL— The  Shenandoah  Valley  in  18G4.  The  Cam 
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XII.—  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  64  and  >65.  T7ie 
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THE  NAVY  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  NAVY  in  the  Suppression  of  the  Rebellion  was 
certainly  not  less  remarkable  than  that  of  the  Army.  The  same  forces 
which  developed  from  our  volunteers  some  of  the  finest  bodies  of  soldiers  in 
military  history,  were  shown  quite  as  wonderfully  in  the  quick  growth — almost 
creation — of  a  Navy,  which  was  to  cope,  for  the  first  time,  with  the  problems  of 
modern  warfare.  The  facts  that  the  Civil  War  was  the  first  great  conflict  in 
which  steam  was  the  motive  power  of  ships  ;  that  it  was  marked  by  the  introduc 
tion  of  the  ironclad  ;  and  that  it  saw,  for  the  first  time,  the  attempt  to  blockade 
such  a  vast  length  of  hostile  coast — will  make  it  an  epoch  for  the  technical 
student  everywhere.  For  Americans,  whose  traditions  of  powers  at  sea  are 
among  their  strongest,  this  side  of  the  four  years  struggle  has  an  interest  fully 
equal  to  the  other— perhaps  even  with  the  added  element  of  romance  that  always 
belongs  to  sea  fighting. 

But  while  the  Army  has  been  fortunate  in  the  number  and  character  of  those 
who  have  contributed  to  its  written  history,  the  Navy  has  been  comparatively 
without  annalists.  During  a  recent  course  of  publications  on  the  military  opera 
tions  of  the  war,  the  publishers  were  in  constant  receipt  of  letters  pointing  out 
this  fact,  and  expressing  the  wish  that  a  complete  naval  history  of  the  four  years 
might  be  written  by  competent  hands.  This  testimony  was  hardly  needed  to 
suggest  the  want ;  but  it  was  a  strong  encouragement  to  ask  the  co-operation  of 
naval  officers  in  supplying  it.  An  effort  made  in  this  direction  resulted  in  the 
cordial  adoption  and  carying  out  of  plans  by  which  Messrs.  CHARLES  SCKIBNER'S 
SONS  are  enabled  to  publish  a  work  of  the  highest  authority  and  interest, 
covering  this  entire  field,  in  the  following  three  volumes,  giving  the  whole  narra 
tive  of  Naval  Operations  from  1861  to  1865. 

I.— The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers. 

By  Professor  J.  RUSSELL  SOLEY,  U.  S.  Navy. 

II.— The  Atlantic  Coast. 

By  Rear-Admiral  DANIEL  AMMEN,  U.  S.  Navy. 

III.— The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters. 

By  Commander  A.  T.  MAHAN,  U.  S.  Navy. 


The  Volumes  are  uniform  in  size  with  the  Series  of"  Cam 
paigns  of  the  Civil  War,"  and  contain  maps  and  diagrams 
prepared  under  the  direction  of  the  authors. 


Price  per  volume,  $1.OO. 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS,   PUBLISHERS, 
743  AND  745  BROADWAY,  NEW  YORK. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 
on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 


23Nov'6?R* 

' 

FEB    4l963 

NOV241980    b 

3 

I 

Ofifil  Sir 

LD  21A-50m-3,'62 
(C7097slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


U.  C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


'?         V      4 


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